# NEG K—Security

### FYI – The WPR Approach (Bacchi 16 ALT)

#### These are the 6 questions that the Bacchi ALT evidence is referring to – and the 7th step is that you also have to be AFF sometimes – I don’t think you need to literally ask them of the 1AC in CX, so long as you can credibly explain how each informed your research/preparation of the 1NC’s criticisms of the 1AC if asked

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What’s the Problem Represented to be? (WPR) approach to policy analysis

Question 1: What’s the problem (e.g., of “gender inequality”, “drug use/abuse”, “economic development”, “global warming”, “childhood obesity”, “irregular migration”, etc.) represented to be in a specific policy or policies?

Question 2: What deep-seated presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the “problem” (problem representation)?

Question 3: How has this representation of the “problem” come about?

Question 4: What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the “problem” be conceptualized differently?

Question 5: What effects (discursive, subjectification, lived) are produced by this representation of the “problem”?

Question 6: How and where has this representation of the “problem” been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been and/or how can it be disrupted and replaced?

Step 7: Apply this list of questions to your own problem representations.

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### The 1AC does NOT describe a knowable, causal reality of threats, interests and values, it projects those meanings onto perceived Others in identifying “the West” as the referent of their security cooperation – an epistemological commitment that enables self-authorization of nuclear and other violences

Schlag 17 Gabi Schlag, Teaching Associate and Research Fellow, Professorship International Security Policy and Conflict Research, Institute for International Politics, Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg, PhD Goethe University Frankfurt, “Re-constituting NATO: Foundational Narratives of Transatlantic Security Cooperation in the 1950s and 1990s,” Chapter 8, *Uses of 'the West': Security and the Politics of Order*, eds. Gunther Hellmann & Benjamin Herborth, Cambridge University Press, 2017, ISBN 978-1-107-16849-7, pp.156-178 /GoGreen! \*added [myopic]

One could imagine that the saying ‘There is life in an old dog yet’ fits quite well for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Many serious challenges threatened its cohesion, such as the Suez crisis in 1956, the disputes over the so-called double track-decision in 1979, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1993. While the history of the alliance has often been told as a history of crises (e.g. Stanley Hoffman, 1981), neither internal disputes over the war in Iraq nor the disappearance of a ‘communist threat’ have led to a break-up of NATO. The transatlantic alliance lives on. It has even expanded in size and tasks after the end of the Cold War. Recent tensions between ‘the West’ and Russia over Crimea and Ukraine make clear that the Atlantic alliance is anything but dead. As Stephen Walt put it: ‘NATO owes Putin a big thank-you’ (Walt, 2014).

In International Relations (IR), debates on the Atlantic alliance have witnessed ups and downs as well. While realist, liberal, and institutionalist scholars strove to explain the existence and persistence of NATO by referring either to an alliance against threat (Walt, 1990, 1997), an alliance of democracies (Risse-Kappen, 1995, Risse, 1996), or a security manager (Wallander, 2000), other approaches have advocated a more critical and reflective understanding of the discourses and practices which constitute(d) the alliance in the first place (Klein, 1990; Bially Mattern, 2005; Behnke, 2013; Hellmann, 2006; Jackson 2003; Neumann and Williams, 2000; Pouliot, 2010; Adler, 2008). NATO’s lasting ability to overcome internal and external challenges to its cohesion, I will argue, directs our attention exactly to the discursive practices which enabled a continuous reconstitution of a Western security community. By re-constitution I refer to the Janus-faced process of activating and transforming foundational narratives which justify the existence and continuity of NATO. This process commonly includes constructions of threats and a sense of a shared identity which are both ingrained in symbolic orders and mobilized by articulations of a common security strategy. Of further interest, therefore, is how the allies answered the question why NATO should exist, how they invented and used a common notion of identity, interests, and threats in order to justify a deep and lasting pattern of military cooperation between North America and (Western) European states. Such a critical constructivist approach directs our attention to the political dynamics whereby a Western security community is invented in the first place instead of already presuming it as taken for granted (cf. Tilly, 1998, Bartelson, 2009, Herborth, 2009). It emphasizes that the practical usage of meaning imbues an act of political power with quite tremendous institutional consequences. Invented as a geopolitical community of solidarity in the early 1950s with a clear distinction of friends and enemies, NATO symbolized more than a classical military alliance. Compared to the ‘pledge’ of collective defense in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 4 emphasized that the allies ‘will consult together whenever . . . the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened’. Exactly this invocation of a political community made NATO’s evolution possible and enabled a smooth reorientation towards out-of-area missions and Eastern enlargement in the 1990s.

This chapter continues with a brief conceptual discussion of the relationship between identity and security by focusing on critical constructivist approaches in IR. In the second section I turn to NATO’s strategic discourse in the late 1940s/early 1950s and the 1990s. In these two periods, the Atlantic alliance seemed to be tenuous, but its (continued) existence could be restored by the declaration of a common strategic concept. In conclusion I show how these discursive foundations of a transatlantic alliance relate to the overall theme of this volume, the (re-)constitution of ‘the West’.

1 Foundational Narratives: Securing a Western Community

In the last twenty years, a turn to discourses and practices has altered the field of security studies in many ways (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). While security studies were traditionally dominated by paradigmatic approaches many scholars have problematized such a rigid fixation on grand theories and a positivist epistemology. In particular the liberal accounts on NATO’s taken-for-granted identity and its normative attractiveness as a democratic alliance, as well as realist and institutionalist explanations of NATO’s likely or unlikely continuity (Risse-Kappen, 1995, 1996; Wallander 2000, Waltz, 1990), were targeted as expressions of a rationalist fixation on causation and macro-structural phenomena (Hellmann, 2006; Sjursen, 2004; Jackson, 2003). Identities, interests, and threats, however, neither signify distinct causes and effects nor do they describe static objects one could easily ‘observe’; they are constructed inter-subjectively and they are only meaningful in the sense that people make use of references to ‘identities’, ‘interests’, and ‘threats’ in specific ways (Weldes et al., 1998, p. 13; Wæver 1995, p. 55; Jackson, 2006, chapter 2; Bially Mattern, 2005, p. 92). For critical constructivists, therefore, all our knowledge about social facts is dependent on communicative processes where people produce meaning and knowledge through the practical usage of language (Guzzini, 2005, p. 498).

Critical constructivist and poststructuralist approaches are interested, in particular, in understanding these discursive practices – i.e. how people make sense of their worlds, how they create and mobilize a common identity or threat assessment and how such references unfold institutional consequences. While some critics have argued that constructivists might underestimate material conditions of power, a critical approach takes power quite seriously (Guzzini, 2005; Bially Mattern, 2006; Barnett and Duvall, 2000). Despite a material fixation on capabilities, the concept of power in critical constructivism indicates ‘the realm of political action and its justification’ (Guzzini, 2005, p. 508), including the institutional consequences made possible by these acts. Power, then, is part of distinct discourses understood as symbolic orders which constrain and enable what can be meaningfully said (Doty, 1996, p. 6; Hansen, 2006, p. 19). While discourse approaches pose the most forceful challenge to more traditional approaches in security studies, scholars occasionally overemphasize the macro-structural level of symbolic orders in general and the disciplinary power of discourses in particular. However, it is always the practical invocation, mobilization, and transformation of structures of signification whereby people make sense of their world and justify why they act the way they do (cf. Jackson, 2006, p. 15; Tilly, 2006; Boltanski and Thevenot, 2006). An assumed ‘shared’ identity between North America and Europe, composed of historical, social, and normative patterns of interaction, is nothing but the actualization of a common discourse where ‘the West’ figures as a powerful yet notoriously vague signifier.

Bearing these arguments of critical constructivist approaches in mind, it is of central interest, then, how NATO is ‘able to mobilize its longstanding identity as the expression and military guarantor of Western civilization’ closely connected to the democratic and capitalist bonds among its member countries (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 361; italics added). It goes without saying that a common threat perception during the heydays of the Cold War has tightened these bonds. However, it does not explain how Western security cooperation was made possible in the first place and why it lasted for over 60 years, including the phase of detente ´ in the 1970s. Hence, the key shortcoming of realist, liberal, and institutionalist approaches to NATO is that they take the actor’s articulations of threats and interests at face value, while a critical approach directs our attention to how actors invoke threats, interest, and identities and to what kind of institutional consequences are made possible by these acts (Klein, 1990, p. 315, p. 317; Jackson, 2003, p. 224).

Such a perspective on the usage of concepts and their meaning is interested in the ways and forms of inscribing plots, characters, relations, and motives for action. As Trine Flockhart (2012, p. 80) writes, ‘[n]arratives describe the history, purpose and achievements of a collective entity such as NATO, and they contribute in the process towards its unity and facilitate its continuous transformation’. These I will call foundational narratives. Foundational refers to two related aspects characteristic of most political narratives: first, it directs our attention to the justifications why something exists. In NATO’s case this refers to the justifications mobilized by the allies in order to found and keep an ‘alliance’, i.e. to construct meaningful stories about what ‘NATO’ is and how its past, present, and future are to be described. Foundational narratives are answers to ‘why’- questions – questions such as ‘why do we still need NATO?’. Second, the term ‘foundational’ emphasizes the taken-for-grantedness of these narratives. Narratives are foundational when they restore unity in the light of (more or less) serious ‘identity crises’ where constructions of common representations appear as problematic. References to a ‘global war on terrorism’, for example, where military intervention and preemption is articulated as necessary, altered the organizational design of NATO in many ways. Within these discursive patterns the continuing relevance of a transatlantic alliance was never really questioned, irrespective of whether NATO was defined as a system of collective defense or a forum for political consultation. Understood in this way, foundational narratives are powerful and consequential in the sense that they enable and constrain the re-constitution of political subjects.

Foundational narratives come in different forms. In this chapter I argue that they materialize in NATO’s strategic documents where the allies agree on a highly symbolic assurance of their mutual trust and shared identity. They frequently invoke a common purpose, mobilize a shared threat assessment, and rearticulate a collective defense assurance as laid down in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Official strategic concepts during the Cold War included M.C. 3 (1949), M.C. 14/2 known as ‘massive retaliation’ (1957), and M.C. 14/3 known as ‘flexible response’ (1968) and were accompanied by more detailed strategic guidance and planning documents. In the 1990s, NATO’s strategic concept became an issue of public declaration, symbolized by the Alliance’s ‘New Strategic Concept’ (1991) and its follow-up documents in 1999 – NATO’s fiftieth birthday – and 2010. All strategic concepts reflected changing security perceptions and restored the unity of the alliance by codifying onestrategy. In the late 1940s/early 1950s, the foundations for a transatlantic alliance were laid down in the North Atlantic Treaty and the following strategic concepts and guidance. Forty years later, the dissolution of the Soviet Union made a public revision of NATO’s strategy necessary in order to re-orient the alliance after the ‘end of the Cold War’ had been declared. Although many commentators doubted that NATO would survive this period of transformation, the alliance counts twenty-eight members today and seems to be ‘very much in business’, as former General Secretary Manfred Worner once stated.1

2 The Formation of the Transatlantic Alliance and the Beginning of the Cold War

When tensions between the Western powers and the Soviet Union intensified after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the formalization of a transatlantic alliance was perceived as an obligation to counter and deter an apparent Eastern threat.2 The purpose of the alliance, NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay has often been cited as saying, was ‘to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down’. While France and Britain, the driving forces behind the initiative to form a military alliance, strongly called for a lasting presence of the US in European affairs, the Truman administration, supported by isolationist sentiments in Congress, had more reservations about pursuing such a project (Kaplan, 1999, pp. 7–28; Osgood, 1962).3 Most controversial was the issue of military assistance. While the US government preferred a nonbinding and declaratory formulation, French diplomat Armand Berard ´ and British diplomat Sir Frederic Hoyer-Millar, both delegates to the so called exploratory talks, insisted on a reliable and forceful assurance of US military assistance (Kaplan, 1999, p. 16–17). When the Truman government drafted a compromise formula, US objections to a formalized alliance were overcome. In a memo to President Truman in 1948, his advisor Clark Clifford remarked that the preamble of a transatlantic declaration should make clear that ‘the main object of the instrument would be to preserve western civilization in the geographical area covered by the agreement’.4

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949 by ten Western European states, the US, and Canada, outlined the principles of the new alliance – consultation (Article 4) and collective defense (Article 5) – and called for the development of an organizational structure (Article 9). The preamble of the treaty states:

The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. (North Atlantic Treaty, 1949; italics added)

The contractual language (‘parties’, ‘Treaty’) of the preamble postulated a community based on shared principles as laid out in the Charter of the United Nations and closely linked to democracy, liberty, and the rule of law. In the late 1940s such an equivalence between these principles and the North Atlantic area is not surprising given the overall perception of a clash between antagonistic identity constructions, a ‘free world’ on the one side and ‘communism’ on the other side. However, the preamble included a puzzling formulation: it assumes that a community of likemined states is already in existence due to the act of ‘re-affirming’ a common faith expressed in another legal document, the Charter of the United Nations, as well as ‘re-affirming’ a shared desire to live in peace. Such a community is then explicated by referring to freedom, common heritage, and civilization as well as principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. All these signifiers have, for some time, commonly been associated with ‘the West’. Here NATO materializes as an actualization of an already existing community, not as a newly created military alliance. Hence, NATO was justified as the means to promote stability and well-being between the contracting parties instead of a goal in itself.

While many commentators would presume that NATO is the institutional core of what we commonly call ‘the West’, the term itself is surprisingly absent in the North Atlantic Treaty and the following strategic concepts. The central subject of every strategic document during the Cold War is the ‘North Atlantic treaty area’, specified as the defense of ‘America and Europe’ (North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5). The name to be given to the institutionalized security cooperation between the US and their Western European allies was of central concern for both sides. While the foreign ministers of France and Britain, Bidault and Bevin, preferred a ‘European’ title for the treaty, US delegates refused such a narrowly defined subject. The ‘‘North Atlantic’, which developed as a compromise, symbolized a geographic and political bond which connected the US, Europe, and some geostrategically important members such as Portugal and Iceland (Kaplan, 2004, p. 30). The insistence of the Truman administration on integrating Canada, Portugal (Azores Islands), and Iceland also pleased those isolationists in the US Congress who rejected NATO as a ‘European’ alliance (Kaplan, 2004, p. 33p). The goal of containing communism made it even possible to include an autocratic member such as Portugal, which hardly counted as a reliable candidate for ‘safeguarding the freedom of their people’, as one of the preamble states.

Invoking the alliance primarily as a loosely defined geopolitical entity signaled a willingness to distance oneself from the specific political circumstances in 1948/49. It united the geographic and political project of a ‘Western’ alliance between North America and (Western) Europe. While the term ‘area’ evoked associations of space and territory, the boundaries of this entity remained rather vague due to the geographical fuzziness of the ‘North Atlantic’ (Franke, 2010).5 How the notion of a ‘North Atlantic area’ is used within NATO’s strategic concepts, nevertheless, illustrates a crucial point. By reading NATO’s strategic concepts, one gets the impression that such an ‘area’ – however materially and ideationally unbounded it may remain – is not defended against a specific, identifiable threat but is constructed as a political space with various social and cultural relations worthy of being secured in a broad sense. The treaty title and preamble do not primarily mobilize a military purpose but a notion of geopolitical unity and durability to be taken for granted.

Despite the imagination of an already existing and geopolitically bounded community, NATO is generally described as a system of collective defense. For most Western European states, Article 5 formalized the (military) assistance of its transatlantic partner and the economic support of the US government to rebuild Western Europe as well as to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Military assistance, though, was not inscribed as a necessity; rather it was invoked with a strong notion of solidarity:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty, 1949; italics added)

Article 5 was perceived as a ‘pledge’ made by the US to defend their Western European allies who were alarmed by the superior number of Soviet conventional forces.6 Framing this pledge in terms of a mutual assurance of assistance implied a strong symbol of solidarity. The compromise formula that active assistance would not be an automatic demand pleased all sides due to the different interpretations it made possible. For the US Congress, the strongest opponent of the ‘entanglement’ of the US with a European alliance, it expressed the freedom of choice isolationists insisted on. For Western European states, Article 5 confirmed the solidarity and military assistance of US conventional and in particular nuclear forces if such assistance would become necessary.

Article 5 is mostly seen as the source of collective defense. Its consequences, though, were ambivalent: on the one hand, it expressed the defensive purpose of the alliance (‘restore’); on the other hand, it made possible a policy of planning, preparation, and precaution in order to ‘maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’ (emphasis added). In relation to the geopolitical imagination of a community, regional defense planning was one central institutional consequence which constituted NATO as a military as well as political enterprise. Although Article 5 is mostly seen as the ‘heart’ of NATO, it was only in combination with Article 4 (consultation) and Article 9 (Council) that an integrated military command structure, the standardization and modernization of forces, and even a common nuclear policy developed so quickly. Through the invocation of this geopolitical community of solidarity, NATO transformed into a military organization and assured the presence of US forces in Europe.

During the formative years of the alliance this foundational narrative of a geopolitical community of solidarity was consolidated in the strategic concepts and guidance via a clear distinction between the ‘Western allies’ on the one hand and the ‘Soviet Union’ with its satellites on the other. NATO’s first strategic concept – at least the first document entitled ‘strategic concept’ available in the archives – was drafted in October 1949 and intended to ‘ensure unity of thought and purpose’ as stated on the cover page (M.C. 3; Wheeler, 2001, p. 123; Pedlow, 1997).7 The kind of community imagined by the signatories put strong emphasis on unity understood in a broad sense. As a highly confidential and mandatory text, the strategic concept authorized the national executives and the intergovernmental committees of NATO to take any measure in order to provide for the defense of the North Atlantic area. The integration of ‘political, economic, and psychological as well as purely military means’ was articulated as a central requirement for efficient defense. Deterrence and, if necessary, collective defense were set up as a core strategy of prevention and preparation. Hence, the insignia of the Allied Command Europe reads ‘vigilance is the price of liberty’.

Key to the implementation of the defense concept was to ‘[i]nsure the ability to deliver the atomic bomb promptly’ as the primary responsibility of the US government and the strategy of ‘forward defense’. The main purpose of NATO was to effectively coordinate and integrate collective defense planning in order to ‘unite the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty nations’. This policy included the standardization of military doctrines, combined training exercises, exchange of intelligence information, and ‘cooperation in the construction, maintenance and operation of military installations of mutual concern’. M.C. 3, however, invoked neither a strong concept of ‘the West’ nor a clear description of an ‘Eastern threat’. It referred to ‘the enemy’ only as an abstract source of insecurity and uncertainty

The strategic concept and every subsequent revision of it are accompanied by guidelines for strategic planning. The first official strategic guidance in 1950, M.C. 14, emphasized ‘the necessity for developing methods to compensate for numerical inferiority’ compared to Soviet (conventional) forces.8 Entitled as a ‘directive’, regional planning groups, NATO’s core institutional structure in the 1950s, were authorized to develop ‘detailed regional defense plans which . . . will ensure the unity of defense of the North Atlantic Treaty nations’. Until 1 July 1954 NATO member states were instructed to implement a medium term defense plan ‘for building up the overall military capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty nations’. NATO allies should be prepared for ‘war’ with the Soviet Union, which had ‘maintained, if not increased, her technical, military and economic capabilities’. Anticipating a potential war with the Soviet Union, NATO’s military planning was justified as an act of defense which was based on several ‘assumptions’ about Soviet intentions, for example ‘[t]hat the USSR will initiate air attacks on the North Atlantic Treaty nations in Europe and the Western Hemisphere’ (italics added). The Soviet Union was invoked as an expansionist and aggressive adversary with stronger and larger conventional forces than those of the Western allies. Therefore, a common nuclear policy was justified as the primary mean to prevent war. It symbolically marked the beginning of the Cold War when assessments of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ alignment invented a global conflict with mainly two competing ideological camps.

NATO’s defense policy, as stated in M.C. 14, was based on a distinction between peace-time and war-time as two operational modes of security:

In peacetime the objectives of the defense policy of the North Atlantic Treaty powers are to convince the USSR that war does not pay, and, should war occur, to insure a successful defense of the North Atlantic area. This policy requires the development of adequate military strength and a close coordination of the political, economic and psychological efforts of member nations. (M.C. 14, 1950; italics added)

Effective deterrence and collective defense ‘required’ military modernization and political coordination. Hence, as a geopolitical community of solidarity, NATO was re-constituted as a military and political enterprise, including economic and psychological efforts. It re-affirmed a sense of ‘Western we-ness’ which reached far beyond the specific historical circumstances of responding to a Soviet threat and developed a comprehensive approach to security. Deterrence and precaution were only two sides of the same coin, namely securing ‘the West’.

The continuing debates between the NATO allies in the early 1950s centered on questions of effective defense planning, deterrence, and nuclear policy. A ‘Report by the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO military strength for the next few years’ in 1954 (M.C. 48) explicated the concept of ‘massive retaliation’ including a ‘forward defense’ of Europe on West German territory (Kaplan, 2004, p. 63f., 80f.; Kugler, 1993, p. 101). It formalized the ‘New Look policy’ of US president Eisenhower, the former SACEUR, in order to guarantee an economically efficient deterrence (Trachtenberg, 1992). US nuclear air capacities were the cornerstone of ‘massive retaliation’, NATO’s strategic concept until 1968. The nuclearization of the alliance gave the European member states a strong voice in the development of a common nuclear strategy and shifted the ‘balance of power within NATO’ in the 1960s from the USA to European member states (Tuschhoff, 1999, p. 159). Self/other depictions culminated in a stylized presentation of a monolithic Soviet system on the one hand and a democratic alliance on the other hand:

The Soviet political system, with its power of immediate decision and its advantage of strict security, as compared with the free and democratic system of the NATO type which must obtain decisions through group action, provides an initial advantage of great importance in achieving surprise. (M.C. 48, 1954; italics added)

While the Soviet Union held the advantage of surprise, Western allies were convinced that they had only one choice: nuclear planning. The prevention of war, in particular the ‘overrun of Europe’ by Soviet conventional forces, legitimized effective deterrence based on a numerical and qualitative superiority in nuclear capacities which had to be integrated in the so-called forces in being, i.e. forces being held in a state of readiness. The enclosure, the most confidential part of M.C. 48, listed those measures ‘necessary to increase the deterrent and defensive value of NATO forces’: integrated atomic capabilities, early warning and alert systems, a German contribution to ‘forces in being’, and measures to ensure the survival of NATO forces after a Soviet first strike. NATO’s forward defense strategy, including the Rhine-Ijssel line, made a military contribution of Germany even more necessary and provided an early justification for a German membership (cf. Jackson 2006).

In the next 35 years, NATO had to weather turbulent times of ups and downs: the Suez crisis in 1956, the withdrawal of France from the integrated military command structure in 1966, the invocation of flexible response as the new strategic concept in 1968, the policy of detente in the 1970s, NATO’s controversial double-track decision in 1979, and the changing political constellations in the Soviet Union beginning with Gorbachev’s reform policies in the mid-1980s. The list of crises and renewed routines, however, is much longer and certainly one reason why research on NATO, its histories and policies, characterized security studies for many decades. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a re-orientation of the alliance seemed to be necessary, even inevitable in order to explicate why NATO should continue to exist.

3 The Re-orientation of the Alliance after the Cold War

With the announcement of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, Soviet ‘new thinking’ of transparency (glasnost) and domestic reform (perestroika) tremendously changed the established discursive patterns of self/other relations and threat constructions. The London Declaration, following the NATO summit in July 1990, symbolically proclaimed the end of the Cold War, and the allies invited the members of the Warsaw Pact to declare that ‘we are no longer adversaries’.9 With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the early 1990s, most commentators expected that NATO’s strategy of flexible response, forward defense, and nuclear first strike capabilities had lost its validity as well, even that the alliance would suffer the same fate of disappearance (Waltz, 1990, 1993; Snyder, 1990; Mearsheimer, 1990). Nevertheless, there seemed to be a strong consensus between the member states that NATO should persist. For the allies, NATO still played a significant internal and external role: externally, in preventing, containing, and controlling instabilities and militarized conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe, including the neutralization of a renewed Russian threat (Duffield, 1994, p. 767–70; see also Pouliot, 2010); internally, in providing an institutional mechanism to overcome the classical security dilemma by practices of reassurance, transparency, and de-nationalization of forces (Duffield, 1994, p. 772–775; see also Adler, 2008).10

While neorealists predicted a slow but inevitable decline of the transatlantic alliance, a variety of institutionalist approaches explained the looming continuity of the Atlantic alliance through institutional adaption and its inherent political function (Wallander, 2000, p. 717; Haftendorn, 1996; Duffield, 1994). New ‘partnership programs’ evolved that were intended to ‘persuade the partners that learning the practices of a community of the like-minded and coming to share an identity with its members will make them part of this community’ (Adler, 2008, p. 207; see also Gheciu, 2005). Bearing these multiple assets and cooperative security practices of NATO in mind, new strategic concepts and military directives developed hand in hand with the declaration of new challenges and missions in the 1990s. While previous strategic concepts had been highly confidential and drafted by military experts within the alliance, the alliance’s concepts in 1991, 1999, and 2010 were unclassified and – in the case of the last concept in 2010 – the work of an appointed political expert group.11 Today, NATO’s strategic concept represents a new kind of public diplomacy which is primarily directed at national publics in order to explain why NATO should continue to exist, expand, and intervene in conflicts far beyond the ‘transatlantic area’.

In 1991, shortly after the proclaimed end of the Cold War, the new strategic concept was an expression of an unexpected crisis caused by the rapid transformations in Europe (Kay, 1998, p. 61). The first years of the 1990s were mainly experienced as a period of uncertainty regarding the future direction of security relations between ‘the East’ and ‘the West’. Already the title of the new strategic concept introduced the subject as a well-known entity, i.e. ‘The Alliance’s new strategic concept’. The term ‘Alliance’, written in capital letters, re-confirmed the positive connotations of the World War II alliance against Hitler Germany and liberated Western security community from the geographical notion of the ‘Transatlantic’. Nevertheless, it coevally reactivated the geopolitical connotation of former times by focusing primarily on Europe’s territorial and political transformation in the East.

One central question the new strategic concept was intended to answer was what aim the Atlantic alliance could serve in a world where a territorial threat had ceased to exist for the better part. Turning away from the depiction of a communist Soviet aggression of territorial expansion, Europe’s transformation was presented as the main referent object of security, including a ‘vision of Europe whole and free’ (SC 1991). Clear distinctions of military and ideological alignment as articulated in the early 1950s had disappeared; new but still uncertain formations of political unity were developing. The strategic concept therefore distinguished between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the ‘USSR’s former satellites’ which ‘have fully recovered their sovereignty’ (SC 1991) on the other hand. Because of political changes in ‘the East’, there were also ‘significant changes’ in ‘the West’: German unification and the development of a European security identity in the context of the European Community. The document, however, articulated ‘the West’, now explicitly named, as an expanding project which already expected to incorporate CEE:

All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in varying degrees, embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy. The political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overcome. (SC 1991, italics added)

The invention of CEE symbolically bridged the dissolution of the Eastern bloc and opened a range of new political, diplomatic, but also military relations for the Western allies with the former members of the Warsaw Pact. NATO policies of dialogue and cooperation were created as instruments of incorporation closely associated with notions such as democracy, human rights, and market economy. Neumann (2001) argues that the invention of the category CEE and how it was used by both sides was quite important in order to open up the road for NATO’s as well as EU’s eastern enlargement (see also Behnke, 2013; Schimmelfennig, 2003). Such a split of the ‘Eastern bloc’ made it possible to conceive of the CEE as being liberated from communist rule and returning to a democratic and free Europe where the Cold War period and their association with Russia seemed to be just a transitory coincidence. A geopolitical narrative was once again mobilized in order to integrate Europe, ‘whole and free’, into the Transatlantic community of solidarity.

The perception of a vanishing Eastern threat and the invention of the CEE, however, also pushed for a revision of NATO’s flexible response strategy, including a justification of why NATO should persist at a time when a major war was becoming ever more unlikely. The document continues:

In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. (SC 1991)

Such a diffuse presentation of ‘risks’ which are ‘multi-faceted’ and ‘multidirectional’ emphasized NATO’s planning capabilities and a renewed concept of precaution. In many ways, the focus on non-military challenges ‘dislodged the distinction between the possible and the probable’ (Williams, 2009, p. 1). While some scholars argue that ‘[r]isk is becoming the operative concept of Western security’ since the 1990s (Rasmussen 2001, p. 285), it was only before the background of NATO’s existing planning capacities that such an invocation of risks could be worked on. Already in the 1950s, the allies laid the foundation for an institutional structure which was dominated by practices of military and strategic planning and the management of different scenarios of attack and defense. The allies planned in detail for a prospective war in Europe if prevention would fail. This renewed and now more explicit emphasis on risks and precaution highlighted the relevance of Article 4:

Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks. (SC, 1991; italics added)

Internally, Article 5 guaranteed alliance solidarity and the indivisibility of transatlantic security; externally, such an assurance of military support was intended to deter a Soviet attack, e.g. ‘convincing the USSR that war does not pay’. With the proclamation of an end of the Cold War, the external function of Article 5 had to be re-interpreted due to the invocation of new non-territorial risks and challenges. In a world where classical inter-state wars and conflicts were vanishing, deterrence was increasingly perceived as an anachronistic strategy of the old times. ‘However’, as the new strategic concept explicitly cautioned, dangers had not disappeared but turned into more diffuse risks. The invocation of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risks’ thus strengthened Article 4 as a mechanism of political consultation and initiated NATO’s transformation towards enhanced practices of security management.

Bearing this discursive shift from Article 5 to Article 4 in mind, out-of-area missions were the most explicit expression of institutional consequences, including new consultation and cooperation practices. The rationale for non-article 5 and out-of-area missions, though, was already inscribed in the 1950s when the strategic concept outlined that ‘[i]n order to preserve peace and security in the NATO area, it is essential that, without disregarding the security of the NATO area, hostile Soviet influence in non-NATO regions is countered’ (M.C. 14/2, 1957).12 NATO’s active military engagement began when the Allied Mobile Force (AMF), a small multinational force which was founded in 1960, was deployed in the southeast of Turkey during the Gulf War in 1991. The violent fragmentation of Yugoslavia in the following years was perceived as a test case for providing regional stability and security. Hence, the ‘Partnership for Peace’ program initially originated as a ‘Partnership for Peacekeeping’ (Wallander, 2000, p. 721). With the air strikes against Serbia in 1999 and even more explicitly in reaction to the attacks on 9/11, NATO’s self-image as a defender of human rights manifested its confirmed self-image as an ‘alliance of democracies’.13

The new emphasis on ‘political means’, as stated in the strategic concept in 1991, already relied on a wide conception of security, including ‘dialogue’, ‘cooperation’, and ‘collective defense’ for the purpose of ‘protecting peace in a new Europe’. While the allies distinguished between peacetime and wartime in the 1950s, a third operational mode of security was now added: crisis. Peace should be ‘protected’, war should be ‘prevented’, and in the event of crisis NATO forces should ‘contribute to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution’. Combined with the invocation of new uncertainties and risks, the notion of crisis helped to justify the development of rapid reaction forces and multinational forces in order to prevent (or at least contain) a crisis.

Compared to this new emphasis on NATO’s ability of crisis management, the fear of war still loomed in the back of any risks assessment. In the light of uncertainties – crisis, risks, and war – the alliance had to be prepared for anything. Nuclear forces, therefore, continued to play a significant strategic and political role:

The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. . . Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. (SC 1991, italics added)

Strategically, nuclear forces signaled a posture of deterrence; politically, they ensured the cohesion and unity of the allies despite the material inequalities between the US and their European allies. US nuclear forces stationed in Europe symbolized a strong political bond of solidarity. While dialogue and cooperation in uncertain times were now the buzzwords of a ‘new world order’, this uncertainty about the future also provoked a sense of insecurity and an urge to be prepared for the worst. The continued stationing of nuclear forces in Europe and the development of multinational as well as rapid reaction forces were a response to this uncertainty. NATO’s central message boiled down to: ‘we are prepared’. This confidence in the continued relevance of the alliance was newly inscribed in its foundational narrative of a geopolitical community of solidarity which now expanded geographically to the East and was functionally expanded into a political community according to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.

This re-constitution of NATO continued through the strategic concepts of 1999 and 2010, solidifying these discursive shifts in several ways. Most explicit is a strengthening of Article 4 and the political power of the alliance, the global perspective on NATO’s mission, and the functional re-organization of the military command structure. While NATO’s foundational narrative of a geopolitical community of solidarity had initially enabled a regionally organized military command structure (regional planning groups, then SACEUR and SACLANT) as well as the deployment of US nuclear forces in Europe, the appearance of new risks and uncertainties beyond the realm of territorial defense in the 1990s enabled a functional transformation: SACEUR became Allied Command for Operations (ACO) and SACLANT became Allied Command Transformation (ACT). While the old military structure symbolised the trans-Atlantic bond – Supreme Allied Command Europe and Supreme Allied Command Atlantic – the new division between operations and transformations dissolved such a narrow geographical representation. In this sense NATO re-constituted itself as a Western global alliance, ‘Western’ in its identity and global in its mission.

4 Conclusion

Debates over the future of NATO easily transform into debates about whether ‘Western civilization’ and ‘the West’ as a whole might be in decline or whether they are the winner of the Cold War’s ideological battles (cf. Huntington, 1993; Fukuyama, 1989). Compared to NATO, however, a Western security community seems to be quite prosperous despite continuing conflicts between NATO members (Cox, 2005; Pouliot, 2006). In this chapter I have tried to show that a transatlantic alliance was (re-)constituted via the mobilization and re-articulation of foundational narratives by the allies in order to justify the existence, continuity, and transformation of NATO. Foundational narratives, then, direct our attention exactly to the politics of security and identity where political subjects are formed in the first place and help to understand how security communities are constituted instead of postulating that they are already existing (Adler and Barnett 1998, p. 3; contrary: Deutsch et al., 1969).

In conclusion, I want to highlight how NATO’s re-constitution relates to the overall theme of this volume, ‘the West’. It is not surprising that NATO allies often referred to ‘democracy’, ‘individual liberty’, or ‘the rule of law’ in order to justify NATO as a geo-political community of solidarity with defensive and peaceful intentions. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union was repeatedly accused of modernizing its military capacities, harboring expansionist intentions, and being an aggressive opponent in an ideological struggle between ‘freedom’ and ‘communism’. This rather plain self/other construction, however, was quickly modified in the early 1990s by declaring an ‘end of the Cold War’, invoking the CEE as a distinct political subject, and by focusing on new risks and challenges different from the past focus on territorial defense. Moreover, NATO had ‘gone global’ in order to ‘bring stability to other parts of the world’ (Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006, p. 105; Brzezinski, 2009).

While this global NATO is depicted as a result of changing security politics, in particular as a consequence of a globalized terrorist threat, it is short-sighted [myopic] to argue that these transformations are merely a reaction to external pressures. Grand narratives about a ‘Cold War’ and a ‘War on Terrorism’ are as much produced by a transatlantic security discourse intended to make sense of the world as they serve to justify political decisions. It is a moot question whether the global projection of power by ‘the West’ caused violent opposition around the globe or whether ‘new wars’ and terror networks such as Al Qaida caused a transformation of NATO. It is puzzling, though, that NATO has managed to secure its survival and to transform. I have argued that the creation and repetition of foundational narratives – in particular the invention of a geopolitical community of solidarity and a political community according to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty – made such a two-sided re-constitution of continuity and transformation possible. This also implies that NATO will persist and at once change as long as the allies carry on re-articulating this foundational narrative.

Such a foundational narrative serves its integrating function only against the background of ‘the West’ as a shared yet unspecified signifier, which is implicitly represented as a threatened referent object of security. ‘Europe’, the ‘transatlantic area’, respectively ‘the West’ are the endangered subjects of NATO’s strategic discourse justifying a durable and institutionally dense military cooperation of its member states and a nuclearization of its defense strategy. Whenever allies pursued (national) security policies without consultation, conflicts and crisis within the alliance were foreseeable. It was only through NATO that ‘the West’ could utilize its power position through a specific form of self-authorization. NATO, respectively Western states, presented ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, the ‘rule of law’, and ‘market economy’ as normatively unquestioned principles they had already realized. Others had only one choice: to comply or to resist. The normative attractiveness of ‘the West’, thus, also implies the temptations of self-authorizing and securitizing practices where a culture of legal formalism is marginalized (Wæver, 1995; Koskenniemi, 2001). Yet ‘Others’ might only be known as defectors to a Western project of modernization and democracy.

After two decades of academic and political debate about NATO’s growing irrelevance and likely or unlikely dissolution, the military escalation on the Crimean peninsula and in Eastern Ukraine has definitely revived the alliance. Some commentators even predict the dawn of a new Cold War based on well-known patterns of enmity between ‘the West’ and ‘the East’. This is not the place to reflect on the current political situation and its impact on NATO’s future. Given its history, however, NATO General Secretary Stoltenberg’s recent remark should be taken seriously that ‘one of our greatest strengths is our ability to adapt’.

#### Failure to challenge representations of threats to “the West” as existential hinders resistance to biopolitical justifications for global policing and endless war

da Mota 18 Sarah da Mota, guest lecturer, International Relations, University of Coimbra, PhD International Relations, University of Coimbra, “Conclusion,” Chapter 10, *NATO, Civilisation and Individuals: The Unconscious Dimension of International Security*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, ISBN 978-3-319-74409-4, pp.231-237 /GoGreen!

Thinking of NATO in terms of survival has mostly meant to reflect on the Alliance’s capacity to adapt to change. It is undeniable, the Alliance has proved to be adapting continuously; not only has it managed to transform itself in face of structural change, as it has also transformed the contexts in which it operates, and led the way to normative evolutions in the field of international security as a self-proclaimed agent of change. Simultaneously, NATO has also managed to keep some things timeless and unchanged, through recurrent and persisting narratives displaying the different shades of its civilisational purpose. In line with a logic of linear progress and constant improvement, the Alliance has remained aware of temporality, which it represents in very open and symbolic terms. In this sense, NATO belongs to, and feeds itself upon, the very narratives on Modernity that Critical Theory seeks to deconstruct. NATO is thus a historical and ideological product of Modernity.

But survival is also the matter of people. Amidst the permanence of change, as events and social phenomena emerge, evolve, or disappear, the importance of living, sentient, organisms cannot be dismissed, hence the need to individualise the very approach of civilisation in relation to security. By conceptualising the Civilised Subject of Security, it becomes possible to cope with the complex relations connecting the individuals’ sense of identity, their perception of security, and broader social processes associated with the idea of civilisation. With the Civilised Subject of Security, different connections are established and converge: social cognition, sociological processes, behavioural transformations, power relations, symbolic representations, and psychological needs. All together, these connections help picturing how the Civilised Subject of Security has been in the West across time: a self-restrained individual who looks up to the state in search for the symbolic representations necessary to his feeling of security. Throughout the last five centuries, civilised subjects of the West have grown on the sense of certainty and naturalness those symbolic connections unconsciously provide them. As they cumulated this assurance within their collective learning process, they cumulated symbolic power, and were able to impose upon and dominate non-Western Otherness with the actual belief that behavioural and social norms from the West could only be beneficial. The West built upon that belief and that symbolic capital to assemble the preliminary system of international security that basically ensured that Westerners would be secure outside the West, which included the liberty to believe and behave as they did in the West. All of this also contributed to the cumulated security experience of the West through time, so it has come to be comprised in the civilised habitus of Westerners, as part of their unconscious history. What the existence of the unconscious structures of human mind suggest in this book is that the perceptions and representations of security are not the fruit of a conscious or voluntary choice of practices and meanings by the subjects, but rather the result of domination, disciplining and exclusionary practices, long-term processes of inculcation, and symbolic suggestions. That, in addition to the process of civilisation from the West, suggests that the security of some cannot be the security of all.

The defence of Western civilisation had a central role in NATO’s original formulation of its referent object of security. In line with the general claim of this book that the civilisation of the West is not a natural, spontaneous or innate idea when conceiving international security, Chap. 5 showed that WWII made Western powers redefine the rules allowing the habitus of the Civilised Subjects of Security to be corrected and resumed. The civilised habitus of the West suffered a major breakdown because of WWII, but it was revived through different concepts and symbols such as democracy and spirituality, and through the representation of a specific stereotyped barbarian Other—the Soviet Union. The fundamental beliefs of Westerners about how civilised they really were, or about how uncivilised they could be, were strongly disrupted, which required a reassertion of justifications and symbolic meanings, in order to continue with the civilised habitus. The symbolic capital of the West had been destabilised as a consequence of both world wars, and needed reassurance. In this sense, NATO’s civilisational referent of security composes a fundamental part of its identity, a foundational principle, an original meaning.

By analysing the first four decades of NATO’s life in those terms, Chap. 6 also showed that a sense of identity and purpose has always been a pressing issue since the beginning of the Alliance. Although NATO’s organisational and identity crisis have been profusely analysed in reference to the post-Cold War period, matters of survival, pertinence, and projection into the long-term future were an important part of NATO’s narrative early in its existence. In a way that is indeed aware of temporality and future, NATO has associated a historical Atlantic identity with long-lasting purposes that expand beyond mere military functions of defence. The short-term, event-related, dimension of WWII was overthrown by NATO’s interplay with longer temporal references, which has also influenced its civilisational referent of security. Not only has NATO evolved in an open way because it is part of a long-duration structural time, as civilisation has also been represented and projected into the long-term future as part of a “common destiny”, ascribing a sense of linearity and timelessness to the very idea of civilisation. The initial significance of the civilisational referent was sustained throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and the idea of civilisational unity was even reclaimed, as more integration, or interdependence, was demanded by Western elites. The civilised habitus of the West was still on the process of reassurance, because the perception of security was not definite, or stabilised. As the 1970s brought strong ideological criticism to the West, civilisation became more discrete in NATO’s discourses. Instead, the Organisation’s values and usefulness were persistently reaffirmed by referring to symbols of security and memories, fed by the references to past achievements and glory. But it also adapted conceptually, to include issues such as poverty and underdevelopment, thereby expanding the Alliance’s competences.

The new structural era that opened with the end of the Cold War provided NATO with many opportunities to dominate the new architecture of international security. Across the 1990s, this was operated on two interrelated levels simultaneously. One occurred with a political and institutional reinvention centred on new ways of relating to non-members and to potentially new ones, by gradually assimilating them into the Alliance’s narrative about collective security and identity. In both cases, this process entailed conditioned socialising practices and learning processes that increased interdependence and regularised behaviour according to democratic standards, so that NATO’s new partners and members would be ultimately perceived as civilised, but would also behave as such.

The final development of the argument suggested that intervening to protect individuals in out-of-area countries is not a natural or spontaneous evolution of NATO neither. This is rather part of a careful reinvention after the Cold War that is entrenched in broader conjunctural changes, but that is still inscribed in the continuity of NATO’s narrative about change. The end of the Cold War left plenty room for the redefinition of a civilisational order; every belief, relationship, practice, justification, or stereotype of the preceding fifty years either ceased to be relevant, or needed to be rethought. In the new conjunctural context of the 1990s, multi-polarity was still virtual. Rules and practices were expected to transform, because the locus of symbolic power was now uncertain. At a deeper level, as Robert W. Cox (2002: 76) puts it, the assumptions upon which prevailing forms of knowledge were based were challenged, and a different set of problems arose to be confronted. During the Cold War, two competing forms of homogenisation were the only games allowed. In the search for a new basis of knowledge, a new ontology of world order needed to be found that allowed “[p]erceiving the historical structures that characterize an epoch” (Cox, 2002: 78). Although it seemed Capitalism, Liberalism and democracy had won over Soviet Communism, the post-Cold War period also liberated societies from old constraints, and could have represented a critical opportunity for renovating a world order based on enhanced multicultural dialogue as the “obscured diversity of the human situation” (Cox, 2002: 77) was suddenly more apparent. However, that period opened a latent ideological struggle for defining the rules that would dominate from then on. Rules and practices changed, because other elements transpired and rose above those of the previous period.

But the main post-Cold War conjunctural change in the field of international security during the 1990s was presented in Chap. 8 as consisting of the Individualisation of Security, a normative process through which Western civilisation could be upheld and continued. NATO has been a major actor in that process, as it strove and managed to be very influential in prescribing and putting in practice the new rules and practices of the Individualisation of Security. The main findings regarding the Individualisation of Security suggested that the valuation of individuals when formulating security policies, or deciding to intervene militarily in third sovereign states, has particular political and ideological stances related to the maintenance of the status quo and world order, empowering in fact the agency of international organisations. The positive connotation of the Individualisation of Security as a system of values can be seen as a way to justify and sustain biopolitical arguments and practices destined to control and contain human life. The preliminary relationship between the Individualisation of Security and the civilising process was set in terms of an apparent rise of a cosmopolitan consciousness whereby the interdependence between individuals make states or groups of states to act in territories other than their own, in a sort of decentralising process of the original monopolistic state. The Individualisation of Security thus implies a transformation of behaviour in both men and states in international society, mostly through the inculcation of responsibility, and through the establishment of new boundaries for appropriate behaviour regarding individuals. The Individualisation of Security also produced an international discourse of discipline and normalisation, whereby a conduct that is respective of individuals should be natural for all states.

The Individualisation of Security constitutes another stage of the civilising process because it has expanded the civilised habitus to non-Western spaces, by normalising the rationale for military intervention, and by transforming the beliefs and behaviours about security. In BH and Kosovo, that rationale was articulated in terms of NATO’s ethical responsibility to intervene in defence of civilians, mostly ethnic minorities, victims of barbarian practices such as ethnic cleansing. The Individualisation of Security thus contributed to NATO’s civilisational narrative in both those nonmember countries, through discourses representing a geopolitics of morality, through barbarian analogies and comparisons. They represented local time and space as stagnated entities, in contrast with the timelessness of the Alliance’s values and moral authority. They also employed memory discourses referring to WWII and the Holocaust, powerful features of the Alliance’s symbolic capital.

The Individualisation of Security as practised and performed by NATO is consistent with its original civilisational referent, for the security of the North-Atlantic area and wider ideological and normative influence have been upheld. But ultimately, it also transformed the dominant perceptions and fundamental beliefs of the twentieth century on war. From an aberration, failure and deviation of the civilised subjects, the justifications and memories of wars like those of BH, Kosovo or Afghanistan are likely to remain in the future as protective wars destined to secure innocent human lives from barbarian ideologies, either from the West, or from the non-West. This could be at the origin of how meanings of security can be unconsciously (and erroneously) shaped.

Throughout the operations, the importance of NATO’s public speeches and justificatory discourse decreased. The initial mediatisation of Bosnia and Kosovo might have corresponded to an initial normalising phase, in which the effort to inform and shape public awareness was stronger. In each of the three interventions, behaviour change was a major objective, ultimately aimed at another interrelated goal: regime change. For that, psychological operations were put in practice through different approaches destined to induce behavioural transformations, such as radio and television broadcasts or air-dropped leaflets. With the Individualisation of Security, humanitarian and biopolitical concerns mixed, and produced discourses framing each of these countries as spaces of behavioural duality, where barbarism was always the original problem, and civilisation only possible under certain controlled circumstances and standards. Whereas BH and Kosovo’s barbarism was represented in terms of a demonized leader and of essentialist ethno-political stereotypes, Afghanistan’s barbarism was associated to both the possibility of terrorist insurgency and more basic battles of perceptions focusing on binary perceptions of amity versus enmity, security versus insecurity, terrorist activities versus inactivity. In each case, NATO’s justifications, narrative on change and overall discourse on civilisation were very often framed within binaries of civilised and uncivilised behaviour, denoting the continual influence of Logocentrism under Modernity, as a hegemonic system of representing the world. The consequence of Logocentrism is, as Richard Ashley suggested (1989), that hierarchical meanings are imposed regarding the non-members of the Alliance, and the non-Western world more widely. In this sense, all that NATO does not consider civilised within international security—identities, practices, behaviour, norms—is conceived as an essential political deviation.

The consequences of this limiting form of thinking and representing the world are quite disturbing, for they enhance and revive the global potential for war. Vivienne Jabri (2007) actually speaks of a “global matrix of war” that is now constituted of two dominant sets of practices; one includes the wars fought in the name of humanity, legitimised by discourses centred on care, rescue, and human rights (as in Kosovo). The other includes war confronting an enemy deemed to constitute an existential threat (as in Afghanistan). Discursively, they are both framed “in terms of progress and civilisation, a battle for modernity itself” (Jabri, 2007: 136–137). Whereas war presented a decivilising potential for both states and individuals at the time of WWII, one may now think of how the Individualisation of Security contributed to its civilising nature. Ironically, Alessandro dal Lago and Salvatore Palidda interestingly use the expression “civilisation of war” to allude to this culture—both civilian and military— “that has been produced by Western countries in just under two decades in relation to the conflicts with those who threaten (or are presumed to threaten) Western security” (Dal Lago & Palidda, 2010: 5). This definition, they claim, has nothing to do with either the stereotypical ideology of Western civilisation or the so-called clash of civilisations theorised by Huntington. Likewise, the intent of this work was rather to highlight the procedural possibilities inherent to civilisation as an “on-going process and a possible aim of action”, quite in Elias’ manner (1991: 82).

The ties connecting civilisation to security are now clear, as they both reveal to be central features in the historic development of Western society and its domination upon the rest of the world. With the resurgence of intolerance, conservative ideologies and what the public opinion deems as irrational leaders in powerful Western democracies dealing with social, economic and political problems perceived as coming from the outside, a crisis seems indeed to be attaining the civilisation of the West right now. In this sense, a crisis of Western civilisation is, before anything, a crisis that comes from within, because the symbols, the values, the social and moral priorities suddenly fall far from the normality we thought we knew, and political phenomena shock and surprise as the unexpected consequences of a lottery. But times of crisis have repeatedly called for re-thinking common assumptions, for questioning the validity of our knowledge, for self-reflexivity, hence the importance of appraising the influence of the unconscious dimensions of knowledge for minimizing the shock and the surprise, and for learning— once again—the lessons from the past, aiming for a better future.

The unconscious connections between civilisation and security have not been questioned by the Westerners themselves, for the symbolic capital of the West has remained largely undisrupted so far—although the current refugee crisis and Brexit from the EU may be increasingly challenging that. The feeling of security of the civilised subjects of the West should endure, as long as it is not unsettled by fundamental death anxieties coming from either their civilised space, or from what they perceive to be uncivilised Otherness. In this sense, the current policies of control and contention of non-Western lives by, and within, the West are likely to remain outside conscious history, doomed to oblivion, precisely because the Western perception of security is what needs to be upheld by Western elites if its cohesion as a civilisational entity is to endure. Hopefully, this book has revealed the epistemological potential of the concept of civilisation in making the domination and control of the unconscious visible.

#### The AFF cannot solve – all of their scenarios for extinction are inevitable unless global structures of identity and power are transformed

Falk and Polychroniou 21 Richard A. Falk, political activist and Professor Emeritus of International Law and Practice at Princeton University, SJD, Harvard University, LLB Yale Law School, BS Economics, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; interviewed by C. J. Polychroniou, political scientist/political economist, has taught at numerous universities in Europe and the US, PhD Political Science, University of Delaware; “Great Power Competition is Escalating to Dangerous Levels: An Interview with Richard Falk,” GP Opinion, 5-27-2021, <https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/27/05/2021/great-power-competition-escalating-dangerous-levels-interview-richard-falk> /GoGreen!

C. J. Polychroniou: Richard, US foreign policy under the Biden administration is geared toward escalating the strategic competition with both China and Russia. Indeed, the Interim National Strategic Guidance, released in March 2021, makes it abundantly clear that the US intends to deter its adversaries from “inhibiting access to global commons, or dominating key regions” and that, moreover, this work cannot be done alone, as was the case under Trump, but will require the reinvigoration and modernization of the alliance system across the world. Does this read to you like a call for the start of a new New Cold War?

Richard Falk: Yes, I would say it is more than ‘the call’ for a New Cold War, but its start. The focus is presently much more China than Russia, because China is seen by Washington as posing the primary threat, and besides, it regards Russia as a traditional rival while China poses novel and more fundamental challenges. Russia, while behaving in an unsavory manner, dramatized by the crude handling of the opposition figure Alexei Navalny, is seen as manageable geopolitically. Euro-American strategy is to stiffen resistance to Russian pressure being exerted along some of its borders, and as in the Cold War can be handled by refurbished versions of ‘containment’ and ‘deterrence.’

China is another matter entirely. The most serious perceived threats are mainly associated with non-military sectors of Western, and particularly, U.S., primacy, its dominance over a dynamic productive economy, especially with respect to frontier technologies. The remarkable developmental dynamism of the Chinese economy has far outstripped anything ever achieved in the West. The United States Government under Biden seems stubbornly blindsided, seemingly determined to address these Chinese threats as if they could be effectively addressed by a combination of ideological confrontation and as with Soviet Union, containment and deterrence. So far, the Biden response is fundamentally mistaken in its approach, which is to view China as a similar adversary than was the Soviet Union. This Chinese challenge cannot be successfully met frontally. It can only be met by a diagnosis of the relative decline of the West by way of self-scrutiny, selective emulation, and a surge of creative adaptive energies. Such a response needs to be accompanied by a reformist agenda of socio-economic equity, massive infrastructure investment, the adoption of fairer wealth and income tax structures, and a commitment to a style of global leadership that identified the national interest to a greater extent with global public goods. Instead of focusing on holding China in check, the United States would do much better by learning from its successes, and adapting them to the distinctiveness of its national circumstances.

It is to be regretted that the present mode of response to China is dangerous and anachronistic for four principal reasons. Firstly, the mischaracterization of the Chinese challenge betrays a lack of self-confidence and understanding by the American Biden/Blinken foreign policy leadership. Secondly, the chosen path of confrontation risks a fateful clash in South China Seas, an area that according to the precepts of traditional geopolitics falls within the Chinese sphere of influence, and a context within which Chinese firmness is perceived as ‘defensive’ by Beijing while the U.S. military presence is regarded as intrusive, if not ‘hegemonic.’ These perceptions are aggravated by the U.S. effort to augment its role as upholding alliance commitments in South Asia, recently reaffirmed by a clear anti-Chinese animus in the shape of the QUAD (Australia, Japan, India, and the U.S.), formally named Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which despite the euphemism intends to signify enhanced military cooperation and shared security concerns.

Thirdly, the longtime U.S. military superiority in the Pacific region may not reflect the current regional balance of forces in the East and South China Seas. Pentagon public assertions have been sounding the alarm, insisting that in the event of a military confrontation, China would likely come out on top unless the U.S. resorts to nuclear weapons. According to an article written by Admiral Charles Richard, who currently heads National Strategic Command, this assessment has been confirmed by recent Pentagon war games and conflict simulations.

Taking account of this view, Admiral Richard advises that U.S. preparations for such an armed encounter be changed from the possibility recourse to nuclear weaponry to its probability. The implicit assumption, which is scary, is that U.S. must do whatever it takes to avoid an unacceptable political outcome even if it requires crossing the nuclear threshold. It may be instructive to recall the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 when Soviet moves to deploy defensive missile systems in Cuba in response to renewed U.S. intervention to impose regime change. It is instructive to recall that Cuba was accepted as independent sovereign state entitled under international law to uphold its national security as it sees fit, while Taiwan has been consistently falling within the historical limits of Chinese territorial sovereignty. The credibility of the Chinese claim was given diplomatic weight in the Shanghai point Communiqué that re-established U.S./China relations in 1972. Kissinger recalled that in the negotiations leading to a renewal of bilateral relations the greatly admired Chinese Foreign Minister, Chou En-Lai, was flexible on every issue except Taiwan. That is, China has a strong legal and historical basis for reclaiming Taiwan as an integral part of its sovereign territory considering its armed severance from China as a result of Japanese imperialism. China governed the area now known as Taiwan from 1683-1895. In 1895 it was conquered and ruled by Japan until 1945 when it was reabsorbed and became a part of the Republic of China. After 1949 when the Chinese Communists took over control of China, Taiwan was renamed Republic of China on Taiwan. From the Chinese perspective, this historical past upholds the basic contention that Taiwan is part of China and not entitled to be treated as a separate state.

Fourthly, and maybe decisively, the international claims on the energies and resources of the United States are quite different than they were during the Old Cold War. There was no impending catastrophe resulting from climate change to worry about or decaying infrastructure desperately needing expensive repair or under-investment in social protection by government in the area of health, housing, and education.

CJP: Isn’t it possible that the approach of the Biden administration to the future environment of great power competition could lead to the formation of a Russia-China military alliance, especially since alliance formation constitutes a key element of state interaction? Indeed, Vladimir Putin has already said that the prospect of such partnership is “theoretically… quite possible,” so the question is this: What would be the implications for global order if a Sino-Russian military alliance were to be formed?

RF: I think we are in a period of renewed alliance diplomacy recalling the feverish attempts of the United States to surround the Soviet Union with deployed military forces, which was a way of communicating to Moscow that the Soviet Union could not expand their borders territorially without anticipating a military encounter with the United States. At first glance, alliances conceived in these traditional terms make little sense. Except in Taiwan it is unlikely that China would seek to enlarge its territorial domain by the threat use of force. In this sense, the ad hoc diplomacy of alliance formation, typified by the QUAD seems anachronistic, and could lead to warfare as one among several unintended consequences.

However, realignment as distinct from alliance frameworks does make sense in an international atmosphere in which the United States is trying to confront its international adversaries with sanctions and a variety of measures of coercive diplomacy that are intended to constrain its policy options. Many states are dependent on international supply chains for energy and food, as well as reliable trade and investment relations. Reverting to the Cold War the Soviet Union was relatively autonomous. This is much less true under present conditions in which the higher densities of interdependence are linked to acute security vulnerability to cyber attacks, and where access to drone technologies and computer knowhow make non-state actors, extremist political movements, and criminal syndicates an increasingly troublesome part of the global political landscape. In such an emergent global setting, traditional reliance on deterrence, defense capabilities, and retaliatory action are often ineffectual, and quite often even counter-productive. The purpose of contemporary patterns of realignment is less to augment defenses against intervention and aggression than to broaden policy options for countries that need to reach beyond their borders to achieve economic viability. Another motivation is to deflect geopolitical bullying tactics intended to isolate adversaries. As China and Russia are being portrayed as the enemies of the West, their alignment with one another makes sense if thought of as a reciprocally beneficial ‘security community.’ Compared to past configurations of conflictual relations, current geopolitical maneuvers such as realignment are less concerned with weaponry and war and more with attaining developmental stability, intelligence sharing, and reduced vulnerability to the distinctive threats and parameters of the Cyber Age.

The logic of realignment gives to countries like China and Russia opportunities to increase their geopolitical footprint without relying on ideological affinities or coercion. Such a change in the nature of world politics is more broadly evident. For instance, important countries such as Iran and Turkey use realignment as a diplomatic tool to offset pressures and security encroachments by U.S. and Israel. In Iran’s case despite radical differences in ideology and governing style it is turning to China and Russia so as to protect its national sovereignty from a range of destabilizing measures adopted by its adversaries. Whereas Turkey, while being devalued as an alliance partner in the NATO context, may be satisfying its overall needs by turning to China and Russia than by sticking to its traditional role of a junior participant in the most potent of Western alliance structures.

CJP: Certain mainstream foreign policy analysts are rehashing old arguments about the US-China competition, in particular, by claiming that this is really an ideological battle between democracy and authoritarianism. What’s your own take on this matter?

RF: I think even more so than in the Cold War the ideological battleground is a smokescreen behind which lurk fears and perceived threats to the Western dominance of the world economy and of innovative military technologies. In the last half century China has already staked a strong claim to have demonstrated a superior development model (‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’) to that produced in the capitalist United States. This Chinese achievement is quite clearly explained and documented by the outstanding Indian liberal economist, Deepak Nayyar, in his important study, Asian Resurgence: Diversity in Development (2019). Great emphasis is placed by Nayyer on the high rate of savings enabling China to finance and strategically manage targeted investment of public funds. Nayyer downplays the role of ideology and stresses these economistic factors, as he analyzes the development achievements of 14 countries in Asia.

The reality of the Chinese rise makes a mockery of the triumphalist claims of Francis Fukuyama in The End of History and The Last Man (1992), even more so in George W. Bush’s covering letter to the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States in which he claims that the 20th century ended with “a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” How dated and misplaced such language seems twenty years later!

If China now additionally manages to challenge successfully the U.S. in such vital areas of technological innovation as artificial intelligence and robotics it will undoubtedly reinforce this image of Chinese ascendancy on the 21st century world stage. It is this prospect of being relegated to the technological shadowland that had made bipartisan elites in the United States so anxious of late. In fact, even Republican stalwarts are willing to put aside their polarizing hostility to join with Democrats in mounting a diplomatic offensive against China that could become war-mongering interaction if Beijing responds in kind. Graham Allison has reminded us that historical instances where a previously ascendent power is threatened by a rising one has often resulted in disastrous warfare. Such belligerence is usually initiated by the political actor that feels displaced by the changing hierarchy of influence, wealth, and status in world order, yielding to pressure to engage the challenger while it still possesses military superiority. [See Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides Trap (2017)]

CJP: Nuclear weapons and climate change represent by far humanity’s two greatest existential crises. Can we really be hopeful that these threats can be managed tamed within the existing international system? If not, what changes are required in current interstate relations?

RF: Of course, at this time we have become acutely aware of such global existential threats by experiencing the ordeal of the COVID pandemic, which has revealed the conflictual state-centric manner of dealing with a situation that could have been more effectively addressed if responding by way of global solidarity. As the pandemic now appears to be subsiding in most parts of the world, we cannot be encouraged by the weakness of cooperative impulses despite the obvious self-interested benefits for all if a global commons approach had been adopted with respect to testing, treatment, and distribution of vaccines. This negative background suggests that it a somewhat vain hope to suppose that the threats posed by nuclear weapons and climate change can be successfully managed over time. Each of these mega-threats disclose different features of an essentially dysfunctional and inequitable system of world order. World history has now entered a bio-political phase where civilizational achievements are at risk and even the survival of the human species is in doubt. Analogous dysfunctions of a different nature are evident in the internal political and economic life of most sovereign states.

The relationship to nuclear weapons has been problematic from the beginning, starting from the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japanese cities in 1945 as the war was nearing its end. The horrifying civilian consequences seared the consequences of collective human conscience almost to the extent of the Holocaust. The two realities exemplifying the atrocities of World War II are Auschwitz and Hiroshima. It is illuminating that in the first instance the behavior of the loser in the war was criminalized in the Genocide Convention while that of the winner in the second instance was legitimated although left under a dark cloud that lingers until now. The reality is that nuclear weapons are retained for possible use by nine states, including the most militarily powerful countries. The fact that the great majority of non-nuclear governments and the sentiments of most people in the world unconditionally oppose such weaponry has hardly mattered. The UN recently sponsored the Treaty of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) that entered into force in January 2021; however, neither law nor morality can challenge the resolve of the nuclear weapons states to retain their freedom to possess, deploy, develop, and even threaten or use such weaponry of mass destruction. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the first states to develop nuclear weapons, have issued a formal statement expressing their belief in the non-proliferation regime and deterrence as a preferred model of nuclear war prevention to that associated with a norm of unconditional prohibition reinforced by phased, monitored, and verified disarmament treaty process.

Martin Sherwin in his definitive study, Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Rouletter from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis (2020), convincingly shows that the avoidance of nuclear war has been a consequence of dumb luck, not rational oversight or the inhibitions on use associated with deterrence. The point being that despite the magnitude of the threats posed by the existence of nuclear weapons the structures of Westphalian statism has prevailed over considerations of law, morality, common sense, and rationality. What is absent with regard to these existential global threats is a sufficient political will to transform the underlying structural features by which authority, power, and identity have been managed on a global level for last several centuries. The absence of trust among countries is given precedence, and is further reinforced by the weakness of global solidarity mechanisms, resulting on leaving this ultimate weapon in potentially irresponsible hands, the fate of the earth in Jonathan Schell’s book bearing that title, published in 1982.

Climate change has dramatized a different facet of this statist structure of world order. The need for the cooperative and urgent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions has been validated by a strong consensus of scientific opinion. The effects of inaction or insufficient action are being concretely experienced in the form of global warming, ocean levels rising, extreme weather events, glacial melting, and migrations from droughts and floods. Yet effective responsive action is blocked by inequalities of circumstances and perception that generate disagreements about the allocation of responsibility and by short-termism that makes private and public sector decision makers reluctant to depress performance statistics by expensive adjustments that cut profits and development. There is a widespread recognition of the need for drastic action, but the best that the collective will of governments have been able to do is to produce the Paris Agreement in 2015, which leaves it up to the good will and responsible voluntary behavior of governments to reduce emissions, a rather wobbly foundation on which to stake the future of humanity.

The UN as now constituted cannot provide platforms for addressing global existential threats in an effective and equitable manner. The responses to the COVID pandemic offer a template for such a negative assessment. It was obvious that short-term national economic and diplomatic interests prevailed at the expense of minimizing the health hazards of virus COVID-19. Once these interests were satisfied the richer countries felt virtuous by resorting to feel good philanthropy, which was masked as empathy for poorer countries and their populations. These societies had been left almost totally without access to the protective medical equipment, ventilators, and vaccines during the height of the health hazards.

A revealing extreme instance of the pattern was embodied in the Israeli approach which was very effective within Israel, while withholding vaccines from the approximately five million Palestinians living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This disparity ignored Israel’s explicit obligation under Article 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention to accord protection to an occupied people in the event of an epidemic. What is disclosed beyond reasonable doubt is the structural dominance of statist and market forces combined with the weakness of existing mechanisms of global solidarity, which are preconditions for upholding global public goods. An analogous dynamic occurs within states, reflecting the class, gender, and race interests and the disproportionate burdens borne by the poor, women, and marginalized minorities.

#### The alternative is poststructural policy analysis – switch-side debate is particularly suited to an ethos of continual criticism that’s vital to avoid error replication

Bacchi 16 Carol Bacchi, Department of Politics, University of Adelaide; and Susan Goodwin, Faculty of Education and Social Work, University of Sydney; “Conclusion,” Chapter 8, *Poststructural Policy Analysis: A Guide to Practice*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, ISBN 978-1-137-52546-8, pp.107-112 /GoGreen!

This book introduces a Foucault-influenced approach to poststructural policy analysis and explains the usefulness of this perspective for those wishing to engage in critical policy analysis. It offers a user-friendly “tool” to conduct poststructural policy analysis, called “What’s the Problem Represented to be?” (WPR approach). Applications of the approach by policy workers/analysts illustrate its potential for disrupting conventional views about the meaning of policy and how governing takes place.

The WPR approach brings together several Foucauldian modes of inquiry, including archaeology, genealogy, and problematization, to generate a range of new questions for policy workers/analysts. These new questions provide guidelines for thinking about policy development at a level uncommonly probed—the deep-seated presuppositions and assumptions that underpin policies and the ways in which policies actively produce, or constitute, “problems”, “subjects”, “objects”, and “places” in specific contexts. This innovative approach to policy analysis puts in question the taken-for-granted view prevalent among many who develop, implement, and analyze policies that policy problems are self-evident, and that subjects, objects, and places simply exist. It facilitates critical policy analysis through creating the possibility of thinking otherwise.

The book has two parts. Part I locates the particular poststructural approach introduced in the book within other recent developments in the policy analysis field and elaborates its theoretical grounding. Chapter 1 sets the scene. It provides a brief synopsis of the Foucauldian version of poststructuralism that guides the analysis in subsequent chapters. It also highlights the importance of this stance for how policy work is thought about and practiced, emphasizing the possibility of critical engagement and contestation.

Chapter 2 introduces the WPR approach and explains the forms of criticism it involves. The approach, as elaborated there, encourages critical interrogation of policy proposals through six questions and an undertaking to apply those questions to one’s own proposals (see WPR Chart on page 20). Importantly, a WPR analysis does not offer firm solutions to assumed problems. Rather, it encourages policy workers to reflect on how policy “problems” are produced (or represented) within the policies and policy proposals they develop and implement.

The argument, introduced in Chapter 2 and developed throughout the book, is that governing takes place through the ways in which “problems” are represented in policies (problem representations). This view of how governing occurs brings a new urgency to consideration of how “problems” are constituted within policies, the unexamined forms of thinking they rely upon, the practices that generate them and the effects they produce. The term “effects” captures the ways in which particular problem representations limit what can be thought (discursive effects), affect what it is possible for people to become (subjectification effects) and impact on how they live their lives (lived effects). Probing problem representations for these effects becomes a politically efficacious task, opening up consideration of alternative problematizations of a wide range of social issues.

Chapter 3 introduces key theoretical concepts in Foucault-influenced poststructural analysis. The chapter contains seven subsections, each of which is dedicated to a group of related concepts. These subsections assist readers to grasp what it means to:

• talk about power as productive;

• take practices as a starting point for analysis;

• focus on discourses as knowledges;

• examine governmental problematizations;

• adopt a governmentality perspective;

• carry out Foucauldian-style genealogies;

• put in question the humanist subject.

The chapter, thus, provides a resource for policy analysts interested in using the WPR approach by outlining direct links between Foucauldian themes and concepts, and the WPR questions.

Part II of the book illustrates the forms of critical analysis made possible through Foucault-influenced poststructuralism, and specifically, through application of the WPR approach. It draws on the work of a diverse array of policy workers/analysts from many countries who have used the questions in the approach to examine critically a wide range of policy developments. These examples of application have been organized around four themes—making and unmaking “problems”, “subjects”, “objects”, and “places”.

The uniting argument that these “things” have been made—and hence can be unmade—finds its inspiration in the poststructural thinking that underpins the book. In a poststructural perspective things that are commonly taken for granted as real and unchanging (e.g., nations, public places, addiction), including the presumed fixed nature of human subjects and groups of human subjects (e.g., youth, irregular migrants), are seen as generated in repeated heterogeneous practices and relations. They are made. Activity is involved in their becoming. Hence, they are political creations rather than inescapable ways of being or facts of life.

The analytic task, therefore, becomes drawing attention to the politics involved in their emergence as “the real”—how it was possible for these things to come to be—making that politics visible. Politics here is understood to comprise the plural practices involved in the coming to be of “things”. By denaturalizing “things” in this way, they are opened up for possible modification—they can be unmade—should they be found to produce detrimental consequences for specific groups of people or for life in general.

Chapter 4 elaborates what it means to say that “problems” are constituted in policies. It traces and contests how “problems” are conceptualized in a range of policy theories, including classic rationalist, interpretive and critical realist approaches. From this starting place it demonstrates how select applications of the WPR approach put into question “problems” presumed to exist in drug and alcohol policy, and gender equality policy.

Chapter 5 confronts the challenging task of rethinking how “subjects” are conceptualized in the policies that purportedly address them. The view that subjects exist as particular kinds of people (rational, self-sufficient, risk averse, caring, lazy) independently of policy is countered with illustrations of how “subjects” are constituted within policies that allocate specific subject positions for them to occupy. “Subjects” become provisional, in ongoing formation, emphasizing the importance of examining policies for how they produce “subjects”. WPR applications that undertake this task are drawn from the following fields: education policy, health policy, immigration policy, economic policy, transport policy, environment policy, and disability/equality policy.

Chapter 6 calls upon readers to rethink the nature of “objects”. Instead of presumed, fixed “entities”, they emerge as “objectivizations” produced in policy. The point of this form of intervention is to encourage policy workers/analysts to interrogate presumed “objects that exist” and show how, through problematization, they are given specific characteristics and associations. The postulated “singularity of objects” turns out to be “an accomplishment,” an act of “coordination” (Mol 2002: 7–8), with research methods identified as major players in the reinforcement of particular realities. On these grounds, the applications of WPR in this chapter call for a rethinking of the commonly assumed policy objects of “poverty”, “addiction”, “literacy”, and “wellbeing”.

Chapter 7 elaborates the implications of taking assumed geographical entities—“places”—for granted as specific kinds of “objects”. Further, it illustrates, through selected WPR applications, how poststructural policy analysis draws attention to the multitude of practices that need to be repeated on a daily basis for certain “sites” to emerge as “real”. In the process this form of analysis produces opportunities to challenge the assumed facticity of “states”, “regions”, “public places”, etc.

The Appendix, by Bacchi and Bonham, offers a poststructural methodology for analyzing interviews. Policy analysts commonly draw on interview material to provide background or on-the-ground perspectives on specific developments. Since poststructuralism puts in question “subjects” as sources of “true” information based on “direct” experience, it is necessary to approach interviews differently from forms of analysis that rest on these premises. PIA [Poststructural Interview Analysis] offers a way to locate interview comments within the practices that generate them and thus to politicize what tends to be treated as “truth”, including assumptions about interviewees themselves as sources of truth. To this end, it draws upon key theoretical concepts introduced in the book, including genealogy and discursive practices. The research task becomes interrogating how specific “things said” come to be said, and how transformation is possible.

Throughout the book, the WPR approach is proposed as an accessible and adaptable guide to poststructural policy analysis through seven interrelated forms of questioning and analysis. The six questions enable analysts to select a specific policy or governmental technology, and to interrogate it in ways that reveal levels of complexity that require consideration. They provoke specific forms of political engagement, encouraging analysts to reflect on possible alternative problematizations. At the same time a practice of self-problematization, endorsed in the undertaking to apply the WPR questions to one’s own proposals or recommendations, alerts researchers to their participation in ontological politics, making rather than reflecting “reality” (Chapter 2). The ethos of continual criticism thus promoted opens up the space for challenge and protest.

The WPR approach, however, needs to be used carefully. Some key premises that can sometimes slip away in the process of analysis are summarized here:

• Usually the terms “problem” and “problems” are placed in scare quotes to signal that their commonly assumed status as fixed and readily identifiable “entities” is put in question. Departure from this practice occurs only where it is clear that a particular theoretical stance, such as positivism, treats problems as straightforward and uncontentious (see Chapter 1, endnote 1, p. 12).

• Analysis begins from proposals or proposed solutions and researchers “read off” the implicit problem representations within them.

• References to governing include but extend beyond the state to encompass a wide range of agencies and people involved in societal administration.

• The term “discourse” refers to background knowledge, and “discourses” are knowledges rather than forms of language use.

• “Subjects” are provisional and in ongoing formation, rather than stable kinds of being.

• Governmentalities, such as neoliberalism, are not monolithic and determining rationalities, nor ideologies.

• Resistance does not sit outside power, meaning that forms of protest might also involve forms of complicity.

• References to strategies and “strategic relations” describe complex societal relations and practices rather than intentional manipulation.

• Poststructural policy analysis aims to study, not people’s views, but how it is possible for such views to exist.

In terms of political vision, the perspective developed in this book is valuable for what it opens up rather than for what it proscribes (Moss 1998: 9). It does not put forward a blueprint for political change, which people are expected to adopt, but instead aims to “craft a different kind of political space in which critics can operate” (Brown 1998: 34). In tune with Foucault’s own “version of emancipation”, universals are replaced with “specific transformations” that minimize domination (Moss 1998: 9). In line with this view the WPR approach consists of questions, not directives. As the sub-title for the book suggests, it is a guide to practice. With the WPR approach as guide, policy workers/analysts become “policy problematizers” (Webb 2014: 371). They are spurred to reflect on the presuppositions underpinning specific policy proposals, including their own proposals. They are prompted, further, to reflect on alternative ways of constituting “problems”, and on how alternative problematizations may produce new “subjects”, different “objects”, and other ways of imagining political space.

As illustrated in the applications in the book, the WPR approach has proved popular with policy workers/analysts. Clearly, there is a significant section of the policy community eager to embrace the form of critical analysis it offers. The applications also indicate the popularity of the approach among research students, who are often also policy workers, in a wide range of policy fields. These and other scholars find the WPR questions helpful in generating and structuring useful research projects (Manning 2014; Bletsas and Beasley 2012). By making the approach more accessible, this book produces poststructural policy analysis in a form that people can employ and enjoy.

## FW

### AT: Framework

#### We meet – poststructural analysis is a policy option – and it’s mutually exclusive – that’s Bacchi

#### Counter-interp – if the impacts of their representations are net worse, vote NEG

#### They’re LESS predictable – there is no negative resolution and no deductive basis for competing policy options – only induction from community practice – and poststructural Ks have been the norm for decades

#### It’s NOT unfair – they choose their ground and the set of poststructural critiques is as finite and researchable as the realist or liberal critiques they call disads – PLUS, 1ACs written to defend assumptions solves any impact to limits, because they don’t need answers, merely defenses

--skew’s inevitable – infinite Ts, disads with hypergeneric or manufactured links, PICs and Process CP’s

--side bias – infinite prep, speak first and last, and DAs are bad on this topic

#### BUT, we’re NOT saying they “don’t get” to weigh the case, our constitutive framework just recognizes that the discursive frames through which plan’s implemented have a net larger effect on outcomes – case isn’t excluded, merely disproven and outweighed

#### Demanding an alternative and staking the ballot on comparative solvency disincentivizes critical research to the point of elimination – only centering clash on representations enables normative approaches to IR capable of transformation, making the K an impact to framework – we control impact uniqueness – poststructuralism is working, BUT all our impacts remain inevitable so long as debate keeps churning out positivists

--TINA = There Is No Alternative

Jahn 21 Beate Jahn, Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, President of the European International Studies Association, “Critical theory in crisis? a reconsideration,” European Journal of International Relations, 27(4), 2021, DOI 10.1177/13540661211049491 /GoGreen!

Although critical IR theorists were inspired by a wide range of thinkers—from Horkheimer and the early Frankfurt School through Wittgenstein, Winch and Kuhn to Habermas and Cox as well as Foucault (George and Campbell, 1990: 271–277, 282, 284)—they originally subscribed to the same two core principles derived from the same arguments. The historical and therefore particular nature of knowledge constitutes theory as “always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1996: 87; Devetak, 2013: 164; Campbell and Bleiker, 2016: 198)—depriving the sciences of an Archimedean point from which to establish objectivity or grasp totality (George and Campbell, 1990: 270–271). In order to overcome these limitations, critical theory aims at “the social and political complex as a whole rather than . . . the separate parts” (Cox, 1996: 89). But since this whole ultimately remains inaccessible, critical theory cannot offer an authoritative vision of a better society (Cox, 1996: 97). In order to keep the possibility of a transformation of the entire society alive, therefore, critical theory refuses to engage in “problem-solving” which is geared toward making the existing order function more smoothly (Cox, 1996: 89). Instead, the aim of transcending the existing order in practice requires overcoming its limitations in theory: by reflecting “upon the process of theorizing itself” (Cox, 1996: 88; Hutchings, 2007: 72; Rengger, 2001: 105)—and by thus opening up thinking space (Ashley, 1981: 217; Ashley and Walker, 1990: 259; George and Campbell, 1990: 269–270, 288).

Yet, Horkheimer and first-generation critical IR theorists did not just share this critical stance toward calls for “practical relevance” for theoretical reasons. Historically, such calls forced theorists to choose sides—between communists and capitalists in the 1920s and 1930s, between the Soviets and the Americans during the Cold War—and hence to sacrifice the critique of a society or an international system in which these were the only choices. Resisting demands for practical relevance was therefore the condition of the possibility to imagine an alternative society or international system; it played a key role in creating space for critical thinking and imagination beyond the given options. And yet, it is precisely such calls for practical relevance that drive much of the current debate—raising the question how and why such core principles are now fundamentally contested.

In order to answer this question, I will draw again on Horkheimer who offers explicit reflections on critical theory’s historical dynamics. First, if critical theory cannot offer a substantive vision of a better society, it cannot offer any (authoritative) guidance for political practice (Horkheimer, 1968: 31). Second, within a fragmented society in which material and ideological power serves to support privileges, all groups represent particular interests (Horkheimer, 1968: 37–38). Hence, critical theory cannot identify particular individuals, groups, issues, or causes as “progressive” per se, as seeds of a future just society (Horkheimer, 1968: 37–38). Today’s oppressed can become tomorrow’s oppressors. Hence, critical theory bears “no flag” (Ashley and Walker, 1990: 264).

But this does not mean that critical theory has no political impact. On the contrary, by undermining traditional ways of understanding particular issues, critical theories constitute them in new ways and thus pave the way for new practices. Critical (like any other) theories thus inevitably have political impact and therefore may also contribute to improvements for particular groups within society—as set out in the previous section. However, within a society that emerges from the competition between particular groups, the empowerment of some groups changes power relations within society but does not lead to the emancipation of society as a whole. Moreover, critical theories can never guarantee the political outcome of their particular activities because society as a whole emerges from the relations of all of its parts. It provides, as Foucault (1984) put it, nothing but a “historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them” (p. 50). This is why critical theories “issue no promises” (Ashley and Walker, 1990: 264).

Critical theory therefore contributes to historical developments even while it is itself subject to historical changes. It is motivated by different historical problems (Weber, 2014: 533): the rise of fascism and national socialism for Gramsci and Horkheimer in the 1920s and 1930s (see Morton, 2003: 121–122), the student revolution in 1968 for Foucault (Torfing, 2005: 5), the decline of the public sphere for Habermas in the 1970s, and the onset of the second Cold War in the 1980s which finally motivated IR scholars to import critical theory into the discipline (Ashley and Walker, 1990: 265).5 Critical theories are also shaped by their particular focus—racism, sexism, political violence, material inequality, subjectivity—developing the theoretical and methodological tools suited to their subject matter. As soon as critical theory is applied in practice, therefore, it fragments into critical theories.

This plurality of critical theories gives rise to significant differences and sometimes even to competition, for example, between a focus on capitalism or patriarchy, or on everyday vs systemic reproductions of power (Hartmann, 1979; Koddenbrock, 2015). But for the most part, this diversity of critical theories is the result of the application of core critical principles to different problems within society and historical periods. That is, most feminist, queer, Marxist, poststructuralist, postcolonial theories subscribe to the metatheoretical assumptions that theory is practice, that all knowledge is historical, and investigate the knowledge that constitutes their respective problems. Hence, feminist and queer theories are the updated and gender sensitive versions of critical theory just as decolonialism is the critical theory sensitive to colonial issues and poststructuralism represents a non-statist critical approach.

But this does not mean that critical theory cannot become uncritical. The fate of discourse ethics provides an instructive example. Jürgen Habermas was dissatisfied with the “pessimistic” implications of critical theory and set out to rekindle its positive emancipatory element (George and Campbell, 1990: 278–279). In order to support the argument that communicative action provided positive resources for a transformative practice, Habermas distinguished between the system, governed by the instrumental logic of money and power, on the one hand and the lifeworld, governed by the logic of understanding, on the other (Habermas, 1984: 366–399, 1987: 106–130; Wyn Jones, 2000: 8). Yet by separating communication from power (Hutchings, 2005: 165), the lifeworld from the system (Schmid, 2018: 7), the subject from the object (Fluck, 2014: 57), emancipation from an analysis of existing injustices (Jahn, 1998: 615, 622), democracy from capitalism (Azmanova, 2020), discourse ethics identified a particular element of existing society as “progressive” and ended up justifying the very power and interest from which vulnerable societies needed protection (Linklater, 2005: 154). The tragic fate of Habermas’ desire for practical relevance confirms the arguments of early critical theorists, within and outside of IR, and it illustrates how the relationship to practice leads to significant changes within critical theory itself.

We thus have to distinguish between two related dimensions (or levels) of critical theory: Its metatheoretical assumptions which are shared widely and are historically relatively stable since they are derived from the nature of liberal society as a whole; and its application in practice which gives rise to a plurality of particular critical theories that are constantly in flux, reflecting the changing relations between different groups and issue areas within society (Horkheimer, 1968: 49, 50). What links these two dimensions are the core principles of critical theory: to refrain from problem-solving and from separating theory and reality in the scientific process. And while the idea of emancipation is strictly tied to the metatheoretical level and the transformation of society as a whole, particular critical theories address specific issues within society and thus inevitably become entangled in its development.

These reflections help make sense of the curious frustration of critical theorists despite their political achievements—for the latter clearly belong into the second register of critical theories successfully addressing particular problems within society. This leads to the mainstreaming and institutionalization of various “critical” projects and to the integration of critical theories into the academic establishment and public discourse. Yet the rise of populism highlights that these achievements do not amount to the transformation of society as a whole. Moreover, confronted with the rise of populism this very success puts critical theorists in a position of defending the status quo—which now embodies some of their achievements. Disappointment therefore arises from the fact that the particular achievements of critical theory appear to go hand in hand with the failure to transform society as a whole.

Yet, this perception of failure stands in contradiction to the original metatheoretical principles in which emancipation is neither derived from features of empirical reality nor does it entail any concrete empirical claims. Hence, critical theory does not promise emancipation—it simply posits that the transformation of society as whole may be possible. Yet, the validity of this assumption can only be determined with hindsight—once that transformation has occurred. In the meantime, there is no empirical evidence that can prove it right or wrong (Horkheimer, 1968: 37, 39, 55). Brexit, Trump, and the rise of populism do not prove that emancipation is not possible. At the metatheoretical level, critical theory is therefore “never ‘accurate’ or ‘wrong’; it is only more or less illuminating, more or less provocative, more or less of an incitement to thought, imagination, desire, possibilities for renewal” (Brown, 2002: 574)—and this potential is realized by not representing things as they are, by undermining their familiarity, by providing different narratives, by refusing to be “useful” and by focusing on the thinking that constitutes practice. While this theoretical practice can lead to empirical claims that require testing, it does not affect the metatheoretical assumption. But instead of applying these principles to the current political juncture, critical theorists read recent political developments as empirical evidence for the failure of critical theory, as evidence for being out of sync with history and out of touch with practice. They have thus lost sight of the metatheoretical nature of the concept of emancipation and of the originally fundamental assumption that theory is practice and that all knowledge is historical. Moreover, in the attempt to get back into line with history and practice, they explicitly aim to discard the two practical principles that link the two levels of critical theory: the refusal to engage in problem-solving and the requirement to focus on the knowledge that constitutes practice.

In the last step of this analysis, I will locate this development of critical theory in its historical context and show that rather than being out of sync with history, the recent debate is perfectly in line with, and reflects the pressures of, neoliberalism. Historically, the introduction and development of critical theory in IR coincides almost exactly with the period of neoliberalism—and therefore with the extension of economic principles, of the market and competition, into all spheres of life. This development was amplified by the end of the Cold War that led to its globalization. It created a situation, in which it was “easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism” (Jameson, 2003: 76) and Margaret Thatcher’s oft repeated claim that There Is no Alternative (TINA) was widely experienced as a reality (Fisher, 2009).

Moreover, this extension of market principles and competition included knowledge production and education (Brown, 2005; Harvey, 2007). Knowledge was now seen as a commodity and education as a driver of economic growth, development, and global competitiveness. As Patrick’s (2013) research shows, universities became producers of commercially exploitable knowledge: from intellectual property and patents to the training that turns student customers into high-skills, high-wage, marketable knowledge workers. Depending on the context, this process has taken a myriad of forms: from Ronald Reagan’s reduction of public funding for higher education in the United States, through the redirection of such funds from universities to students in the United Kingdom, to the introduction of a competitive process for the funding of “excellence clusters” in Germany. Despite vast differences in higher education systems, the common aim of these policies is to introduce competition—which global university rankings ensure affects all of them.

It also affects the nature of knowledge: for even while knowledge becomes the most important commodity in the “knowledge economy,” all knowledge that is not readily commodified loses its value. “Hence the intensifying demand on and in universities . . . for knowledge that is applicable and marketable” (Brown, 2002: 573)—including “critical” theory which can provide institutions with a “progressive” brand and helps to attract students.

This is the historical context in which critical IR theory successfully established itself, willy-nilly participating in the process of professionalization described above: contributing to textbooks, landing Chair appointments, founding critical journals, establishing professional networks, volunteering in professional organizations, validating critical work through prizes. Critical theorists have turned themselves into highly competent knowledge entrepreneurs and critical theory has become part of the academic establishment and is hence also subject to its pressures.

This context and its pressures are reflected in critical theory’s latest developments. If there is no alternative to the existing globalized neoliberal world order, this undermines the rationale for a metatheoretical conception of the transformation of society as a whole—but it does provide a reason for shifting attention to particular issues within that society. The pressure to produce marketable knowledge directly undermines the critical requirement not to become useful—and provides strong incentives for “critical problem-solving” (Post-Critical IR?, 2018). In light of the demand for applicable knowledge, the critical requirement to focus on the knowledge that constitutes reality appears like a waste of time—and calls for a direct engagement with practice (Kurki, 2011). And pervasive competition leads to the individualization not only of success but also of failure—and therefore to excessive self-criticism of critical scholars expressed in the current debate (Conway, 2021).

Hence, if critical theorists today feel that their approaches lack the ability to provoke and inspire new ways of seeing things and acting in the world, it is not because they are out of touch with practice or out of sync with history. Quite the opposite. It is because critical theorists are deeply embedded in the dynamic globalization of neoliberalism that they suffer from its closing down of alternative thinking spaces. And it is because critical theory participates in and is dependent on the dominant neoliberal practices of knowledge production that it experiences the pressure to be useful in and for existing society—and thus to abandon original critical principles.

Conclusion

Critical theory is thus indeed in crisis, but its problems are widely misunderstood and the solutions run the risk of abandoning critical theory entirely—instead of reinvigorating it. Many critical theorists attribute their disappointment to a lack of engagement with practice and a disconnect from the current historical juncture. Yet, we have seen that critical theory has always engaged with concrete policies and was well aligned with historical developments. In fact, it can be proud of a wide range of political achievements. Critical theory is today firmly (though by no means irreversibly) embedded in universities and textbooks, in social movements and international organizations, in public debates and foreign policies.

And yet, it is the resultant close alignment with the historical forces of neoliberalism that has cost critical theory its inspirational quality. It subjects critical theory to the pervasive experience of TINA and thus challenges its core assumption that an alternative form of society is possible. And it is critical theory’s active participation in neoliberal forms of knowledge production that dissolves its original suspicion of practical relevance and engenders calls to become “more effective in its daily practice” (Post-Critical IR?, 2018). The intimate entanglement with neoliberal history and practice thus simultaneously undermines critical theory’s core aims and means: the emancipatory ideal of the possibility of an alternative form of society and the refusal to engage in problem-solving as the means to approach this aim.

But if the problem lies in the close entanglement with history and practice, the solution cannot lie in more of the same. On the contrary, such suggestions turn critical theory into an embodiment of neoliberal world views and practices. “Updating” core critical principles, for example, subsumes theory under the dominant historical forces and sacrifices the space created by their tension—an end of history that literally removes the logical possibility of alternatives. Similarly, searching for an authoritative version of critical theory extends the introduction of neoliberal competition into the realm of critical theories leading, just as in society at large, to fragmentation instead of the recognition of common predicaments and principles that could further creative cooperation. And the demand for acting in the world requires instrumental rationality and catapults critical back into traditional theory (Rengger, 2001: 102, 105)—as the fate of discourse ethics clearly demonstrates. If we capitulate “to the demand that theory reveal truth, deliver applications, or solve each of the problems it defines,” we sacrifice the very space for potential renewal that our inevitable alignment with the forces of neoliberalism has closed down (Brown, 2002: 573–574).

Hence, if attachment is the problem, the solution lies in detachment: in creating spaces in which different forms of thinking become possible again. And this is precisely what critical theory’s core principles were originally designed to produce: by forcing the theorist to step away from the problem itself and focus on the knowledge that constitutes it instead, by refusing to solve problems directly and instead offering new ways of seeing these problems to a variety of creative political actors. We need, in short, to remind ourselves of the metatheoretical principles that critical theories share with each other, to apply them to our current predicament, and thereby to identify those pressures that need to be resisted and analyzed (Hutchings, 2001: 88; 90; Levine, 2012; Paipais, 2011). And this, to be clear, is not an argument against practical political engagement—which critical theorists have always undertaken. It is an argument against confusing political practice with critical theory because the latter never promises a practical transformation of society as a whole. It promises to create the space for political imagination—a space that closes down when theory is made to fit practice.

#### It also turns case AND any educational value to their framework – a normative approach (as opposed to descriptive) to IR analysis is ethically prior to and more determinative of the impact of emerging tech than the plan

Burke 14 Anthony Burke, associate professor of international relations and political science at the University of New South Wales; Katrina Koo, senior lecturer of international relations at the University of Queensland; and Matt McDonald, senior lecturer of international relations at University of Queensland; *Ethics and Global Security*, Routledge, 2014, ISBN 987-0-203-07130-4, pp.4-6 /GoGreen!

The moral anxiety and debate in such cases-just a few of many-suggests something important. Ethics matters. in this book, we contend that the nature of global insecurity in the last century, and the kinds of security that the world will be able to achieve in this century, depends significantly on ethics: on the ethics we bring to our analysis, policymaking and decisions; on the ethics that underpins our understanding of what security is and to whom it is owed; and on the ethics that shapes the realities we accept or deny. Whether people live or die, whether they suffer or prosper--which people live and prosper and where they are able to do so are ethical questions. How these questions are answered in the real world will be the results of particular ethical frameworks, rules and decisions; the result of the ways in which ethical dilemmas are posed, and how they are addressed and resolved. Is it right to attack or target cities with nuclear weapons? Is it right to even possess them? Is it right to detain asylum seekers, push their boats out to sea, or return them to the places from which they fled? Is it right to target terrorists and insurgents with remote-controlled robotic aircraft and missiles, even if those killed include civilians and if their operators aim—and kill without risk? Is it right to invade a foreign country to stop crimes against humanity, end a famine, build a state, or remove a regime, and if so, what are the right ways of going about it? Is it right to use torture, or suspend habeas corpus or the rule of law, to protect our security? What forms of reasoning, what criteria and ends, should govern such decisions?

These are some of what most of us recognise as "moral" questions central to war and security questions about killing, harm and humanity—and put in this form they are certainly of great importance. In particular, such questions are addressed in great depth in the "just war'' tradition, and you will read more about that school of thought in the pages that follow. However, in this book we argue that the influence and problem of ethics in security goes beyond moral choices in particular cases, and beyond questions of war and violence, to take in the very system and infrastructure of global security itself. This "system" is a dynamic and contested set of processes that develops out of the frameworks provided by (and actions of) key structures and actors: international treaties and law, regional and global organisations, governments, militaries, intelligence and aid agencies, NGOs, corporations, communities, and civil society organisations. The "international" management of security, however, should not be confused with a genuinely global sensibility, perspective, practice or set of institutions. Currently, we have a largely state-centric international security system that attempts very imperfectly to deal with increasingly global processes and dynamics of insecurity: risks and threats that have transnational and often global sources and symptoms. This system is structured around a cooperative tension (and sometimes outright conflict) between national security policies and military alliances, regional security organisations (like ASEAN or the OSCE) and collective security "regimes" of international law, treaty agreements and international organisations in areas like arms control, disarmament, and the environment. These regimes reflect both cosmopolitan commitments to deal with global problems in an effective and equitable way, and an uglier power politics that generates compromises that reflect particular national and corporate (rather than global) interests. Such regimes are also almost entirely missing or stagnant in areas like the energy and the world economy. A global approach to security thus recognises that our common problems are global in scope and that national, regional and collective security responses need to be reformed to serve genuinely global ends (Burke 2013a).

In our view, the kind of global security system we have, how and to whom it provides security, is the very first ethical question. Does this system serve the interests of states and corporations alone or the interests of all people and the ecosystems that they depend on? Does it serve the interests of the wealthy and powerful, or the poor and the marginalised? Does it serve the interests of some at an unacceptable cost to others? These concerns preoccupied a "high level panel" of former states-people asked by then United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to map out a new global security agenda in 2004. In their report, A More Secure World, they said:

Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus lead us to dismiss what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their survival. Inequitable responses to threats further fuel division. Many people believe that what passes for collective security today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful. (United Nations 2004: 2)

We believe that “ethics” and “morality” are not things that can be brought to insecurity or war from outside, to a space that would otherwise be unethical or amoral. Rather, we believe that even before we face a specific moral decision, ethics constitutes the choices available to us—that particular ethical commitments, options, limits and imperatives are implicit in the system itself, and in particular theoretical and policy world views. Every' vision, every' practice, and every' system of security has an ethics—even if we cannot agree that all are equally ethical. As Richard Shapcott argues, any work of political ethics

must draw attention to the possible consequences or implications of different starting points...it is only once we have assessed or understood these [consequences] that we can reflect adequately upon our ethics and whether we think the costs of our positions are worth it, or not, or whether they are justifiable or need modification. (Shapcott 2010: uii-ihiii)

In sum, even as we accept that to be able to term a perspective or behaviour “amoral”, “immoral”, or “unethical” is a powerful and sometimes legitimate use of language, it is analytically more helpful to be able to lay out the assumptions and commitments of a range of ethical frameworks that bear on the problems and realities of global security, so that their effects can be considered and judged. Even as we assume a responsibility to advance a distinctive global security ethics that is better—that will lead to a more just and stable world—we do so in a global political context where moral pluralism is a fact. Debate among competing ethical perspectives is necessary and important.

### Policy Failure

#### Precluding poststructural analysis guarantees policy failure

Reus-Smit 12 Christian Reus-Smit, Professor of International Relations, Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Italy, “International Relations, Irrelevant? Don’t Blame Theory,” Millennium, 40(3), 2012, pp.525-540, DOI 10.1177/0305829812442046 /GoGreen! \*added [awareness], [unaware of]

In Defence of Theory

However widespread it might be, the notion that IR’s lack of practical relevance stems from excessive theorising rests more on vigorous assertion than weighty evidence. As noted above, we lack good data on the field’s practical relevance, and the difficulties establishing appropriate measures are all too apparent in the fraught attempts by several governments to quantify the impact of the humanities and social sciences more generally. Beyond this, though, we lack any credible evidence that any fluctuations in the field’s relevance are due to more or less high theory. We hear that policymakers complain of not being able to understand or apply much that appears in our leading journals, but it is unclear why we should be any more concerned about this than physicists or economists, who take theory, even high theory, to be the bedrock of advancement in knowledge. Moreover, there is now a wealth of research, inside and outside IR, that shows that policy communities are not open epistemic or cognitive realms, simply awaiting well-communicated, non-jargonistic knowledge – they are bureaucracies, deeply susceptible to groupthink, that filter information through their own intersubjective frames. 10

Beyond this, however, there are good reasons to believe that precisely the reverse of the theory versus relevance thesis might be true; that theoretical inquiry may be a necessary prerequisite for the generation of practically relevant knowledge. I will focus here on the value of metatheory, as this attracts most contemporary criticism and would appear the most difficult of theoretical forms to defend.

Metatheories take other theories as their subject. Indeed, their precepts establish the conditions of possibility for second-order theories. In general, metatheories divide into three broad categories: epistemology, ontology and meta-ethics. The first concerns the nature, validity and acquisition of knowledge; the second, the nature of being (what can be said to exist, how things might be categorised and how they stand in relation to one another); and the third, the nature of right and wrong, what constitutes moral argument, and how moral arguments might be sustained. Second-order theories are constructed within, and on the basis of, assumptions formulated at the metatheoretical level. Epistemological assumptions about what constitutes legitimate knowledge and how it is legitimately acquired delimit the questions we ask and the kinds of information we can enlist in answering them. 11 Can social scientists ask normative questions? Is literature a valid source of social-scientific knowledge? Ontological assumptions about the nature and distinctiveness of the social universe affect not only what we ‘see’ but also how we order what we see; how we relate the material to the ideational, agents to structures, interests to beliefs, and so on. If we assume, for example, that individuals are rational actors, engaged in the efficient pursuit of primarily material interests, then phenomena such as faith-motivated politics will remain at the far periphery of our vision. 12 Lastly, meta-ethical assumptions about the nature of the good, and about what constitutes a valid moral argument, frame how we reason about concrete ethical problems. Both deontology and consequentialism are meta-ethical positions, operationalised, for example, in the differing arguments of Charles Beitz and Peter Singer on global distributive justice. 13

Most scholars would acknowledge the background, structuring role that metatheory plays, but argue that we can take our metatheoretical assumptions off the shelf, get on with the serious business of research and leave explicit metatheoretical reflection and debate to the philosophers. If practical relevance is one of our concerns, however, there are several reasons why this is misguided.

Firstly, whether IR is practically relevant depends, in large measure, on the kinds of questions that animate our research. I am not referring here to the commonly held notion that we should be addressing questions that practitioners want answered. Indeed, our work will at times be most relevant when we pursue questions that policymakers and others would prefer left buried. My point is a different one, which I return to in greater detail below. It is sufficient to note here that being practically relevant involves asking questions of practice; not just retrospective questions about past practices – their nature, sources and consequences – but prospective questions about what human agents should do. As I have argued elsewhere, being practically relevant means asking questions of how we, ourselves, or some other actors (states, policymakers, citizens, NGOs, IOs, etc.) should act. 14 Yet our ability, nay willingness, to ask such questions is determined by the metatheoretical assumptions that structure our research and arguments. This is partly an issue of ontology – what we see affects how we understand the conditions of action, rendering some practices possible or impossible, mandatory or beyond the pale. If, for example, we think that political change is driven by material forces, then we are unlikely to see communicative practices of argument and persuasion as potentially successful sources of change. More than this, though, it is also an issue of epistemology. If we assume that the proper domain of IR as a social science is the acquisition of empirically verifiable knowledge, then we will struggle to comprehend, let alone answer, normative questions of how we should act. We will either reduce ‘ought’ questions to ‘is’ questions, or place them off the agenda altogether. 15 Our metatheoretical assumptions thus determine the macro-orientation of IR towards questions of practice, directly affecting the field’s practical relevance.

Secondly, metatheoretical revolutions license new second-order theoretical and analytical possibilities while foreclosing others, directly affecting those forms of scholarship widely considered most practically relevant. The rise of analytical eclecticism illustrates this. As noted above, Katzenstein and Sil’s call for a pragmatic approach to the study of world politics, one that addresses real-world problematics by combining insights from diverse research traditions, resonates with the mood of much of the field, especially within the American mainstream. Epistemological and ontological debates are widely considered irresolvable dead ends, grand theorising is unfashionable, and gladiatorial contests between rival paradigms appear, increasingly, as unimaginative rituals. Boredom and fatigue are partly responsible for this new mood, but something deeper is at work. Twenty-five years ago, Sil and Katzenstein’s call would have fallen on deaf ears; the neo-neo debate that preoccupied the American mainstream occurred within a metatheoretical consensus, one that combined a neo-positivist epistemology with a rationalist ontology. This singular metatheoretical framework defined the rules of the game; analytical eclecticism was unimaginable. The Third Debate of the 1980s and early 1990s destabilised all of this; not because American IR scholars converted in their droves to critical theory or poststructuralism (far from it), but because metatheoretical absolutism became less and less tenable. The anti-foundationalist critique of the idea that there is any single measure of truth did not produce a wave of relativism, but it did generate a widespread sense that battles on the terrain of epistemology were unwinnable. Similarly, the Third Debate emphasis on identity politics and cultural particularity, which later found expression in constructivism, did not vanquish rationalism. It did, however, establish a more pluralistic, if nevertheless heated, debate about ontology, a terrain on which many scholars felt more comfortable than that of epistemology. One can plausibly argue, therefore, that the metatheoretical struggles of the Third Debate created a space for – even made possible – the rise of analytical eclecticism and its aversion to metatheoretical absolutes, a principal benefit of which is said to be greater practical relevance.

Lastly, most of us would agree that for our research to be practically relevant, it has to be good – it has to be the product of sound inquiry, and our conclusions have to be plausible. The pluralists among us would also agree that different research questions require different methods of inquiry and strategies of argument. Yet across this diversity there are several practices widely recognised as essential to good research. Among these are clarity of purpose, logical coherence, engagement with alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons (empirical evidence, corroborating arguments textual interpretations, etc.). Less often noted, however, is the importance of metatheoretical reflexivity. If our epistemological assumptions affect the questions we ask, then being conscious of these assumptions is necessary to ensure that we are not fencing off questions of importance, and that if we are, we can justify our choices. Likewise, if our ontological assumptions affect how we see the social universe, determining what is in or outside our field of vision [awareness], then reflecting on these assumptions can prevent us being blind to [unaware of] things that matter. A similar argument applies to our meta-ethical assumptions. Indeed, if deontology and consequentialism are both meta-ethical positions, as I suggested earlier, then reflecting on our choice of one or other position is part and parcel of weighing rival ethical arguments (on issues as diverse as global poverty and human rights). Finally, our epistemological, ontological and meta-ethical assumptions are not metatheoretical silos; assumptions we make in one have a tendency to shape those we make in another. The oft-heard refrain that ‘if we can’t measure it, it doesn’t matter’ is an unfortunate example of epistemology supervening on ontology, something that metatheoretical reflexivity can help guard against. In sum, like clarity, coherence, consideration of alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons, metatheoretical reflexivity is part of keeping us honest, making it practically relevant despite its abstraction.

### AT: Scenario Analysis Good

#### Scenario analysis is itself what we’re critiquing, and drives our impacts – does NOT challenge stereotypes, rather magnifies and empowers them to self-authorize violence through surveillance, policing and intervention

Hogue 15 Simon Houge, PhD candidate, philosophy, McGill University, MA linguistics, University of Ottowa, “Ubiquitous surveillance for paranoid security apparatus, or how mass security surveillance threatens the democratic space of revelation and deliberation,” paper presented at the CPSA Annual Conference, 6-24-2015

Securing through risk is based on an act of imagination: that of future threats. Security experts, or “managers of unease”, must think of the possible and, more importantly, not so possible threats, those almost unthinkable plots that would bring the greater damages (Salter, 2008). Uncertainty provides for a logical foundation to imagination: the absolute impossibility to know the future means that all scenarios must be anticipated (Amoore & De Goede, 2008b). This process of imaginative thinking, or premediation, is not about forecasting correctly the future. Grusin explains: “premediation ... is not necessarily about getting the future right as much as it is about trying to imagine or map out as many possible futures as could plausibly be imagined” (De Goede, 2008a). Once imagined these possible futures become the basis for present actions. The visualization of these futures allow for planning scenarios and acting in the present to avoid them from happening in the future. For Marieke de Goede, premediation is for this reason highly problematic: Perhaps precisely because of its ability to foster current action, we could argue that premediation has itself become the catastrophe (Coutin, 2008). Not only does security premediation offer a fantasy of control and rational management of the uncertain future that ‘depoliticises the limits of knowledge’ (Best, 2006: 13–14); more worrying still is the fact that premediation is performative. This does not mean that disastrous imagined futures will inevitably play out, but it does mean that the imagination of some scenarios over others, the visualization of some futures and not others, entails profoundly political work that enables and constrains political decisionmaking in the present (De Goede, 2008a, p. 171) In this context, the use of algorithms to visualize these scenarios accentuates the importance of predetermined data (and fear and stereotypes) by raising attention to some while ignoring others. The attention raised by algorithms validates not actual threats, but the information deemed relevant in the imagined scenarios. Amoore explains: In effect, algorithms precisely function as a means of directing and disciplining attention, focusing on specific points and cancelling out all other data, appearing to make it possible to translate probable associations between people or objects into actionable security decisions... In this sense, the algorithm produces a screened visualization of suspicion, on the basis of which ‘other’ people are intercepted, detained, stopped and searched (Amoore, 2009, p. 22). In brief, the security surveillance apparatus works from an algorithmic, intuitive reality based on imagination and “confirmed” by dissected and reassembled data that form profiles of safe or threatening dividuals. In a sense, relying on a fictitious world is not illogical since history has proved that one cannot trust what it sees. But this generates a double problem: the algorithmic visualization of intuitive scenarios constrains the apparatus to see only the predetermined scenario that reappears in their algorithms (Amoore, 2009; 2011). These scenarios become similar to self-fulfilling prophecies that cannot be proved wrong since risk may always spring from an uncertain world. In addition, to use de Goede’s words again, “Premediation has the ability to foster societal fragilities and resentment, while disregarding its present victims as ‘collateral damage’” (De Goede, 2008a, p. 171). Today’s victims represent the potential threats in a scenario that did not happen, but that always can. As such, they are never freed of suspicion.

## ALT

### AT: Alt Fails

#### Poststructural IR is empirically effective

Jahn 21 Beate Jahn, Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, President of the European International Studies Association, “Critical theory in crisis? a reconsideration,” European Journal of International Relations, 27(4), 2021, DOI 10.1177/13540661211049491 /GoGreen!

All strands of critical theory, in sum, have undergone considerable theoretical development over the course of their operation in IR. And far from representing some ahistorical theoretical flight of fancy, these developments clearly run parallel with and address contemporaneous historical dynamics. Critical theories, in short, are neither substantively nor theoretically out of sync with history.

Hence, I will now investigate the second claim, also in two parts: that critical theories have been politically irrelevant—because they failed to provide empirical studies of pressing political problems. Have critical theorists “empirically” analyzed “pressing political problems?” To answer this question, I will treat as “pressing political problems” issues that were widely discussed in mainstream academic and public debates and as “empirical” analysis methods such as ethnographic fieldwork and interviews as well as the analysis of documents, pictures, statistics, and so on.

Critical IR scholarship systematically provides empirical analyses of pressing political problems from the 1980s onward. In the context of the Second Cold War and the peace movement, feminists used fieldwork and empirical research to investigate strategic discourses (Cohn, 1987) as well as the reproduction of gender inequality in and through military service (Yuval-Davis, 1985). Among the most pressing political issues arising at the end of the Cold War were the Yugoslav wars. While feminists conducted interviews and used statistics to study the systematic use of rape in those wars (Stiglmayer, 1994), poststructuralists analyzed their media representations (Campbell, 1998). Marxists challenged dominant discourses on globalization by empirically comparing the integration of the world economy in the 1990s with that at the end of the 19th century (Hirst and Thompson, 1996) while feminists exposed the gendered nature of global governance by studying policy documents of international organizations (Meyer and Prügl, 1999). Feminist and postcolonial scholars also undertook fieldwork in Somalia (Miller and Moskos, 1995) and analyzed international legal texts regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Kosovo (Orford, 1999).

In the early 2000s, 9/11 raised a host of important issues addressed by critical scholars. Thus, we find the empirical analysis of different cases of political self-sacrifice (Fierke, 2012), a poststructuralist investigation of the Muhammad cartoon crisis (Hansen, 2011), analysis of the role of enemy images in the case of Iraq (Dodge, 2012), and legal implications of preemption in the war on terror (De Goede, 2008). There are empirical investigations of counter-terrorism policies and programs like Prevent and Channel (Martin, 2018) as well as of British involvement in prisoner abuse through the rendition program (Blakeley and Raphael, 2017). The analysis of media and policy documents demonstrates the role of gender in the justification of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the importance of women as targets and practicioners in counter-insurgency (Dyvik, 2014). This development of a militarized femininity is also explored through the role of women prisoners of war and women prison guards in the Iraq war (Sjoberg, 2007).

In addition, critical scholars empirically investigated the AIDS crisis and its impact on security and governmentality (Elbe, 2009). The financial crisis and rising inequality are widely explored through economic data (Knafo, 2009; McNally, 2010) and their political impact in the case of Brexit and Trump linked to electoral statistics (Rosenberg and Boyle, 2019). Critical IR scholars have also provided in-depth empirical analyses of concrete human rights struggles and their consequences (Odysseos, 2011) and of arms trade and licensing strategies (Stavrianakis, 2008).

In short, critical scholars have systematically analyzed “pressing political problems” and they have regularly done so using “empirical” methods. It therefore now remains to determine whether this work has remained politically sterile. I will show that critical theories have made a significant contribution to different types of political impact.

I will begin with the impact of critical theories on their home ground: academia. Higher education in general and universities in particular, it is worth recalling, are integral to the division of labor in contemporary societies (Campbell and Bleiker, 2016: 210). Since their entry into IR in the 1980s, critical theories have radically transformed the field. Today, IR textbooks regularly contain chapters on Marxist, feminist, poststructuralist, postcolonial—and sometimes even generically critical—theories (Baylis et al., 2017; Sterling-Folker, 2013). Proponents of these critical approaches now occupy chairs in IR (and Politics) departments (University of Sussex, 2018). Critical scholarship like postcolonialism has led to the establishment of entirely new fields of study like Black Studies in the United Kingdom (Andrews, 2016) and Africana Studies in the United States (Cornell University, n.d.). Critical scholarship is today published in mainstream journals—from International Studies Quarterly to the European Journal of International Relations—and it has its own outlets like Security Dialogue or International Political Sociology, the latter endorsed as an International Studies Association (ISA) publication. Professional IR associations have Global South, Women’s and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Asexual (LGBTQA) caucuses (ISA, n.d.). Academics decolonize education, the classroom, the University (Kennedy, 2017), ensure that women are represented on appointments committees, and rule out male-only panels at their conferences (European International Studies Association (EISA), n.d.). Even if mainstream approaches and positivism remain dominant in academia in general and IR in particular, therefore, critical theories have radically transformed the discipline’s understanding of and approaches to the study of IR (Rengger and Thirkell-White, 2007: 5). And they have contributed to a shift in power relations as well as to organizational and cultural reform within academic institutions.

But the political impact of critical theories is not restricted to academia. Critical theories have played an important role in shifting public perception in a variety of issue areas thus empowering social movements. Marxist2 and postcolonial studies, for instance, widely challenged the hegemonic discourse on globalization thus contributing to the anti-globalization movement, to protests against neoliberal economic and development policies (Krishna, 2000: 155–156), to climate change negotiations (Saran, 2015) as well as informing refugee and migration policies (Bilgic, 2018).

Postcolonial analyses of the way in which representation and memory serve to uphold unequal power relations has informed protest movements for quite some time—from the naming of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton (Fisher, 2015) through the “Rhodes must fall” movement in Oxford and Cape Town to reviews of a number of public statues associated with colonialism, racism, and genocide from Australia to New York (Mudditt, 2017; NYT Editorial, 2017). These movements are currently sweeping across the entire globe, leading to significant policy changes (The New York Times, 2020). Similarly, poststructuralist work like Cynthia Weber’s film I Am an American (Weber, 2007) is an integral part of public debate on the openDemocracy website while James DerDerian’s documentaries have won awards at major film festivals and are the subject of national newspaper reports (Der Derian, n.d.).

Academic theories have also influenced political parties and topical issues like Brexit lately. The work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, also influential in IR, played a role in the development of new parties like Podemos in Spain or Syriza in Greece (Hancox, 2015; Judis, 2016). Similarly, Marxist arguments feed into Lexit—leftist arguments for Brexit (McFadyen, 2017; Zagoria, 2017).

In addition, individual critical scholars actively participate in a wide range of political projects. Teivo Teivainen set up the Network Institute for Global Democratization (NIGD, n.d.) and is an active member of the World Social Forum (Teivainen, 2018). The scholar-activist network Transnational Institute has been supported by IR scholars like Fred Halliday, Boris Kagarlitsky, Richard Falk, Achin Vanaik (TNI, n.d.). Poststructuralists are actively engaged in the “Righting Corporate Wrongs” campaign (Coleman, 2015).

Not limited to social and protest movements, critical theory has also shaped the policies of governments and international organizations. Postcolonial and feminist thought, for instance, is reflected in the Equality Act passed by the British Government in 2010 (Equality Act 2010, 2020) just as gender, LGBT, and queer studies have paved the way for the integration of women into the military and the repeal of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policies in the American military in 2010. Similarly, feminist work3 led to the recognition of rape as a war crime in the International Criminal Court (ICC, Rome Statute, n.d.) and to the integration of policies addressing sexual and gender-based violence into humanitarian policies (Veit, 2018). In 1995, the UN Human Development Programme adopted the Gender Development Index (GDI). It also led to the adoption of gender mainstreaming by the United Nations (UN) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and in 1996 the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted international standards for home-based work that largely impacts on women (Tickner, 2011: 273). Critical scholars serve as experts on governmental committees on human rights and arms trade (Stavrianakis, 2015) and their work on the environment is taken up at the UN (Newell, 2020; Newell and Simms, 2020).

Critical theories have thus been successful in leading to legal and political change within and between societies. In doing so, however, they have also become part of the establishment. As Alex Veit shows, the integration of a response to sexual and gender-based violence into humanitarian policies simultaneously entails an integration into a wider liberal governance strategy—thus providing opportunities for the improvement of beneficiaries’ lives but not for the radical transformation of gender relations in society as a whole (Veit, 2018). Similarly, the treatment of women is now used as a justification for war or intervention, in Afghanistan for instance, while International Financial Institutions use gay rights to cast their economic policies in a progressive light (Rao, 2015). Critical thought is thus widely—albeit variably—reflected in public debate, in political struggles, and in the law and policies of powerful states and institutions—where it now also serves dominant governance purposes. The same is true for academia itself. Erstwhile critical approaches like securitization theory become part of the academic establishment and begin to attract critical scrutiny (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020).

In sum, the empirical evidence shows that critical IR theories have, over the past (almost) 40 years, been closely aligned to historical developments and conducted empirical research into serious political issues. Above all, the empirical evidence undermines the claim that critical theories have had no political relevance. It shows, on the contrary, that critical theories have shaped a wide range of political principles, practices, and institutions.

Yet, these empirical findings do not indicate that the debate about the fate of critical theory today is unfounded. Instead, they help us formulate the puzzle more accurately: How do we account for the widespread sense of disappointment among critical theorists in light of these achievements?

Critical theory in theory

In order to make sense of this tension, I will now trace the changing conception of critical theory over time and show that in the course of its inevitable engagement with political practice, critical theory loses sight of its core metatheoretical principles. Critical theories become integrated into the mainstream and thus lose the ability to inspire visions of an alternative society. And it is this loss, not despite but because of the empirical successes of critical theory, that accounts for the current disappointment. What is more, I will show, the solutions offered to address this problem today tend to reflect the specific pressures of neoliberalism and lead to the subsumption of critical theory under the current hegemonic forces.

The term critical theory as used in professional academia today was originally coined by Max Horkheimer. Horkheimer’s essay Traditionelle und Kritische Theorie (1937, republished in 1968) provides a useful starting point not only because it offers its first systematic conceptualization but also because it was motivated by the same question as the current debate. Confronted with the rise of Nazism, Horkheimer asked how it was possible that the sciences, supposedly based on reason, did not present an obstacle to the development of an utterly unreasonable society. What made the co-existence of science and national socialism possible? According to Horkheimer, the answer lay in certain features of “traditional theory” and he designed “critical theory” specifically to preclude such complicity. And yet, today it seems that critical theory has been unable to prevent the rise of populism. The current debate is therefore motivated by the parallel question: what makes the coexistence of critical theory and populism possible, and what resources does critical theory offer to confront this challenge?

Such parallels are, of course, dependent on drawing historical and theoretical lines—between the rise of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s and populism today, and between Horkheimer’s conception of critical theory and critical IR theories today. The historical claim of comparability is contested but it has given rise to a revival of interest in the Frankfurt School (Guyer, 2020; Illing, 2016; Ross, 2016).4 This interest is relevant for us in two ways. First, Horkheimer identifies core principles of critical theory that also explicitly characterized early conceptions of critical theory in IR—and it is these same principles that are fundamentally contested in the current debate. The fate of these principles over time thus provides a historical thread that meaningfully connects Horkheimer’s work to the current debate. Second, Horkheimer theorizes the historical logic of critical theory and thus provides tools for its analysis today. Horkheimer’s conception of critical theory, in short, serves as an analytical resource providing historical reference points and theoretical tools rather than authoritative definitions.

I will begin by reconstructing Horkheimer’s conception and its difference to “mainstream” theory. The next step shows that critical IR theories of all strands originally subscribed to the same core principles—that are now, however, under serious attack. Following Horkheimer’s theorization of the historical dynamic of critical theory, the last section shows that it is the practical alignment with neoliberalism that engenders calls to discard these critical principles.

At the core of Horkheimer’s conceptualization of critical theory lies the relationship between theory and practice—specifically, between science and national socialism. He argued that their coexistence was made possible by positivist theory in three main ways. First, positivism presupposes a separation between thinking and reality, reason and society. Ideally, theory serves to bridge this gap: to provide a theoretical explanation of that reality in the form of causal connections—hypotheses—which then need to be empirically tested (Horkheimer, 1968: 16–17). Yet, this assumption overlooks, according to Horkheimer, that thinking itself is shaped by society and changes over time—hence that thinking and reality cannot be separated.

Second, positivism claims that its language is, in principle, universally valid, that it can be applied to all areas of knowledge. As long as one makes sure that all the individual elements of a particular theory are true (i.e. empirically substantiated) and logically connected, one can work one’s way up from the simplest objects of cognition to the most complex ones (Horkheimer, 1968: 13). Horkheimer points out, however, that if reason is indeed independent of reality—as positivism assumes—then positivist science is completely self-referential: it can only ever test its own theories rather than determine or explain extra-scientific purposes. Hence, the inhumane purposes of Nazi society made no difference to the process of theorizing while, conversely, the scientific process never presented an obstacle to the development of national socialism (Horkheimer, 1968: 18).

Finally, the purpose of positivist science is to make as much empirical knowledge as possible useful to society—rather like a library catalog without which the accumulated books and articles cannot be accessed and used (Horkheimer, 1968: 13). However, since positivist science cannot grasp society’s purposes, it is useful only with reference to the existing purposes of society. The Nazis could make use of science despite, or indeed for, their inhumane purposes because the latter did not appear within the scientific process (Horkheimer, 1968: 18).

Horkheimer therefore concludes that the positivist separation of reason and reality provided the basis for the coexistence of science and national socialism: by “failing to fail,” by allowing reason to exist within a fundamentally unjust and violent society, the sciences contributed to making the latter “respectable.” And he locates this separation of reason and reality in a particular historical context. Liberal capitalist society, he argues, is not directed by a plan, governed by a particular authority, or oriented toward a common goal. Instead, the whole of liberal society emerges simply as the result of a myriad of particular relationships, as the result of competition between different individuals and groups (Horkheimer, 1968: 22, 24–25). As long as the whole of society is unreasonable, therefore, reason cannot come into its own (Horkheimer, 1968: 27–29, 36).

This analysis, whether or not it does justice to positivism, provides the basis for Horkheimer’s elaboration of critical theory. The shortcomings of positivism imply that science has to overcome the separation of reason and reality if it wants to present an obstacle to violence and injustice. But this would require a transformation of society as a whole—whose unreasonable nature constitutes this separation. Alas, since society is constituted through a division of labor of which the sciences are an integral part, they cannot help but participate in its reproduction (Horkheimer, 1968: 19). Any substantive vision of a better society is thus rooted in, the product of, and limited by the existing—unjust and violent—society. This analysis produces two basic assumptions: First, theory is practice. The sciences willy-nilly play a constitutive role in and for society, and hence there is no such thing as an “ivory tower”—a sphere of knowledge production detached from political practice. Second, thinking, science, perception itself are socially formed: all knowledge is historical (Horkheimer, 1968: 23). Critical theory therefore has to operate under the same limitations as traditional theory: it has no privileged vantage point, no special methods, no access to the whole of society (Horkheimer, 1968: 29).

Critical theory thus cannot offer a substantive notion of emancipation (Horkheimer, 1968: 31). The emancipatory goal of transforming society as a whole must instead become a regulative ideal—and this in turn provides critical theory with two core principles. First, if a substantive notion of emancipation is only possible for society as a whole and if this whole is obscured to all parties, then the only way to honor that goal lies in the refusal to “solve” particular problems within existing society, to make anything in that society work “better.” Critical theory is suspicious of terms like “productive,” “valuable,” “progressive” because they are defined with reference to the purposes of existing society—rather than its transformation. It thus lacks the “pragmatic” character of, and cannot be “consumed” like, traditional theory (Horkheimer, 1968: 27, 29, 35–36). Second, critical theory honors the assumption that reason and society, knowledge and reality, theory and practice, are mutually constitutive by refusing to separate them in the scientific process. Critical theory therefore does not analyze problems “out there”; it investigates those problems always through the way in which they are constituted through knowledge (Horkheimer, 1968: 36). Critical theory aims to change thinking (Horkheimer, 1968: 31); it reflects on the way in which knowledge production itself is complicit in the constitution of social and political issues.

### AT: Alt Fails – Jarvis

#### Jarvis and other grumpy get off my lawn takes, while amusing, are not responsive

Shapiro 1 Michael J. Shapiro, Professor of Politial Science at the University of Hawaii, “Review: Pragmatic Critique and Gothic Fiction,” International Studies Review, 3(1), Spring 2001, pp.126-128, JSTOR /GoGreen!

D. S. L. Jarvis's International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodern­ism: Defending the Discipline constitutes a radical alternative to Cochran's practice of critique. Manifesting a serious allergy to critique and especially to what he calls "postmodernism," Jarvis presumes that he must defend tradi­tional, neopositivist IR against (in the words of the book jacket) "the various postmodern and poststructuralist theories currently sweeping the discipline of International Relations."

To put the matter simply at the outset, Jarvis appears to be almost entirely ignorant of the philosophical predicates of the critical IR literature he attacks. He invents a model of thought that he finds vulnerable and then proceeds with his method of argumentation, mostly to scoff at the enemy he has invented. But Jarvis's scoffing amounts to whistling in the dark. He has entered a field of critique with predicates that are mysterious to him, and he shows signs of being genuinely anxious about the consequences of critical work.

The monster Jarvis creates is a work of fiction, for he begins with the pre­sumption that postmodern orientations are "sweeping" and therefore threaten­ing the discipline. (I estimate that roughly one percent of the papers at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association reference postructural­ist philosophy.) Returning to the Victorian genre of Gothic fiction in which the constitutive practice involves two primary roles—the monster and the victim—Jarvis portrays Richard Ashley as the Frankenstein monster and the victim as the entire IR discipline. Moreover, Jarvis's overwrought style of characteriza­tion of the dangers of postmodern IR fits Gothic fiction's motivational profile as well. As is noted in Fred Botting's treatment of the genre: "The terrors and horrors of transgression in Gothic writing become powerful means to reassert the values of society, virtue and propriety. . . . They warn of dangers by putting them in their darkest and most threatening form" (p. 5).

Why fiction? Jarvis' makes "the postmodern" (which he seems to know primarily on the basis of rumor, for most of his citations are not to postructur­alist texts but to thinkers hostile to them) an elastic category that applies to everything that he perceives to be antagonistic to his pre-Kantian empiricism. It encompasses most of feminist IR and anything that uses interpretive method. Although the use of a deconstructive mode of critique is extremely rare in international studies (the major practitioner is David Campbell), Jarvis fre­quently uses the term "deconstruction" as a synonym for postmodernist method. He assumes, without showing any evidence that he has read a word of Jacques Derrida's writings, that deconstruction is hostile to theory building and is opposed to all forms of affirmation. This characterization is belied by Derrida's statements and demonstrations and by Campbell's deconstruction-inspired writing on war, security, and the ethics of responsibility. Symptomatic of his woeful ignorance of critical work in general, Jarvis refers at one point to the expression "structure of feeling" as a "postmodern phrase" (p. 32). Structure of feeling is initiated in the work of Raymond Williams, the late (and famous—though not sufficiently to alert Jarvis) Marxist literary critic whose work cannot be remotely related to poststructuralist critique and has inspired such prominent postmod­ernism bashers as Terry Eagleton.

Jarvis's ignorance is not confined to contemporary critical interpretive theory (postmodern or otherwise); it even extends to the neoempiricist philosophy of science. For example, he chides postmodernists for holding the outrageous view that theorizing constitutes fact (p. 27), while he wants to uphold a model in which the integrity of theory—in international studies or elsewhere—requires that the domains of theory and fact be understood as radically separate. One need not resort to a Foucauldian treatment of discourse as event or a Deleuzian critique of representational thinking to challenge Jarvis's approach to theory. Jarvis's view of the theory–data relationship was seriously impeached by enough neoempiricist philosophers by the 1960s to field a softball team (among the heavy hitters in the starting lineup would be Willard V. Quine, Patrick Suppes, and Norwood Russell Hanson).

The critical work for which Jarvis has contempt is not the threat he imag­ines to "the discipline," unless we construct the IR discipline as a trained inat­tention to the problematics, within which the work of theory proceeds. The writings of Michel Foucault (some of whose work Jarvis seems to have read) have implications for a critical and affirmative perspective that does not com­promise the kind of theory building that IR empiricists do. It extends the arena—in which to theorize while encouraging a historical sensitivity—to regimes of discourse and suggests an ethico-politics of freedom from the impo­sitions of identity. Although Foucault's conception of the problematic points to how concepts and the modes of fact assigned to them are historically contin­gent, explicable in contexts of value, and complicit with modes of power and authority, this does not thereby invalidate theory. Rather, it opens the way to work on the ethico-political context of theory and, among other things, to theo­rize with a sensitivity to theory's constituencies (beyond the policymakers that seem to be prized by Jarvis). As Molly Cochran, whose work is based on knowl­edge and critique rather than rumor and contempt, implies, an important legacy of contemporary critical work is the expansion of political and moral inclusion.

Finally, there is one other genre that is (regrettably) embedded in Jarvis's fable of the dangers of postmodernism, a biographical speculation about a five-year hiatus in Richard Ashley's publishing life. Obsessed with the dangers of postmodernism, Jarvis attributes these years of silence to the "deep resigna­tion" (p. 183) that he thinks Ashley's version of postmodern theorizing invites. Without insisting on a counterspeculation, I want to point out that Ashley's publishing hiatus coincides with the period shortly after an automobile accident claimed the life of his wife and seriously maimed his two sons. At a minimum, the information renders Jarvis's biographical fable crass and uninformed—like the rest of the book.

### AT: Link Inevitable

#### Links are NOT inevitable – only seems that way because speech acts such as the 1AC continually reconstitute “Western” identity through securitization – the ALT solves

Burke 7 Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer, School of Politics and Professor of International Relations, University of New South Wales, *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, Routledge, 2007, ISBN 978-0-203-96570, p.68-69 /GoGreen!

This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, otherness and violence in ways that for many appear like enduring political facts, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose conditions might be understood and policed; they condition politics as such, forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very possibility of the present. Conflict and alienation seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination has conceived and thought security, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance.

While I hold out the hope that security can be re-visioned away from a permanent dependence on insecurity, exclusion and violence, and I believe it retains normative promise, this analysis takes a deliberate step backward to examine the very real barriers faced by such a project. Security cannot properly be rethought without a deeper understanding of, and challenge to, the political forms and structures it claims to enable and protect. If Ken Booth argues that the state should be a means rather than an end of security, my objective here is to place the continuing power and depth of its status as an end of security, and a fundamental source for political identity, under critical interrogation.' If the state is to become a means of security (one among many) it will have to be fundamentally transformed.

The chapter pursues this inquiry in two stages. The first outlines the historic strength and effective redundancy of such an exciusivist vision of security in Israel, wherein Israel not only confronts military and political antagonists with an 'iron wall' of armed force but maps this onto a profound clash of existential narratives, a problem with resonances in the West's confrontation with radical Islamism in the war on terror. The second, taking up the remainder of the chapter, then explores a series of potential resources in continental philosophy and political theory that might help us to think our way out of a security grounded in violence and alienation. Through a critical engagement with this thought, I aim to construct a political ethics based not in relations between insecure and separated identities mapped solely onto nation-states, but in relations of responsibility and interconnection that can negotiate and recognise both distinct and intertwined histories, identities and needs; an ethics that might underpin a vision of interdependent (national and non-national) existence proper to an integrated world traversed by endless flows of people, commerce, ideas, violence and future potential.

### AT: Floating PICs Bad

#### No link – we’re NOT a floating PIC – no part of the ALT advocates security cooperation with NATO – because there’s no version of it that can avoid being framed by “Western” identity – BUT that does NOT mean transatlantic cooperation is impossible, NOR that nothing can be done to solve their advantage impacts – our argument is simply that by debating representations, we come to understand unintended consequences better, and through creativity and reflexivity, can figure out ways of thinking and acting that mitigate those consequences – that’s Bacchi

#### No impact – it’s no different than saying the states counterplan spills up, or a pilot program is modelled – their burden to win their advantages are intrinsic to the plan, and there’s no other way to solve them, is the same as answering any advantage counterplan

### ALT – Security/NATO PIC

#### The alternative is cooperation (minus security/NATO) – it’s NOT incompatible with alliances, NOR policy engagement – BUT the solidarity required to actually provide peace is mutually exclusive with NATO and security cooperation

Acheson 22 Ray Acheson, Director of the Women’s International League For Peace & Freedom’s Disarmament Programme, represents WILPF on the steering committees of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and the International Network on Explosive Weapons, “Militarism Cannot Prevent War: An urgent call for de-escalation, demilitarisation, and disarmament in relation to Ukraine and beyond,” WILPF, 2-14-2022, <https://www.wilpf.org/militarism-cannot-prevent-war-an-urgent-call-for-de-escalation-demilitarisation-and-disarmament-in-relation-to-ukraine-and-beyond/> /GoGreen!

People-centred solutions for peace

Beyond this immediate context, action is needed to prevent future armed conflict and threats of nuclear war.

Instead of maintaining opposing military alliances, all parties should engage in building a common, demilitarised security strategy that places cooperation and the collective fulfilment of the needs of people and planet in the forefront of all policies and actions. NATO, for example, should be disbanded and non-militarised, non-divisive alliances for peace and cooperation should be built instead, with international solidarity as its guiding principle. All countries should reduce their military spending immediately, and agree to phased reductions through the implementation of Article 26 of the UN Charter, the mandate for which should be taken from the UN Security Council and given to the UN General Assembly.

All countries should join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and work urgently for the timebound elimination of all nuclear weapons. Through the treaty’s provisions for disarmament, the elimination of nucelar weapons could be pursued through verifiable process and achieved within a decade. The process of nuclear weapon abolition could provide a foundational path to broader changes in the world order. Eliminating nuclear weapons would help establish a new cooperative paradigm in international relations and free up resources help address the climate crisis. It would also help generate momentum for broader disarmament and demilitarisation and redirection of money and human ingenuity towards meeting human and planetary needs.

At the core of our efforts, we must put the lives of civilians and care for the planet above perceived military, political, and economic interests. To this end, a people-centred peace process is imperative. As Almut Rochowanaski writes, “We must apply the lessons of 21st-century peacebuilding to create a peace process that is people-centred, women-led and rights-based.” Without this, “patterns of exclusion and victimisation will not be remedied, and memories of pain and injustice will turn into grievance and alienation lasting generations. A broad range of stakeholders can be heard and validated through proven peacebuilding practices, and can go on to build a different future for their country.”

In the Ukraine context, we echo the call of the Ukrainian Pacificist Movement for “open, inclusive and comprehensive negotiations on peace and disarmament in the format of a public dialogue between all state and non-state parties to the conflict with the participation of pro-peace civil society actors.” This type of inclusive process, a process that is not driven or dominated by those who created the crisis in the first place, must be applied to other contexts. We know that more inclusive processes lead to more stable peace, yet time after time, only men with guns dictate the terms of “peace”. These solutions invariably lead to the imposition of neoliberal economic policies, gender and racial oppressions and inequalities, and endless militarisation.

The old ways of doing things have proven over and over again that they do no work. We need a new vision of global peace, grounded in the intersectional experiences of people and the needs of the entire planet. Creating and achieving that vision requires changing who is invited to the table: out with the ruling elites, who are bound to personal interests and gains, and in with everyone who stands to lose from conflict. Land and water protectors, feminists, antinuclear activists, those organising for demilitarisation, equality, and care must lead the work for peace, not the people who profit from conflict.

Abolition for transformation

We need a paradigm shift in international relations, stemming from this kind of people-centred peace process. We need to alter the relations between United States and Russia, but more broadly we need to dismantle the militarised global order, militarised conceptions of security, and the dominance of the military-industrial complex over world affairs. The hegemony of colonial-corporate extractivism must also be transformed — for the climate, for relations with First Nations, for the protection of land, water, air, and animals.

An abolitionist framing is useful for cultivating such transformation. Instead of investing in weapons and preparing for war, we must be investing instead of care for people and planet. Abolition is a tool to build a world that works for all, instead of just a few. The abolition of war, globally, requires disarmament and arms control, systems for demilitarisation and reduction of military spending. But it also requires building structures for peace, solidarity, cooperation, and nonviolence to flourish. It means replacing weapons with renewable energy, war with diplomacy, capitalism with a redistributive feminist political economy that is centered on equality, social justice, degrowth and ecological sustainability.

Unlearning the necessity of violence is essential to exploring what could be built in its place. This means turning on its head so much of what we are taught about what’s necessary for safety and security in our world. It means learning to reject violence as a solution to all problems, interrogating and challenging systems of power that assert they exist to protect while instead they persecute and oppress.

## PERM

### AT: Perm

#### Poststructural analysis is mutually exclusive with endorsement – refusing to offer a competing solution now is key to producing future advocacies capable of solving both the case and our links – that’s Bacchi – makes any perm severance – a voter for making offense impossible

#### Even if it’s possible to problematize policy representations while endorsing them anyway – that disincentivizes researching representations – making all offense on framework offense against the perm – that’s Jahn

#### Our links are disads to implementation that turn case AND generate external offense – they explicitly describe how the particular reps we’re indicting will be attached to the plan – quote – “narratives…materialize in NATO’s strategic documents where the allies agree on…shared identity…[and] shared threat assessment” – that’s Schlag

#### Failing to reject problematic representations of security revealed through poststructural analysis prevents transformation

Neocleous 8 Mark Neocleous, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy in the Department of Government, Brunel University London, *Critique of Security*, Edinburgh University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-7486-3328-9, pp.185-186 /GoGreen!

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.

This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.

Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.

For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to [remain ignorant of] the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

### AT: Performative Contradiction

#### The fact that we also read positions that link is irrelevant – our framework isn’t “you said a dirty word” – rather, that a win condition for poststructuralist criticism, within a hypothesis testing approach to policy analysis, is important to produce reflective subjects capable of transformative change – it’s NOT a contradiction and does NOT justify “severing reps”

Jahn 21 Beate Jahn, Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, President of the European International Studies Association, “Critical theory in crisis? a reconsideration,” European Journal of International Relations, 27(4), 2021, DOI 10.1177/13540661211049491 /GoGreen!

But what does this mean for critical theory in practice—and for its relationship to practice? After all, critical theory cannot just rest on these metatheoretical principles; it has to apply them. And this means, first of all, that in the absence of a privileged vantage point with access to society as a whole (Horkheimer, 1968: 29), it must—just like traditional theory—take particular individuals, groups, or issues as a starting point. Second, in the absence of special methods, critical analyses must also use the most advanced theoretical tools available. Third, however, in order not to separate theory and practice, critical analysis has to focus reflexively on the particular forms of knowledge that constitute its object. And, finally, it must explore how the problem at hand is entangled with society as a whole (Horkheimer, 1968: 35, 30).

In practice there is, then, considerable overlap between conventional and critical theory—from the focus on particular problems to the use of common methods. Indeed, Horkheimer’s analysis of the limitations of “traditional” theory were not at all unique. Max Weber’s lecture on Science as a Vocation famously highlights the limits of scientific knowledge: establishing its historical nature, the particularity of its insights, its inability to grasp the whole or to establish objectivity (Weber, 1948: 137, 135, 138, 139, 153). Weber (1948), too, comes to the conclusion that “science is meaningless because it gives no answer to . . . the only question important for us: ‘What shall we do and how shall we live?’” (p. 143). And like critical theory, Weber (1948) sees the highest aim of science in exploring ‘the devil’s ways to the end in order to realize his power and his limitations’ (p. 152). Mainstream and critical theories thus share a reflexive critique of science, just as they share conventional methods. Hence, the fact that critical theorists themselves use positivist methods—work on the “authoritarian personality,” for example, is based on hypothesis testing (Adorno, 1973)—or that critical IR theorists use a wide range of empirical methods (as we have seen in the previous section) does not present a contradiction.

Rather, the difference between conventional and critical theory lies in the response to these limitations of science. For Weber, these limitations lead, at best, to self-clarification about the implications of the ends or means we choose, and thus to an ethic of responsibility (Weber, 1948: 152). Meanwhile, critical theorists aim to overcome these limitations—not by promising a substantive utopia but by keeping the possibility of an alternative open: through the refusal to become “useful” within the given parameters.

## IMPACT

### AT: Consequentialism

#### Consequentialism is inseparable from securitization – relies upon treating violence as a knowable object, rather than an intersubjective relation – training students to describe “causes”, rather than examine their own relationship to its enabling structures – ensures external, Otherized threats are inflated, while the greater violence endemic to securitized society is dismissed because “the ALT doesn’t solve” – prioritize our impacts in distrust of your capacity to evaluate consequentialist debate on these terms

McDonald 13 Kevin McDonald, Professor and Director of the Centre for Cultural Diversity and Wellbeing at Victoria University, “The Return of Violence,” Chapter 1, *Our Violent World: Terrorism in Society*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, ISBN 978-0-230-22473-5, pp.1-4 /GoGreen!

Among the most significant of these changes are transformations in forms of social and political violence, the kinds of violence recently described by the philosopher Charles Taylor as ‘categorial’, directed towards people whom the protagonists do not personally know (2011). Often such violence is contrasted to the violence that takes place within personal relationships, but as we will see as this book develops, this distinction is not as clear as it once may have been. The chapters that follow attempt to explore a context that has become increasingly evident, as violence that once appeared to be 'contained' by key dimensions of modern society is now much more fluid, increasingly part of the flows making up a global world (Urry 2005). But such violence is not a 'thing' or an object. It is a form of agency, an embodied relationship and human experience. As such, it is a critical lens through which to explore wider transformations of social life. On the other hand, to separate violence from such transformations profoundly limits our capacity to understand, and respond to, one of the most urgent questions shaping the twenty-first century.  
The Surveillance Society  
Most of us are aware of changing forms or potentials of violence through the growth of security and surveillance (Crelinsten 2009). Some developments are obvious, such as airport security. Others are less so, such as passport tracking systems, internment camps, control orders and detention without trial, or erosion of the distinction between immigration policy and security policy (Connolly 2005: 54). Some receive extensive debate in the press and social media, while other developments are less discussed. Over recent years, for example, states as different as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States have been engaged in the construction of thousands of kilometres of walls along national borders, a development that the political scientist Wendy Brown calls 'walling', something she contends is driven by 'waning sovereignty' (2010). Global military expenditure, which had declined in the years following the end of the Cold War in 1989, expanded rapidly over the first decade of the new century, increasing by some 49 per cent to reach US$1.53 trillion in 2009 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2011). New types of public surveillance involve pervasive but ambiguous categories of 'pre-crime' as public policy seeks to identify groups and individuals 'at risk' of committing criminal acts (Zedner 2007). The changing role of the criminal justice system has become evident in the relentless increase in the number of people imprisoned in the world, a figure that reached some 10.65 million in 2009 (Walmsley 2010).  
Political theorists in particular have been aware of the ways these transformations 'resonate', mutually amplifying each other (Connolly 2005: 54). Brian Massumi (2007) argues that we are witnessing the emergence of a new type of governance in complex societies, one shaped by a shift from a model of prevention, which operates in an 'objectively knowable world', to a model of pre-emption, which involves the attempt to wield power in a world based on uncertainty. Brad Evans (2010) points to the rise of ‘consequentialist ethics’ involved in this development, where forms of moral judgement framed in terms of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are becoming redefined as calculations to determine whether a situation is to be judged better or worse as a result of a course of action. These are not minor transformations. The OECD argues that 'security' has become a major area of economic activity, a driver of modern economies (OECD 2004), while the sociologist David Lyon traces the contours of a surveillance society increasingly based on digital technologies (Lyon 2004). The political philosopher William Connolly argues that this new social and political model involves an increasing mobilization of the population against ‘unspecified enemies’ (2005: 54).   
The Blurring of War and Peace  
One way to think about this transformation is in terms of a changing relationship between peace and war. The historical sociologist Charles Tilly argues that the emergence of modern societies from the seventeenth century to the Second World War saw violence moving in two directions: increasingly deadly inter-state confrontations and increasingly peaceful domestic societies, evident in the disarming of populations and the rise of peaceful forms of protest and conflict (Tilly 2002, 2003). This constituted an increasingly clear separation between zones of war and zones of peace, a separation that for the philosopher Immanuel Kant constituted the very basis of modern society (Kleingold 2006: ix). This account of the birth of modernity locates violence beyond the borders of increasingly peaceful societies, and to a significant extent has established itself as a structure of thought preventing any significant exploration of the violence at the heart of modern societies, in particular the violence present in colonial expansion, or in the extent of atrocities and extreme violence undertaken by the colonizers in the process of decolonization (Bennett 2011). Within this modern self-understanding, the capacity for extreme violence has always been associated with 'the Other’, with modern society, by definition, understood as being inherently peaceful.   
The securitization we have referred to above signals two related transformations: the separation between war and peace is becoming less and less clear, while the state's monopoly of violence is becoming less and less certain. Rather than war being an external event, the cultural geographer Nigel Thrift argues that contemporary, globalizing societies have entered an ‘era of permanent and pervasive war’ (2011: 11), with war no longer understood as taking place beyond borders, but across all areas of social life. This shift seems particularly evident when we look at urban design, where we encounter not simply the increasing integration of blast proofing and other defensive systems into buildings, but the actual militarization of urban space, evident in particular in contemporary military theory where older conceptions of 'battlefield' are giving way to new models of 'battle space' (see Graham 2012) where the space of warfare becomes ‘coterminus with the space of civil society itself’ (Dillon and Reid 2009: 128). This pattern is evident in the extent that conceptions of urban security developed in a warzone such as post-2003 Baghdad have established themselves as paradigms for policing and security in the cities of North America and Europe (Graham 2010).   
War, from this perspective, rather than being an activity beyond the borders of modern society, becomes instead a lens with which to conceive of the core organization of such societies. The rise of war as a lens to frame social life has been particularly evident in military theory. William Lind, for example, argues that the world has entered an age of 'fourth generation war', characterized by the loss of the state's monopoly over the exercise of war. Today states find themselves at war with non-state opponents, wars he argues that states are losing. Writing in a respected journal, Lind argues 'invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army' (2004: 14). We do not need to embrace this type of argument to recognize that the twenty-first century has been shaped by an awareness of a new vulnerability.

### AT: West/Liberalism Good

#### The causality their authors ascribe to Western liberalism is a function of the intersubjective process of epistemologically pluralist community-building itself – NOT of its liberal- or Western-ness – means the ALT solves their offense BUT avoids ours

Boehmer 4 Charles R. Boehmer, University of Texas, El Paso; and David Sacko, The United States Air Force Academy; “Economic Affinity and Liberal Pacificity: Why Democracies Really Kant Fight: Political Community and Peace,” working paper, 2004, <https://utminers.utep.edu/crboehmer/Economic%20Affinity%20and%20Liberal%20Pacificity_ISA04.pdf> /GoGreen!

This paper examines the pacifying effects of political community. We advance a theory based on Deutsch (1957) explaining how pluralistic security communities through the creation of functional networks and the formation of common identity could reduce the risk of militarized tensions, making war unthinkable. We also show that the liberal peace should be explained as a type of political community, but not the only form that could pacify states. A theory of political community should possess great leverage in explaining the lack of militarized conflict, national preferences, trade flows, and IGO formation and joining. Thus, a theory of political community should subsume the liberal peace literature and account for its findings. We test our theory by examining whether political community reduces militarized conflicts in dyads from 1816-2001. We also examine how political community increases state preferences and voting at the UN. We create our measure of political community by measuring the similarity of two states’ portfolios of memberships in IGOs, focusing more specifically on economic and security organizations, with the use of the S-score methodology by Signorino and Ritter (1999). By using the S-score instead of summing IGOs we tap into the spatial aspects of political community that condition the interactions of dyads. Our findings support our theory. When we include our measures of political community the liberal variables of democracy and trade dependence have little remaining explanatory power. Interestingly though, while we show that political community also explains national preferences and affinities, measured using Gartzke’s data (1998), Affinity still has an independent pacifying effect separate from both political community and liberalism, which begs the question what Gartzke’s measure is actually measuring.

#### Liberal peace is a violent façade of pacification – scholars mis-code violence as peace because it’s phenomenologically obscured in an escalating cycle of deterrence, compellence, nuclear terror, surveillance, repression, and control – kills value to life and ensures nuclear war

Baron 19 — Ilan Zvi Baron, Associate Professor of International Political Theory in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University (UK), holds a D.Phil. from the University of Wales (UK), et al., with Jonathan Havercroft, Associate Professor in International Political Theory at the University of Southampton (UK), holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, Isaac Kamola, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Trinity College, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, Jonneke Koomen, Associate Professor of Politics, Sociology, and Women’s and Gender Studies at Willamette University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota, Justin Murphy, Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Southampton (UK), holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Temple University, and Alex Prichard, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of Education in the Department of Politics at the University of Exeter (UK), holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Loughborough University (UK), 2019 (“Liberal Pacification and the Phenomenology of Violence,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 63, Issue 1, March, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Oxford Academic)

Toward a Phenomenology of Violence

To illustrate the limits of direct and indirect accounts of violence, consider the following thought experiment. A man enters a home with a gun, points the gun at the family, and begins to make requests of the family. The family, intimidated by the implied threat of the gun, complies. Is this interaction violent? Most people would agree that, yes, it is. The implied threat of force terrorizes the family. Yet, neither direct nor indirect conceptions of violence adequately capture the violence of this scene. Any physical violence committed by the gunman is direct violence, and any causal, lasting, yet largely unseen effects (such as a heart attack induced later by the stress of attack) is indirect violence. While direct and indirect violence both focus on measured effects of violence, our point is more fundamental. We offer a third conception of violence to make sense of such scenes.

Acts of violence do not only inflict physical (and/or psychological) harm, they also restructure the social and political world. Imagine that the gunman in the thought experiment attacked a white South African family who live within a gated complex. The barbed wire crowning the compound walls, the bars on all the doors and windows, and the private security guard posted out front illustrate how this family lives in constant fear of armed intruders. The assailant might come from a family that suffered under apartheid's racialized social order. He might not have benefited from society's democratization and liberalization. If the gunman scaled these walls and inflicted wounds—physical or otherwise—everyone would agree violence had occurred. But what if the barbed wire, barred windows, and private security guard successfully kept the would-be assailant at bay? The family goes about its daily routine, but is the world any less violent? Though the presence of walls and barbed wire prevent observable violence in this scenario, we argue that this society remains—in its lived, material, and psychic forms—structured by violence. Violence constitutes the worldhood.

Data showing that direct violence is on the decline obscures the intensification of other forms of violence. Using the graph below as an example, rapid and historically unprecedented increases in economic inequality since 1970 have coincided with the pacification of militant political opposition such as rioting, guerrilla warfare, and political assassinations (see Figure 1).9 Rioting, guerrilla warfare, and assassinations throughout the first half of the twentieth century exposed increasing discontent with perceived systemic injustice, including capitalism, patriarchy, imperialism, colonialism, and white supremacy. Liberal society suppressed these forms of violent political resistance over the past fifty years (Murphy 2017). A restructuring of social relations displaced and co-opted violent protests against the perceived injustices of the world order. This restructuring represents a third type of violence called pacification.10

[Figure 1 Omitted]

The hallmark of pacification is that the structures of domination ensure that resistance in the form of direct violence against this order is less frequent. There are numerous ways that implicit and explicit threats, global surveillance, imbalances in military power, displays of military might, occupations, blockades, nuclear deterrence, terrorism, and counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, sanctions, trade disputes, and embargoes, for example, restructure intersubjective relationships in global politics. A focus solely on discrete acts of physical harm and quantifiable events does not and cannot capture the restructuring consequences of these acts. Our account of violence hypothesizes that the restructuring of social and political worlds might lead to fewer acts of direct violence if the restructuring deters agents from engaging in direct violence. The restructuring might also lead to less quantifiable physical harm, direct or indirect. However, this decrease may be achieved through an intensification of pacification.

Our point is that pacification is the most difficult kind of violence to observe and, if operating effectively, will correlate with the absence of direct violence. Pacification is difficult to observe because it is diffuse and involves the coercive reordering of social relations. Phenomenology, with its focus on background practices, structures, and the constitution of social relations, provides a methodology for uncovering this form of violence.

The first step in this theoretical development is to recognize the intersubjective character of violence. The meaningful structures of our world do not exist independently of us. Our identities are in a coconstitutive relationship with our society's institutions, practices, shared meanings, and norms (Taylor 1971, 27). A phenomenological account of violence examines the ways that violence is not simply a thing. “The expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies primarily a methodological conception,” able to uncover not just things themselves, but phenomena that are hidden yet are fundamental to our being (Heidegger 1962, 59). These phenomena include different types of beings or entities, including structures, and how our being makes sense of and functions in this world (Dreyfus 1991, 32).

Violence is one of the structures of our world and contributes to our understanding and ability to function in this world. There are, however, different worlds (Heidegger 1962, 93). Martin Heidegger offers a tripartite classification. The first (1) is the world of physical objects. The second (2) is a world of shared practices and shared beliefs. The third (3), what Heidegger calls “worldhood,” is the ontological-existential sense of the world (1962, 93). Direct violence operates in the first world. Indirect violence operates in the second world. Pacification as violence exists in this third world (worldhood).

Within world three the ontological character of violence is not that of an object, but is the structuring of the intersubjective relations of our being-in-the-world. Most of the time we are able to function in our surroundings because of our ability to cope with that which we encounter. We know how to act in certain situations and what specific purpose specific things serve. Sometimes, however, something breaks down or malfunctions. In such situations, the object, relation, or worldhood reveals itself (Heidegger 1962, 105). This revealing is when the inconspicuous becomes conspicuous. Violence functions as a moment of revealing.11 Overt acts of violence (direct or indirect) reveal elements of our world that otherwise remain hidden. Violence brings out grievances and animosities that are otherwise dormant, perhaps simmering, waiting to be released; this is the case whether it is to do violence to a text or to erupt physical violence in a pub. Similarly, the violence of a riot is a visible expression of a worldhood characterized by unseen or ignored social relations.

Our typology of violence distinguishes between direct, indirect, and pacification (see Figure 2). The typology distinguishes six different characteristics across the three types of violence. Pacification operates through different modes of power other than direct and indirect violence. Drawing on Michael Barnett's and Raymond Duvall (2005, 48) typology of power, direct violence corresponds to compulsory power, indirect violence to institutional and structural power, and pacification to productive power and some elements of structural power. Pacification as violence is inconspicuous. It pertains to our worldhood in a constitutive fashion. It is intersubjective and it is diffuse. These characteristics, taken together, identify pacification in ontological-existential terms.

[Figure 2 Omitted]

Researchers rarely, if ever, consider violence that falls under the ontological-existential category. From this category, what counts as violence within international relations scholarship is be understood instead as brief moments when the largely invisible structuring of the world becomes visible: direct violence is epiphenomenal. To rephrase Heidegger, direct and indirect violence mark breakdowns that reveal part of the world, but violence remains a part of this world that it reveals.

Phenomenology, as we are using it, is not about lived experience. It is the philosophical tradition of revealing different types of beings and things that contain meaning in our world, the structures and/or contexts in which they exist, and how these structures and contexts are meaningful. Understood in this way, violence is one of these structures and/or contexts. A phenomenological perspective does not approach violence from a particular normative position, although it does not preclude normative critique. A phenomenological approach does not treat violence as a discrete thing that one agent does to another, although it does not preclude such acts being described as violent. Instead, a phenomenological perspective adds to our intellectual and methodological toolbox by identifying violence as a condition or context in which people function. Phenomenology allows us to identify violence occurring in ways and in places that we otherwise would not be able to recognize. It does not change the meaning of violence (as harm, for example). Instead, it treats violence ontologically, enabling us to reveal more accurately the extent to which violence exists in the world.

From a phenomenological perspective, violence is often inconspicuous. Violence can function as a naturalized or internalized regime of compulsion or domination. Pacification reveals both the pervasiveness of violence and forms of violence that may otherwise remain inconspicuous. The erasing of tradition and the enforcement of particular legal codes at the expense of indigenous cultural norms is one example of an inconspicuous form of violence that involves conspicuous and inconspicous consequences (Cocks 2014). In understanding violence phenomenologically, as a structure of revealing across multiple worlds, we are better able to reveal the extent to which violence shapes our world and how we are then shaped by violence.

Pacavere

The Romans understood violence as a necessary condition for pax. The liberal imagination blinds itself to the ways that pacification functions as violence in our world order. International relations scholarship's strict distinction between peace and violence reinforces this obfuscation. Yet, the violence of (and in) pacification is central to the contemporary world. A phenomenological approach shows that moments of violent rupture are not aberrations of the world order. Violent outbreaks are breakdowns of pacification. It follows that multiple structures of the world order function as the violence of pacification, of pacavere.12 These structures include liberal capitalism, colonialism and the postcolonial aftermath, and war. Each functions as a key site of pacification. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capitalism. Postcolonial thought reveals the pacification of colonial projects. Both anarchist and postcolonial thought demonstrate how war is a breakdown of pacification, revealing the hidden violent structures of our worldhood.

Anarchist critiques of capitalism, unlike Marxist and liberal interpretations, take seriously the decisive role of state violence in structuring society and markets. Anarchists view the state as an institution that sustains elite appropriations of political and economic power (Proudhon [1861] 1998; Sorel 1999; Prichard 2015). Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy bear the costs of this enforced order. The state diffuses violence (pacification) throughout the entire society—often in ways that go unrecognized by its subjects (Sorel 1999, 65). The naturalization of violence consolidates arbitrary regimes of domination in society. While specific, countable incidents of violence may decline, the social order is largely premised on the threat of violence for contravening social norms making specific, countable incidents of violence relatively rare (Kinna and Prichard, forthcoming).

Anarchist thinkers view rising inequality in the context of declining riots, insurgencies, and assassinations (see Figure 1) as evidence of pacification. Incidents of proletarian violence, anticolonial violence, riots, and protests are all examples of resistance to the “regimes of domination” that shape contemporary society, regimes easily identifiable by those subject to them (Gordon 2007, 33). Drawing on these accounts, we interpret declining rates of riots as a sign of increased pacification, rather than evidence that the system is becoming less violent. Conversely, eruptions of antistate and anticapitalist direct violence are signs of a breakdown in pacification. Much like Heidegger's example of broken equipment (1962, 102–3, 412–13), which draws our attention to the background structures of our world, brief instances of direct violence reveal violently structured social relations.

Although the liberal imagination obscures the centrality of violence, violence has always been central to the liberal world order—to the liberal worldhood—particularly during the colonial and imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bell 2007a, 2007b). Colonial violence was diffused throughout the entire society, often in ways that went unrecognized by the colonized themselves. The violence of pacification structured the very existence of the colonized subject. This violence transformed the colonized subjects into a different “species” (Fanon 1963, 35–40, 43). Colonial pacification was more than direct and indirect violence; it was sufficiently diffuse to remake the psyche of the colonized, affecting their mental health and emotions (Fanon 1963, 35–106). Fanon (1963, 31) described it as “atmospheric violence,” a “violence rippling under the skin.” Unable to lash out against the colonizer, the colonized lived everyday within a world ordered by violence. In this world, the colonized could not respond to the colonizers for fear of directly violent reprisals and would turn to symbolic activities such as a dance circle to expose the violence experienced on a daily basis (Fanon 1963, 57). For the colonized, rituals such as the dance were a means of expressing existential frustrations with and resistance to the violence of colonial pacification through reenactments of direct violence. Ultimately, anticolonial struggles exposed the violence of colonialism by directing that violence back on its authors.

Practices of colonial rule were central to developing liberal norms of sovereignty, as well as to the domination and control of recalcitrant populations whether within Europe, such as the English domination of the Welsh, Irish, and Scots, or outside of Europe by settler colonialists against indigenous populations (Deloria Jr 1974; Anghie 2005; Miller 2006; Havercroft 2008; Shaw 2008; Barkawi and Stanski 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014; Lightfoot 2016; Rueda-Saiz 2017). This civilizing imagination functioned phenomenologically. It produced insiders as civilized and peaceful and outsiders as violent, external threats to civilization. In doing so, this imagination successfully obscured how the structures of liberalism produced colonial violence.13

The idea of war as an external practice of states, not tied to their internal workings and located according to specific normative projections of Western identity, followed from this colonial mentality. This mentality legitimized the exporting of violence to create a Western imperial pax and was so widespread that it shaped the development of modern warfare (Ellis 1986; Proudhon [1861] 1998). The colonial wars reproduced and reinforced ideologies of Western superiority, evidenced in part by the West's superior military technology. A consequence of this racist hubris was the inability to foresee the destructive tendencies of Western warfare when unleashed against themselves (Ellis 1986).

The discipline of international relations, founded in response to the unexpectedly destructive character of the First World War, reproduced this understanding of war.14 This understanding disguises the possibility of increasing violence within the liberal world by presuming a historical narrative of progress and being shocked by its aberration. War, however, is not the absence of peace or an aberration of liberal progress, but is instead a phenomenological breaking of the liberal worldhood.15

Once a liberal order of democracy, free markets, and international institutions are spread throughout the world, liberal ideology imagines peace as the end state. Yet, states often deploy war under liberal guises.16 Wars under the aegis of humanitarian values and regime change are examples of the multifaceted character of liberal pacification. Liberal regimes emphasize the violence of those that they are invading, while minimizing the violence involved in these military undertakings and the violence necessary to sustain the liberal societies themselves. What Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called “the moral phenomenology of war” (Prichard 2015, 112–34; Proudhon [1861] 1998) becomes an integral part of the everyday workings of society that shape innumerable aspects of our daily language. The upshot is that, within liberal ideology, the violence committed by liberal states is justified, whereas the violence committed by illiberal states is not.

Postcolonial and anarchist scholarship focuses on the incorporation of violence in the production of liberal spaces (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). These same concerns can be directed onto the liberal order itself. Seen from the perspective of marginalized and oppressed populations, the structures of liberal pacification take on a distinctly violent aspect. The liberal world is not less violent. Rather, the liberal world involves a sophisticated phenomenological process of legitimating certain types of violence in order to render other types of violence invisible.

Liberal Pacification

What does it mean to apply this third type of violence to our understanding of international relations? Pacification reveals liberalism as a violent process as opposed to a system that is emblematic of the absence of direct violence. There are parallels between the Pax Britannia, Pax Americana, and the ancient peace of the Pax Romana (Neocleous 2010, 13). However, our account emphasizes the crucial role of pacification as a distinct kind of violence in maintaining these pacific orders. Our theory offers the novel insight that incorporating pacification into the analysis of the liberal peace reveals crucial aspects of this peace that conventional and critical accounts neglect.

A focus on pacification provides three critical insights. First, it recovers the crucial role of pacification in the historical founding of the liberal order. Second, by distinguishing between three kinds of violence (Figure 2), we account for the empirical observations of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and an increase in violence overall as part of the pacification of the Pax Americana. Conversely, the liberal version of the Pax Americana cannot account for key anomalies. Third, our approach draws attention to the violent ordering of social relations. This dimension of violence is neglected even in Marxist, postcolonial, neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist critiques of the liberal peace, which primarily focus on the role of direct and indirect violence in maintaining the Pax Americana.

Contemporary liberal international relations theory emphasizes the nonviolent role of the liberal triad (democracy, free markets, and institutions) in causing the liberal peace. Yet, a quick review of the history of liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that key figures in liberalism, from John Stuart Mill, to Joseph Galliéni, to American foreign policy elites, understood pacification as a necessary step in establishing and maintaining the liberal order.

Mill, one of the philosophical founders of liberalism, conceptualized and deployed liberalism as a domination strategy. Mill argued that it is appropriate to impose despotism or slavery on “savages” who incline to “fighting and rapine,” but the government should use force as little as possible:

What they require is not a government of force, but one of guidance. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government fittest for them is one [that] possesses force, but seldom uses it. (Mill 1998, 232–33)

In terms of our conceptual distinction, Mill argued that liberalism as pacification was a more effective instrument of violence than the direct modes of violence that governments usually deploy.

The history of European colonialism is replete with this line of reasoning. “[L]iberal improvement” was a regular plank of colonial strategy by France and Britain in the nineteenth century (Owens 2015, 154). Consider one example from the French colonial tradition. Galliéni, a military commander and administrator, consciously deployed liberalism as a domination strategy in the pacification of Tonkin during the 1890s. Galliéni's strategy involved slowly spreading military outposts and deploying civil administrators to create markets, schools, and amenities. The rationale was that locals would gain a personal interest in the continuation of French control and would help to quell Chinese brigandage. “Piracy,” said Galliéni, “is the result of an economic condition. It can be fought by prosperity” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). Galliéni devised a “theory of pacification” in which “the correct combination of force and politics can socialize, pacify, and domesticate a population into regulating itself” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). What Mill proposed in theory, Galliéni enacted in practice; pacification—the violent reordering of social relations in a colony—was a more effective means of maintaining liberal rule than the deployment of direct violence.

While less explicit, the relationship between liberalism and imperialism remained present in the twentieth-century development of the Pax Americana. During this era, US policy makers sought to construct a zone of peace distinct from the zones of war associated with authoritarian regimes. The US State Department first recognized the concept of “hegemonic pacification” in the Euro-Atlantic conference diplomacy of the 1920s (Cohrs 2008, 619). The United States’ “strategic restraint” in the aftermath of World War Two was motivated by this concept of liberal, hegemonic pacification (Ikenberry 2009; Ikenberry 2011, 173). US defense officials Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Peterson agreed that it was a matter of the security interests of the United States to maintain “open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines” (Leffler 1984, 349–56; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Liberalism as a domination and pacifying strategy continued throughout (and long after) the Cold War (Laffey 2003; Stokes 2003), as evident in one of the founding documents of the post–World War Two liberal order, NSC-68 (Ikenberry 2011, 168). While the enforcement of a Pax Americana eventually yielded a decline in direct violence, it produced an increase in other types of violence. The first insight of our theory is that pacification has always been part of the liberal project and that the violence in the liberal project never went away.

The second insight is that by reinterpreting the liberal peace as liberal pacification we are able to grant the empirical findings of liberal peace theorists while maintaining that the Pax Americana represents an intensification of violence overall. In the language of positivist social science, our theory is observationally equivalent to that of liberal peace theory. We expect that the quantity of direct violence inversely associates with the degree of pacification in a society. Therefore, our interpretation challenges research that identifies liberal institutions as the cause of declining violence. Liberal institutions, as apparatuses of liberal pacification, ensure that direct violence is increasingly rare while leaving the structures of violence and domination in place. The observational equivalence on particular dependent variables (in our case, all forms of direct violence) produces a theoretical change requiring the generation of novel observable implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 30).

Furthermore, increased suffering in liberal societies provides evidence contradicting the main claims of liberal peace theories, while remaining consistent with liberal pacification. At its core, liberalism is a project that tries to maximize the utility of its subjects (in other words, minimize suffering while maximizing happiness). As such, a state of liberal peace should lead to a decrease in markers of suffering. However, there is more slavery in the world today than ever before, with conservative estimates of between 12.3 and 27 million people in debt bondage, chattel, or contract slavery (Gordon 2012).17 Moreover, there is ample evidence of rising psychological disorders in liberal societies. A preponderance of evidence from the United States suggests that depression, anxiety, alienation, opioid dependency, stress, other related psychological disorders, increased social isolation, and the decline of community have increased throughout the twentieth century (Twenge, Zhang, and Im 2004, 320; Adler, Boyce, Chesney, et al. 1994; Twenge 2000; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, et al. 2008; Twenge, Gentile, DeWall, et al. 2010; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012; American Society of Addiction Medicine 2016). Changes to human life associated with modernity have caused psychological stress to increase (Jackson 2014). Mortality rates have increased for some white, non-Hispanics aged 45–54 in the United States between 1999 and 2013 (Case and Deaton 2015). Modern technological advances from television to the Internet may contribute to increasing separation and alienation of the social human animal into individualized bodies connected by increasingly weak and empty bonds (Putnam 2000; Gray 2011; Turkle 2011). At minimum, new information communication technology such as Facebook can increase the stress and anxiety of its users (Lee-Won, Herzog, and Park 2015). The violent structuring of liberalism enables increases in social alienation, anxiety, stress, and human bondage through repression, economic control, and social isolation.

These are not isolated instances of suffering. They are fundamental structural features of our liberal world. If liberalism is a process of pacification rather than simply peace, then this rise in individual suffering in liberal spaces may be evidence of a similar process that Fanon equated with the psychic life of the colonist. Just as Fanon's colonial subjects, unable to lash out at the settler through direct violence, internalized their suffering, modern liberal subjects, unable to resist liberal pacification, internalize their suffering (1982, chap. 6; cf. Sorel 1999, 118). Liberal peace should bring about a rise in happiness; that it has instead led to rising suffering is evidence of liberal pacification.

Third, in addition to offering an alternative interpretation of the liberal peace, our theory of liberal pacification supplements key insights from critical approaches to peace. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey's work on imperial processes and liberal spaces makes a similar point to ours, that the celebrated zone of liberal peace rests on practices of violence (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 2002; cf. Neocleous et al. 2013). Their account, however, focuses on practices of direct violence, such as humanitarian interventions against authoritarian regimes or corporations hiring local militias to make work sites in the global south safe for economic extraction (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 422). Our point is that these moments of direct violence lead to pacification wherein social relations have been so violently reordered as to make direct violence no longer necessary. Once direct violence has established liberal space, pacification functions as a structure of violence that sustains the space. Direct violence only manifests itself when pacification weakens.

Pacification, however, does not merely operate through manipulating the conscience of its subjects. While Marxist and Gramscian concepts of ideology and hegemony are consistent with our theory of pacification (Peceny 1997, 418), they do not address how the constructed political order sustains itself through a violent reordering of social relations. A Gramscian-inspired critique of the democratic peace can yield a bird's-eye view of the ways in which liberal peace theory is itself deployed as an ideological tool (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569–75). However, Gramscian-inspired approaches do not account for the ways that everyday practices of violence (for example, surveillance technologies, implied threats from weapons, security barriers, etc.) sustain liberal pacification. While ideational factors are important in pacification, these factors rest upon practices and structures that are of an ontological-existential character.

To review, our reinterpretation of the liberal peace as liberal pacification offers three novel insights. First, liberal scholars and others associate the development of the liberal order with peace and a decline in violence by ignoring how pacification is part of the liberal project. Second, the empirically observed decline in violence equated with the liberal peace is not necessarily a sign of human progress but could be a sign of intensified repression or increases in other forms of suffering across the liberal world order. Third, our concept of pacification reveals violence that is neither direct nor indirect but is phenomenologically structured into the world order. Understanding liberalism as pacification produces a paradigm shift. Liberal pacification is violent in the sense that it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while also preventing types of resistance that might be understood as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars, and interstate wars. Pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against violence.

Conclusion

Our account of pacification recovers a crucial aspect of pax, one originally etched into Roman monuments. The heading of the Res Gestae (the funeral monument to Emperor Augustus) reads, “[t]his is how he [Augustus] made the world subject to the power of the people of Rome” (Beard 2016, 364). This monument does not celebrate peace as the absence of violence; it celebrates pacification. Pax takes the form of a process that violently reorders the world so that imperial subjects are rendered incapable of using violence to resist Roman rule. The absence of overt acts of violence depends upon the maximization of pacification.

The practice of pacification includes threats, coercion, intimidation, and surveillance to restructure and sustain social and political relations. When this type of violence operates effectively, it appears as the absence of violence; pacification's violence resides in the structuring of the prevailing order. While such an outcome may appear peaceful, it entails, at best, a negative peace that operates through a violent and coercive reordering of society.

Liberal peace advocates measure direct violence and equate the decline in that kind of violence with peace. However, our claim is that the spread of liberal institutions does not necessarily decrease violence but transforms it. Our phenomenological analysis captures empirical trends in human domination and suffering that liberal peace theories fail to account for, including increased inequality, slavery, anxiety, addiction, and anomie. Our analysis also highlights how a decline in direct violence may actually coincide with the transformation of violence in ways that are concealed, monopolized, and structured into the fabric of modern liberal society. If our theory is correct, we will find increases in markers of suffering as society liberalizes. While we cannot say whether these indicators are unique to pacified liberal societies, it is significant that they are rarely, if ever, discussed in terms of violence and the liberal peace.

Liberal pacification is observationally equivalent to liberal peace. This is not a semantic argument. Liberal peace advocates claim that processes that promote individual freedom and autonomy (that is, democracy, free markets, and global institutions) cause peace. While the restructuring of the global order—pacification—reduces direct violence, it also restructures social relations in ways that are violent. Declines in directly observable violence render other forms of violence invisible as violence; in fact, insidious, coercive, and violent systems of military deterrence and compellence, nuclear terror, surveillance, and intimidation constitute the worldhood of the liberal order.

**—— Footnotes ——**

10 Our account of pacification differs from those of Neocleous (2010, 2011) and Neocleous et al. (2013). We push beyond an account of violence and peace as material or institutional forms of violence and toward an account of violence that encompasses a richer phenomenology. In their account, pacification operates through direct and indirect violence. In our account pacification is a third kind of violence that makes instances of the first two kinds of violence less likely.

11 While Heidegger's phenomenology in Being and Time does not address either politics or violence, Hannah Arendt's (1970) work illuminates the political implications of a phenomenological critique of violence. In her critique, violence takes on similar characteristics as any other technology that breaks. However, the type of breakdown that occurs through violence differs from Heidegger's because violence involves people's interactions with each other (and not primarily with other objects). Arendt's treatment of violence rests on this distinction.

12 Pacavere is a conjugation of paco.

13 Arguments about the foundational role of colonialism, primitive accumulation, and white supremacy in structuring the modern international system are particularly useful in thinking about phenomenological violence (Jones 2006; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915; Shaw 2008; Coulthard 2014; Deloria 1974; Lowe 2015; Hartman 1997). The legacy of these practices pervades contemporary liberal peace-building (Richmond 2014; Sabaratnam 2015; Bouka 2013; Autesserre 2009) and liberal global governance (Koomen 2014a, 2014b, 2013), while trade liberalization can facilitate mass violence (Kamola 2007; Smith 2016). Césaire argues that colonialism produced a “boomerang effect” within European societies; Nazism was the return of violence previously “applied only to non-European peoples” (Césaire 2000, 36). At independence, international law became a mechanism for reinforcing this international order upon the previously colonized world (Grovogui 1996).

14 See Agathangelou and Ling (2004), Vitalis (2017), Nayak and Selbin (2013), and Koomen (2018). On different origin stories of international relations and their consequences, see Baron (2014, 226–28).

15 Our concept of liberal pacification is not the same as “positive peace.” Paul Diehl argues that rather than focusing on the negative peace—such as, “the absence of war”—scholars should also study “broader conceptions of peace,” namely those that include “considerations of justice, human rights, and other aspects of human security” (Diehl 2016, 9; Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). Using the terms of our analysis, however, such arguments simply call upon scholars accustomed to studying peace as an absence of direct violence to expand their analyses to study how liberal institutions can find solutions to indirect violence as well. Phenomenological violence remains absent in these accounts.

16 See Abu-Lughod (2015), Coker (1998, 2010, 2007), Dillon and Reid (2009), Evans (2011), Howard (2008), and Neocleous (2010, 2013, 2011).

17 Much of the research we cite here is based on data from the United States, mirroring the US-centric liberal peace literature. As a paradigmatic liberal market economy, the United States should be a most-likely case for the expectation of generally decreasing violence. John Owen, for example, argues that it is not coincidental that the “discourse and practice” of the democratic peace thesis was developed in the United States, given that American social scientists are greatly informed by the country's “strong liberal tradition” (2011, 162). For an overview of the Eurocentric assumptions embedded within critiques of the liberal peace, see Sabaratnam (2013). Anomalous observations from the United States should raise doubts about other countries around the world. There is evidence that such trends likely generalize across liberal societies. For example, Ferrari, Charlson, Norman, et al. (2013) have calculated that depression is a significant and growing cause of shortened lifespans and death around the world, including within many liberal societies. With respect to the pacification of violence, we note that rioting has decreased as a share of street-protest activity (relative to peaceful demonstrations) since the 1970s in most continents around the world (Murphy 2017). These data suggest that these dynamics are unlikely to be peculiar to the United States.

#### Liberal peace is the chief motor behind global violence at every scale—the impact is mass death and extinction from far-right populism and environmental collapse—all stats go neg and we control uniqueness because lib-ism inevitably produces illiberal responses that their scholarship can never account for

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To develop this critique, I draw upon three main bodies of literature that, despite their apparent affinities, are seldom brought together. These include Polanyi and Gramsci-inspired understandings of hegemonic crisis, counter-movements, and the rise of nationalism and populism (Gill, 2015; Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017); critical political economies of social conflict within a context of neoliberal globalization (Harvey, 2005; Springer, 2015); and political geography analyses of international relations theory (IRT), and more specifically critical geographies of peace (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995; Flint, 2005; Koopman, 2016; McConnell, Megoran, & Williams, 2014; Megoran, 2011; Nagle, 2010; Williams & McConnell, 2011). Elaborating upon these, I contend that the methodological nationalism of the disciplines of economics and international relations – in which much of the liberal view is based – has left them in a sorry state in making sense of recent political development throughout the world, specifically when addressing the contemporary rise of reactionary forms of populism.

In this sense, the high degrees of violence and vulnerability associated with processes of market integration have often escaped the radars of economics and IR analyses, fixated as they are with mono-scale scrutiny of national economies and state-to-state relations. Although some liberal IR scholars have laid the grounds for a less normative paradigm that incorporates domestic variables and bottom-up societal processes into the understanding of state action, the assumption remains that policy interdependence and compatibility between states, combined with the Pareto-efficient outcomes of globally integrated production and trade, result in ‘strong incentives for coexistence with low conflict’ (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 521; see also Oneal & Russett, 1997; McDonald & Sweeney, 2007). Recent developments suggest there are fundamental flaws with this largely deductive hypothesis. Whereas on aggregate terms, and according to some measurements, nation-states may have benefitted more or less from globalization, social conflict occurring at multiple scales – and indeed in a class-based dimension – is an undeniable constitutive element of state action, the latter reflecting and/or attempting to contain particular constellations of social forces and their interests. In this way, the damage inflicted upon many by increasingly disembedded markets and post-political states that shield policy from popular deliberation (both the products of the liberal agenda) are at the very root of the current crisis of liberal hegemony (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017).

In what follows, I draw upon a variety of cases to explain how a dialectical approach to liberalism, neoliberalism and their illiberal responses,1 and a multi-scalar analysis of market violence are indispensable in explaining much of the turbulence that world politics faces today. To be clear, the paper’s goal is not to deny that state leaders factor in the economic repercussions of conflict when they contemplate its possibility – a logical assumption of liberal international relations scholarship. The aim is instead to argue that these calculations tell very little about the nature of peace and conflict as historically bounded processes that need to be studied in relation to broader transformations in the global political economy, the latter affecting state behaviour in terms of both economic policy and inter-state rivalry. In this way, and crucially, I also wish to refute the liberal argument that the pursuit of economic integration at any (social) cost will unequivocally lower the prospects for international conflict or, indeed, structural violence more broadly understood as a multi-scalar phenomenon.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section problematizes the concept of peace in IRT, with a more detailed discussion of economic liberalism. The following section presents a temporal critique, contextualizing the contemporary rise of illiberal politics within the transformation of the global political economy under world market capitalism. After this, I build upon Agnew (1994) to develop a scalar critique and argue that liberalism’s methodological nationalism hampers a proper assessment of the transnational dimensions of processes such as development, violence or peace. I chart various scales of market-induced violence and vulnerability (as a form of economic violence) in the global era, tracing the rescaling of violence and risk from the interstate scale to the individual sphere. I conclude by discussing the transition from a ‘durable disorder’ (Cerny, 1998) to an emerging (albeit contested) new populist order under world market capitalism. To do so, I echo Polanyi and Marx in contending that processes of marketization, replete as they are with contradiction, cannot engender liberal or capitalist peace, but result instead in anti-liberal reactions of various kinds (what Polanyi called ‘counter movements’) to the violence of unrestrained markets. Importantly, these counter movements can often take reactionary characteristics, as people under threat or the perception of threat retreat into culture and nationalism against the ‘other’ and internationalism in all its variants.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE LIBERAL PEACE

While the pursuit of peace is a central preoccupation for progressive IR scholarship, peace as a concept and as an actual manifestation is rarely discussed in the IR literature. Instead, peace often appears as a negative occurrence, intuitively understood as the avoidance of war or an absence of overt inter-state violence (Galtung, 1969; Richmond, 2016, p. 57). Thereby, most IR literature focuses on the challenges to state-based peace, with commentary typically dominated by the two main competing schools, realism and liberalism, both subdivided into further dissenting subcamps. Conventional realist approaches take the ‘anarchic’ or violent nature of international politics as a given and place their focus on states’ survival strategies. Offensive realists warn of the disruptive effects of ‘power transitions’ and in the contemporary context claim, for example, that as China grows economically and militarily, and as its interests expand and it seeks greater influence, tensions with other countries are certain to arise (Mearsheimer, 2014). Defensive neorealists hold similar assumptions about the foundations of the international system, yet contend that states privilege security over domination and that the incentives for conflict are contingent rather than endemic, with balances of power potentially keeping states at bay and preventing conflict (Waltz, 1979).

Liberal theorists dispute these interpretations and reject that competition alone guides state behaviour. Elaborating on the Kantian ideal of ‘perpetual peace’, and drawing upon Adam Smith, David Ricardo or John Stuart Mill, liberal theories contend that economic integration and institutional enmeshment or socialization exercise a constraining force on conflict and are conductive to peaceful scenarios (Doyle, 1986; Howard, 1981; Johnston, 2008; Keohane & Nye, 1977). While there is no absolute agreement on the exact shape that such ‘interdependence’ should take (Mansfield & Pollins, 2001), liberal IR scholars often hold that large-scale conflict in the 21st century can be avoided if the liberal world order survives the relative decline of the United States and manages to assimilate rising powers such as China. The emphasis is placed both on institutions and norms of reciprocity, on the one hand, and on economic integration, on the other. Regarding the latter, and evoking Smithian language, the agenda for a ‘capitalist peace’ assumes that free markets represent ‘“a hidden hand” that … build(s) up irrevocable and peaceful connections between states’ (Gartzke, 2007; Richmond, 2008, p. 23), and that ‘put simply, globalisation promotes peace’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003, p. 562). The theory is in many ways deductive, but relies also on the statistical data that on aggregate tends partially to support the liberal peace argument (except for the period leading to the First World War; see also Barbieri, 1996) and on the ‘logic’ that national leaders are not expected to act irrationally or be insensitive ‘to economic loss and the preferences of powerful domestic actors’ (Hegre, Oneal, & Russett, 2010, p. 772).

A more nuanced exposition of the liberal argument suggests that what brings nations together and heightens the opportunity cost of conflict is market integration according to a set of commonly devised regulations – rather than the realization of an ideal ‘free’ trade archetype (Moravcsik, 2005). This results in a sort of ‘embedded liberalism’, with the successful integration of postSoviet states and China in world market capitalism through World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and other liberalizing initiatives understood as a deterrent to military action and, hence, as an effective strategy for both global growth and security, particularly in the face of China’s rising economic and military might (Funabashi, Oksenberg, & Weiss, 1994). From this perspective, not only is violence avoidable but also peace may indeed be engineered with the creation of a world market society being key to this endeavour as well as to the broader goal of crafting a liberal hegemony able to deliver a veritable ‘end of history’ where markets and functioning liberal democracies prevail (Fukuyama, 1992). The engineering of market-orientated democracies has indeed often been the main task of liberal peace- and state-building operatives in post-conflict areas (Campbell, Chandler, & Sabaratnam, 2011).

Yet, decades of neoliberal integration have not brought Fukuyama’s prophecy closer to its realization. Across the world, liberal market integration has facilitated convivial relations among key countries and paid important dividends to elites, yet it has also resulted in the concentration of wealth in ever fewer hands, rising inequalities within countries (although not between them) and higher concentration of wealth at the top, and increased risks and vulnerability as the logic of market competitiveness takes hold of many aspects of our lives (Anand & Segal, 2015; Lynch, 2006). The relation between the United States and China or the processes of economic integration in the European Union are clear examples of these trends. In these places as well as others, inequalities, precarization and economic insecurity have given way to a populist and nationalist momentum that can be interpreted both as a popular response to the extreme and diverse forms of violence engendered by processes of market integration, or as a manoeuvre to channel discontent towards the ‘other’ in order to protect elite interests (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). By prescribing ever more market globalization to counter populist politics and avoid conflict, liberal elites add fuel to the fire as they sever the very conditions that led to the disfranchisement of significant segments of the population in the first place. Thereby, it is crucial to understand how the argument for capitalist peace fails to factor in the crisis-prone and socially destructive tendencies of capitalism, particularly in a context of unfenced global competitiveness along market lines.2

Two of the underlying problems in the liberal peace argument stand out. The first has to do with the statistical selection of fixed points in time that suggest correlations between growth in trade and diminished conflict – while failing to discern mechanisms of causation (Hayes, 2012). A wider temporal lens is needed to situate the contemporary rise of mercantilist and illiberal politics in the context of neoliberal globalization, representing the same sort of ‘counter movement’ that Polanyi had warned of in his reading of the 19th-century downward spiral towards war – aided in our contemporary case by the demise of the traditional left (Blyth & Matthijs, 2017; Carroll & Gonzalez-Vicente, 2017). The second problem relates to liberal international political economy and IRT’s scalar fixation on inter-state matters and hence their inability to factor in violence in the absence of war. I turn now to these two points.

NEOLIBERALISM’S ILLIBERAL MOMENT AS COUNTER MOVEMENT

On paper, the two intertwined arguments for liberal peace would seem to make sense: if countries remove the barriers to trade and investment and choose to specialize in their comparative advantages, international productivity will be raised and we will enjoy a more prosperous global economy with satisfied consumers and states; also, if states develop close economic linkages, they will have important material incentives to avoid conflict with one another. In the real world, competition between jurisdictions and social groups implies often that the development and prosperity of some is based on the exploitation and vulnerability of others, as typically emphasized by the extensive literature on bifurcated economies, temporally constrained and contradictory growth patterns, and uneven and destructive forms of development. In this way, it is not that economic interdependence, when removed from its social context and put under the microscope, does not raise the costs of conflict. However, the political choices and social transformations needed to achieve interdependence are a key variable to understanding a state’s behaviour and predisposition to conflict. And while governments may in many junctures align with the interests of capital, they are not immune to crises of legitimacy, and will need to mediate issues of accumulation and social cohesion when people perceive the social transformations required to achieve interdependence to have a negative impact on their lives (Jessop, 2016, p. 189). This will reflect in a way or another on state behaviour as political elites, current and prospective, jostle for votes and/or legitimacy.

A key problem with the argument for liberal peace lies in its emphasis on narrow temporal correlations between trade and (lack of) conflict, which removes interdependence from its broader political economic context, disembedding peace and conflict from the broader set of historically bounded and politically contingent social relations that underpin them. A widened analytical timeframe renders clear the dialectical relationship between (neo)liberal social projects and their social responses, both progressive and reactionary. Whereas high volumes of trade may coincide at a particular ‘optimal’ period of liberal expansionism with interstate peace, they may also transform societies in ways that engender the conditions for a potential ‘illiberal’ turn or counter movement resulting in a higher risk of conflict as beggar-thy-neighbour positions emerge and new enemies need to be sought by political elites to bind national-constrained constituencies to their agendas to maintain power.

We can observe this temporal incongruity in the work of some of the key proponents of the capitalist peace. For example, Oneal and Russett (1999, p. 439) argue that trade ‘sharply reduces the onset of or involvement in militarized disputes among contiguous and major-power pairs’, which are identified by Maoz and Russett (1993) as the set of countries more likely to enter into conflict with each other. Despite Oneal and Russett’s sophisticated approach to the data (modelling, for example, to avoid ‘false negatives’ by factoring in geographic contiguity, or controlling for alliances) and the attention paid to statistical rejections of the liberal peace argument, trade interdependence and the occurrence of conflict are analyzed on a year-by-year basis (Oneal & Russett, 1999, p. 428). This is also the case with other comparable studies (Hegre, 2000; Oneal & Russett, 2001; Souva & Prins, 2006). This temporal frame is problematic, as inter-national conflict tends to build up over prolonged periods of time, and the adverse impacts of interdependence and liberal integration are more likely to result first in crisis and social dislocation, followed by some sort of economic distancing (perhaps under a new administration that replaces the one that embraced liberalization) and a wide range of policy measures, before leading to military conflict – underpinned either by the state that perceives that liberal integration is having negative impacts on socioeconomic development, or more often than not by the one which wants to prevent the deterioration of important trade and investment links.

Here, one vital issue often left out of the liberal peace equations is the fact that most military interventions in the post-Second World War period were aimed at disciplining countries that opted out of the United States’ global liberalizing project and sought to pursue a variety of indigenous pathways to modernity, often including many that did so under the rubric of socialism, democratically achieved or otherwise. The reverse is also true, as countries that chose to ally with the United States during the Cold War were shielded from attacks, and in some cases given preferential trade access, technology transfer and allowed to engage in market protection. In this context, associating conflict with the lack of strong trade links, rather than to the meticulous unfolding of a market-based imperial agenda, would be tantamount to concluding that low opium consumption was responsible for British military expeditions in 19th-century China. While there is certainly a correlation between China’s ban on opium and British intervention, nobody could seriously suggest that opium consumption reduces interstate conflict. Similarly, in many of these cases, it is not that the absence of trade results in conflict, but on the contrary, that military intervention has often been aimed at expanding markets and protecting investment.

This situation is aptly explained by Richmond (2006), who discusses ‘virtual’ peace and emphasizes how war and peace can be synonymous in countries subjected to military intervention in the name of liberal peace. Old examples of this practice would include the above-mentioned Opium Wars or indeed most colonial wars to open new market frontiers. Cold War examples abound, from the CIA-supported assassination of Salvador Allende following his policies of nationalization and collectivization in Chile, to the training of Contras to oust the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua, or the perennial yoke on Cuba to seed the ground for a market-friendly regime.3 While these interventions were justified on the basis of dubious arguments regarding the national security of the attacking country, today these rationales cohabit with moral claims for ‘human security’ and humanitarian intervention in the target countries, although many authors have suggested that these moral arguments often conceal Realpolitik motivations (Chandler, 2004). The Iraq War is a case in point, having achieved a boom in trading links between Iraq and United States following the 2003 invasion, with a six-fold increase of trade between 2002 and 2008 that only started to decline following the discovery of shale oil reserves in the United States (United States Census Bureau, 2017), but having achieved very little in terms of curbing internal violence.

The liberal peace fixation with short-term correlations between trade openness and the absence of grand inter-national conflict is particularly perplexing if one considers how the liberal argument for economic development dismisses the immediate social dislocations underpinned by market integration as tangential to longer term improvements for all segments of society (Garret, 1998, p. 796). Here, it would seem that liberal arguments for peace and development operate under different temporal logics. If liberalism’s positive impacts on peace are attested with a focus on yearly correlations between commerce and an absence of conflict, its alleged positive developmental impacts can often be supported only by eschewing the immediate social conflict and diminished living standards fomented by interdependence and marketization – see, for example, the arguments for structural adjustment throughout the developing world in the 1980s and 1990s or more recent austerity policies in Europe, which, incidentally, many authors have demonstrated to be also counterproductive for long-term development (Blyth, 2013; Chang, 2007).

This last example brings one back to the contemporary juncture. Across the world, we are observing an emergence of illiberal politics in countries that have represented the backbone of neoliberal globalization, and indeed at its very Anglo-American core. In many places, reactionary politicians have been first to galvanize social discontent successfully by publicly condemning the negative social impacts of economic globalization, such as increased inequalities and growing insecurity. In the United States, the UK or France, for example, it has been the populist right that has more prominently hoisted the anti-globalization flag, even if its discourses place targets on ethnic minorities or national trade imbalances, rather than on class inequality or the increased leverage of businesses in processes of transnational integration. We can see, for example, how rising job insecurity and deteriorating living standards in the UK were mobilized by the Brexit campaign. While much of the ‘Leave’ discourse was problematic, and focused its anger towards European Union regulations and immigrants, Brexit advocates successfully tapped into a widespread sense of vulnerability and precarization throughout the isles that is intimately linked to neoliberal transformations at home and to the consolidation of the world market and its competitive pressures more broadly (Pettifor, 2017; The Guardian, 2016). Similarly, Donald Trump’s antiChina and anti-migrant rhetoric resonated with the experiences of many in the middle class who have been on the losing side of growing inequality and declining social mobility for decades, but also remarkably in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, with the top 1% capturing 85.1% of the country’s income growth between 2009 and 2013 (Economic Policy Institute, 2016). Indeed, there are striking similarities in the protestations of politicians at opposite ends of the spectrum, such as Trump and Bernie Sanders, despite proposing diametrically opposed treatments to the perceived problems, with Trump doing little to upset the business-centric order and only adding bigotry and defensive nationalism into the mix.4

In this way, this rise of illiberal positions and movements must not be seen as a diversion from the road to neoliberal globalization, but rather a direct consequence of the consolidation of the world market facilitated by neoliberal policy sets and the techno-logistical developments underpinning globalized forms of accumulation. The current illiberal rise is hence aptly interpreted both as a counter movement in the Polanyian sense, and as a dialectical relationship. Although the detrimental social impacts of liberal integration are often felt rather swiftly by many, their reverberations into politics take the shape of more prolonged reactions. Yet, there is a strong association between liberal integration, its social impacts and the rearticulations of politics that follow and that we currently experience in many parts of the world (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). The current rise of various kinds of populism – in places as diverse as the United States, the UK, Indonesia, Russia, Turkey or the Philippines, to name a few– represents from this perspective a ‘counter movement’ following a ‘global organic crisis’(Gill, 2015), as people look beyond the mainstream for alternatives that explain and respond to the social dislocations brought about by the pursuit of transnational liberal integration. In this way, neoliberalism’s illiberal moment is in a dialectical relationship with the pursuit of a liberal utopia, mirroring the Polanyian counter movement that would put an end to the ‘Hundred Years Peace’ (1815–1914). Most importantly, the traditional centre left’s failure in many contexts to formulate viable responses to the current social dislocation has left it up to the reactionary right to devise a way out of the crisis.5 More often than not, the leaders of the new populist moment combine an enduring business- and market-centric approach to development with nationalist and reactionary discourse, resulting in a dangerous blend that is likely to perpetuate social discontent, but redirecting it not towards the policy and economic elites responsible of the current developmental impasse but towards countries that are increasingly perceived as rivals.

THE MULTIPLE SCALES OF VIOLENT NEOLIBERALISM

How are we then to explain the inability of mainstream liberal approaches to predict what seems to be a logical turn – in the form of a societal defence or Polanyian ‘counter movement’ versus the inequalities, risks and vulnerabilities fomented by the world market? Much of the problem lies within IRT’s scalar limitations, which we can explore by focusing on the disjunction between the interstate scale and the diversity of political economic processes and social conflict occurring at other scales. This disjunction is with no doubt closely related to IRT’s development and consolidation in the post-Second World War years, a period characterized by particular patterns of growth of national development, marked ideological preferences and methodological nationalism – although at that point debates on structural violence and positive peace already existed in the margins of the field of IR (Gleditsch, Nordkvelle, & Strand, 2014). These all resulted in what John Agnew famously described as IRT’s ‘territorial trap’, a fixation with the interstate scale and the assumption that states are containers of societies, with politics played in a domestic/foreign binary (Agnew, 1994). Below, I expand on this notion to discuss how violence or risk have been rescaled in the neoliberal era from the interstate realm and into the individual one, with societies taking on the costs of a competitive market integration that has allowed for – at least temporarily – relatively convivial relations between key states (and the elites who control them) mediating the global economic architecture (on risk, see also Beck, 1999).

IRT’s territorial trap remains ubiquitous. Despite decades of powerful critiques that have presented the post-Westphalian nation-state as a never fully realized political moment and a site of social conflict (Agnew, 1994; Mitchell, 1991), states remain an ontological fixation at the core of IRT. This is even more so the case when it comes to the understanding of conflict and peace. Whereas the field of IR is today increasingly open to accepting ‘non-traditional’ security threats such as organized crime, terrorism or epidemics, these are to a great degree studied as anomalies in a state-based system, and considered only inasmuch as they pose a threat to state order. Typologies of war such as the Correlates of War (COW) Data Sets accept non-state entities as potential actors of conflict. However, these are narrowly defined as ‘nonterritorial entities or non-state armed groups’ that are not formally accepted as members of the interstate system but which must contest the power of a state or at least represent a violent challenge to state or state-like entities in order to be agents of conflict (COW Wars v. 4.0, 2014). According to this understanding, peace is not only negatively constructed as the absence of violence (Williams & McConnell, 2011, p. 928), but in particular as the absence of violence explicitly directed at the state or at gaining control of a state.

This monoscalar conceptualization of peace and conflict pervades liberal IRT, too, which considers the state the key actor in international relations, and markets the connecting fabric holding international peace together. Gartzke and Li argue, for example, how the demonstrators who took the streets ‘from Seattle to Switzerland and from Gothenburg to Jakarta … mobilised by apocalyptic visions of the menace of globalisation’ failed to recognize that economic integration offers mutual benefits to states that opt for settlements in the place of fighting (Gartzke & Li, 2003, p. 562). This is, of course, a caricature of ‘alter-globalisation’ movements that fails to acknowledge the transnational networks behind such movements.6 Yet, it is a useful example to show how, by focusing on states as the aggregate beneficiaries of ‘efficient’ modes of transnational production and exchange, liberal scholarship eschews the variegated forms of politico-economic conflict that market reordering foments at intrastate scales.

The crucial point is that, with the complexities of global dynamics flattened into a chessboard of one-dimensional state actors, mainstream IR perspectives are often unable to address the multiscalar violent repercussions of liberal market integration and therefore its challenges to positive peace – understood as ‘the possibility of maximising human potential’ (Flint, 2005, p. 7) and the absence of structural, cultural and environmental violence (Galtung, 1996; Richmond, 2008, p. 89). Peace, much like war, operates at ‘intertwined and mutually constitutive’ scales, from the intimate to the global (Koopman, 2011, p. 194). Anchored in mid-20th-century statist notions of world politics, conventional IR understandings of peace and conflict are oblivious to threats to everyday peace when state power is not directly under challenge. In this way, foreign direct investment or trade are considered phenomena that bring states more closely integrated, hence either increasing the likelihood of peace (from the liberal perspective) or not necessarily having an impact on the probability of conflict in the long term (from the realist perspective).

Yet, the undemocratic trends behind processes of transnationalization of capital reproduce new and old forms of violence. John Nagle, a political anthropologist of ethnic conflict, highlights, for example, how global market integration may indeed ‘cause a violent backlash if economic reconstruction dispossesses groups from their land or dismantles their traditional economic systems without providing acceptable alternatives’ (Nagle, 2010, p. 232), or what could also be described as processes of primitive accumulation without immediate proletarianization. The creation of masses of unemployed youth, surplus to the immediate exploitative needs of capital, is of course an important factor behind the rise of violence in many societies, as, for example, many in the Caribbean (Pantin, 1996). Moreover, these processes of dispossession and the dismantling of livelihoods are per se violent by-products of neoliberal integration.

Violent neoliberalism, mediated not by an invisible hand but by explicit elite interests (Harvey, 2005) or more subject-based processes of governmentality (Larner, 2000), is a recurrent phenomenon in the study of the globalization of capitalism. The integration of ‘developing countries’ with global markets is typically plagued with violent rationales of development and tangible issues of exploitation and dispossession, as vividly exemplified in Simon Springer’s studies of violent neoliberalism in Cambodia (Springer, 2015). An important issue to be considered here is the transformation of the state alongside processes of economic globalization, adopting increasingly competitive and regulatory forms, and ubiquitously morphing into what some have described as ‘capitalist states’ (Jessop, 2002). This transformation implies that, through processes of disciplinary neoliberalism (Gill, 1995), states can in fact mediate between global competitive forces and domestic societies not to protect the latter from outside dangers or the recurring crises of capitalism, but in fact to impose measures of austerity, protect creditors, and in general promote more precarious and vulnerable patterns of living.

A powerful example of violent neoliberalism is found in processes of worker exploitation fomented by flexible regimes of accumulation required to attract capital investment. This explains why 70,000 workplace casualties in China during 2012 (The Economist, 2013) – a country where workers’ independent organization is to a great extent illegal, or 180,000 protests in 2010 (The Wall Street Journal, 2011), do not affect IR’s calculations of peace, despite the close link between these incidents and exploitation dynamics associated with China’s integration into global markets (Chan, 2001). It is only from this perspective that IR scholars in China can present their country’s growing economic pre-eminence as a ‘peaceful rise’, arguing that ‘the Chinese have made [the choice] to embrace economic globalization rather than detach themselves from it’ (Zheng, 2005). Ironically, given the ostensible incompatibility between liberal emphases upon freedom and pluralism and state propaganda, Chinese official media also suggests that globalization and peace provide ‘favourable conditions for building a harmonious society’, where ‘the political environment is stable, the economy is prosperous, people live in peace and work in comfort and social welfare improves’ (People’s Daily, 2007). The actual ‘harmonisation’ of society in China has indeed entailed occasional improvements in welfare provision and some concessions to labour – for example, in the form of a new Labour Contract Law in 2007 that required firms to give written contracts to their workers. Yet, disciplinary measures hold sway, and the very lawyers who sought to protect worker rights under the Labour Contract Law framework are being incarcerated under the charges of ‘disturbing social order’, while income inequality and labour unrest have continued to rise (Financial Times, 2016; Hui & Chan, 2011). And crucially, intrastate violence can in turn be rescaled to the inter-national sphere. Therefore, analysts often associate the rise in protests and repression in China with the Chinese Communist Party’s orchestration of and permissiveness towards nationalist campaigns and patriotic discourse – including typical recourse to international belligerence over disputed territories and anti-Western rhetoric – in search for legitimacy (Hughes, 2006).

Similarly, there has been an emergence of inequality, vulnerability and precarization in economically developed countries that can also be analyzed under the framework of violent neoliberalism. As transnational capital benefits from exploiting the world’s largest unfree labour force in China and other low and middle income countries, middle classes elsewhere have seen their rights and economic power decline. In the United States, the last decades of globalization and prosperity have been accompanied by increased levels of poverty, a net decline of 2.7 million jobs between 2001 and 2011, and declining inflation-adjusted minimum wages (Mischel & Davis, 2015; Scott, 2015; Shaefer & Edin, 2013). Marketization has reached grotesque proportions, and today even the disciplinary apparatus of the state is up for sale, resulting in skyrocketing incarceration rates, chiefly affecting impoverished populations and the African American community (BBC, 2014). In Spain, a rampant series of evictions following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis – with over 600,000 foreclosures from 2008 to 2015 (El País, 2015) – left families homeless while political elites transferred €100 billion of public wealth to private and privatized financial institutions, with four-fifths of the sum deemed unrecoverable according to the estimations of the Spanish Central Bank. Global and national processes have in this way powerful impacts on other scales, including the personal lived experiences of crisis. In the United States, studies find that the 40% rise in suicides since 1999 is connected to the recession of 2007–09, while the World Health Organisation (WHO) observes a 60% increase in suicide rates across the world over the last 45 years that appears to be connected to periodic spikes in economic hardship (Oyesanya, Lopez-Morinigo, & Dutta, 2015; Whiteman, 2015). With global affluence concentrated in increasingly fewer hands (with eight people having the same amount of wealth as 50% of the world’s population according to some studies; Hardoon, 2017), and with risk gradually removed from markets and transferred to increasingly vulnerable individuals, national illiberal politics has come to constitute a logical reaction to the liberal order for many, or a quest for refuge from the violence of markets, however fraught the responses offered by many of the populist alternatives now in vogue.

Another vivid example of violent neoliberalism is seen in the apparent capitulation of the future of the world’s environment and the present livelihoods of many to the immediate needs of capital. Here we see the expansion of capitalist activities in search of previously untapped resources in the developing world and elsewhere driving conflict with local populations and fomenting processes of internal colonialism and dispossession (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2017; Kaag & Zoomers, 2014). Even a wide range of allegedly well-intentioned initiatives to preserve biodiversity operate now according to market logics, relying on the valuation and commodification of nature and the deployment of green credentials ultimately to displace populations in ways that are reminiscent of processes of primitive accumulation (Fairhead, Leachm, & Scoones, 2012; Lohmann, 2010). And, of course, climate change and environmental degradation in general have become key drivers of global migrations, with the risk of being displaced by natural disasters today being 60% higher than 40 years ago and 25.4 million people needing to migrate every year to escape the consequences of natural disasters (Greenpeace, 2017, p. 6). Crucial here – once again – is the fact that our current global environmental crisis cannot be understood outside the context of global liberal integration, as the promotion of ‘good business environments’ (note the irony) and competition across jurisdictions to attract capital investments have resulted in any attempt to make businesses pay for the environmental ‘externalities’ of production being just a marginal note in a downward trajectory towards an environmental dystopia.

These violent by-products of liberal integration operate at scales that go from the global to the intimate. Yet, despite the vast amounts of empirical evidence illustrating the violence inherent in processes of marketization, the epistemological limitations of IRT create illusions of liberal peace in the absence of conflict between states. The examples above illustrate how state-based peace is limited in its implications for the everyday lives of many people and may even be counterproductive at diverse scales where violence is systematically applied and justified to perpetuate liberal state peace and market integration. Importantly, people are not just victims of violence, but agents of political change. If at an early stage of globalization liberal elites were able to contain discontent through appeals to technical prowess, claims of a lack of viable alternatives (see, for example, Margaret Thatcher’s famous ‘there is no alternative’ mantra) and the depoliticization of policy more broadly, today we observe a process of re-politicization that often takes reactionary forms (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). While in some countries progressive alternatives to the liberal order are revitalizing the political debate, and indeed solidarity campaigns have delivered some important victories across the world, what we observe in many places today is the conjunction of national reactionary discourse (with elites placing responsibilities for the social crisis on foreign forces and migrants, for example) and a continued hegemony of markets. This new populist order dangerously combines an economic base that will continue to produce market violence with nationalist rationales that undermine internationalist solidarity, and which unfortunately invite further violence towards the ‘other’.

#### Pacification is a structuring mechanism that renders violence invisible

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Introduction

Canonical texts in international relations define peace as the absence of violence (Aron 1973, 21; Bull 2012, 18; Clausewitz 1976, 75; Waltz 1959, 1; 1979, 343). However, a glance at the philology of the word “peace” reveals a more complex relationship with violence. The Latin words for peace (pax, pacis, paco) trace their roots to the verb for a pact (pacisci), “which ended a war and led to submission, friendship, or alliance.” As Rome transitioned from republic to empire, pax changed its meaning from a pact among equals to submission to Rome, and “pacare began to refer to conquest” (Weinstock 1960, 45).1

Two monuments built by Augustus, the first Roman Emperor, record this shift in the meaning of peace. The first, the Ara Pacis Augustae, a monument to the goddess of peace, commemorates Augustus’s pacification of Gaul and Spain (Kleiner 2005, 212). The second, the funerary inscription Res Gestae Divi Augusti, appeared on Augustus’s tomb and celebrates his many accomplishments, including bringing peace to the sea, Gaul, Spain, and the Alps. Crucially, the term used to characterize this peace is pacavi, which means pacified. Pacavi is not the absence of violence but the use of violence to reorder the world into a Roman Empire. Thus, Pax Romana meant eliminating the threat of war—both civil and foreign—through the preponderance of Roman military might.

Romans understood peace to include both the absence of violence and the forceful creation and maintenance of a political order: pacification. Modern scholars in the field, however, understand violence and peace as antonyms. While some researchers question the meaning of peace (Martín 2005; Richmond 2008), the field almost never scrutinizes its concepts of violence.2 In fact, scholars of international relations seldom even use the term (Thomas 2011, 1815–16).

Inspired by this anamnesis analysis of pax, we argue that violence functions as a structural feature of the world—even a seemingly peaceful world.3 Violence is not the absence of peace but, rather, as the Romans recognized, the ordering feature of the pax. Violence constitutes modern society. We argue for a phenomenological understanding of violence to reframe how we might theorize what violence is. Our approach does not contest the basic character of violence (harm, death, and so forth.). Rather, it identifies violence as a structuring feature of the world, one that conditions and enables political, social, and economic relations. We define this process as pacification: the process of rendering invisible what scholars in the field identify as direct and indirect violence.

This article proceeds in four parts. In part one, we identify a conceptual gap at the heart of much international relations scholarship about violence. We show that scholars generally conceptualize violence as either direct (the consequence of empirically identifiable behaviors) or indirect (behaviors that in the aggregate cause violence via the institutions of modern society). Across mainstream and critical literatures alike, scholars understand violence as a specific thing, the effects of which we can observe, count, measure, and potentially eliminate. In part two, we introduce a phenomenological methodology for theorizing violence. We show how violence operates even when it is unobservable. Observable violence can function as a rupture that reveals the hidden violence of pacification. In part three, we develop our account of violence as pacification, which we argue is central to the development of the liberal world order. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capitalism. Postcolonial thought reveals the pacification in colonialism. In part four, we demonstrate the theoretical value of our tripartite classification of violence: direct, indirect, and pacification. Our understanding of pacification as violence allows us to account for both the empirical observation of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and the claim that the Pax Americana represents an increase in violence overall.

**—— Footnotes ——**

1 Pacare is a conjugation of paco, the Latin verb meaning to pacify or subdue.

2 An exception is Frazer and Hutchings (2007) who have sought to expand theoretical understandings of the concept. See also Calkivik (2016) and Rodriguez-Alcázar (2017).

### ! – Structural Root Causes

#### Crisis avoidance makes extinction inevitable by occluding the structural causes of instability and fueling militarized conflict around the globe---interrogating their epistemological failures is a pre-requisite to effective policy

Ahmed 11 – Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, International Security Analyst, Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and DPhil, Associate Tutor at the Department of IR, University of Sussex, “The International Relations of Crisis and The Crisis of International Relations: From the Securitisation of Scarcity to the Militarisation of Society,” Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 23, Issue 3, Taylor and Francis

Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics.84 Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox’s words, because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason – thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.87

By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military–political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to ‘securitise’ them – and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity.

‘Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’, therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military– police measures in purported response to an existential danger.89

The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating ‘new security challenges’, and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the ‘surface’ of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms.

Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to ‘new security challenges’ such as ‘low-intensity’ intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such ‘new security challenges’ are non-military in origin – whether their referents are states or individuals – the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military–political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state’s adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations – rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism.

3.2 From theory to policy

Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential ‘threat-multipliers’ of traditional security issues such as ‘political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens’. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources.94 The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a ‘stress-multiplier’ that will ‘exacerbate tensions’ and ‘complicate American foreign policy’; while the EU perceives it as a ‘threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability’.95

In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this ‘securitisation’ of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of ‘resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies’, particularly due to a projected ‘youth bulge’ in the South, which ‘will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy’. This will prompt a ‘return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets’. Finally, climate change will ‘compound’ these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations.

A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99

3.3 Exclusionary logics of global crisis securitisation?

Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous ‘outsiders’. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new ‘outsider’ identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of ‘Otherisation’. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying ‘discursive complex’, where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on ‘the construction of stark boundaries’ that ‘operate to exclude and include’. Yet these exclusionary discourses are ‘intimately bound up with political and economic processes’, such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of ‘maintaining American hegemony’ by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100

But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests – exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military–political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different.101 As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of ‘othering’ in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously ‘included’ groups become ‘ideologically recast’ and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines – eventually legitimising their annihilation.102

In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and ‘Otherised’ in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of ‘inclusion’, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.103 This recalls Lemkin’s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.104

Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new ‘outsider’ group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105

This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed ‘outsider’ group vindicating various forms of violence.

Conclusions

While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.

The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question.

As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves.

There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them.

Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.

Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

### ! – Value To Life

#### Securitized governmentality creates bare life and Global Civil War---threat strips life to parts that are maximized through mastery and destruction

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Duffield’s principal message here is clear and provocative: Liberalism proceeds on the basis that ‘Others’ are the problem to be solved. With politics therefore becoming the handmaiden of necessity, mired in the instrumental pursuit of power, any form of political subjectivity that stands against the technical recovery of the good life is necessarily rendered dangerous for the greater social good. This is significant. Since de-politicization is said to occur when life is being primed for its own betterment – that is, within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices – it is possible to offer an alternative reflection on Agamben’s bare life. Bare life for Agamben is seen to be a product of the sovereign encounter. Life, in other words, becomes bare since it is beyond the recourse of any legal frameworks/obligations – hence set outside (‘abandoned’ in Agamben’s terms) the juridical protections that normally guarantee the subject a place in our moral and political universe of obligation. What Duffield implicitly suggests, however, is that the bare life of the biopolitical encounter is the product of a different logic. No longer banished from the realm, life is denied its political quality as the ‘bare essentials’ for species survival take precedence. No longer then made bare in order to be rendered inactive to the society it endangers, life is stripped bare of its pre-existing values on the basis that those precise qualities impede its potential productive salvation. Hence, while this life is equally assumed to be without meaningful political quality – though in this instance because of some dangerous lack of fulfilment – permitting the restitution in the life of the body implies that exceptional politics are displaced by the no less imperial and no less politically charged bare activity of species survival. Barely active life accordingly has not only become the privileged object of global security governance. Global battle lines are effectively drawn around its hollowed-out form in order to gain mastery over the productive spoils of global existence.

The Liberal War Thesis

Imposing liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war. While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in mapping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. With ‘liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, the more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order to achieve it: ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonetheless committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace:

However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7).

While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the ontotheological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cultures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/­soldier, and so on), these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited:

Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . . What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162).

Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important departure. Not only does it illustrate how liberalism gains its mastery by posing fundamental questions of life and death – that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative (see below).

Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be for the unification of the species. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life. Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name:

At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15).

What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled:

political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15).

David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philosophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment:

NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means.

Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war therefore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counter-­ insurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life. Giving primacy to counterinsurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/developmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast.

## LINK

### AT: Never Said “the West”

#### NATO is synonymous with “the West” – BUT it’s irrelevant – the link is NOT that “West” is a dirty word, rather that the identity category and set of secondary markers that’s often self-described as “Western” is the implicit referent of the 1AC’s securitization, whatever you want to call it – that’s Schlag – AND…

Hansen 17 Lene Hansen, Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, “Conclusion: The Ways of the West and the Road Ahead,” Chapter 13, *Uses of 'the West': Security and the Politics of Order*, eds. Gunther Hellmann & Benjamin Herborth, Cambridge University Press, 2017, ISBN 978-1-107-16849-7, pp.295-296 /GoGreen!

4 The Presence/Absence of ‘the West’

One of the other tensions in the book as a whole is whether ‘the West’ is, as stated in the Introduction, ‘ubiquitous’, or in decline. This raises the question of the presence/absence of ‘the West’, a question which ties methodology, epistemology, and ontology together. For the chapters that adopt a linguistic, discursive epistemology, ‘the West’ is always constituted through discourse, either through explicit articulations of ‘the West’, or more indirectly through those signs that are thought to indicate ‘the West’, be that ‘liberal democracy’ or ‘human rights’. Although this might sound pretty straightforward, I think it is worthwhile to discuss in more detail what such implicit-explicit criteria imply and what they say about the ontological – and empirical – status of ‘the West’. First, it is obvious that to hold ‘the West’ as present exclusively through an explicit articulation of ‘the West’ would limit the analysis. For example, as Schlag notes, because ‘the West’ is absent from the NATO documents she studies, one would conclude that NATO has no connection to ‘the West’. Specific texts, here NATO documents, need therefore to be situated within a broader field of texts and political practice; but we also need to be open to the possibility that ‘secondary terms’ are so established as markers of a sign or identity that they can be used to identify an identity. This, for instance, is the strategy adopted in the chapters by Hellmann, Herborth, and Weber. Steele also takes this route arguing that the pictures of the burned contractors at Fallujah questioned the ‘American Self’ and hence the vitality of ‘Western civilization’. Yet, there is also always an instability in the ability of ‘secondary terms’ to define ‘something’ and we need therefore, as noted earlier, to incorporate that instability into our analysis. Thus, I read Schlag’s observation that ‘the West’ and NATO are synonyms as the outcome of constant discursive performances by political actors that seek to close the gap between the two. I wonder also if more could be said about the closure of the distance between ‘America’ and ‘Western civilization’ in Steele’s analysis. While on the one hand, one must define ‘the West’ through indirect discursive markers, one should also, on the other hand, recognize that such a definition is more elusive than one that relies upon explicit articulations.

That this is not just methodological nitpicking is illustrated by the fact that the way in which an analysis adopts an implicit or explicit criterion of identification has implications for the conclusion about the presence/absence of ‘the West’. Let us take here Jackson’s conclusion that ‘the West’ is receding from US vocabulary. Jackson offers strong textual evidence for this shift, quoting for instance Bush’s 2006 fifth-anniversary speech for September 11. The short passage Jackson quotes contains no less than five times ‘freedom’ – and once ‘free nations’ – which is the first among the ‘commonalities’ defined by Hellmann as those which identify ‘the West’. Thus, if an implicit criterion is adopted, ‘the West’ looks less as if it were in decline than as if it were morphing into a ‘Western universal’ discourse, an option explicitly adopted by Steele. To reiterate: my point is not that we should decide on either the explicit or the implicit criterion as that which truly defines ‘the West’ – it clearly can be said to be present through both – but that we might benefit from making the criteria we adopt more visible. Only then could we interrogate why implicit and explicit criteria might lead us to different conclusions about the status of ‘the West’.

### AT: Ukraine Proves

#### Ukraine doesn’t “prove” anything in itself – dominant meaning is yet to be constructed – reading it through a lens of “revisionism” hardens identities and accelerates escalations of violence

Papastephanou 22 Marianna Papastephanou, teaches Philosophy of Education in the Department of Education at the University of Cyprus, “Coming full circle: A pamphlet on Ukraine, education and catastrophe,” Educational Philosophy and Theory, published online 5-6-2022, DOI 10.1080/00131857.2022.2071260 /GoGreen!

The persistence of the Western ‘we’ has spiraled into a more and more homogenous and univocal public sphere and academic concordance. The ‘politics of conflict and post-conflict management’ increasingly rely on a controversialization of claims to justice manifested inter alia in the ‘emphasis on the study of the past from a plurality of views’ (Klerides, 2014, p. 18). This plurality is partially and conveniently recruited only when the others’ claims to rights need to be relativized and the victim and wrong-doer levelled.7 The ‘plurality of views’ approach is activated when the invading force is an ally and must be given ‘voice’. When the aggressor is an enemy, the switch from the ‘plurality of views’ approach to that of ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative facts’ accusations is almost instantaneous.

The principled stance of condemning an invasion should not preclude critique of all the involved or affected parties, nor should it compel lack of nuance. Nuance as such has most intricate political operations: either missing or added it may controversialize something that should remain uncontroversial or consolidate something that should be controversialized. Consider such operations when revisionism is now uncritically used in the current global, Western, political vocabulary. Revisionism, a normatively neutral term, has, as an explanatory frame for the invasion in Ukraine, replaced the older explanatory and normatively loaded terms of expansionism or imperialism. Quickly, uncritically and virally dispersed, this euphemism obliterates all nuances necessary for discerning when the re-sketching of maps is justified by de-colonial historical genealogy and irenic implementation of majority and self-determination principles and when it is an outcome of expansionist aggression. Adding these nuances, returning to the principle that any attack on a state’s sovereignty is imperialist no matter what else it might be, also invites caution. In the effort to condemn the clearly spelled-out state expansionism, one may forget the gap between an aggressor state’s government and the citizens or culture of the state and hysterically incriminate the country as such rather than the country’s policy. The educated skill in international politics that could mitigate such risks has been totally overlooked by the education of our times and its theory.

Cyprus, Iraq, former Yugoslavia, etc., form a chain, and this ‘etc’. interestingly indicates an ominous continuity rather than cata-strophe as future transformation and rupture with the past. In Ukraine’s case the chain seems broken; the Western world now feels free to use the word ‘sovereignty’ unreservedly, perhaps even uninhibitedly. After many years of other invasions in various localities having failed to sensitize educational theorists/philosophers concerning the dangers of deconstructing (instead of complicating) national identity, the Western world seems to be taking a U-turn. That is, the ‘we’ of Western visions of political configurations has also come full circle: from the Westphalian roots of the state and the late-modern apotheosis of sovereignty to the post-modern wholesale incrimination of the nation-state and now to sovereignty being again in fashion. Coming full circle concerning sovereignty could prove fruitful, since there has been a surplus of normativity that theory obliterated in its zeal to go post-national, though this should not be taken unconditionally, simplistically and unreflectively.

However, temporary awakenings after images of horror followed by a merry slumber is not unusual, and I do not claim any originality in registering this, since it has been recurrently registered by many people in the margins of the world empire. Still, it helps pose the question: how much redirection, cata-strophe, may be indicated in the new common cause of the West? The recent events in Ukraine could initiate a re-thinking that events such as Iraq failed to mobilize, but I think it unlikely that (post-, or post-post-)theorists will make the connection. If I may attempt some prediction, the interest in an invaded country and related territorial politics will remain emotivist, short-lived and circumstantial, guided by official narratives, media coverage and partial sympathies evoking Schmittean ‘friend-enemy’ alliances. The global political support may expire when the global balances of power will have surpassed the current situation. I will not be surprised if the Ukrainians will be asked in the future to square the circle.

Also possible is that the global public concern for Ukraine will last until the next point of interest. And theory may remember Ukraine only until the new post-post-post-ist project. In too single-tasked a manner hegemonic theory has so far gone where the current has drawn it: from the politics of difference to exclusive emphases on inclusion and now to post-humanist, single-focused interest in climate issues. Even when it turns multi-perspectival or polyprismatic it does this just to acknowledge ‘the plurality of voices’ and obtain from that acknowledgement the image of the democratic and progressive. It misses the interconnectivity of the perspectives, their synergies and tensions that reveal yet invisible or overlooked issues of (in)justice.8 Ukraine could ruffle a few feathers since the detractors of territoriality would now face the dilemma of either a politically incorrect deconstruction of Ukraine or a deconstruction of their own views – if they are to have any minimal claim to consistency. A scholarly world which has incriminated all national identifications; based much of its self-understanding as postmodernist and post-Westphalian on ‘deconstructing’ national sovereignty and patriotic affect; and sleepwalked violations of international right and disintegrations of the UN now faces this challenge: to deconstruct Ukraine or to be deconstructed by it?

The wave of sympathy for Ukraine in the West, the global love for its people, conjures up the etymology of a pamphlet (pan + philos, loved by all/loving all, https://www.etymonline. com/word/pamphlet), which is obscured by the contemporary meaning of a pamphlet as a short, polemical and partisan text on a contemporary topic. The topic is not just popular (demo-philes); it is universally loved (pan-philes). Ukraine may become the metonymy for the normative task to think critically about invasions and educate for this discursive justice too, a metonymic status that Iraq, Cyprus, etc., never obtained in educational theory. To become metonymic an event needs first to become pamphilic.9 But, for the metonymy to have some lasting consequence in global political imaginaries, the pamphilic positive political emotions for one victim must be turned into a pamphilic concern for all victims, maintained consistently and transferred to likely events, old or new. Beyond the emotivist, universal reaction of sympathy and all that philia connotes, also important is the well-meant principled universalism that enhances the public’s or academia’s ability to see the connections among cases and the interconnectivity of faces of justice. Such enhanced (in)sight helps avoid double standards and allow the metonymy (e.g., Ukraine) to deconstruct theoretical complacencies. Care should be for all, pan-philia shown not just for some. This universalism condemns crimes of war wherever they come from; it condemns the acts, not the people or the culture of a country. It aims to a future of global friendliness (pamphilikotis) of states, against ongoing uses of ‘friendly’ as a particularist predicate of some states (consider the term: friendly nations).

All these require the turn of the West and its others toward some self-critique, one as radical as a cata-strophe, that is still not in view and is highly unlikely: so far, there are no signs that the numbed West has at last realized what happened in Iraq and elsewhere and has not made the connections between its own unilateral preemptive strikes on pretexts of security and the use of the same rhetoric by an ‘unfriendly’ country against a Western ally. Nevertheless, such a U-turn would presuppose some sense of improvement (school improvement notwithstanding), a notion that has its own political complicities. ‘We are stuck to the notion that we must improve ourselves, our society, our world, and that education is the necessary path to this ever-receding condition of fulfilment’ (Peim & Stock, 2022, p. 259). However, can we avoid the normativity of improvement, and at what cost? The effort to avoid biopolitics, Eurocentrism and toxic humanism has this risk: to incriminate all improvement, and all educative moments. Besides, not being stuck to the notion of improvement would logically be an improvement too (an improvement from the condition of being stuck).10 In my opinion, not being stuck to the hegemonic sense of improvement does not mean to abandon the notion, but to loosen the hegemonic grip or to show alternative meanings, namely, faces of the notion that the dominant signification has kept from view. Then again, an immediate objection would be that such nuances may condone education’s becoming a ‘master concept’ that reflects ‘faith in the fallen present order of things through its dual promises of individual and collective fulfilment and redemption’ (Peim and Stock, p. 256). Distinguishing improvement qua adaptive ‘learning’ from the improvement that is deeply, thoroughly critical, original and uncompromising, and loosening the former’s grip on today’s world (if this could ever be attained), promises some redemption. The distinction, just as all sanitizations of tarnished terms, is untrustworthy. But the very expectation of trustworthiness may itself be problematic, having its own risks.

One such risk is that dismissals of any future redemption may empower retrotopias. ‘The pendulums of the public mindset’ are ‘perform[ing] a U-turn: from investing public hopes of improvement in the uncertain and ever-too-obviously un-trustworthy future, to re-reinvesting them in the vaguely remembered past’ (Bauman, 2017, p. 6). The past is ‘valued for its assumed stability and so trustworthiness. With such a U-turn happening, the future is transformed from the natural habitat of hopes and rightful expectations into the site of nightmares’ (Bauman, p. 6). Certainly, not all blanket incriminations of normative notions (e.g., international law, or education/improvement in the case of Peim and Stock’s article) resort to retrotopias; in fact, some could also vehemently attack retrotopics. Nevertheless, while portraying the future as a site of nightmare and catastrophe (qua disaster) most accurately, sweeping incriminations of normative terms (and of nuancing such terms), ironically divest cata-strophe (qua radical change) of resources, at the very moment that they extol radical transformation. For, the resources of cata/strophes (disasters and promising changes) have always been normativities, their ever renewed operations of nuancing and the utopics to which wholesale incriminations deal a blow.

Peim and Stock theorize the prospect of catastrophe/disaster most accurately. ‘The instigation of the nuclear age marks a dramatic turn whereby human technologies begin to immediately impact on the ecosystem of the earth in an irreversible mode’. More inescapably than the steam engine, ‘nuclear arsenals become monstrosities that can destroy whole worlds’ (Peim & Stock, 2022, p. 253). Indeed, with the events in Ukraine, the world is witnessing another U-turn, that of the possibility of a catastrophe more imminent than the ecological: the nuclear. We are coming full circle on that too: nuclear arsenals preoccupied the world in Cold War times (Russell, 1959/2009), then they largely eclipsed from philosophy, educational discourses and the public sphere. But, now, biological, chemical, nuclear wars and related laboratories are in full view again. This coming full circle is alarming as much as it is illusive – illusive because there was never a real break from war (certainly non-nuclear) and conflict, it was only the big Western places that enjoyed peace and wrongly projected it on the whole world. Nor did the world (Western or other) and its theory prove pamphilic to cosmos (biota and non-biota). In reality, the nuclear industry and the corresponding science continued their ‘progress’ unabated.

While the theoretical world (Western and non-Western) overlooked the continuation of nuclear production and related scientific research, a disaster, which could at that stage be prevented through principled action, was taking place. ‘Ecological catastrophe signals an unprecedented time of extreme crisis that involves changes to the geological structure of the earth affected by nuclear tests that will outlast any reasonable calculation of the lifespan of the human species’ (Peim & Stock, 2022, p. 257). Peim and Stock remark that ‘conventional wisdom’ ‘decrees education an essential force in saving the world’. They pertinently disturb this wisdom by showing that ‘education as we know it must be seen as the most extensive expression of a dangerous biopower that is beyond control’,11 not only ‘impotent in combating ecological catastrophe’, but also reproductive of the Anthropocene (p. 251).

Reflecting on the times, the time of education, and the complicities of education, its theory and the whole human world in ecological and other catastrophes, we may concur with Peim and Stock that ‘there is no hiding place from education. Temporally, education is characterized by its ancient provenance beginning at the beginning of civilization itself’ and ‘by its interminable projection into a future that is completely unknowable’ (Peim and Stock, p. 259). Yet, it is through education that the authors and their readers are able to view education as they do. This does not only affirm the authors’ view of education as intractable, all-encompassing and inescapable; it also shows that education has a disclosing power, a possibility of cata-strophe, one that does not leave education’s own, hegemonic thinking habits unaffected. I have already discussed some such habits concerning global justice, double standards and unqualified incriminations of normativities. Peim and Stock aptly critique another hegemonic habit that characterizes even post-humanist educational thought.

They argue that ‘educational studies and philosophy of education’ fail to recognize the ‘contemporary condition of education’ because of ‘the idealist split between the fallen, manifest form of education and the supposedly unlocked potential it possesses’ (Peim and Stock, p. 257). This condition reflects ‘the very forces that have driven modernity’ and effected ‘the technological and social changes implicated in the great transformation’ that reproduces the Anthropocene (p. 258). I agree with Peim and Stock’s critique of our field, but not on the attributed causality because it implicitly grants our field that, though it has failed to critique education per se, it has critiqued the world and the fallen, manifest form of education. I doubt that our critiques have been sharp, thorough or genuine enough to unlock educational potentials for changes in global ethico-politics. The ‘We’ that shapes the ‘we’ of our field is too immersed in its world to turn verbal promises into practices, let alone critique the world ‘cata-strophically’. Moreover, nothing secures that the educational potentials that could be unlocked would be for the better. This assumption rests on a hasty normativization of rethinking and of transforming. Even if theory and education were to unleash their most transformative critical energies, these would not necessarily be apposite or redemptive just because they promise a transformation, especially if they are too formalist/indeterminate concerning what transformation they speak for. Nor is cata-strophe inherently normative; it is ethically neutral, neither guaranteeing nor precluding the desirable and worthwhile direction.

‘Education is symptomatic of the end of the world as opposed to a tool to combat it’ (Peim and Stock, p. 252): what education? Education is a functioning institution; a critical-normative term (an ideal at variance with the institution); and a concept and phenomenon broader than the institution. None of these is reducible to the other. A critique of them should be nuanced to reflect this plurality and related interconnectivity. Thus, I agree that ‘education is not a pure and redemptive concept that has been perverted into the form of the school’ (p. 256) and find it important for contesting popular binaries such as ‘learning vs education’ that glorify education. But I disagree with the incrimination and identification of the concept of education with the current education worldwide. Both sides essentialize education and obfuscate its normative doubleness. Like many other human endeavours education is encircled by catastrophe qua disaster and qua promising change. Education as ideality involves cata/strophe, though not only in the negative meaning that catastrophe has in the current Western vocabulary and in Peim and Stock’s paper. The inauspicious record of redemptive utopias which undermines their trustworthiness should not lead to essentializing mistrust of the future and educational failures to serve a better future.

‘An object that inhabits spatio-temporalities like that of climate change, whilst also feeding off and harvesting bodies through the mode of biopower is one that we should be quick to challenge or combat’ (Peim and Stock, p. 261). A recurrent (crypto)normative task that Peim and Stock set for the ‘we’ is ‘to combat’ education: a polemical term evoking a battle, and battles sometimes effect a catastrephein (destroying/destruction). This is a valuable contribution, especially now, given the growing tendency in our field to go post-critical and show love for the world, as if love were precluded by the critical. Peim and Stock convincingly argue that, instead of combating, theory aspires ‘to consistently ameliorate, build upon, and consequently grow the hyperobject in question’ (p. 261). They applaud efforts to ‘step outside of education and look to the broader ontologies of the world around them’ but what they call for ‘is an interrogation of the object of education itself, a vital endeavour to be acted upon before (perhaps futile) attempts to move outside of it’ (p. 257). To the doubt they insert concerning feasibility I would add doubt about the normative desirability of stepping outside of (a homogenized, non-nuanced) education. To their call for combat I respond with cata-strophe.

‘Disaster’ carries normative implications because ‘to call an event a ‘disaster’ is to signal that it is worthy of immediate, serious human attention and purposive corrective activity’ (Zack 2009, p. 7). But what will count as ‘corrective’ reflects, in my view, dominant mindsets. Catastrophe qua disaster is per se normatively unclear as to what cata-strophe qua U-turn or radical change it may activate. The currently popular educational-philosophical normativization of rupture and transformation per se is just a postmodern wishful thinking. Taking Ukraine as a metonymy for a possible (though actually unlikely) U-turn of educational philosophy concerning global ethics/ politics, I have wondered whether our field (or related fields) will be cata-strophic in front of yet another catastrophe qua disaster. Will academia think Ukraine through to theoretical and political implications for currently hegemonic and globally disseminated discourses? Will academia grasp education’s relevance to egregious injustices that remain invisible and outside of its attention? Unfortunately, ‘disasters and similar events do the political-philosophical work of providing justification for government authority in general or for extraordinary measures’ (Sandin, 2018, p. 20). Rather than witnessing a U-turn it is more likely to experience a nightmarish fortification of NATO as a Western project and an intensification of the arms race with even less public or academic protest.

### AT: No Threat Inflation

#### Yes threat inflation – especially around NATO – confluence of institutional and social incentives makes it inescapable absent the ALT

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In Elizabethan theater, “alarums and excursions” was a stage direction calling for actors to rush about the stage in a chaotic clamor suggestive of battle.1 In American politics, threat inflation has a similarly theatrical role: it tries to confuse and excite an audience to win its support for some policy, often military excursions of some sort. This chapter explains why U.S. defense politics is especially prone to such behavior—why, that is, U.S. leaders serially exaggerate the nation’s vulnerability to national security threats.

The explanation, in a nutshell, is that power gives the United States the opportunity to adopt expansive foreign policy goals.2 “Expansive” here refers not necessarily to attempts at expansion in the sense of territorial acquisition but to a militarily active and interventionist grand strategy. To heighten support for those goals, U.S. leaders exaggerate their contribution to domestic security. Over time, expansive foreign policy also generates societal interests tied to its survival. Those interests, most prominently national security organizations, inflate threats to protect their prerogatives. Educated amid that cacophony of threat inflation, new political leaders learn to echo it, either because doing so seems politically safe or because they believe it. Assertions of insecurity become a cultural habit of American elites.

The chapter begins by defining threat inflation and describing how U.S. leaders use it. It then reviews political science and economics concepts showing how special interest groups dominate debates about risk. The second section shows how the growth of U.S. power distributes the costs of expansive foreign policies, thus undermining the formation of interest groups opposed to such policies. The next shows how power concentrates the benefits of those policies, forming interests that promote themselves with threat inflation. The last section discusses conditions that make for more balanced debate about threats and how to foster them.

In explaining U.S. threat inflation, the chapter sheds light on which security threats are especially prone to exaggeration; on why reactions to new threats are often slow; on why fears tend to outlast the dangers that brought them; and, more generally, how debate fails to purge myth—how the democratic marketplace of ideas fails.

Threat Inflation as Conflict Socialization

Threat inflation is speech that gives an exaggerated sense of danger. It need not involve lying. U.S. leaders, for example, often threat‐​inflate by abusing worst‐​case scenarios—highlighting a dangerous possibility and omitting its probability.3 Shorn of context, the possibility implies more danger than reality merits. If you tell someone skiing bunny slopes in New Hampshire to beware of avalanches and illustrate the danger with tales of heliskiers buried by snow in the Canadian Rockies, you are not lying. But you have failed to point out that the danger of an avalanche in the White Mountains is remote. You are inflating skiing’s danger. Of course, in national security politics, exaggeration is rarely so blatant. It can be difficult to separate the prudent warning from threat inflation, especially when the speaker’s job is to warn.

In the Semi‐​Sovereign People, E. E. Schattschneider imagines democratic politics as a street fight watched by a crowd.4 The fight’s outcome, he tells us, depends on the extent of the crowd’s involvement. So the brawlers may try to involve the crowd, depending on its disposition and on how the fight is going. In politics, he argues, beneficiaries of the policy status quo will seek to keep conflict narrow, whereas those seeking change will often try to broaden it. Activists frustrated by local politics might try to involve state government, and statewide combatants may look to the federal government. The full Congress can reverse its committees’ actions. The secretary of defense might reevaluate an army decision, and the president, driven by public opinion, might overrule him.

In U.S. politics, threat inflation is often a shout of “danger!” meant to socialize conflict, an effort to energize public opinion. The U.S. system, according to Theodore Lowi, is especially prone to such appeals. Compared with dictatorships or even parliamentary governments, power in the United States is diffuse: spread among branches of government, committees, agencies, and private interest groups.5 Those entities are potential points of resistance to policy change. They create a powerful bias toward the status quo.

Crises and wars unify public goals, overcoming the typical stasis. Invocations of insecurity attempt to create a similarly unifying sense of crisis that removes parochial barriers to collective action.6 Because policymakers always struggle to implement their proposals, alarmism is a regular feature of U.S. policy debate. It rarely works. But as with most shouts for help, the absence of initial success is likely to produce louder shouting, not quiet. Threat inflators are searching for arguments that win with the public.

Another species of threat inflation defends the status quo. Advocates of security organizations and policies naturally defend them by references to the dangers that they confront. Such defenses shade easily into exaggeration, especially as the relevant threat lessens.

Misperception vs. Dishonesty

The considerable academic literature dealing with how states misunderstand and mismanage danger generally focuses on errors of perception—psychological bias, ignorance, intelligence mistakes, and other communication and comprehension problems that prevent the state from correctly interpreting information.7 So the Nazi threat mounted without a proper response because nations slept, blind to its menace. The 9/11 attacks resulted from a “failure of imagination.”8 The United States invaded Iraq because it overestimated Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction arsenal. The solution to misperception is to see more clearly—correct for predictable biases, collect better intelligence, improve analysis of it, share information faster, and use better theory about enemy thinking.

The tendency to attribute security policy failure to misperception follows what can be called the rational‐​comprehensive model of politics, where government is seen as a process of revealing the national interest.9 Intelligence and commission reports, congressional hearings, and analysis from think tanks or academics inform policymakers’ perceptions. Those perceptions yield policy without too much trouble.

The rational‐​comprehensive model sees liberal democracy as a marketplace of ideas that selects for truth and wise foreign policy and sees misperception as a distorter of that market’s prices.10 The separation of powers and the need for public approval mean that policies will be publicly debated. Debate will be wide because the public bears the cost of policies and thus has an interest in truthful analysis of their consequences. Contestation exposes the errors supporting policy options, costing them support. Even the prospect of dissent can prevent leaders from proposing actions detrimental to the national interest. Leaders either learn directly from debate or adjust their preferences for electoral reasons as the public debates its way toward wisdom. The nation will not always avoid folly but will eventually recognize it and self‐​correct. Liberal countries will adjust better than illiberal ones to the international system’s pressures and will adopt wiser foreign policies.11 They should continually reevaluate their assessments of threats and the efficacy of policy responses, adjusting programs and spending accordingly.

Misperception is often a convincing tool for understanding failures in security policy. But there are several reasons to suspect that political analysts overdiagnose it. First, misperception flatters social science. If flawed theoretical lenses cause leaders to misperceive, analysts are optometrists. Their importance under this approach probably makes them overly eager to use it. Second, perceptual explanations for policy failures invite technocratic solutions, which essentially say stick with present policy goals while improving the means—tweaking the engine rather than swapping cars or picking a new destination. Because those fixes threaten no important public organization or interest, they are relatively uncontroversial and easy to implement, making them especially attractive to politically ambitious analysts. Third, misperception shucks aside dishonesty. Children know that politics is dishonest, but international relations scholarship pays little attention to it, probably because it is hidden.12 Elected leaders avoid admitting that they often sacrifice the general or national interest for narrower ones, even those they were elected to represent. National security politics are particularly prone to that problem. The supposed stakes make parochial considerations seem particularly inappropriate, hence the myth that politics stops at the water’s edge.

Pluralism and Threat Perception

The theory elaborated here sees leaders’ tendency to purposely mislead the public as the main cause of national errors about threat. The theory comes from pluralism, not the rational‐​comprehensive model.13 Pluralism sees democratic government as an arena for the competition of interests manifest in pressure groups, congressional committees, and government agencies. In pluralism, sales and bargaining are the guts of democracy; science is just the marketing language. That is because the legitimacy that democratic rule gathers by process is never enough. Science’s sheen, the ritual consultation of expertise, expands policies’ appeal. White papers, intelligence reports, and other forms of expert analysis are less for enlightenment than affirmation—to convince observers that government serves their interests, rescuing it from the ward heeler, the backroom plutocrats, and the like.14 Policies are solutions seeking problems to solve.15 The rational‐​comprehensive model has the causal arrow backward; estimates of danger are more servants of policy preferences than their cause. Ideas’ competition is less a marketplace than a theater, where debate produces noise and passion but little progress toward truth or agreement.16

The American government is supposed to avoid the problem of special interests triumphing over the general interest. In Federalist 10, James Madison argues that faction checks faction in large republics, preventing narrow interests from dominating public policy.17 Madison’s essay reflects a classically liberal idea—one present in the checks and balances in the Constitution—that competition among self‐​interested actors serves the general interest.

David Truman and other early pluralists use similar logic to argue that the U.S. government succeeds by inviting group competition.18 The distribution of power in American government makes it uniquely open to influence, encouraging the formation of political interest groups. Those groups include not only economic interests such as industry associations but also religious groups, civil rights organizations, conservationists, and so forth. New groups organize to advance new goals or to defend old ones against other interest groups. For example, public health advocacy groups trying to ban smoking in bars may prompt bar owners to organize against the ban.

Pluralists see the political interest groups as servants of various societal goods or ends, which they embed in the aims of government agencies. Policymaking is the competition of those goods. The government as it stands—its budget and programs—is their compromise, though not a static one. That outcome approximates the national interest better than any alternative, though none of the competitors will ever be satisfied.

In an optimistic reading of pluralism, interest‐​group competition heightens appreciation of truth. If groups mislead the public, they are likely to harm other groups’ interests. Those groups will combat the misinformation. For example, if the army exaggerates an enemy’s capability in order to win funds for more personnel, the air force may correct the record for fear that the funds will come from its budget. Export industries might downplay threats if responses to them threaten market access. These fights spill into debates in the Congress or the press, and observers learn what is accurate.

Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action critiques the optimistic kind of pluralism. Olson argues that many societal goods—those that he calls public goods—lack interest‐​group protection and, therefore, public policies that serve them.19 His argument implies that no one will inflate threats to serve those goods or to combat threat inflation that harms them.

Public goods have two characteristics, Olson says. No one can be effectively excluded from enjoying the good (nonexcludability), and one person’s consumption of the good does not reduce availability of the good for consumption by others (nonrivalry). Those characteristics encourage people to free-ride—to try to enjoy the good without contributing to its provision. As a result, people lack incentive to provide public goods. That is the collective action or free‐​rider problem. Small groups overcome the free‐​rider problem by enforcing participation and providing benefits for participation (select benefits) to members.

Pecuniary motives are not the sole cause of people’s preferences about politics or engagement in it, of course. People often damage their material well‐​being in service of social, familial, moral, or religious ends. But the fact that some people’s behavior does not reliably follow from material incentives does not mean that they do not create general tendencies that powerfully affect politics. Collective action theory suggests that without the aid of private interests, public goods will be underprovided, whatever the efforts of do‐​gooders. Moreover, even if one’s goals derive from moral considerations, free riding impedes organization.

Government overcomes collective action problems by coercion— forcing people to fund public goods via taxation. But without private interests pushing it in the first place, why will government provide the good? Collective action theory says policy in any given area will serve private interests, not the national interest.

Pure public goods are rare. In most cases, government provision of a good via policy creates classes of beneficiaries.20 A policy’s costs and benefits distribute unevenly and, therefore, so do incentives to try to implement or change it. That insight points to a more realistic way of considering political organization: transaction costs. That term means the cost of engaging in economic exchange, excluding the good’s price. Transaction costs include the effort required to make a deal and gather the information needed to determine whether it is worthwhile.

In public policy terms, the transaction costs that a person would expend to learn his or her interests generally outweigh the benefits gained from doing so. If you do not pay the information cost of learning your interest, you cannot know that for sure, of course. But people will have a general sense that in most policy areas, their efforts are unlikely to pay off. They remain rationally ignorant. Only people who receive relatively high returns from the good have incentive to learn their interests, let alone organize others in service of them.

Policy outcomes, then, depend less on a policy’s total costs and benefits for society than on the intensity and distribution of interests that the policy creates. Minorities with concentrated interests rule over disinterested majorities.21 Those groups—concentrated or special interests— will likely dictate policy if it causes no one losses of similar magnitude. Though transaction costs are an economic concept, their relevance extends to immaterial interests and groups formed to advance them. What facilitates organization is not the nature or origin of preferences but their distribution. The few whose moral or religious fervor makes them care deeply about a policy area exercise outsize influence over it. Cuban exiles dominate U.S. policy toward Cuba just as the farm lobby dominates agricultural policy.

Transaction costs explain how narrow interests dominate not only policy but also ideas about policy. Politics are rife with what economists call information asymmetry—where one party to a potential exchange holds most of the information about the value of a good being sold.22 Because people lack incentive to pay the cost of figuring out what a good is worth to them, they use proxies to guide their political preferences.23 Those that stand to benefit more directly will gather the relevant information, employ experts, and try to convince a larger and more uncertain group that the good is valuable enough to justify their action—organization, contributions, or votes. For example, interest groups such as the Chamber of Commerce will struggle to convince would‐​be members that their contribution buys them something worthwhile. Ideas about politics, including what constitutes a threat, are largely the byproduct of the formation and conflict of organized political interests.24 Voting for a party or candidate is deciding whose story about your best interest to believe.

That logic extends to ideologies, which are informal normative frameworks.25 Ideology is considered here to be a species of institution, which means rules and norms governing human behavior.26 Ideologies allow people to generate many preferences from a few beliefs. The belief that you are a conservative, for example, yields a plethora of beliefs about how society ought to be constituted. Ideology thus lowers both the cost of policy preferences and the cost of translating them into action. Leaders use ideology to convince the public to support particular policies.

Once a policy’s cost becomes high enough, those paying have incentive to inform themselves, reducing asymmetry and the potential for manipulation. For example, those likely to be drafted into Vietnam and killed became more informed about the war and more likely to oppose it.27 Where information is cheaper, more individuals have incentive to gather it and discern their interests more carefully.

This analysis of transaction costs has three implications about threat perception and national reaction to threats worth highlighting. First, because learning about security is expensive, national security is especially prone to information asymmetry and thus to threat inflation. Few entities can afford the surveillance assets needed to know the disposition of foreign missiles. It is hard to learn what terrorists in Waziristan are doing, even if you live there. As a result, information about threats comes mostly from government or analysts tied to it.28 Threats are ambiguous, and the logic of policies meant to mitigate them is often complex. Providers of security play a particularly dominant role in the formation of public ideas about it.

Second, the distribution of societal interests implicated by responses to the danger—the domestic economy of incentives—drives national reactions to danger. If responding to a threat creates concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, government will likely adopt expensive and aggressive policies to combat it. Threats that encourage policies creating concentrated costs and diffuse benefits may provoke little response. Policies that concentrate costs and benefits will create controversy and a balanced response to threats. If responding to a threat concentrates no interest, we should expect an indifferent policy response.

Third, national threat perception will be slow to respond to changes in threat. Interests tied to a threat will not disappear with it. They will continue to promote it or the similar threats that they combat.29 In fact, by endangering those interests, the threat’s disappearance may even increase their output of hype.

Unrestrained Power Causes Threat Inflation

Expansive defense policies and perception of threats that justify them serve the national security establishment but harm the American public slightly. Threat inflation is one tool that the establishment uses to convince the public otherwise. Because expansive policies’ costs distribute to everyone as deficits or taxes, few people have an incentive to organize against them and convince the public of its true interests.

Arnold Wolfers argues that the term “national security” tends to cloak other interests:

A glance at history will suffice to show that survival has only exceptionally been at stake, particularly for major powers. If nations were not concerned with the protection of values other than their survival as independent states, most of them, most of the time, would not have had to be seriously worried about their security, despite what manipulators of public opinion engaged in mustering greater security efforts may have said to the contrary.30

Wolfers says that we give rhetoric too much due in considering the sources of foreign policy. States want safety, but they also seek status, material gain, and ideological goods. Some states, he says, value such goals more than security.31 To maximize support, they always talk about their goals in relation to security, however, obscuring the distinction between needs and wants.

The modern United States is Wolfers’s poster child. National survival is virtually ensured by geography, tradition, nuclear weapons, and the wealth and technology that generate military power. For most Americans, unsuccessful wars, even the recent one in Iraq, result in little more than marginally higher tax rates or debt. Since the draft’s end, war kills only the volunteer military and foreigners. Contrast that with Europeans living 100 years ago or the Athenians portrayed by Thucydides, where foreign policy failures meant conquest and mass death, and even successful wars would kill many sons and consume a considerable portion of societal wealth. U.S. foreign policy, no matter how misguided, rarely endangers safety at home.32

But nothing sells foreign policy in public like danger. To increase public support for an interventionist foreign policy, leaders portray it as a means to lessen threats. That portrayal requires threat inflation. There is a paradox: security increases the sense of insecurity.33 In economic terms, the costs of expansive U.S. foreign policies might badly outweigh the benefits, but costs are diffuse. The United States makes foreign policy like rich people shop: indulging luxurious tastes without much concern about price.

That argument is broadly consistent with realism. Realism concerns the systematic interaction of power. It sees rival power, or appreciation of its possibility, as the source of restraint in domestic and international politics. Power checks power. We can preach self‐​restraint, but preaching rarely restrains when opportunities for indulgence arise.

Realism is sometimes seen as the absence of folly, as clear‐​eyed pragmatism. But that view is realpolitik—the behavior the international system encourages, according to Kenneth Waltz.34 His theory, structural realism, considers states to be like units in anarchy seeking survival with varying capability. The system created by the interaction of those units is competitive. Competition encourages states to protect their power through realpolitik. One such behavior is to balance each other’s power. Another is to appreciate the limits of power, the danger of provoking rivals. International politics thus generally encourages restraint in territorial acquisition, troop deployment, and war making.

Structural realism should not be confused with the unconditional prediction that states adopt realpolitik—pragmatic, restrained policies.35 The theory says that international relations generally create pressures against military adventurism, but not always. Systemic pressures vary with time, geography, and relative capabilities. When threats are remote and relative resources great, structural realism suggests that foreign policy contrary to realpolitik is more likely.36 Another way to put it is that states, like people, are more likely to act according to moral values when the price of doing so is low.37

Systemic pressures were strong in European states a century ago. They have long been weak in the United States. They are nearly absent today. As a result, the United States has embraced realpolitik only intermittently, when threats loomed, and has traditionally indulged an expansive foreign policy. Realists today typically argue that the international system will teach the United States restraint, sooner or later. But structural realism can accommodate the idea that the system is the problem, not the solution.

The absence of international constraint is an open door. Relative power and safety offer an opportunity for an expansive foreign policy. Whether or not the state walks through depends on its internal characteristics.38 But a history of being unrestrained internationally will affect characteristics in consequential ways. The education offered by international politics needs to become institutionalized to guide state policy. So it will be slow to take even once conditions encourage it, and it will outlast the dangers that brought it. What matters in producing threat inflation is not simply the absence of restraint because of relative power, but the history of being unrestrained and safe.

Institutions explain why not all states, having the same power as the United States does, would do as it does.39 For historical reasons, a state with similar relative power and safety might have more doubt about whether it can be a global force for good. Having been institutionalized, those beliefs resist changes in international conditions, changing only gradually or because of shocking events. For example, experience renovated German and Japanese ideas about foreign policy, replacing militarism with reluctance to use force. Laws and traditions limit the size and influence of those nations’ military establishments, which were once powerful supporters of expansive foreign policy.40 The two world wars left even their European victors chary of policies that risk war, at least more chary than the United States, where those wars were less painful.

As discussed earlier, ideologies organize social action. Those with the most at stake—those that stand to receive concentrated material or moral benefits—will tend to dominate ideological debate. But, as social constructs, ideologies are broadly disputed, making consensus hard to achieve. Overly abrupt proposed changes in ideological content will be rejected by other ideological leaders and thus will convince few. Over time, however, ideologies should shift to match the interests of intellectual and political elites.

We can analyze the evolution of American ideas about foreign policy this way. By generating new interests in expansionist foreign policy, as will be discussed, and by lessening and distributing the costs of such policy, growth in relative power helped change ideas. The United States was generally isolationist in its first century of independence because it had little capability to participate in global power politics and wanted to be unmolested by other powers. There was no American empire to promote, and there were European empires to keep out. An army was occasionally raised and a navy kept to that end, but they needed an anti‐​imperial ideology for support. The absence of a permanent military establishment limited support for more expansionist takes on liberal ideology.41 The liberal tradition confused and retarded the embrace of expansion but did not prevent it.

Opportunity and experience were the key causes of the American shift to expansive military policies in the 20th century, particularly after World War II.42 Europe wanted American support against communism, allowing the assertion of American power there. U.S. leaders justified the new expansionist policies by disparaging isolationism and conflating the spread of liberalism with U.S. security.43 Soviet power prevented

U.S. military intervention in some areas, like Eastern Europe and (along with China) discouraged escalation of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The tragic results of Vietnam tempered U.S. enthusiasm for military intervention for the rest of the Cold War. But the Soviet Union did little to prevent interventions in most of the Third World. And communism’s threat encouraged some states to invite U.S. defenses, encouraging interventions. The Soviet Union’s collapse left the United States even less restrained. The Gulf War and the perceived success of the Cold War served the story that advocates of expansive foreign policy told. Those events helped overcome the lingering popularity of insularity. Government support for realpolitik ideas diminished after the Cold War, and foreign policy idealism flourished.

In the course of U.S. history, Americans went from considering liberalism a fragile thing protected at home by isolation to something protected abroad by troops or delivered there by wars of liberation or state repair. That ideological shift produced more threat inflation. It did so because leaders motivated by ideological ends always avail themselves of arguments about the security benefits of their proposed action. There is a feedback mechanism here. As a result of being unrestrained and rich, the United States, in the course of its history, became more active abroad. To promote activist policies, leaders hyped threats and made ideological arguments. Over time, others, including new leaders, came to support those policies because they had learned the ideology, generating more threat inflation.44

Who Hypes What and Why

The United States is likely to adopt foreign policies contrary to its interests if the costs of the policy are diffuse and the benefits are concentrated. The theory discussed in this section can be thought of as the benefit side of that equation. To summarize: expansive defense policies and perception of threats that justify them harm the American public slightly but help the national security establishment.45 The establishment inflates threats to try to convince the public otherwise—that policies conductive to various parochial interests serve the public interest. Because expansive policies’ costs sparsely distribute to everyone as deficits or taxes, few people have an incentive to organize and resist the establishment’s take on threats. An exception is military service members, who bear great cost in the event of war. But professional norms discourage service members from taking vocal anti‐​war stances. So the establishment dominates the creation and interpretation of information about threats. Because the establishment formed in the past and changes with difficulty, it tends to focus on past threats, or threats like them, thus hindering the nation’s ability to react to new types of threats. The president generally compromises with the establishment because of its information advantage and the limited power and time he has to combat it. To sell that compromise, the president echoes the establishment’s threat inflation.

The rest of this section discusses why specific elements of the national security establishment hype threats and encourage the president to do so. The entities discussed include the so‐​called iron triangle—military services, congressional committees, and defense contractors—and intelligence agencies, nongovernmental veterans and military organizations, think tank and academic defense analysts, foreign governments, and the media. Before examining the incentives that influence those groups, a caveat is needed. The claim here is not that people are simply products of their organizational or personal interests, that fidelity to such incentives is an inviolate law of human behavior. People often serve the national interest at the expense of their own. Working in government can be an example. But though people often resist those incentives, they push, pull, and create general tendencies.

The national security establishment is neither a unified entity nor a conspiracy. Its parts have various goals that lead them to compete and promote different dangers. But their interests in exaggerating threats often overlap.46 Les Aspin explained that confluence well:

The ends of MIC Inc. [the military‐​industrial complex] are achieved through 1,001 individual and basically unrelated decisions, which taken together have the effect of a conspiracy without there ever being one. The decisions are taken not only by the services and their contractors, but also by labor unions, local politicians, and a press inflicted with community boosterism. These factotums, who might otherwise be brawling with one and other, rarely link arms in pursuit of the ends of the MIC, but the decisions they take in pursuit of their perceived self‐​interest have the same result. On the other side, there is no other side. The power of a labor union or of a big business is circumscribed by the fact that there are opposite (if not equal) pressures working against it. But the MIC has long functioned in an atmosphere of at best inchoate countervailing pressures.47

Congress and the executive branch share power over defense and foreign policy. The executive, however, has become dominant since the start of the Cold War, thanks largely to congressional acquiescence.48 The executive drives national threat perceptions, though Congress plays a key role under certain circumstances. Within the executive branch, the White House directs security policy, but the president and his staff have limited time and political capital. The real executers of defense policy are the national security agencies, especially the military services.

National Security Agencies

Organizational theory helps us understand why security agencies inflate threats. Successful agencies mature by responding to their political environment, particularly early formative experiences.49 They ensure political and budgetary support by reliably producing whatever outputs they were created to deliver. They motivate employees through promotional tracks and harmonize their actions with common training and standard operating procedures. They maximize autonomy, avoiding reliance on other agencies that might disrupt their ability to achieve their goal. Those adaptations yield a fixed way of doing business or doctrine.50 Doctrine typically consists of various related tasks carried out by specialized personnel, meaning that it requires a division of labor. Divisions of labor are especially important in military organizations because of the complex nature of their work. Those performing the most essential jobs rise to dominate the management structure. Hence, a hierarchy forms around a doctrine. Its maintenance protects the organization’s purpose.51 The organization teaches employees the doctrine’s worth, making it a culture, an ethos, or a mission.

Security agencies inflate threats to preserve public and budgetary support for their mission. Tied by incentive structures to their purpose, organizations pursue it at the expense of economy or truth. It is not that those considerations are ignored, just that they matter less than organizational health, which depends on outside support for its missions. When their preferred threats fade, security organizations will search for new enemies to justify their services. The better the threat fits their doctrine, the more they hype it.

The tendency to promote threats to protect missions is strongest in large and unified organizations such as the U.S. Air Force. The tendency is weaker in smaller and less focused organizations. Fewer resources mean less ability to influence opinion directly and fewer dependents in Congress and industry that share the organization’s view. A divided sense of mission means less incentive to sell a particular threat. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard might hesitate to sell the terrorist threat should counterterrorism force it to shift focus from harbor patrol, one of its traditional missions.

Dedication to purpose makes bureaucratized agencies reliable servants of their goal, but it limits organizations’ ability to respond to new conditions. A new mission would require a new division of labor, resulting in a new hierarchy. Leaders are unlikely to cast themselves and their protégés aside, especially when the current mission has reliably brought outside support, including funding. So government organizations tend to embrace only change that is consistent with their doctrine.52 In national security, that tendency means that organizations will be slow to adapt to the new types of threats. The U.S. Army struggles with counterinsurgency. The Drug Enforcement Agency exists because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was reluctant to chase drug criminals. Agencies will not hype threats that seem to require doctrinal innovation.

Organizations promote threats via congressional testimony, reports, leaks, press conferences and releases, and sponsored research, as well as by feeding information to congressional allies. As autonomy seekers, security agencies prefer to monopolize intelligence assessments about threats that concern them. Where that monopoly is impossible, they use their own intelligence units to inflate their favored threats to compete with other agencies.

Independent intelligence agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency will likely provide more accurate assessments than will military intelligence agencies. Because providing accurate intelligence is the CIA’s mission, it has a greater incentive to assess correctly.53 It checks the military services’ ability to use their intelligence agencies to hype threats. But, for three reasons, independent intelligence agencies bend their analysis toward that of the organizations most relevant to the threats being assessed. First, military intelligence agencies may convince them. Second, the independent intelligence agency may compromise to avoid being out on a political limb. Third, intelligence agencies serve presidents, who are themselves influenced by military preferences about dangers, as discussed later.54

Prestige and secrecy aid military threat inflation. Prestige stems from the rarity of military expertise and the self‐​sacrifice that service members risk. Prestige makes it harder to challenge military assessments, particularly where other military authorities do not contradict them. Secrecy often shields official claims about danger from scrutiny.

Congress

Congress has the power to challenge executive branch takes on threats but generally lacks an interest in using it. Constitutional powers to legislate, enact agency budgets, and—in the Senate’s case—approve agency heads give legislators leverage over executive agencies. That leverage can encourage agencies to echo congressional views on dangers or to resist publicizing threat assessments likely to offend their congressional sponsors. Legislators can also directly promote their take on threats. Though congressional committees lack the staff and expertise to evaluate many threats, they can pick their spots. They can produce committee reports, fund outside experts to produce analysis, or request reports from the Government Accountability Office or Congressional Budget Office. They can hold hearings where experts testify about threats. Committee hearings and reports, especially full committees, can generate substantial media coverage.

Congressional power over defense policy is held largely by congressional committees eager to fund the agencies they oversee. Defense authorization and especially appropriations committees function basically as real estate committees that are interested mainly in extracting federal funds for local defense contracts and bases.55 Members typically join defense committees because of a local base or defense production facility, and reliably promote and echo dire assessments that encourage defense spending benefiting that local interest. Where they challenge executive branch assessments, it is usually because they are not sufficiently dire.

Members of congressional defense committees fight mainly about where to locate military bases or produce military goods. But because most locations are settled and the committees must produce an annual compromise among regions in the form of a budget bill, comity prevails.56 Members rarely attack the basis for others’ funds by undermining the threat claims that justify it. That live‐​and‐​let‐​live ethos thrives particularly when defense spending is rising. Budget growth dulls distributional conflicts. Declining budgets force choice, and members then become more likely to attack one another’s arguments, including their portrayal of threats. But norms of accommodation persist, and budgets generally rise.

The Defense Industry

The defense industry does little itself to promote security threats but encourages others to do so. Contractors are too obviously biased to make compelling Cassandras. Their public communications, therefore, tend to include only vague messages about their weapons’ usefulness and economic benefits. Moreover, their expertise lies in moving the government, not the public.57 They mostly leave detailed talk about danger to military personnel, politicians, and the experts that they fund.

Contractors influence Congress—and to a lesser extent the military services—in three ways. First, they sponsor studies by nominally independent analysts. Second, they lobby and make campaign contributions to win congressional support for their work. Members of Congress who receive those funds are more likely to aid contractors and promote threats to justify it. But campaign finance influences lawmakers far less than local jobs, the third source of contractor influence.58 During the Cold War, the distribution of military bases and production contracts, especially those to the burgeoning aerospace industry, gave more U.S. regions and their elected representatives a stake in high defense spending.59 By distributing production facilities and subcontracts, the defense industry encourages politicians to justify their constituency’s spoils with threat inflation. Note, however, that the members themselves press for those jobs, making contractors less the driver of political outcomes than their servant.

Nongovernmental Organizations

Various support communities echo the military services’ take on threats.60 Veterans’ organizations and service support organizations, such as the Air Force Association and Navy League, are composed of people who personally identify with a service. They reflect organizational talking points. The public presence of veterans’ networks in most communities reminds Americans that there are always enemies to defend against.61

The defense establishment’s need for friendly expertise during the Cold War aided the growth of defense analysis in think tanks and, to a lesser extent, among academics. Scholars’ nominal independence and appeal to scientific expertise provide an aura of credibility. Defense analysts reflect the interests and threat assessments of the national security establishment, or a portion of it, for three reasons.

The first is inclination. People who seek careers studying weapons and militaries are more likely than is the general population to believe in the efficacy of using them and thus are more likely to see threats that need defending against. That is typical. Scholars of international development tend to believe in foreign aid. Environmental analysts are usually environmentalists.

The second source of analyst bias is funding. Some nominally independent experts moonlight as paid consultants for defense contractors or investment firms. Others hope to do so and thus avoid saying things that are likely to offend future employers. Many think tanks also rely on Pentagon contracts or congressional allocations for budgetary support. Analysts receiving such funding tend to answer only the questions their sponsors ask and to avoid saying anything that is liable to offend sponsors, including future ones.

Third, careerism encourages think tank analysts to reflect the national security establishment’s threat inflation. Many hope to work in future administrations and thus reliably reflect the threat assessments of one party’s elite. Because both parties typically inflate threats, so do ambitious analysts. Because they are uncertain about patrons’ future ends and might want to find others, they are cautious in their deviations from mainstream views about security issues. Even analysts uninterested in entering government need a sense of danger to be relevant. They are in the national security business too. Without threats, they will have fewer chances to testify before Congress, fewer media invitations, and so forth. So defense analysts have little interest in noting the arrival of safety or placing dangers in context.

Those factors produce selective speech, not necessarily dishonesty. Politically ambitious analysts tend to focus on how to best combat threats, not on whether they should be combated or how pressing they are. They write mostly about operational issues that offend few, rather than taking the riskier track of questioning established goals, such as existing alliances. They learn that it is safer for their careers to warn of dangers other than overreaction. Academic researchers avoid those pressures to the extent that they have different career incentives. They are less a part of what they study.62 They rely less on grants from security agencies and work less often for contractors.

Foreign States

Foreign states encourage American elites to combat their enemies via lobbying, trips arranged for U.S. officials and intellectuals, and publicity campaigns. Because they cannot vote or contribute to campaign coffers, ideological affinity and threat inflation are their main tools to gather support for military aid or commitments. They often conflate their security with Americans’ and embellish their liberalism while casting their rivals as illiberal.

Like other interest groups, foreign lobbies can dominate issue areas that engage no other strong interest. In the language of transaction costs, foreign lobbies reliably succeed until they concentrate costs sufficient to motivate rivals. One sort of concentrated cost that limits foreign lobbies’ effectiveness is war. That is why lobbies can rarely induce Americans to undertake costly acts such as invasions on their behalf.63 But U.S. security is so profound that foreign lobbies can do a lot of mischief before they do enough to awaken powerful resistance. The security loss is typically minor, the consequences remote and hard to understand. U.S. foreign policies serving the ideological affinities of vocal minorities are a luxury that safety often affords.

Long‐​term alliances institutionalize interests that exaggerate the dangers that the alliance counters. The most obvious example is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has generated various justifications for its existence since the Soviet Union collapsed. Foundations and think tanks that are focused on keeping the United States tied to Europe support those threat arguments. Employees and affiliates of those organizations maintain professional and personal ties and fly each other across the ocean for conferences. They all depend to an extent on the notion that the alliance defends against something. Other U.S. alliances, even informal ones such as those with Taiwan and Israel, create similar networks of transnational dependents.

News Media

The media are more like the national security establishment’s microphone than its watchdog.64 The media tend to reflect, rather than evaluate, the threat assessments of the national security elite for three reasons.65 First, reporters are mostly generalists lacking the regional or technical expertise to thoroughly evaluate government claims. They are easily awed by military prestige and knowledge, especially now that the draft is long gone and few reporters have served. Second, media outlets lack incentive to produce skeptical analysis even if they can. They win readers by publishing news quickly. Critical analysis is not their core business. Moreover, hype and alarm attract more readers than caveat and caution.66 Third and most important, information about security threats is usually hard to gather. It often comes from dangerous or remote regions. Collecting it requires skill in foreign languages, an appetite for personal risk, or access to expensive technologies such as satellites that are mostly controlled by states. The information is largely secret and thus centrally controlled. Even when security information is made public, it often requires interpretation from experts, who tend to either work in government or to reflect its biases, for the reasons discussed earlier.

Thus, national security reporting depends on official sources. Those sources can, for example, grant or revoke access to war zones or secret information as a reward for reporting that reflects their views. That dependence creates a culture of accommodation where reporters cultivate and avoid offending sources.

Where official consensus is lacking, the media can play something of a watchdog role. Skeptical reporting increases with divided government, when conflict about policy arises among or within agencies, congressional committees, or executive branch officials.67 Officials in conflict leak information, offer anonymous quotes questioning competing claims, and hold informative hearings to promote their take. Where the media checks official claims about threats, it is typically capitalizing on those schisms and conveying other official doubts rather than discovering it via gumshoe reporting. There is ample conflict in American national security policy, particularly when new policies arise. But consensus about threats generally prevails, preventing the media from helping check threat exaggeration.

The Presidency

The publicity and authority now commanded by the president and his national security appointees in the White House give them considerable power to promote threats. On foreign issues, where Congress plays a relatively small role, presidents have less competition for public attention.68 The president can also use his formal powers—including appointments and budgetary and legislative authority—to pressure agencies to tow his line about threats or at least to avoid contradicting it in public.

Presidents rarely use those powers to combat threat inflation, however. They tend, instead, to echo the national security establishment’s assessments. They do so because their power is more limited than we often imagine. Even in foreign policy, where power resides more in the executive branch, the bureaucracy enjoys considerable latitude. Limits on time, expertise, and popularity check the president’s willingness to persuade others to do his bidding.69 To convince staff members to follow a particular course requires some presidential effort. Firing an official for insubordination is a pain and sometimes a scandal. Forcing an agency to comply with presidential wishes may require various threats and cajolements. Getting congressional cooperation may require public struggle. Any of those acts may burn political capital, which presidents struggle to gather.

Limits on power encourage presidents to choose fights carefully and to compromise with the bureaucracy and Congress on policy issues. The president and his agents are less policymakers than policy custodians who work to manage the compromise that governs particular policy areas and satisfy interested parties. The status quo, having recently gathered enough support to exist, is usually the most attainable compromise and the path of least bureaucratic resistance.70 That working compromise is manifest in budgets.

Once the president compromises and signs a budget, the many policies it contains become his own. Explaining his limited power to alter policy is unlikely to be effective public relations, so presidents will generally choose instead to promote the compromise policy. The easiest way to do so is to repeat the standard arguments in the policy’s favor, which are typically those the agencies already make. The result is that presidential rhetoric about security threats usually reflects the security establishment’s rhetoric. Because the national security establishment, for the reasons given earlier, tends to overstate dangers, so does the president.

Nevertheless, there are exceptional circumstances that push presidents to downplay threats. First, a president advocating military budget cuts has reason to avoid inflating threats and even to acknowledge safety. Second, although a president arguing for war is likely to hype the enemy he hopes to attack, he may play down the threat the war itself poses. Third, a president trying to end a military conflict should have the opposite inclinations. Fourth, if the administration hopes to increase funding to combat a new threat, it may need to shift funds from organizations or functions dealing with old threats to fund the new effort. The president may then play down the old threats.

A Sum of Our Fears?

How do those various actors’ fears conglomerate? To a large extent, they do not. There is considerable competition for resources and power within the national security establishment. That competition encourages competing perspectives about security threats. Because of the way the United States constructs budgets, resource competition increases with bureaucratic proximity. For example, the navy surface fleet’s biggest competitor for dollars is other navy components. Other defense agencies are a secondary concern, and agencies funded in nondefense budgets an even more remote one. Competition also increases with austerity, which heightens tradeoffs among and within defense agencies. As noted, organizations competing for support might debase the risks that rivals peddle so as to eat their rivals’ budgetary lunches.

Still, the interests that make up the national security establishment are more cooperative than competitive. One reason is that budgets rise more often than they fall. Second, strong organizations such as the military services can suppress conflict in their ranks, thereby preventing rifts—or at least publicity about rifts. Third, a similar ethos, colloquially called “jointness,” has infused the Department of Defense, especially since the passage of the Goldwater‐​Nichols legislation in 1986.71 Through various measures, the law encourages cooperation among the services, and prevents open debate. A more important source of jointness is the tradition, dating to the Kennedy administration, where each military service gets about the same share of the defense budget every year.72 The tradition encourages the branches to produce arguments that grow the total defense budget, rather than attacking the relevance of rivals.

Left unchallenged, the overwrought fears that justify U.S. security policy become a kind of social convention, especially among informed elites.73 People adapt their opinions to their peers’ because they learn from them and because conformity is socially easier than dissent. Agreement tends to make people’s views more extreme.74 That problem is particularly acute in Washington’s security debates, where ambition checks dissent. The less threat deflation analysts chance, the less others feel free to echo it.

Conclusion: Prospects for Balance

Threat inflation bridges the gap between what U.S. defense policy is and what it claims to be. U.S. defense policy is an expression of international power and a compromise among jostling entities unified by a preference for military action or spending. U.S. defense policy pretends to be a servant of domestic security.

Power has made the United States more prone to exaggerate security threats. Wealth and safety limited exposure to the international dangers that encourage military restraint. The military actions that power allowed, meanwhile, spawned political interests that prefer ambitious military policies abroad. Those interests inflate threats to convince everyone else that those policies serve the national interest. The threat inflators do not sing together exactly, but their collective voices produce a powerful chorus. Because the voices that are heard mostly benefit from a perception of danger, the world they portray to Americans, especially those who pay attention to the news, is one of swirling dangers. At least during peace, truth about security falls victim to a free‐​rider problem.

Still, U.S. politics, including the current sort, occasionally favor the growth of political interests that are prone to resist threat inflation or even to understate threats. Examination of those conditions points at ways to rebalance debate and improve U.S. security policy. We escape bad security policy not by quixotic attempts to banish organizational and other parochial interests from political debate, but by getting new participants into the fight.

### AT: Objectivity Good

#### Relying on warrant comparison to reclaim “objectivity” backfires in the post-truth era – only the ALT can train effective responses

Crilley 19 Dr. Rhys Crilley, Postdoctoral Research Associate at the Open University; and Dr. Precious Chatterje-Doody, Postdoctoral Research Associate at the University of Manchester; “Security studies in the age of ‘post-truth’ politics: in defence of poststructuralism,” Critical Studies on Security, 7(2), 2019, pp.166-170, DOI 10.1080/21624887.2018.1441634 /GoGreen!

On the contrary, poststructuralism can help with making sense of security in the age of ‘post-truth’ politics. Poststructuralism presents a host of conceptual and methodological tools helpful for uncovering the conditions of possibility which have allowed the politics of ‘post-truth’ to thrive. It can also assist in understanding, challenging and changing the contemporary insecurities so bound up with it. Most significantly, you do not have to be a paid-up postie to see where these insights can map on to other approaches, or to derive something useful from the toolkit. As a starting point, this essay explains how several insights of poststructuralism can help us navigate the ‘post-truth’ security environment.

Poststructuralism is often blamed for the ills of ‘post-truth’ politics. This argument, however, is ‘based on a shallow caricature of the theory and an exaggerated estimation of its effects’ (Perrin 2017). Poststructuralism is not a dogma that demands that we all reject ‘facts’. The point is rather to recognise how particular ideas and practices gain the status of ‘facts’ or ‘common sense’ knowledge as a result of the way in which they are represented, abstracted or interpreted. Key to this process is the issue of power relations, whereby particular understandings and assumptions about all areas of social life, be it science, sexuality, or security, are normalised in place of alternatives. The point, then, of poststructuralism isn’t to say that ‘anything goes’, it is to explore and analyse how ‘“truths” are mobilized and meted out’ (Epstein 2005, 13). Poststructuralists like Foucault ‘recognized the way in which competing narratives about, or constructions of, reality are involved with political power…but that was to identify the problem rather than to cause it’ (Leith 2017).

The solution to ‘post-truth’ politics and ‘fake news’ does not lie in the refuting of claims through fact checking and the quest for a more objective notion of truth. Rather, research has shown that fact-checking articles rarely have as much influence as the false claims they set out to debunk, and they actually perpetuate the dissemination of falsehoods to larger audiences (Vargo, Guo, and Amazeen 2017). Poststructuralism can point us towards a more effective response, based not around attempting to ‘reveal essential truths that have been obscured’ but rather in examining ‘how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible’ (Doty 1996, 4).

This is important, because it has repercussions in the everyday lived experiences of people across the planet. Poststructuralism has afforded an attention to language, aesthetics, practices, emotions, and the everyday which can help us to understand how real people experience insecurity in the contemporary ‘post-truth’ era. A case in point here is President Trump’s attempt to ban Muslims from certain countries entering the U.S. Such policies have become socially plausible largely because of how Muslims are represented, and have been represented, as threats – particularly during the ‘War on Terror’ (see Said 1997; Jackson 2005). As the experiences of ‘fact checkers’ bears out, reiterating that Muslims are not by definition a threat is not enough, nor is it likely to be effective.

Here, poststructuralism makes an important contribution. To date, research in security studies that draws upon poststructuralism and postcolonialism has offered precisely the tools with which to uncover, critique and destabilise the representations, knowledge claims and identities that make such racist and Islamophobic policies possible (see for example Heath-Kelly, Jarvis, and Baker-Beall 2014; Fitzgerald, Ali, and Armstrong 2016). Methods such as genealogy and deconstruction are vital in understanding, critiquing and changing the political, social, technological and cultural conditions which enable the likes of Trump. Trump’s rhetoric constructs a notion of American identity which is built upon racial and gendered dichotomies of a white America threatened by a non-white Other; whether that be Mexican ‘rapists’ or Islamic ‘terrorists’. As a recent range of studies under the auspices of ‘critical studies on security’ have demonstrated in this very journal, methods of deconstruction and genealogy can help to uncover and challenge these discourses and their impact on security (Bentley, Eroukhmanoff, and Hackett 2017; Eroukhmanoff 2017; Hassan 2017).

Using tools such as these, it becomes possible to pick apart the structures of inequality, sexism, and xenophobia that have enabled the ‘post-truth’ policies of politicians like Trump, and have encouraged people to seek out ‘alternative’ sources of news which speak more to their interests and beliefs. All these phenomena are underpinned by representations that construct knowledge, shape identities, and serve to legitimise certain forms of politics. The success of ‘post-truth’ politics, populist politicians, and hyper-partisan news providers is not because a group of academics encouraged people to question that which they take for granted. It is because of representations and ‘identity; the power of a brand; the prioritizing of a “friendly” or in-group source; the signalling of a claim rather than its factual accuracy; the force of an established narrative, and so on’ (Leith 2017, emphasis in original). In seeking to deconstruct these embedded inequities, poststructuralists trouble some of the core obstacles to alternative forms of politics and offer the means by which those at the sharp end of contemporary structural inequalities can highlight, interrogate, and challenge the conditions of their lived experience.

This is at the core of poststructuralist work. It is not an unrelenting pessimism about the state of the world; it is not a refusal to engage with the ‘facts of the matter’ – indeed, it is the opposite. For, poststructuralists are intimately concerned with the injustices and inequalities so innocuously entrenched within current ways of thinking, being and doing. That is, they interrogate the ways in which the social structures developed that enabled a politics of ‘post-truth’ to become not only possible, but also palatable to various groups. Yet, they are also concerned with the contingency of this process, the structures of power and authority that helped it to evolve, and the disruptions to those structures that can open space for alternative ways to develop – an ‘inherently positive exercise’ (Campbell 2007, 225). By challenging that which is taken for granted, poststructuralism is in the business of making politics and society less exclusionary, more inclusive, and less contingent on the dominance of the marginalised.

If we are to push for a security studies that works towards helping ‘real people in real places’ (Booth 2005, 272) in the era of ‘post-truth’ politics we should not blame a caricature of poststructuralism for making the world more insecure. Rather we need to take seriously the insights that poststructuralism offers on language, practice, aesthetics, emotions, and the everyday discontents of race, gender, and class and how they intersect in the ‘post-truth’ era. In providing the toolkit to pick apart these inequities, poststructuralism may just provide a platform for making people more judicious in their media consumption habits, ending racist policies at home and abroad, and for addressing global inequalities.

### AT: Ontological Security Good

#### < Eberle 22 hybrid war link is an explicit and the best response >

#### Securitization in pursuit of ontological security is self-defeating – similar Russian dynamic means it escalates conflict – and magnifies ontological anxiety in the allegedly anti-militarist EU, even if it’s consistent with NATO’s identity

Browning 18 Christopher S. Browning, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, “Geostrategies, geopolitics and ontological security in the Eastern neighbourhood: The European Union and the ‘new Cold War’,” Political Geography, vol.62, January 2018, pp.106-115, DOI 0.1016/j.polgeo.2017.10.009 /GoGreen!

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, developments in EU/West-Russia relations over recent years seem to confirm the hypothesis of the ontological security literature ‘that actors prefer relationships they have practiced and recognize, even if attachment to these relationships maintains conflict or reproduces other harmful, but recognizable and certain, situations’ (Chernobrov, 2016: 3). In particular, it seems to confirm Mitzen's (2006) alternative account of the endurance of security dilemmas detrimental to the physical and economic security of the parties involved. For Mitzen, security dilemmas are less about problems of (mis)trust in a Hobbesian anarchy as realist accounts contend, and more about how relations of enmity – despite raising concerns about physical safety – ultimately enhance a sense of identity and provide a comforting narrative about the nature of world politics. What this teaches us, Mitzen contends, is that ontological security concerns often seem to trump concerns of physical security (also Rumelili, 2015). To this extent, Western responses of sanctions, veiled threats of further measures, NATO military manoeuvres and troop deployments to Poland and the Baltic States, while understandable as such, only feed into an underlying dynamic in Russia that is clearly welcomed by many for its reinforcement of a narrative that replaces anxiety about the future with a sense of certitude in terms of Russia's identity and mission in the world. Insofar as Russian responses do likewise in Europe and the West we might even speak of a ‘spiral of ontological (in)security’ generation (Lupovici, draft). The attraction of tropes of a new Cold War and a return of geopolitics is precisely that they salve anxiety about current events by fitting them into clearly established systems of meaning, though doing so entails reducing anxieties by emphasising a world of threats and fears connected to an increasingly securitised other.

There are obviously potential problems with this. While the (re)-securitisation of enemy others may help ameliorate anxieties about a sense of ontological insecurity, doing so entails ramping up the overall sense of threat and carries the danger of becoming self-fulfilling. Such practices inevitably entail the danger that the complexities of contemporary events are overlooked in favour of seeing them as just further examples of an established pattern. Thus, we see a tendency to depict events in Ukraine (as well as suspected sightings of Russian submarines in Swedish waters, interceptions of Russian military aircraft, or NATO redeployments in the region) simply ‘as signifiers of Cold War times’ (Chernobrov, 2016: 3). The danger is that this results in ‘unnecessary escalation’, with such conflation being both ‘attractive and dangerous’; dangerous because ‘It creates an illusion of predictability but prevents seeing other dimensions of the problem and leads to a known and well-rehearsed routine of policy escalation and popular suspicion’ all premised on the illusion that we actually know the other (Chernobrov, 2016: 3-4). For Chernobrov (2016: 2), all this constitutes a form of ‘(mis)recognition dictated by a societal need for ontological security’ and which is further evidenced, for instance, in how official European support for Ukrainian protestors on Maidan square was largely premised on identifying them as archetypal cosmopolitan Europeans ‘like us’. The protestors of the Arab Spring movements were identified likewise. The attraction of doing so is that it serves to confirm the EU's own sense of self-identity and founding narrative. The problem, of course, and where (mis)recognition comes in, is that these groups were much more diverse, and which in the Ukrainian case arguably led to the EU – and not least European media (Ojala & Pantti, 2017: 46-7) – overlooking fascist and neo-Nazi elements amongst the protestors and the subsequent new coalition government (Chernobrov, 2016: 5, 8; Toal, 2017: 213; Youngs, 2017: 121).8 Of course, acknowledging that we do not actually know the full nature of the situation we face, or exactly who the other is and what motivates them, can generate anxiety, with this being why locating new events in established narratives is so tempting.

To end, the above analysis has emphasised that calls for the EU to become ‘more geopolitical’ in its relations with Russia are problematic in several respects. First, it has been demonstrated that the EU is already (and always has been) a geopolitical actor. However, the EU's geopolitics are heavily imbricated with geoeconomic (and postmodern) elements, where through geostrategies like the ENP/EaP the EU actively engages in practices of spatial ordering beyond its borders. Moreover, these geostrategies also perform ontological security seeking functions insofar as they routinize particular conceptions of EU self-identity and established understandings of the nature of the EU's salient environment. As such, however, they can also be challenged, undermined and destabilised, and the EU's sense of ontological security imperilled as a result. Calls for the EU to become more geopolitical – where this equates to a desire for a more modernist Cold War style geopolitics – reflect how far the EU's sense of ontological security has been challenged in the neighbourhood (but also more broadly).

Crucially, though, it has been argued that such calls are themselves a form of ontological security seeking, an attempt to replace one set of narratives of spatial ordering and self-identity generation, with another felt to be better able to account for the nature of the contemporary situation. The temptation of this modernist turn is that it re-establishes a sense of cognitive control and order over what has become felt to be unpredictable and unexpected. The danger, however, is that the sense of ontological certitude established is too simplified, overrides the complexities of the contemporary situation, but in doing so threatens to become self-fulfilling. Thus, just as it is wrong to suggest the EU does not do geopolitics, it is similarly wrong to suggest that modernist geopolitics captures the full essence of Russia, a country that is also heavily integrated into the globalised world economy, with this significantly raising the costs of it withdrawing from such interactions or excessively damaging its image and reputation with potential (Western) investors. This should also make us question whether simple modernist geopolitical calculation is all that is at play in Russia's recent, more overt geopolitical moves in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, with analysts suggesting a range of explanations are available (Toal, 2017, Triesman, 2016). As such, meeting Russia's traditional modernist geopolitical moves by resorting to its own modernist geopolitical responses, not only threatens to generate a spiral effect, but also overlooks the possibility that alternative strategies may be available. It may also, however, only serve to enhance the sense of ontological anxiety within the EU by further challenging core elements of its own self-narrative as a peace organization aimed precisely at overcoming militarism, nationalism and traditional geopolitics in Europe (Guzzini, 2012: 62).

#### Does NOT turn the K – disinformation empirically has no effect on securitization discourses

Ünver 22 H. Akın Ünver, Department of International Relations, Özyeğin University; and Ahmet Kurnaz, Department of Public Administration and Political Science, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University; “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis,” SSRN, 2-21-2022, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4040148> /GoGreen!

Overall, our analysis has shown that NATO still defines its security identity against Russia, and there isn’t a significant shift in NATO’s securitization dynamics since the Cold War, evidenced by our comparative analysis of older and newer NATO texts. Although Chinese disinformation attempts have also begun to enter into NATO threat language, NATO’s primary discursive security identity continues to develop against and around Russia. This is most evident in our longitudinal analysis of pre- and post-2014 documents that prioritize Russia as a threat alike, implying that it is not really disinformation or fake news agenda that is rendering Russia a threat for NATO. This suggests the hypothesis that even if technologies change, NATO-Russia rivalry will remain securitized the same way. In other words, contemporary disinformation and fake news agenda is a continuation of the same NATO-Russia rivalry – at least in discursive form – through newer mediums.

### L – AI: Arms Race

#### Securitizing an “AI arms race” is self-defeating – drives acceleration, making accidents and escalation more likely

Roff 19 Heather M. Roff, associate research fellow at the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence at the University of Cambridge, “The frame problem: The AI “arms race” isn’t one,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75(3), 2019, pp.95-98, DOI 10.1080/00963402.2019.1604836 /GoGreen!

The “AI arms race”

Often,12 one hears the phrase “AI arms race,” 13 especially in regard to competition14 between major powers. Yet an AI arms race seems a particularly unfortunate and misleading phrase. Since 1957,15 myriad scholars have attempted to understand arms races, including how one can identify and measure16 them and what the potential effects of one are.

While there have certainly been academic and policy disputes over the last 62 years, there is one important consensus to note about arms races: looking at one particular dimension of a state’s behavior is not sufficient. Arms races deal with military build ups, arms expenditures, rivalry, alliances, territorial disputes, economic policies, and more. As yet, however, there has been no coherent or comprehensive discussion about the so-called AI arms race. For example: How is AI by itself a weapon? Or is the “race” merely military modernization efforts that include automation, autonomy, or AI enabled military systems? How would we even begin to find, label and disaggregate the numbers to claim that there is an arms race between rivals regarding only AI? Indeed, the discussion of an AI arms race is reminiscent of the hyperbolic and mislabeled rhetoric surrounding “cyber bombs” 17 in the battle again ISIS.

Of course, there are quite spectacular claims about AI’s potential benefits and risks. Russian President Vladimir Putin18 fanned that fire when he claimed that “whoever becomes the leader in this space [AI] will become the ruler of the world.” But talking about technological competition – in research, adoption, and deployment – in all sectors of multiple economies and in warfare is not really an arms race. Indeed, to frame this competition in military terms risks the adoption of policies or regulations that could escalate rivalry between states and increase the likelihood of actual conflict.

More accurately stated, the current situation is one of AI competition, with variations of technological proliferation and diffusion. In some cases, countries may want to limit the amount and kinds of specific AI systems that proliferate to other countries or non-state actors. In these instances, it will more than likely be particular kinds of components or platforms that are at issue. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Australia Group, or the Missile Technology Control Regime are but a few regimes that are meant to deal with such proliferation issues.

Diffusion, however, is a different animal. Widely available commercial off the shelf components, a widely available and open source knowledge base, and wide access to large amounts of data make limiting the diffusion of AI knowledge almost impossible. There are necessary ingredients for AI, including access to computing power and sufficient amounts of data. Some actors possess more of these ingredients than others, but that advantage does not preclude individuals, groups, companies, or states from obtaining access to and knowledge about AI. As greater emphasis is placed on the economic and security benefits of using AI systems, AI will become more diffused because the incentive structure rewards diffusion.

Managing the risks of proliferation and diffusion of a knowledge base is an entirely different enterprise than restraining an arms race. In the case of artificial intelligence, rather than looking at what sorts of actions are required for deterrence, what balances may affect conflict onset or escalation, world leaders should turn their focus to how to foster responsible competition.

Mitigating the risks associated with AI is not a single-shot activity. Certainly there are technological solutions, such as researching new ways of testing, verifying, and validating systems that include the technologies that fall under the AI umbrella. There even may be novel ways of constraining unwanted system behaviors by generating new architectures or safety controls. Ultimately, however, reducing the risks that AI will be abused requires a reframing of the way in which we think, talk, write about, and deploy AI. The problems of AI misuse are human problems; they are problems exhibited by all dual-use technologies, not just AI. Control of artificial intelligence lies with humans, because they are the moral agents responsible for the design, development, and deployment of AI.

### L – AI: China

#### Securitizing Chinese “AI arms racing” and “digital autocracy” is self-defeating – does NOT reflect reality on the ground – obscures the similar impact of US arms racing and exports of AI-driven surveillance tech – AND only escalates competition and conflict

Can 20 Muhammed Can, University of Minho, Portugal, “Deciphering Factual Realities in the Process of Securitizing Artificial Intelligence,” Chapter 14, *Analyzing Future Applications of AI, Sensors, and Robotics in Society*, IGI Global, September 2020, DOI 10.4018/978-1-7998-3499-1.ch014 /GoGreen!

These all initiatives are a clear sign of competition on AI narratives between global powers. According to Buzan et al. (1998, p.6) three steps are necessary to talk about proper security issue. Firstly, there should be identification of existential threats. Secondly, emergency action and finally effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules. Interestingly enough, the US narrative — both in government papers and media — on regarding ‘AI arms race’ is more aggressive than China even though there have been ongoing push backs from both parties particularly on Huawei’s 5G technology and surveillance system.

For instance, Kania (2017) argues that China has closely followed the U.S technological advancements over the decades in order to develop asymmetric tools to exploit the U.S vulnerabilities in a military context. It is almost certain that China occupies at the top of the main concern of the U.S given the catching up initiatives to compete launched by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in various realms (Auslin, 2018). Apart from the military context of competition, the US narrative regarding China’s AI progression contains the import of authoritarian surveillance system. This anxiety leads to the question of whether liberal democracies will be affected by these trends? (Thompson and Bremmer, 2018). Dangers of harnessing AI-based tools range from creating bots to manipulate social media to the ‘deepfakes’ — AI generated fake videos — which might lead to unexpected consequences (Scharre,2019). Authoritarian regimes might use ‘deepfakes’ to eliminate opponents and predictive machines to determine potential trouble-makers which is evident Chinese social credit system (Ibid). It is also no secret that China have imported AI-based surveillance systems to the various countries. For instance, in 2018 China and Zimbabwe along with Angola and Ethiopia signed an agreement on surveillance system — facial recognition software provided by a Chinese company the CloudWalk — so as to monitor population (Gwaga, 2018).

Undoubtedly, these revelations have brought about concerns regarding future usage of AI given the Chinese multilateral initiatives. However, these instances cannot represent the entire reality in the ground. It is evident with the recent United Arab Emirates surveillance system case. According to Schectman and Bing (2019) former the US security officers — including intelligence and counterterrorism experts — helped to create Development Research Exploitation and Analysis Department (DREAD). Even though this surveillance system intended to provide security assistance, “the UAE unit expanded its hunt far beyond suspected extremists to include a Saudi women’s rights activist, diplomats at the United Nations and personnel at FIFA, the world soccer body” (Ibid, para.3).

Accordingly, authoritarian export of AI-based tools is not only the problem unless the UAE and other Gulf Region monarchies recognised as democracies by the US. The crux of matter is narrating existential threat in different landscapes where securitization of AI becomes clear. These narratives create various factual realities regardless of what is happening on the ground. Embedding the AI concept to grand strategies — economic, military, societal terms — is the part of taking pre-emptive measures of parties, if not extraordinary ones. One thing is certain that strategic competition to harness AI has already begun between China and the US. Recent trade war, 5G debates, information warfare, malign propaganda accusations, cyber espionage and algorithmic warfare concepts are manifestations of this strategic competition.

Even though these political warfare instruments are not a new phenomenon — the Cold War history rife with different types of them — AI has opened a new frontier to the strategic competition between China and the US. Three points are significant in this manner. Firstly, convincing audience that China/ the US is existential threat is a part of securitization process of AI. Secondly, it is problematic to use the ‘Cold War’ analogy in this context that might be misleading due to the fact that main competition took place between the US and the Soviet Union in various domains including ideological and military arenas. China has not been posing an ideological threat to the rest of world given its dependence to the global economy. Thirdly, extraordinary measures are not fully employed by the parties due to the probability of escalation of confrontations. However, much of these conflicts has been undergoing below the acceptable thresholds — in cyberspace and grey zones — with the chance of plausible deniability. Therefore, it is highly likely to witness complete securitization of AI in the near future as techniques and impacts of AI expands into different spectrums.

As for the realities on the ground regarding current AI arms race, China is spending less than what previously has been presumed by the authorities (Hao, 2019). The vast majority of current AI budget of China goes to non-military research and development, notably smart-infrastructure development, robotics and fundamental algorithm development. This argument has been borne out by the latest report of Center for Security and Emerging Technology (Acharya and Arnold, 2019).

**[TABLE 1 OMITTED]**

It is not to say that China will keep these efforts in the area of civilian perspective of AI. As any powerful state does, it will harness emerging technologies in different theatres be it for becoming militarily global dominant power or for undermining opponents’ social cohesion. Current realities are still premature to designate China as the direct threat. It is more about the convincing audience — as a part of securitization — to justify extraordinary measures/ policies taken by any authorities of given countries.

CONCLUSION

The advent of new technologies provides new opportunities to the states along with tricky paradoxes. Needless to say, AI is the one of them. From governing outer space to the nuclear competition, history jam-packed with cases. China and the US are the major actors in AI industry along with Israel and the EU countries. However, Chinese exponential growth in AI strengthens threat perception of China. Narratives that have rendered China as an existential threat are direct consequences of the US foreign policy approach which is not entirely different from the narratives are being used by Trump administration towards allied countries given the current trade tariffs and protectionist priorities of the US foreign policy. In the same vein, existential threat narrative of the US with respect to Chinese AI strategy can be regarded as the reflection of securitization process. Securitization process has three distinct pillars. Firstly, securitizing actor should claim that referent object is existentially threatened. Secondly, there should be an extraordinary measure to be taken by securitizing actor in order to eliminate threat. Finally, audience should be convinced that measures are necessary to deal with threat.

In this context, narratives from both parties to alienate each other might be considered as the endeavour to convince the audience. However, in this process determining extraordinary measures are still vague. Cyberattacks and algorithmic warfare between the US and China might be regarded as extraordinary even though it gives plausible deniability manoeuvre to the parties given its grey nature. Majority of Chinese AI applications are criticized under the two categories. First one is internal developments — social credit system, mass surveillance and facial recognition systems — which plays relatively equal role to reify Chinese threat narrative. Second one is the transferring Chinese AI capabilities to third countries that might empower authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, the US is not immune from these critiques given the aforementioned facts. What we are witnessing is two different competing realities — which are part of securitization process — in AI domain that will escalate threat perception and strategic competition between the US and China.

Undoubtedly, this leads us to sensitive topics regarding the AI, particularly as to possible effects on AI to societies. For instance, how the way of framing AI in securitization process alter the AI’s exponential growth? And in what ways societies could be affected from this strategic competition? Therefore, it is safe to arrive at the conclusion that securitization process of AI is vital to digger deep into complex relations between great powers and influences on future societies.

### L – AI: Bias

#### Securitizing discriminatory AI backfires, tanking norm generation – gets mapped to geopolitical Others like China, alienating potential cooperators

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One of the key narrative tropes is that of biased AI. What has been foregrounded are gender and race biases, as well as the lack of legal regulations over the use of personal data. For instance, the Campaign warned that human biases will end up influencing intelligent algorithms and publicly stated that ‘achieving a ban on fully autonomous weapons or killer robots is a feminist issue’ (CSKR 2020b). In this context it was also stressed that lethal autonomous weapons ‘increase the risk of targeted violence against classes of individuals, including ethnic cleansing and genocide’ (Stop Autonomous Weapons n.d.-b). Another trusted source provides virtually the same information: ‘Autonomous weapons are ideal for … selectively killing a particular ethnic group’ (FLI 2015). Increasingly one also hears the argument that autonomous weapons ‘could become powerful instruments of violence and oppression, especially when linked to surveillance and data systems’ (FLI n.d.-b). The Canadian component of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots provides the following, more general, explanation:

Killer robots will mostly require artificial intelligence to function, and artificial intelligence requires data to “think.” For those of us whose personal data has been available on the internet since we were children, this is a massive risk to our safety and freedom. (Osler 2021)

But it should not be forgotten that a heightened focus on racism, gender-based discrimination, and personal data safety has been uneven across regions and countries. However fair and rightful the concerns, placing particular emphasis on these issues can further alienate some parties (e.g., China) from the negotiation process.

### L – AI: LAWS

#### Securitizing LAWS is self-defeating – inevitable threat inflation perversely empowers blocking coalitions, making norm-setting even less likely

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Broad, sometimes inaccurate or problematic, generalizations have also been made. For instance, there has been too much focus on the current arms race in AI. The social imaginary of ‘[a]n artificially intelligent [emphasis added] system tasked with autonomous targeting’ (Sauer 2016) is certainly part of what makes killer robots fearsome. So arguments of this sort have surfaced: ‘Starting a military AI arms race is a bad idea, and should be prevented by a ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control’ (FLI 2015). The Asilomar AI Principles, proposed by AI experts in 2017, are also formulated in a way that identifies the current arms race in AI directly with autonomous killing machines: ‘AI Arms Race Principle: An arms race in lethal autonomous weapons should be avoided’ (FLI 2017b). The same concerns have even been explicitly presented as involving a clear and present danger. The UNSG, António Guterres, stated, for example, at the Web Summit in 2018: ‘The weaponization of artificial intelligence is a serious danger [emphasis added]’ (Guterres 2018). It is, however, a reductionist trap. Such a narrow definition of the race puts aside other uses of AI military systems and networks, as shown in Chapter 3. Inaccurate representations of current R&D efforts make it easier for the other side, represented mainly by the world leaders in AWS development, to dismiss pro-ban arguments altogether.

The killer robots rhetoric is also grounded in the discourse on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For example, health professionals highlighted in their aforementioned open letter that ‘lethal autonomous weapons can … become weapons of mass destruction enabling very few to kill very many’ (FLI n.d.-a). The Future of Life Institute also define lethal autonomous weapons as ‘a new class of weapon of mass destruction’ (FLI n.d.-c). The arms control advocacy viral video Slaughterbots visually demonstrated how killer drone swarms turn into robotic weapons of mass destruction (Stop Autonomous Weapons 2017). It is yet another attempt to take a short cut that is, however, not necessarily the best solution. The analogy between WMD and AWS is deeply problematic but it is rather an attempt to re-create the emotional appeal of WMD. WMD-based language is, in most cases, pervasive enough to stigmatize the weapons in question as immoral and unacceptable. Enemark (2011) concluded, however, and in this we concur, that the term WMD is ‘misleading from a technological viewpoint’. He argued that it ‘obscures the paramount threat of nuclear weapons, exaggerates the destructive power of chemical weapons, and is unhelpful or counterproductive when used in the context of biological weapons’. One can safely argue that the term is similarly unproductive, and may even be counterproductive if not applied carefully, in the case of AWS. In particular, it bears the risk of over-simplification in that case. Chapter 4 makes clear that there are many proposed benefits to the actual use (as opposed to the benefits that deterrence yields, for instance, in the case of nuclear weapons) of AWS. This is, at the very least, what distinguishes AWS from all other categories of WMD. Falling into the reductionist trap of such umbrella terms and hastily dismissing substantive counterarguments, pro-ban activists risk jeopardizing the success of the whole enterprise.

Fear of killer robots is also stoked by their extremely stereotyped presentation in science fiction, often invoked to symbolize and visually represent danger. Media coverage of the Campaign and autonomous weapons has broadly featured images of terrifying humanoid military robots, as seen in science fiction films such as The Terminator (e.g., Walsh 2015; Devlin 2018). The Terminator has indeed become a central metaphor in the killer robots discourse. In one of the BBC reports, virtually the same visual representation was even accompanied by the following words: ‘“Killer robots” may seem like something from a sci-fi film, but reality is catching up’ (Smith 2017). In a Forbes report, a very similar image was captioned as ‘[t]he reality of the rise of autonomous weapons systems’ (Pandya 2019). These examples clearly illustrate the importance of visuals in threat construction and presentation. Amnesty International also highlighted the possible link between science fiction and autonomous weapons: ‘“Killer Robots” will not be a thing of science fiction for long’ (Amnesty International 2015). What needs to be stressed, however, is that the Campaign has repeatedly tried to dispel the illusion of killer robots that look like the Terminator. One of their earliest joint statements cited roboticist Noel Sharkey as saying that ‘[k]iller robots are not self-willed “Terminator”-style robots’ (CSKR 2013). AI-enabled weapons, even if still under development, do not really have anything in common with the Terminator, as shown in Chapter 3. However, as also spotted by Carpenter (2016: 60), there is a direct contradiction between what the Campaign claims and how it is represented, fairly widely, by other actors directly or indirectly involved in the cultivation of killer robots as a threat. Misrepresentations of the threat – be they intentional or unintentional – do have an adverse effect on the securitization process because they make it even easier for the other side to lightly dismiss arguments made by the Campaign.

Concluding remarks

This chapter uncovered the paradox related to securitization efforts in a broader sense and the one specific case studied here: greater efficiency does not necessarily translate into greater effectiveness. On one hand, it allowed us to fill the existing gap in the securitization literature. As we made clear, the problem of oversecuritization has heretofore received scant attention. We argued and showed that the continuum of securitization, i.e., the progression from normalcy to the recognition of an existential threat and the adoption of extraordinary measures, is far more complex than that. It is no less important to inquire into securitization efforts that begin as useful and gradually become counter-productive. Here we offered two analytical tools with which to address such problems as soon as they are discovered: the concept of hybridization and that of grafting. We demonstrated how the increasingly hybridized, more diverse, and seemingly more politically powerful authority of the ones who perform the securitizing act paradoxically leads them away from the desired goal. The chapter also discovered numerous traps related to threat construction and presentation. Grafting a new representation of threat onto a range of other forms of perceived threats is not necessarily helpful, as we show. If discursive and visual frames are not carefully selected, the call for multilateral regulatory action might seem stronger at first glance but will, also quite paradoxically, have a lower chance of materializing.

#### Shifting regulation and norm-generation efforts to NATO is a ruse – merely functions to legitimate deferral of stronger efforts driven by the “non-West” and sustain self-authorization loopholes that turn case

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However, the pro-ban movement still lacks direct leverage over ban-resisting actors, as leverage maintained by politically and economically dominant states over all other actors in the equation prevails. Hall (1997: 594–597) was correct in pointing out that moral authority operates on balance with other ‘power resources’, mainly state economic and political(-military) capabilities. The legal status of the OSCE in relation to participating states is non-binding (OSCE n.d.). Despite its increasing prominence, the EP has little influence over member-states in the domain of EU security and defence policy (EP n.d.). The EU’s political stance is still fragmented, with Austria calling for a ban while France, Germany, and the UK remaining either sceptical towards the ban or opposing it (CSKR 2020). Within the global system of governance, the UNSC stands out as ‘the most structurally unequal body’ (Ruhlman 2015: 37–38). Though enjoying the right of interference in internal affairs of states with humanitarian services and a broad right of initiative, the ICRC lacks credible enforcement mechanisms, particularly outside of conflict and crisis zones (ICRC 2011). The stratified global arms transfer and production system, which only emerges in the domain of AWS, usually enables dominant producers and suppliers to manipulate arms transfers and related dependencies for political ends (Krause 1992: 99–126 and 206–210; Kinsella 1998: 19). With minor exceptions, strategic partnerships run through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, the OSCE, the EU, and beyond also account for certain degrees of dependence and followership, particularly between smaller and greater states (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1991). As the experience with nuclear weapons has shown and as now evident with killer robots, non-allied states tend to join humanitarian disarmament or prohibition agendas (Sauer and Reveraert 2018: 442). In fact, the Non-Aligned Movement has taken an active role in lobbying for prohibitions and regulations in the issue area of AWS (CSKR 2020). States may, to various extents, be in control of the commercial sector too. For example, China’s national strategy of ‘civil-military fusion’ leaves little freedom for big companies to conduct business independently from the state (Verbruggen 2019: 340). Another example is Russia. Most of Russia’s national corporations and companies that are at the forefront of AI development are, to a considerable extent, under state ownership (Kremlin.ru 2019). Both cases testify to the model of a ‘developmental state’ as understood by political economists (Woo-Cumings 1999).

To warrant and sustain their controversial stance on AWS, ban-resisting actors engage in what Sauer and Reveraert (2018: 446–447) call ‘stigma rejection’. They recognize the stigma but detach themselves from it. For example, both Russia and the US highlight the preservation of a meaningful human element in their AI-oriented military projects (TASS 2018; BBC 2019). The US furthermore insists that, even in the event of degraded or lost communications, tele-operated systems should not be capable of autonomously selecting and engaging targets (DoD 2012/2017). Following the same course, the UK has also underlined the significance of human direction for the application of lethal force (Country Statement 2018b). China has even called for a ban on the use of fully autonomous weapons (CSKR 2020). The language of human ‘involvement’, ‘judgement’, ‘control’, and ‘responsibility’ has generally been agreed upon and formally codified at the CCW (CCW 2018, 2019a). However, the question of norm compliance remains shrouded in ambiguity, chosen by ban-resisting actors as an effective strategy to reconcile normative pressure and preference for strategic flexibility. During CCW GEE discussions, Russia has repeatedly requested to cut down on unnecessary details in the final report, especially when there has been no consensus or sufficient evidence. The US has in turn expressed concerns at the rigid concept of ‘human control’ (Acheson 2018; Acheson and Pytlak 2019). China’s diplomatic position on AWS can also be characterized by a degree of ‘strategic ambiguity’. This is evident, for instance, in its recent position papers and its national strategy of ‘civil-military fusion’ (Kania 2018). At the same time, it opposes a ban on the development or production of AWS (CSKR 2020). The situation is similar with private companies in the US, Russia, China, Israel, Europe, and beyond. While explicit about how human control is ensured, some continue working on technologies relevant to AWS. Quite a few do so even without clear, at least clearly declared, policies concerning the question of human control (PAX 2019: 5–8). On top of that, ban-resisting actors have simultaneously resorted to what might be termed ‘counter-stigmatization’ (Sauer and Reveraert 2018: 446–447). Often backed by knowledge-based expertise, they have tried to shift attention to the positive value of AWS (Country Statement 2018a, 2018b, 2019). Robert Work, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense, once argued: ‘AI will make weapons more discriminant and better, less likely to violate the laws of war, less likely to kill civilians, less likely to cause collateral damage’ (Fryer-Biggs 2019). A clear indication of expert support is, for example, that the Berlin Statement was not endorsed unanimously at the experts’ workshop in Berlin (ICRAC n.d.). Referring to computer scientist Ronald C. Arkin, Lucas (2014) also assumed that autonomous robotic technology might ‘render war itself, and the conduct of armed hostilities, less destructive, risky, and indiscriminate’. Many other frequently raised arguments against the ban are presented in Chapter 4.

As demonstrated, sheer politico-economic power is not enough: gaps in this realm can to some extent be overcome by other structures of power (discursive tools, normative pressure, moral authority, etc.). Through the latter, norm entrepreneurs are able to generate normative ‘hooks’ in the configuration of power, and such ‘hooks’ are emerging to frame AWS. Manifestations of self-restraint on the part of ban-resisting actors testify to this. However, despite the broad reach and thriving appeal of the pro-ban movement, their discourses and practices cannot curb ban-resisting actors at this moment. Politically and economically dominant states still possess credible leverage grips to mobilize opposition to the stigmatization and prohibition of AWS.

Institutional power: Diplomatic impasse and absence of legal encapsulation

In this part, it is shown how the aforementioned dynamics eventually play out in the production of legal commitments. This section serves to demonstrate that institutional power is largely, yet not exclusively, a product of other power relations. Conceptually, we offer insight into the mediatory power of involved institutions and the nature of indirect interactions among the key stakeholders. Decisional rules, lines of involvement and responsibility, as well as configurations of pathdependence are taken into consideration. In practical terms, the focus is on how pro-ban actors can influence or control other, especially ban-resisting, actors via institutional loci.

The CCW has firmly established itself as a humanitarian law instrument and an international forum for addressing the problematic of weapons, including AWS regulation (UNODA 2014). The practice of successfully adopted protocols on BLW, explosive remnants of war, non-detectable fragments, and other devices has set procedural and path-dependence characteristics of this negotiation format. Such prohibitive practices have a standard-setting function going far beyond a particular treaty (Rappert 2008; Acheson and Fihn 2013). Having broadened their scope to address AWS, CCW discussions were originally held in the format of informal expert meetings but gained a ‘formal status’ by moving to the GGE format (Rosert and Sauer 2020: 17). Over a hundred nations are state parties to the CCW, including all five permanent members of the UNSC (CSKR 2018b). The UN’s CCW framework has brought together its state parties and other states, UN agencies, (regional) IOs, the ICRC, and other registered (I)NGOs, including the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, to address AWS (UNODA 2014; CSKR 2018b). Campaigners acknowledge that it has been a 20-year practice of meaningful (I)NGO participation in such sessions (CSKR n.d.). The history of the ICRC and the UN working together is even more deeply rooted (Fortin 2012). To clarify the position by the ICRC: it has underlined the importance of human responsibility over decisions to kill, thereby granting diplomatic support to the pro-ban movement within the UN (ICRC 2016). Informal meetings between civil society and diplomats have additionally been arranged under UN auspices (CSKR n.d.). A close relationship between the UNHRC and the CCW is admitted in view of the linkage between IHRL and IHL (Bieri and Dickow 2014: 3; CCW 2015: 19). Experts, academics, researchers, and analysts have also gained a firm seat in the CCW negotiation format as recent reports also testify to (e.g., CCW 2019a). Scientists, academics, and political, military, legal, economic, and technical specialists have also appeared among governmental representatives along with ministers, secretaries, ambassadors, counsellors, and attachés (e.g. CCW 2019b).

Deeply embedded within this multi-voice institutional composition, the issue of AWS has not become institutionalized via a working international security regime. Progress in the CCW has largely been hampered by its tradition of consensus voting and lowest common denominator outcomes. Besides that, the GGE’s mandate has generally been weak. Its principal goal has always been to discuss the matter and report to the CCW. The GGE has never been authorized to arrange formal negotiations for a new CCW protocol, even though it has recently been tasked to consider ‘aspects’ of a prospective legal framework on AWS in 2020 and 2021 (Rosert and Sauer 2020: 17). There also lack enforcement mechanisms in the CCW format (Abramson 2017).

As a result, there is no legal instrument to govern the emerging field of AWS (as of 1 September 2021). The current GGE process might be characterized as ‘going slow and aiming low’ (Rosert and Sauer 2020: 17). In line with the cases of APL and CM (Hynek 2018b), these are mainly dominant powers that have blocked the ban proposal (CSKR 2020). As R&D and governmental spending accelerate in the field of AWS (Haner and Garcia 2019), little progress and even a degree of regress can be observed in the GGE. The diplomatic language of a few countries, including the US, Russia, and Israel, is firmly fixed on the ‘benefits’ of AWS (Acheson 2018: 1). Some states criticized the GGE process for the lack of ambition and urgency as early as in 2017 (Acheson 2017: 4). The US, Russia, and Israel have even tried to remove explicit references to ‘human control’ – the central issue in the AWS debate since 2014 – from the GGE’s latest reports (Acheson 2018: 7–8; Acheson and Pytlak 2019: 5–6). While the phrase still appears repeatedly in the 2018 report, there are barely any references to it in the 2019 report. On balance, the most recent report introduces a new guiding principle: ‘[h]uman-machine interaction, which may take various forms and be implemented at various stages of the life cycle of a weapon’ (CCW 2018, 2019a). This provision may implicitly create space for the lawful use of AWS: the key would be to ensure that the system effectuates human intent when using force. More flexibility is given by the lack of a precise definition of AWS and a clear understanding of the relevant concepts and characteristics after six years of CCW discussions.

Increasingly frustrated with the CCW format, pro-ban actors have already begun thinking about moving the process to another venue (Bieri and Dickow 2014: 3). The UNGA or an alternative ad hoc forum seem to be ‘the only legitimate spaces where progress is possible’ (Acheson and Pytlak 2019: 2). Other successful treaties have demonstrated that the UNSC resistance is not necessarily decisive (Johnson, n.d.). For example, the Arms Trade Treaty or the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty clearly testify to the utility of the UNGA in building up international regimes. The UNGA might also be an option for AWS, especially now that regular issue-oriented deliberations at the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security have complemented the CCW procedure (UNGA 2018). Recalling the Ottawa (APL) and Oslo (CM) processes, there is also a real possibility for lesser powers led by patrons, typically middle powers, to bypass conventional arms control for an ad hoc regime (Hynek 2018b). However, neither of these options is favourable in the case of AWS, at least as of now. The UNGA upholds the principle of equality, and – on top of that – the five permanent memberstates of the UNSC maintain the right to veto decisions concerning international peace and security (Ruhlman 2015: 37–38). With only China inclined towards a limited ban at the most, all of the five oppose the all-embracing ban on the use, development, and production of AWS (CSKR 2020). However, the pro-ban movement lacks not only influential members but also state members in general. This makes it much harder for them to generate any meaningful legal outcomes at the UNGA or an alternative ad hoc forum. Their coalition also lacks active middle powers whose leading role proved significant in previous norm-setting processes: Sweden on BLW, Canada on APL or Norway on CM (Rosert and Sauer 2020: 17–18).

To sum up, pro-ban actors yet remain institutionally powerless in the face of competing (mainly great powers’) interests. Pursuing the process via an alternative ad hoc forum is also highly demanding, especially when there is little support from diplomatically influential governments. Benvenisti and Downs (2007: 595– 597) would interpret the case as the post-Cold War trend of institutions working along ‘functionalist lines’, making it more convenient for powerful states and more challenging for weaker states to bargain.

Discussion and a way forward

The chapter sheds light on the complex workings of power around the security issue of AWS. We drew attention to the legal backdrop and political advancements that jointly point towards international security regulation of AWS and discerned that the legal underbrush applicable for managing AWS is yet restricted. This is because it principally features general international laws of war, in particular humanitarian principles, and the piecemeal emerging framework regulating cyberweapons. We then demonstrated how, given these limitations, the issue-oriented prohibitionary agenda has deeply penetrated the political scene cutting across global, regional, and local levels. The opening section concludes that, despite the success of ‘severe politicization’, AWS have not become truly ‘securitized’: the issue has neither moved beyond standard political procedures nor culminated in the adoption of issue-oriented, extraordinary measures. The power-analytical approach is then utilized and refined, with the nexus between ethics and law interpreted, to address the case. It serves to reflect on the dynamics and conditions influencing the prospects of outlawing AWS, as well as the ethical and legal intensity of the emerging regulatory framework. Attempts at establishing a global prohibition regime on AWS and the existing resistance to this are brought into sharp focus, and the main findings are graphically synthesized (Figure 6.2).

This analysis begins with the notion of productive power and dissects discourses and counter-discourses related to the stigmatization of AWS. It shows how both deontological and consequentialist arguments are used to frame AWS as immoral, unethical, illegal, and inhumane military instruments, and even as a threat to humankind. The imagery of killer robots is additionally utilized to build a horrifying, and withal graphic, representation of AWS. The standard of civilization is also recalled by pro-ban actors to assist in this framing. Not only does it help them to portray AWS as uncivilized, but political subjects are also differentiated on this basis into the ingroup of civilized actors and the outgroup of barbarians. We eventually argue that a nascent stigma is emerging in association with AWS, yet more a ‘politicized’ rather than actual category of weapons at the moment. Building upon broader ethical forces and humanitarian dispositifs, it targets the removal of human control from the use of force. The tradition of legal grafting (progressively embedding ethical codes in more and more weapons treaties) is seen as spilling over to the studied case with an incentivizing and facilitatory effect. However, we conclude that the prohibition discourse has not become a dominant regime of truth, at least as of now. Powerful oppositional narratives exist in no small part due to the lack of a meaningful material basis under the stigmatization of killer robots. They feature positive strategic-military implications of AWS and reveal the flaws of the prohibition discourse. Since ethical forces and humanitarian dispositifs are an important general condition for issue-specific discourses, competing narratives maintain a positive ethical and legal profile of AWS. Ethical artefacts that emerge in such debates form the basis for subsequent legal arguments and, prospectively, new legal principles and norms. Acceleration and increasing investments in AWS R&D, embedded in the global structure of arms production and transfers, set the whole process in motion.

Marginally touched upon in the previous section, structural power is our next analytical focus. Through its lens, we demonstrate how the structural position of pro-ban actors is disadvantaged in the prevailing systemic distribution of power and associated interests. To still emphasize a very high calibre of their composition, heterarchies of power underpinning the pro-ban movement are depicted. It becomes clear, however, that both pro-ban and ban-resisting actors enjoy state and public support, facilitation by (elements of) IOs, expert blessing, and commercial sector endorsement. The dynamics of arms production and trade are found to have been particularly influential in shaping the profile of ban resistance. They have affected political decision-making on the part of weapons-dependent governments, including dominant producers and suppliers as well as arms recipients, and spotlighted the role of the commercial sector. It is highlighted that economically dominant actors largely correspond to politically dominant actors in the UN system of governance (the P5). The key finding of this analysis is that a divided social stance in relation to AWS has not favoured the pro-ban movement. While the latter commands knowledge production on par with ban-resisting actors, it cedes control over the sphere of security, technological know-how, finance, and material production to them. The intensity of the gradient shade, which is even for the terrain of knowledge and uneven for the other ones, graphically nuances this (Figure 6.2).

Next, attention is directed towards the working of compulsory power. Here, we analyse how ban-resisting actors maintain their structural dominance and freedom to continue investing in AWS, and how ban advocates may steer their behaviour in the desired direction. Having analysed how normative arguments are translated into normative strategies, we found that structurally disadvantaged actors can harness their moral authority and to some extent overcome gaps in politico-economic power. The key mechanisms of direct influence utilized by the pro-ban movement include tabooization of AWS, naming and shaming, as well as persuasion via normative and peer pressure on multiple fronts. We draw a clear connection between their hybrid moral thrust and the emergence of normative ‘hooks’ working to constrain the freedom of AWS R&D. While civil society engagement and increasing public awareness are positive developments, their efforts have so far proved not enough to change the present course of affairs. Their discursive and practical strategies still concede to resistant great powers’ counter-strategies. Leverage maintained by the UNSC in the global system of governance is unparalleled, compared to any other intergovernmental architecture. What reinforces the position of its members is political support by other, typically smaller and less technologically developed, states characterized by certain degrees of politico-economic dependence and followership. The commercial sector may also not have much freedom to manoeuvre, especially if governmental agencies work in close coordination with private companies. The obvious example is China where there is hardly any room for dissent against the central government. To warrant and sustain their controversial stance on AWS, ban-resisting actors address the emerging stigma as inapplicable to them but often resort to strategic ambiguity to maintain flexibility. Backed by knowledge-based expertise, they also engage in counter-stigmatization to keep the door open – just slightly – for lawful uses of AWS.

What follows is an inquiry into mechanisms of institutional power. The diplomatic impasse at the CCW is discovered. We recognize that ban advocates have become deeply embedded with the UN system of governance, including the CCW. Non-state actors – including (I)NGOs, representatives of the Campaign, the ICRC, scientists, academics, as well as political, military, legal, economic, and technical specialists – may access and influence institutional processes. What reinforces their institutional position is support by a group of (like-minded) governments, but also endorsement by certain elements of IOs such as the UNHRC, the UNSG, the EP, and the OSCEPA. However, the consensus rule within the CCW format, combined with the P5’s implicit power to influence outcomes, renders pro-ban actors virtually powerless in the face of competing, mainly great powers’, interests. There are alternative options to pursue the process: as other weapons treaties have shown, success might be reached at the UNGA or an ad hoc forum. However, the UNGA principle of equality and blocking moves by UNSC vetobearing members may be detrimental to further progress within the UN. The lack of influential governments and sufficient mass of aligned states on the side of the pro-ban movement keeps conditions unfavourable for bypassing conventional arms control fora at this moment. Restrictions adopted athwart the opposition by dominant institutional players – largely corresponding to dominant producers of AWS – may still appear to be ineffective. This is also due to the lack of direct leverage potentially available to influence or control such non-signatories outside of institutional loci. Certain degrees of (informal) norm adherence by ban-resisting actors might even further delay progress on legal commitments, and especially a ban, in the issue area of AWS. So can the inability to agree upon a clear definition of AWS for regulatory purposes.

#### Securitizing LAWS is self-defeating

Metzger 21 Ronja Schahira Kaya Metzger, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS), Malmö University, “Security or Security Issue of tomorrow? Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems,” bachelor dissertation, Spring 2021, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1604606/FULLTEXT02> /GoGreen!

5.2 Between LAWS and weapons ’in the area of LAWS’

5.2.1 Threatening entity

This section examines how LAWS are presented as a threat or security issue in the material. Furthermore, to which extend LAWS are not securitized or portrayed as threatening, in which a discourse of progress and growth play a role. The threats or vulnerabilities that lethal autonomous weapon systems create are linked to different thematic clusters and discourses. They can be summarised under key themes of technological discourse and threat of other actors, a military threat.

Firstly, an important aspect in the construction of a threat in LAWS identified in the material is a cluster which will be referred to here as a new technology discourse. In this discourse, rapid technological advances are perceived as a security issue. The term new technology appears repeatedly in the material, though not always associated with linguistic means of threat production, but it is characterised as a discourse concerned with technological development. Where new technology is variously clustered with terms as: “cyber attacks” (E1) a “new technological age” (E2), “Hackers” (E1; E8)) and consequential terms such as “miscalculation”(E2), “manipulation”(E1), “misuse”(E1). To demonstrate this discourse element, I will use various examples from the material:

New technologies are far more susceptible to proliferation, manipulation and misuse that conventional weapons. Hackers don´t need much more that a computer in order to carry out cyber attacks. (E1)

The second big driver of change and new technologies the topic of our conference today autonomous weapons systems have created the fear of killer robots that attack targets without human control. Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure could paralyse entire countries. And while attribution remains difficult, retaliation could easily provoke unintended conflicts. (E2, cursive by me)

These quotes exemplify the threatening or concerning discourse around new technology. In the first quote the threat is enacted in temporal and special terms of proximity, an ‘attack’ could occur at any moment inflicting some sort of personal harm as nothing more than a computer is needed. In the second quote, the modality marker ‘could’ contributes to the creation of an ominous threat. The source is not known or a ‘killer robot without human control’. All these construe images of speed, devastating effects, and imminence toward the recipient of the message.

killer robots that Lord over life and death on the basis of autonomous datasets and entirely beyond human control are already a frightening real prospect today (…) fully autonomous weapons are susceptible to manipulation and also to miscalculation. Automatic escalations - ‘flash wars’ - and arms races are virtually inevitable. This is therefore a red line that we must not cross we are committed to this in Geneva [and] We need your support for this. (E1)

Here, the metaphor of a red line is invoked concerning autonomous weapons systems, which is commonly used to symbolize a point of no return. Additionally, in the speech, analogies are used to induce fear. Analogies are often used to illustrate a threat, creating a link between a current crisis and a past situation in which neglect led to the fulfilment of the threat scenario (Cap, 2017).

For example, in the 2019 speech, a link between the current crisis of technological developments and their possible impact on warfare to the discoveries of the German chemist Fritz Haber is made. Besides paving the way for “mass production of artificial fertilizers” (E1) which saved countless lives, Haber is known as the “father of gas warfare” (E1). Therefore, the example exemplifies the potential as well as threat emanating from new technologies.

The linguistic creation of a threat emanating from LAWS and new technologies is more pronounced in the speeches of Foreign Minister Maas than in the small inquiries and the material of the CCW. An observation that coincides with the fact the speech genre functions in a broad category in which the speech is argumentative and supposed to entertain and persuade (Fairclough, 1995). While the statements from the CCW and the small inquiries fall more strongly in a category that is more argumentative, in which the text serves to inform and persuade. The statements for the CCW are published in an environment in which what is said is very controlled and the content is intertextually linked to prior statements which as Fairclough argues, signals continuity of discourse practices (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).

The threat discourse of new technologies closely links the threat of LAWS with a discourse of cyber threat. The perception of cyber space as a threat environment has developed in Germany in recent decades. Cyber security became part of the public debate in Germany in the early 1990s. Yet, it was not strongly perceived as a threat until the early 2000s with the fear of the Millennium, bug. Then the terror attacks of 9/11 led to increased attention to various security risks. These included cyber security. In Germany, the cyber threat is particularly perceived in connection to the protection of personal data. Besidesthe event of 9/11, especially Edward Snowden led to increased public attention. Snowden's disclosure of the US National Security Agency (NSA) documents led to the increased relevance of cyber security. It raised the threat perception in the general public in 2013 (Schallbruch & Skierk, 2018). Sandywell (2006) suggests that post 9/11 new technology and especially the cyber space caused new insecurities through a blurring of the boundary between the physical and virtual, the global/regional. Where “states of emergency settle into a condition of permanent societal instability” (p.48). That these insecurities create a field in which the extreme manifestations of the cyber threat are linked to the threat discourse of global terrorism. Sandywell (2006) suggests that both discourses are marked with boundary dissolving characteristics, which have intrusive attributes. Further,that the blurring of common and familiar binaries suggests a more general state of emergency. On the textual level, the temporal and spatial boundaries are dissolved, and the threat is emanating from an unknown intrusive other (Sandywell, 2006). It is this sociocultural context that the threat of new technologies and risk perception of LAWS is linked with within Germany.

A second theme or cluster of threats in which LAWS is embedded is the threat of ‘other actors’ and the changing of capabilities that could come with LAWS. Particularly, other states and illegitimate actors. As previously mentioned delegitimization can be used as a counterpart to underpin own legitimization, which can be enacted through ideas of difference, negative representations and geographical or cultural boundaries (Cap, 2017). In the speeches a starker image of the ‘other’ is created in representations:

‘we are urging President Putin (…) to ensure that Russia returns to compliance with the INF treaty. Its termination would have grave consequences for Europeans` security. (…) as a result of infringements, trust, transparency, and stability which we have built up labouredly over decades [is] at risk of being forfeited’(E1)

‘Players such a China must also take responsibility for strategic stability’(E1)

‘I (…) therefore welcome the willingness shown by the US to conduct talks with North Korea on the North Korean nuclear programme’(E1)

These quotes while taken out of direct context serve to demonstrate the creation of images of other states. Russia is represented as non-compliant ‘other’ and while the substantives serve as negative attributions toward Russia, they simultaneously positively represent the in-groups Europe and Germany. Thus, it reinforces the mental-geographical boundary of Europe as a whole and its common identity. Undergirding the call on China is implicit a lack of taking responsibility for strategic stability. Contrary, the US is portrayed as positive, willing to conduct talks, while North Korea becomes a passive other. Therefore, a representation of the world is reinforced with positive attributes to allies such as the US and representations of ‘other’ to Russia, North Korea, and China.

The ‘other’ in terms of states in the CCW material is only visible in reference to ‘potential adversaries’(E8), however, there is a reference concerning illegitimate actors as “terrorists” (E1; E8), “criminals” (E1) “illegitimate actors” (E1), and “illegitimate groups” (E9) who are “expanding their capacity to indiscriminately inflict harm and inflict terror on civilians” (E8).

There are also consequential threats present in the material which are in causal relation with the aforementioned threat of ‘other actors’, the threat of arms race and arms proliferation. The threat of arms race is mentioned in different ways. That with the development of LAWS “threat perceptions are likely to change under the impression that potential adversaries have or are in the process of acquiring such weapon systems” (E8, omitting underline) and that “Arms races are under way around the world” (E1). However, an increase of possible arms race is articulated as not being limited to the development of LAWS:

[In] the German government's assessment, the development of autonomous functions for use in weapon systems can further strengthen the already existing armament trends. (E18)

Noticeable is that while in the material of the CCW conference the threat of an arms race is discussed in future terms, it is declared as already ongoing in the small inquiries and speeches. An image of a growing threat is generated through increased capacities of other states, which are, however not named and thus contribute to an ominous external threat.

Further, a consequential threat of proliferation is articulated. It relates to illegitimate actors and how “transfer of software” (E8) is “difficult to prevent and even harder to detect” (E18) and that “the risk of [LAWS or predecessor technologies] uncontrolled proliferation [is] significantly greater than the corresponding risks of uncontrolled proliferation of finished weapon systems” (E18). Acknowledgement of the problem is followed by arguments that:

these concerns are being addressed and regulated by national administrative laws, in particular weapon laws and transport and traffic law. This enables governments to effectively stop or limit the spread of dangerous dual use technologies, if necessary. (E18)

5.2.2 Neoliberal discourse and technocratic view of the arms trade

Juxtaposed with the prior discourse threads are liberal economic discourse elements. Here, trade and development are central aspects and that:

Our focus cannot be on stifling or preventing technological development. This would be fatal for a country such as Germany as a high-tech location and leading export nation. (E1)

A discourse is visible in which economic interest and the possibility of growth is central. The aim is toward little restriction in regard to trade. This suggests a neoliberal discourse, which encourages economic freedom and interdependence (Navari, 2008). The aim is not to hamper “scientific progress nor the consideration of the beneficial aspects of emerging technologies in the area of LAWS for future use” (E9). In this context of military technology, these statements further reflect a historical development of the discourse on arms trade and development in which economic rationale in relation to arms trade “moved to the forefront” (Hartung, 2008 p.351). Prior to the end of the cold war arguments of employment were used to loosen restrictions of arms transfer policy in Germany. This marks a development which increased in the 90s. While strategic considerations also play a role especially after 9/11, economic aspects and benefits to Germany´s industry play an important role (Brzoska, 1989; Hartung, 2008). Therefore, the neoliberal position in regard to LAWS emphasising development and Germany´s export position, though not limited to arms trade, continues. The problematization of arms development and trade is made primarily on issues in the receiving states, illicit acquisition by states or individuals such as terrorists or on the problem of weapons of mass destruction (Cooper, 2011).

5.2.3 An observation of LAWS as the ’other’

Within the aforementioned discourses, we come to an essential factor in the question of securitisation. That securitisation or de-securitisation can also be used by securitizing actors. To either lower the significance or importance given to an issue or to take control over an issue. By becoming the securitizing actor and therefore being the one to curb the issue (Buzan et al, 1998; Booth, 2007). After the two parts above have illuminated the discourses, LAWS are linked with, it is important to pay attention to the boundary enacted between LAWS and emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. Thus, between the illegitimate LAWS and new technologies who lie within the boundary of the legitimized. The debate around LAWS and their problematisation or conceptualization as a security issue turn LAWS into the ‘other’ of legitimate military technology:

Germany considers lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) to be weapons systems that completely exclude the human factor from decisions about their employment. Emerging technologies in the area of LAWS need to be conceptually distinguished from LAWS. Whereas emerging technologies such as digitalization, artificial intelligence and autonomy are integral elements of LAWS, they can be employed in full compliance with international law. In Germany´s view, the guiding principles [contribute to] compliant development, deployment and use of emerging technologies in the area of laws. (E17)

This quote exemplifies how emerging technologies can be employed in full compliance with international law. Thus, in effect that they are discriminate, precise, and thus humane. However, this delineation neglects that many of the articulated problematizations above are also present for weapons in the area of LAWS. Therefore, weapons with autonomous functions. These include the increased international military spending, fear of an arms race and problems associated with proliferation. One might argue that the securitizing actor here has the constructive role who can decide on the enaction of that boundary between the legitimate and illegitimate. Deciding on what the reality, definition and response to LAWS are.

5.3 Action or adoption of distinctive policies

Constructing the above-portrayed threat allows for the creation of specific policies. The adoption of distinctive policies is a central concept within the process of securitization. These policy measures do not have to be exceptional when taking Balzacq’s (2016) definition. This section examines the measures and actions related to reducing the threat posed by the LAWS contained in the material.

In the material the representations of the measures related to mitigating the threat move in two broad clusters. One relates to representations of conduct. Both the construction of conduct between the governmental entities which have been identified as the securitizing actors and conduct within war. The second are representations of measures necessary outside of conflict oftentimes institutionalised measures.

Representations of conduct between government entities to mitigate the threat are constructed through calls for “dialogue” (E1; E18), “working together” (E2), “side by side” (E1) and promoting “transparency” (E1; E2; E18), “cooperation” (E2) and “sincere political will” (E1). These are depicted as necessary to address the issue at hand. In these substantives, the general ideology of ‘international community’ is reinforced which also reiterates responsibility to the international community to address the issue of LAWS. Moreover, these principles relate to the self-representation and identity ascribed to Germany. It reinforces their identity of being a ‘good’ actor. Further, these identified measures suggest an ideological discourse of liberal peace, meaning a conception of security integration through the mechanism of democratization, rule of law and conflict resolution. That security is achieved through interdependence, cooperation and working together (Navari, 2008).

A primary representation of necessary conduct within war is adherence to international humanitarian law (IHL) through “human control” (E21), that:

only weapons that are operated in compliance with IHL [International humanitarian law] are acceptable means of warfare (…) this might (…) only be assured as long as humans retain the sufficient control at least over the critical functions. (E7)

The modality marker might indicate the degree to which the statement is valid. It suggests that it is likely, and it can only be assumed that if humans are retaining sufficient control over critical functions international law is applied. As discussed previously, the adjective ‘sufficient’ raises the question of what constitutes human control. To solve this unclarity a “military code of conduct” (E18; E19) is to be developed. Undergirding the calls for action of human control and the military code of conduct specifying the degree of human control is the ideological discourse of just war. It is visible in the natural assumption that there are acceptable means of warfare as long as IHL can be followed. One might argue that it works interdiscursive with the discourse of liberal peace as in both emphasis is on rule of law (Navari, 2008).

The second cluster of representations relates to measures outside of conflict, mainly institutionalised measures. The first is the CCW conference itself, the second concerns the regulation of weapons.

The international meetings at the CCW are constructed as a measure to mitigate the threat of LAWS. The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) meetings at the CCW “[contribute] to an IHL compliant development, deployment and use of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems” (E18). The status and legitimization of the CCW are variously constructed, as a platform in which the different states are “working together” (E2), being cooperative to find a common solution. The CCW is reiterated in both the Speeches and Small enquiries as a platform to negotiate LAWS. “The German government considers the CCW to be the appropriate forum for negotiations on LAWS” (E21) and that:

In accordance with the requirements of the coalition agreement14, the Federal Government is committed to a worldwide ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems (...) the Federal Government regularly pursues this goal in the consultations within the framework of the UN Weapons Convention. (E21)

Through such reiteration by voices of authority, of the federal government and Maas as Foreign Minister the legitimacy of the CCW is reinforced (Cap, 2017). It suggests that the ‘adoption of distinct policy’ is sought within the CCW, transferring the responsibility of finding policies to address the issue to the international level of the CCW. However, the status of the CCW is challenged which is visible in the material of the small inquiries:

Regardless of the process at international level, is the Federal Government planning to take national legal steps to outlaw autonomous weapons systems in order to meet the goal of the coalition agreement (...)?

(…) National legal steps to implement the requirements of the coalition agreement are (...) not planned. (E19)

This quote reveals several relations in the material. Firstly, an oppositional relation between parliamentarians to government but also a hierarchical relation of the form of communication. The idiom ‘regardless of’ signifies a dismissal of the international level and holds the government accountable for action. It suggests the parliament as one of the audiences whose agreement is necessary for the intersubjective process of a securitizing move. However, it is not recognizable whether such an agreement is reached within the material. The parliamentarians can pose questions through the small inquiries but cannot go into further detail if something is answered unsatisfactorily. This is visible in another question within a small inquiry:

What measures have been and are being taken by the previous and current federal government (…) to meet the goal formulated since 2013 in the respective coalition agreements (…) of outlawing fully autonomous weapons systems? Please list the concrete measures at national, European and international level. (E19)

While the answer by the government contains a reference to the CCW and its process as well as investments into research, national and European measures are omitted. In the material, an intertextual chain is visible between the material of the CCW which then is reiterated in replies of the German government to the small inquiries of parliamentarians. It shows that the German government draws on in the CCW established meanings to the topic of LAWS.

Moreover, there are various calls for the promotion of “arms control regimes and disarmament” (E1), “global arms control” (E2), and “respect certain rules and limitations” (E2) in the material. That:

Arms control regimes and disarmament have always started with the realisation that they have the capacity to contain rivalries and security policy and preserve mutual interests more effectively. (E1)

While this discourse of arms control and disarmament is visible in Maas`s speeches, there is no application visible concerning specific legal measures of arms control concerning the topic of LAWS. Merely, that to ensure compliant development of technologies “weapon reviews” (E12; E17; E18) should be conducted by the states. Reference to weapon review bords is made both in the material of the CCW and the small inquiries. These form a national institutionalised mechanism of control which is conducted by each state with individual criteria and are supposed to ensure the applicability of IHL for new means of warfare. In the material of the CCW, various actions are proposed to curb the challenges regarding LAWS. “Options (…) ranging from a legally binding instrument (…) to no regulation at all [and] Germany [recommending to] workout the elements of political commitment to take the form of a declaration, middle ground so to speak” (E14). To “build consensus on elements of a normative and operational framework (...) on the topics of human responsibility, accountability and human-machine interaction” (E16). In these representations, the construction of a ‘common’ solution is reinforced with Germany´s proposal of a political declaration as being a ‘middle ground’. Visible in this section is the tension between global/local, national/international distinctions when it comes to action and the adoption of distinctive policies present in the material. This is reflected in how on the international level emphasis is on ‘common’ solutions and ‘consensus’ while the nationally implemented weapons review bords as institutional control mechanisms highlight the heterogeneity of the different actors as their specific implementation varies (Sohm, 2018).

In light of the discourse promoting arms control and regulation on the textual level, this section will consider the wider context and what economic and regulatory conditions these are juxtaposed with in Germany. Beginning with arms control and regulation mechanism as well as Germany´s contribution to the global arms trade.

As previously mentioned, Germany is one of the major arms exporters worldwide. Regarding the export practices, researchers found a discrepancy between the normative policy statements of the German government and actual export permits allowed by the national security council. It is argued that human rights considerations are put aside for strategic and economic export decisions (Platte & Leuffen, 2016: Grässlin, 2013). This ties into the previously decerned historical discourse in which economic rationale for arms trade and development moved to the forefront. In the last ten years, civil society actors in Germany have uncovered important cases of deficiencies in arms export control mechanisms. Concerning the tracking of exported goods and violations of the export permits in the destined countries. This revealed gaps within the arms trade control within Germany for conventional weapons. The civil society actors triggered investigations later taken up by the public prosecutor’s office15 (SWR, 2021; Dorsch, 2018). Technologies significant for LAWS or weapons in the area of LAWS are often dual-use and for their autonomy, software is decisive16. The control of dual-use is conducted by the European Dual-Use Regulation (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle, 2018). Since 2016 the European Union negotiated to review the legal framework for dual-use goods to increasingly include digital technologies. However, this was a five-year negotiation process and many civil society actors believe that the outcome does not provide sufficient guarantees for “human right and security across the EU” (Krapiva, 2021; Fanta, 2020). An important aim however is the announcement to increase transparency in the publicised export lists by each country. As of now, no real informative value is in the German dual-use report causing it to attract little public attention. Lurz (2021) claims that is because no distinction is made between military and civilian use of the exported goods within the published dual-use list of Germany and only the number and value of licences by country are listed (A. Lurz, personal communication, February 10, 2021). The newly announced transparency could contribute to increased public oversight. In both dual-use exports and arms trade, there is strong economic interest visible in Germany. Germany ranks on spot 4, on global arms exports with a share of about 17%, and additionally, an estimated 50- 60% of Europe’s dual-use exports are from Germany (Stolton, 2020; SIPRI yearbook, 2020). Transparency is needed to better study these economic factors and to be able to scientifically assess other actors relevant to LAWS such as arms companies. Inflexible regulatory frameworks are opposite to what Surabhi (2019) calls “a buzz [of potential benefits from technologization of military operations] around which private companies are hurdling, to develop AI, thereby diversifying the constellation of manufacturers who have traditionally been associated with the weapons industry” (p.46).

Moreover, the calls on arms control and disarmament are located in the context of new military defence projects. Such as the EU initiative of the European Defence Found (EDF) and the EU agency Frontex. The EDF was allocated a budget of close to 8 billion between 2021-2027, whereby 2.7 billion are allocated to defence research and 5.3 to capability development (European Commission, n.d). Moreover, the EU agency Frontex´s budget has continuously increased since its inception and is supposed to be allocated a budget of 5,6 billion until 2027 (Monroy, 2021).

The question of regulation and the military defence investments show that Germany cannot be considered solely within its national environment but must be considered with the inclusion of the wider context of the EU.

### L – Arms Regulation

#### The 1AC’s call for arms regulation is not a neutral or progressive method to control the tools of war---rather it props up empire and liberal militarism by defining who can legitimately use which tools of violence

Neil Cooper 18, Professor of International Relations and Security Studies and Head of Peace Studies & International Development at the University of Bradford, October 2018, “Race, Sovereignty, and Free Trade: Arms Trade Regulation and Humanitarian Arms Control in the Age of Empire,” Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 444-462

Consequently, the spaces of empire were increasingly subject to intensive and extensive efforts to restrict the trade in arms via import controls, internal regulation of colonial spaces, and export controls instituted at key nodal points in regional arms markets. Thus, rather than being an era of free trade in arms, the late nineteenth century was characterized by a dual regime of regulation: general adherence to a peacetime liberal export norm for arms transfers from imperial metropoles along with intensive and extensive regulation of arms flows into, within, and between the spaces of Empire.

The Third Matryoshka Doll: The Devil's Bargain, Constitutive Norms, and Arms Control as Governmentality

Calls for arms trade regulation in the spaces of empire were rarely located in broader critiques of militarism in Europe. For policymakers, small arms control in Africa and elsewhere was necessitated by the threat to colonial order and therefore distinct from discussions about armaments policy and armaments competition amongst the so-called civilized powers. Even for the campaigners at Brussels, small arms proliferation was an issue umbilically linked to the questions of slavery, arms, and liquor control abroad rather than questions about domestic policy. The Brussels Act was equally distinct from late nineteenth century attempts to curtail the excesses of war amongst civilized powers. Some campaigners had certainly called for the disarmament of Arab traders; the act itself cited the need to “diminish intestine wars between tribes” (Article II(i)), but such calls were very much rooted in a humanitarian anti-slavery tradition rather than any emerging humanitarian law of war tradition. For example, neither activists nor officials actively sought to frame the Brussels Act in relation to earlier initiatives such as the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg banning the use of explosive and fulminating bullets or the 1874 Brussels Declaration on the Laws and Customs of War. The genealogical heritage of the Brussels arms regulations ran through an anti-slavery tradition rather than a HAC one.

This is not to deny there were expressions of discontent from gun manufacturers about the impact of colonial restrictions upon their business.28 But, both domestic arms production and the dynamics of arms rivalry in Europe remained largely untroubled by efforts at small arms control in the peripheries. Indeed, in 1889, the British government launched a new program of military shipbuilding and both France and Russia followed suit. According to Laity (2001, 114) “a new arms race was underway”—and at the very same moment, diplomats were concluding the Brussels restrictions on small arms proliferation.

Of course, a decade after the Brussels Conference, the Tsar called the first Hague Peace Conference to explore a “possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations” (Keefer 2006, 7). In the end, though, the Hague Conference achieved little on this front. Salisbury, who had been so eloquent about the Brussels Conference, observed that the expense and destructiveness of war had worked as a deterrent in solving conflicts (ibid., 10)—disarmament, humanitarian or otherwise, was for savages, not for civilized powers. Indeed, British military experts also argued any attempt to freeze armament levels risked favoring “the interests of savage nations” (Cooper 1991, 125). At the Hague Conference itself, even a call for a ceiling on the growth of armaments met with failure (Keefer 2006, 14), and the best the delegates could agree on was a nonbinding resolution noting the restriction of military budgets was desirable (Best 1999, 631; Keefer 2006, 15). Modest calls for limitations on the development of rifles, gunpowder, and explosives were rebuffed, although restrictions were imposed on dum-dum bullets and some technologies still in their infancy. The second Hague Conference of 1907 achieved even less (Sidorowicz 1992, 15). As Sandi Cooper (1991, 132) has noted, “arms reduction had been entombed again.”

Even more instructively, the first Hague Conference was convened in the very same year as the 1899 agreement between Britain and Egypt establishing a joint condominium over the Sudan. This had been preceded by the battle of Omdurman in which five hours of fighting had left 11,000 Mahdists dead in comparison to just 40 on the British side (Headrick 1981, 118). Back in Britain, The Morning Post (September 29, 1898) highlighted the role played by “the powerful weapons of civilization—the shrapnel shell, the magazine rifle and the Maxim gun.” Winston Churchill (1902, 300) recorded “the most signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians.” Unsurprisingly perhaps, the advantage provided by the “weapons of civilisation” was duly recognized in the Sudan Agreement. Article 12 noted that “special attention shall be paid to the enforcement of the Brussels Act of the 2nd July, 1890, in respect to the import, sale and manufacture of firearms and their munitions” (ibid., 373). As this example illustrated, qualitative arms control functioned to underpin the capacity to deploy violence in the service of empire, not constrain it. The Brussels Act therefore represented an early version of the “devil's bargain” highlighted by Krause (see above, pX), in which a prohibitory HAC norm is promoted at the cost of legitimizing the logics and practices of liberal militarism both at home and abroad.

However, focusing only on the operation of prohibitory regulatory norms obscures the way arms trade regulation also constituted a specific colonial form of arms control as governmentality, whereby mechanisms of prohibition and prescription were both put to the service of governing which peoples could legitimately use what kinds of arms. Of course, efforts to manage arms flows to potentially unruly colonial subjects by constantly seeking to balance permission and proscription were neither completely effective nor ever effectively complete. First, efforts at restraint were perennially subject to strategies of evasion undertaken by local actors operating with their own normative and cartographic understandings (Tagliacozzo 2005; Mathew 2016). Second, arms trade regulation was a contested terrain over which advocates of permission and advocates of restraint often clashed. For example, pressures for restraint were offset by pressures to use the provision of arms to secure access to markets and the loyalty or security of allies in a context of intra-European competition to maintain and expand formal and informal empires (Grant 2007; Chew 2012). Policy on the ground, therefore, often appeared contradictory. Nevertheless, proponents of permission and proscription generally agreed on the broad goals of policy—to maintain imperial influence and imperial order. As will be illustrated below, they agreed even more on the broader logics in which arguments for permission and proscription were to be located—those governing sovereignty, free trade, development, and the standard of civilization.

For example, the Brussels Act certainly failed to prevent a substantial arms trade into Abyssinia and Somalia where, by 1908, British officials considered the act had “completely broken down”29 largely as a result of French support for a profitable arms trade through French-controlled Djibouti. In this case, colonial norms of sovereignty provided the regulatory space for proliferation. The legal legitimacy of this transit trade was enshrined by Article Ten of the Brussels Act, which, somewhat ironically, had been vigorously promoted by the British. This affirmed the right of inland territories “under the sovereignty or protectorate” of another signatory power to acquire arms via the territory of a coastal power, and Italy had previously announced Abyssinia's adhesion to the agreement. Compounding the irony, at one point in the negotiations the French had suggested the conference had “no power to impose a right of transit on any Sovereign state.”30

Enforcement of both the arms and slave trade regulations of Brussels was also hampered by French refusal to permit searches of sea vessels flying the French flag. Arms smuggling dhow owners operating in both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf quickly realized the French flag represented “a license to traffic” (Mathew 2016, 35), as it made each dhow an “island of colonial sovereignty” (ibid., 34) and therefore immune to search. This is not to imply sovereignty norms offered an unfettered license to trade. The arms provisions of the Brussels Act were ultimately predicated on the fact that European powers exercised “rights of sovereignty” (Article Nine) in their colonial possessions. Thus, the act and its implementation was suffused with norms of sovereignty that both underpinned restrictions on the arms trade and provided the regulatory spaces permitting their circumvention.

Similarly, both the advocates for free trade in arms in the spaces of empire and the advocates of restriction crafted their arguments by reference to the shared ideational frames of free trade, development, and the standard of civilization—each heavily imbricated in the other. In Africa, for example, free trade advocates argued the offer of arms was essential for recruiting African laborers and that arms proliferation would speed the depopulation of local wildlife, thus hastening the day when natives switched from hunting and alcohol to legitimate trade (Storey 2008, 196). Conversely, proponents of restriction such as Alexander Mackay (1890, 42) of the Church Missionary Society deplored the fact that “in the name of Christianity, free trade and civilization we see firewater and firearms pouring in every port [in Africa].” However, for Mackay, the solution lay not only in “forbidding the import of arms and ammunition” but in promoting legitimate trade amongst Africans, “developing the resources of the country, and . . . promoting internal peace” so “the natives will . . . busy themselves with growing whatever they can get a fair price for instead of fighting” (Letter to The Times, May 8, 1889). In this sense, the Brussels Act represented the archetype of regulation in the spaces of empire, combining restrictions on the arms and liquor trades with calls for the development of “agricultural labour and . . . the industrial arts” amongst native populations (Article Two). At the same time, the precise ways in which these twin processes of grafting and counter-grafting played out varied from region to region and over time. For example, in Singapore, policy from the 1820s onwards oscillated between permission and proscription, as free trade and merchant pressure on the one hand and concerns about the destabilizing impact of the firearms trade on the other hand were weighed in different ways at different times (Tagliacozzo 2005, 270; Chew 2012, 174–79). At Muscat, commercial treaties between the sultan and various powers (particularly the French) enshrining free trade severely hampered Britain's ability to curtail the trade in the Persian Gulf. This was only finally resolved by the aforementioned 1913 agreement between Britain and France. Thus, free trade norms were constantly exposed to serial processes of grafting and counter-grafting. Nevertheless, as the nineteenth century merged into the early twentieth century, arms trade regulation in the spaces of empire was increasingly seen as consonant with a dominant imaginary of liberal market norms (Mathew 2016).

This is not to downplay the pressures for imperial powers to supply arms to local allies, or the way broader colonial conceptions of economic and geostrategic interest militated against cooperation to limit the arms traffic as at Djibouti and Muscat.31 However, such factors ultimately illustrate the way in which particular assemblages of norms, formal and informal practices, responses to evasions, and norm-derived conceptions of interest constituted colonial practices of arms control as governmentality. Understood in this way, oscillations in policy in the same region or between different spheres of colonial interest reflected the attempt (always imperfect) to manage arms flows according to where people were placed in the racially inflected triple hierarchies of civilization, loyalty, and utility to imperial power—hierarchies that could be either mutually reinforcing or mutually opposed depending on circumstance. Pressures to arm or disarm locals also illustrated how judgements about what constituted interest were predicated on a particular moral economy in which European norms of racial superiority and imperialism framed the standards of appropriate behavior of the era (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 892) and the fluid but always subordinate identities of the other.

The centrality of European racial and imperial norms in arms governance was illustrated in the late 1870s when the Cape Colony in Southern Africa introduced a licensing system aimed at disarming supposedly disloyal native tribes (Storey 2004, 707). In response, one tribe, the Basuto, proclaimed their loyalty to the Queen and asked whether “we are to be disarmed because we are black.”32 In British India, Acts in 1858, 1860, 1878, and 1909 constantly refined and revised who had the right to own, import, export, and produce what kinds of arms, where they could be transferred to, and under what conditions. Each act was also regularly amended via a series of notifications that led one official reviewing rules on exports to Aden to lament “it is impossible to say . . . with absolute certainty what are now the precise powers of the Government of India under the [1878] Arms Act.”33 This illustrates how such regulations were not just about the effective management of arms flows but also an intrinsic part of the process by which imperial gradations of race, culture, and threat were actually produced. Indeed, in this context, the performative of adherence to, and refinement of, regulatory processes was as important as actually achieving a concrete impact on arms flows.

### L – Biotech

#### Securitizing biotech is coopted by scientific racism to empower global surveillance and war

Mbembe 17 Achille Mbembe, Research Professor of History and Politics at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research in Johannesburg, South Africa, Visiting Professor in the Department of Romance Studies at the Franklin Humanities Institute, Duke University; translated by Laurent Dubois; *Critique of Black Reason*, Duke University Press, 2017, ISBN 9780822373230, pp.21-24 /GoGreen!

The same is true of the different ways in which living things can be manipulated, including the hybridization of organic, animal, and artificial elements. In fact, there is good reason to believe that in a more or less distant future genetic techniques will be used to manage the characteristics of populations to eliminate races judged "undesirable" through the selection of trisomic embryos, or through theriomorphism (hybridization with animal elements) or "cyborgization" (hybridization with artificial elements). Nor is it impossible to believe that we will arrive at a point where the fundamental role of medicine will be not only to bring a sick organism back to health but to use medical techniques of molecular engineering to refashion life itself along lines defined by racial determinism. Race and racism, then, do not only have a past. They also have a future, particularly in a context where the possibility of transforming life and creating mutant species no longer belongs to the realm of fiction.

Taken on their own, the transformations of the capitalist mode of production during the second half of the twentieth century cannot explain the reappearance and various metamorphoses of the Beast. But they—along with major discoveries in technology, biology, and genetics—do undeniably constitute its background. 42 A new political economy of life is emerging, one irrigated by international flows of knowledge about cells, tissues, organs, pathologies, and therapies as well as about intellectual property.43 The reactivation of the logic of race also goes hand in hand with the increasing power of the ideology of security and the installation of mechanisms aimed at calculating and minimizing risk and turning protection into the currency of citizenship.

This is notably the case in regard to the management of migration and mobility in a context in which terrorist threats are believed to increasingly emanate from individuals organized in cells and networks that span the surface of the planet. In such conditions the protection and policing of territory becomes a structural condition for securing the population. To be effective, such protection requires that everyone remain at home, that those living and moving within a given national territory be capable of proving their identities at any given moment, that the most exhaustive information possible be gathered on each individual, and that the control of foreigners' mobility be carried out not only along borders but also from a distance, preferably within their countries of departure. The massive expansion of digitization under way nearly everywhere in the world partly adheres to this logic, with the idea that optimal forms of securitization necessarily require the creation of global systems of control over individuals conceived of as biological bodies that are both multiple and in motion.

Protection itself is no longer based solely on the legal order. It has become a question of biopolitics. The new systems of security build on various elements of prior regimes (the forms of punishment used within slavery, aspects of the colonial wars of conquest and occupation, legal- juridical techniques used in the creation of states of exception) and incorporate them, on a nanocellular level, into the techniques of the age of genomics and the war on terror. But they also draw on techniques elaborated during the counterinsurgency wars of the period of decolonization and the "dirty wars" of the Cold War (in Algeria, Vietnam, Southern Africa, Burma, and Nicaragua), as well as the experiences of predatory dictatorships put into power throughout the world with the direct encouragement, or at least complicity, of the intelligence agencies of the West.

The increasing power of the security state in the contemporary context is, furthermore, accompanied by a remodeling of the world through technology and an exacerbation of forms of racial categorization. Facing the transformation of the economy of violence throughout the world, liberal democratic regimes now consider themselves to be in a nearly constant state of war against new enemies who are in flight, both mobile and reticular. The theater of this new form of war is both external and internal. It requires a "total" conception of defense, along with greater tolerance for legal exceptions and special dispensations. The conduct of this type of war depends on the creation of tight, panoptic systems that enable increasing control of individuals, preferably from a distance, via the traces they leave behind.46 In place of the classic paradigm of war, in which opposing sides meet on a well-defined battlefield and the risk of death is reciprocal, the logic is now vertical. There are two protagonists: prey and predator.47 The predator, with nearly complete control of the airspace, selects the targets, locations, times, and nature of the strikes.48 The increasingly vertical character of war and the more frequent use of unpiloted drones means that killing the enemy looks more and more like a video game, an experience of sadism, spectacle, and entertainment.49 And, even more important, these new forms of warfare carried out from a distance require an unprecedented merging of the civil, police, and military spheres with those of surveillance.

The spheres of surveillance, meanwhile, are also being reconfigured. No longer mere state structures, and operating as chains linked in form only, they function by cultivating private-sector influence, by expanding into those corporate entities responsible for gathering the data necessary for mass surveillance. As a result, the objects of surveillance become daily life, the space of relationships, communication (notably through electronic technologies), and transactions. There is not, of course, a total concatenation of the mechanisms of the market and those of the state. But in our contemporary world the liberal state is transformed into a war power at a time when, we now realize, capital not only remains fixed in a phase of primitive accumulation but also still leverages racial subsidies in its pursuit of profit.

In this context the citizen is redefined as both the subject and the beneficiary of surveillance, which now privileges the transcription of biological, genetic, and behavioral characteristics through digital imprints. In a new technetronic regime characterized by miniaturization, dematerialization, and the fluid administration of state violence, imprints (fingerprints, scans of the iris and retina, forms of vocal and facial recognition) make it possible to measure and archive the uniqueness of individuals. The distinguishing parts of the human body become the foundations for new systems of identification, surveillance, and repression. The security state conceives of identity and the movement of individuals (including its own citizens) as sources of danger and risk. But the generalized use of biometric data as a source of identification and for the automation of facial recognition constitutes a new type of populace, one predisposed toward distancing and imprisonment.51 So it is that, in the context of the anti-immigration push in Europe, entire categories of the population are indexed and subjected to various forms of racial categorization that transform the immigrant (legal or illegal) into an essential category of difference.52 This difference can be perceived as cultural or religious or linguistic. It is seen as inscribed in the very body of the migrant subject, visible on somatic, physiognomic, and even genetic levels.53

War and race have meanwhile become resurgent problems at the heart of the international order. The same is true of torture and the phenomenon of mass incarceration. It is not only that the line between war and peace has been blurred. War has become a "gigantic process of labor," while the military regime seeks to impose its own model on the "public order of the peace state."54 While some citadels have collapsed, other walls have been strengthened.55 As has long been the case, the contemporary world is deeply shaped and conditioned by the ancestral forms of religious, legal, and political life built around fences, enclosures, walls, camps, circles, and, above all, borders. 56 Procedures of differentiation, classification, and hierarchization aimed at exclusion, expulsion, and even eradication have been reinvigorated everywhere. New voices have emerged proclaiming, on the one hand, that there is no such thing as a universal human being or, on the other, that the universal is common to some human beings but not to all. Others emphasize the necessity for all to guarantee the safety of their own lives and homes by devoting themselves-and their ancestors and their memories, in one way or another-to the divine, a process that only subtracts them from historical interrogation and secures them completely and permanently within the walls of theology. Like the beginning of the nineteenth century, the beginning of the twenty-first constitutes, from this perspective, a significant moment of division, universal differentiation, and identity seeking.

### L – Bioweapons

#### Bio-threats broaden violent management of life to the whole population and create a continuous state of emergency

Rychnovská 17 – Dagmar Rychnovská, Department of Security Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, and Institute of Political Studies, Charles University, Czech Republic, “Bio(in)security, Scientific Expertise, and the Politics of Post-Disarmament in the Biological Weapons Regime,” Geoforum, Volume 84, p. 378-388

The imaginaries of biological threats and the prominence of these issues on the political agenda of Western governments have undergone major changes. What started to be seen as a security concern has been not only a deliberate spread of disease, but also much broader scope of biological risks related to the increasing global circulation of bodies, materials, and technologies (Braun, 2007; Cooper, 2006). The narratives of how biological agents may be used in political violence changed further in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the anthrax letters incidents as a part of a broader concern that malign nonstate actors may seek to develop and use WMD (Guillemin, 2005; Wright, 2006). The taxonomy of biological threats and risks started to increasingly include not only biological warfare, but also biological terrorism, biological crimes, laboratory incidents, and dual-use research, and some add even naturally occurring pandemics to this issue-area as well (Koblentz, 2010). To address biological risks and threats, many governments started to develop new strategies for managing these issues (Bonin, 2007; Lentzos and Rose, 2009).

These changes have been compiled under the notion of biosecurity (Lakoff and Collier, 2008; Rappert and Gould, 2009). Biosecurity embodies a new approach to secure society against biological threats and risks, legitimizing a state of continuous bio-emergency (Braun, 2007). As such, biosecurity leads to not only new understanding of values and vulnerabilities in security politics but also new techniques of anticipatory governance (cf. Anderson, 2010), which justify the establishment of new preparedness policies and practices crossing the boundaries of disarmament, policing, public health, science governance, etc. (Caduff, 2012; Cooper, 2006; Dobson et al., 2013).

The attempts to develop new governmental techniques to address bio-insecurities can also be observed in the biological weapons regime, with an effect on science–security relations. Similarly to the chemical weapons regime, biological disarmament is thought of as facing the challenge of “global shifts in the nature and mode of organized violence and conflicts, and incremental and interlinked changes in science and technology” (Ilchmann and Revill, 2014: 754). These challenges have been recognized at the BWC especially after 2002, when new ways to approach biological disarmament started to be sought.5 Scholars point out several dimensions of this development in this regard.

On-the-one-hand, linking bioweapons with terrorism and other nontraditional forms of political violence caused changing understandings of the referent object threatened by bioweapons. Not militaries, but whole populations are perceived as the risk group to be protected. As a result, the preparedness for biological risks started to be linked more with the governance of public health—both in national and international contexts (Kelle, 2007).6 On-the-other-hand, what came to be seen as a key concern for the BWC has been the pace of techno-scientific progress in life sciences and the convergence of life sciences with chemistry, engineering, and other academic fields. Because biowarfare programs of the 20th century were established in close conjunction with broader scientific developments, the capacity of disarmament practices to keep up with the rapid advances in life sciences is seen as crucial for the success of the regime (Dando, 1999). Scholars and practitioners alike in this regard point out especially the increasing scope of facilities, equipment, agents, and knowledge that have socalled dual-use and may be thus used in legitimate research and development and for causing harm (Atlas and Dando, 2006; Buchanan and Kelley, 2013; Revill and Jefferson, 2013; Tucker, 2012). Given the apparent accessibility of biological materials and technologies, the rising power of science and technology is seen as increasing the opportunities of state and nonstate actors to obtain bioweapons and enhance their lethality (Atlas and Dando, 2006; Chyba and Greninger, 2004; McLeish and Nightingale, 2007; Tucker and Zilinskas, 2006).

### L – China

#### The China threat is not objective, but a product of technical expert discourse that presumes securitized outcomes and then dogmatically selects evidence to “confirm” pre-supposed “reality”---this locks US/China relations into a spiral of conflict

Song 15 – Weiqing Song, PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science @ Macau, Securitization of the “China Threat” Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account The China Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring, 145-169

Within the China threat genre there is a broader range of discursive examples following the scientific mode of securitization. These are mostly scholarly works enacted by academics. Here is a classic "theory as practice" text: Can China rise peacefully? My answer is no. If China continues its impres sive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with conside rable potential for war. Most of China's neighbours—including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam—will join with the United States to contain China's power.40 At the very beginning of this essay, boldly titled "China's Unpeace ful Rise," John Mearsheimer, a world-renowned IR scholar, pessimistically predicts the consequences of China's rise. Mearsheimer's claim that China's rise will be "unpeaceful" is clearly in antithesis to the Chinese government's promise of a "peaceful rise." In a typical example of the latter, Zheng, a former Chinese official and policy advisor, assures the outside world that "China does not seek hegemony or predominance in world affairs," and that "China's development depends on world peace— a peace that its development will in turn reinforce."41 People are thus faced with two opposing scenarios for IR in East Asia. Which should one believe? A poststructuralist reading of the above extract suggests that Mearsheimer articulates the China threat theory through the scientific mode of representation. First, there is a process of structural incorporation, whereby the subject of China serves the broader interests of academic enquiry. In short, although this is a serious issue of "hard" security, it is presented as a research topic. The author does not mention the China threat directly in the essay, and his argument develops in a fairly objective tone. Indeed, Mearsheimer emphasizes at the outset the need for a "theory of international politics" that explains the behavior of rising great powers when one tries to "predict" the future of world politics.42 Therefore, the issue of China's rise and its consequences is fashioned as an academic subject rather than an internationally current topic of passionate debate. In the scientific mode, the China threat is securitized via "scientific" reasoning. In this regard, the referent object is the national security of the United States, the world's single remaining superpower and its allies. The subject or audience comprises the intellectual elites and, more important, policy makers of the United States and its allies. The securitizers are IR academics and policy analysts, represented in the above extract by Mearsheimer. From the poststructuralist perspective, these agents perform securitization acts by formulating theories, predicting inevitable outcomes, and advocating policy options. As a result, the distinction between theory and practice disappears at this point. To ensure that the issue of the China threat is situated in the relevant epistemic terrain, the proper language must be adopted for academic debate on the existence and nature of the threat posed by China. Mearsheimer thus claims that his argument is based on a "theory" of rising great powers and the effects of their rise on international politics. As students of international politics will immediately recognize, this "theory" is the "offensive" variant of the realist IR tradition, well docu mented in Mearsheimer's 2001 book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,43 In this influential study, Mearsheimer presents his argument on the China threat issue with consummate professionalism. He first enumerates the five "bedrock" assumptions of offensive realism: an anarchic international system; the inherently offensive military capabili ties of great powers; uncertainty about other states' intentions; survival as the primary goal; and the rationality of state actors. The combined effects of these assumptions are that great powers tend to be fearful of each other, to rely upon themselves for their survival, and to try by any means to maximize their own power.44 Mearsheimer concludes that this "scientific" logic is generally applicable as an explanation of the behavior of great powers that "seek to gain as much power as possible over their rivals."45 The issues of power and knowledge are crucial to the scientific mode. Only certain individuals can lay claim to the "knowledge" that is widely accepted as legitimate. The dominant "knowledge" of global affairs is both "arbitrary" (in the sense that it is only one of many inter pretations) and "non-arbitrary" (in the sense that certain interpretative practices predominate worldwide).46 For an interpretation of global affairs to become dominant, it requires power and authority in its field. The epistemological and ontological foundations of interpretations of IR thus matter less than their authority. Due to his well-established reputation worldwide as a scholar of IR, Mearsheimer's acts of securitization have considerable power and authority. One survey ranks him among the scholars with the greatest influence and most interesting output in the field over the past few decades.47 According to Google Scholar, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics has been cited as many as 3,371 times (as of April 2014). With regard to substantial modality, the main social spheres add ressed by the scientific mode of securitization are military and strategic. Unlike China, which defends itself against China threat allegations primarily with reassurances of goodwill, a securitizer, like Mearsheimer, seeks to argue from a "scientific" basis. He reasons that "to predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics"that is"logically sound.'48 Mearsheimer builds a specific communicative "sign system" in the use of scientific language to make claims to knowledge.49 He speaks from the perspective of a scientifically trained expert in world politics, thus privileging technical language over everyday language. The threat posed by a rising China to international security is reasoned"scientifically" to be inevitable. This raises the question of what practice or activity this use of language is designed to elicit. By persuading readers of the inevi tability of a Chinese threat, for example, Mearsheimer may aim to prompt the action perceived as necessary to prevent this threat. According to a survey titled "The Ivory Tower," published in Foreign Policy, the majority of both academics and practitioners in the United States consider China's rise to be the most important U.S. foreign-policy challenge.50 Similarly, both IR scholars and practitioners regularly pinpoint East Asia as the region of greatest strategic impor tance to the United States today and over the next 20 years. Although most IR scholars agree that China's political influence has not yet exceeded that of the United States, they predict that the chance of war between the two countries will increase from 13 percent in the next 10 years to 23 percent in the next 30 years.51 In the scientific mode, securitizers reason deductively from scientific theory to the existence of a "China threat." This deductive process entails many instances of "intertextuality,"52 moments at which one spoken or written text alludes to, quotes, or otherwise relates to another. Discussion of the China threat is no longer limited to the world of academia; for instance, the issue has been widely referenced and examined by U.S. journalists in books that have subsequently become bestsellers.53 It is difficult to trace the ways in which academics and policy makers influence each other. However, it is clear that renowned IR scholars like Mearsheimer are influential not only in their own fields but far beyond. Here, knowledge and power mutually reinforce each other. With the increasing popularity of offensive realism and power transition theory, people in many different professions are alluding to or talking at length about the so-called China threat. In scholarly discuss ion, policy analysis, and strategic planning, the issue is often taken as a given. (152-5)

### L – Cohesion

#### Securitizing “cohesion” is self-defeating – essentializes “the West” as a liberal security community, occluding recognition of internal heterogeneity – makes security cooperation empower illiberal identifications of Western-ness that only magnify divisions

Gheciu 19 Alexandra Gheciu, Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and Associate Director of the Centre for International Policy Studies, “NATO, liberal internationalism, and the politics of imagining the Western security community,” International Journal, 74(1), p.32-46, 2019, DOI 10.1177/0020702019834645 /GoGreen!

In recent years, there has been renewed interest among International Relations (IR) scholars in the ability of the Western security community to protect itself from a variety of threats and challenges. In this context, longstanding debates concerning the role played by the organization that is widely regarded as the institutional expression of that community—NATO—have recently taken on new dimensions. Scholars and policymakers often disagree in their interpretations of the relative strength of NATO, but many agree that the alliance needs to play a central role in protecting the West from a mix of conventional and non-conventional dangers, ranging from an increasingly assertive Russia to transnational terrorism. One of the key assumptions underpinning many analyses is that NATO constitutes the institutional expression of a pre-existing Western security community united around liberal-democratic norms and values. However, a close reading of the alliance’s history shows that, far from simply representing a pre-given community, NATO has always been involved in constructing “the West.” At the heart of that process of social construction lie practices of collective (re)imagining of the Western world in specific ways, as well as the representation—and management of—internal tensions as feuds within a community united by shared liberal values. Today, the task of managing internal differences has been rendered particularly difficult by the rise of radical conservative political forces in several allied states.

This has translated into a clash between liberal and illiberal interpretations of the Western security community, which has the potential to seriously complicate inter-allied relations in the foreseeable future. As this paper shows, contrary to conventional wisdom, middle powers have always played important roles in the constitution of the Western security community. More recently, they have also played significant roles in contesting liberal interpretations of the security community, and articulating an alternative, radical conservative vision of the West. Recent developments in allied countries such as Turkey and Poland are a potent reminder that not all middle powers are alike; on the contrary, based on their socially constructed, historically specific definitions of identity, they can perform a diversity of international roles—in support of, or, conversely, as obstacles to liberal internationalism.

The narrative of Western unity and the politics of collective forgetting during the Cold War

One of the most influential narratives of international security put forward by liberal IR scholars and practitioners centres on the Euro-Atlantic security community, consisting of a group of countries united around a set of key liberal norms and institutions that generate ‘‘dependable expectations’’ of peaceful resolution of conflicts that might arise among them.1 From that perspective, NATO is an institution that was created in the context of the Cold War to protect the pre-existing security community from the threats posed by the West’s dangerous other: the communist bloc. Yet, as a series of constructivist scholars have persuasively argued, there is nothing natural about the Western security community.2 In Emanuel Adler’s words, ‘‘security communities are socially constructed and rest on shared practical knowledge of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.’’3 Furthermore, the absence of violence should not lead us to conclude that the construction of security communities in general and the Western community in particular were power-free processes. On the contrary, as Adler and Barnett explain, central to the establishment of a security community is the dialectic between power—primarily symbolic power—and knowledge.4 Thus, in the physically non-violent context of security communities, power is primarily ‘‘the authority to determine the shared meanings that embody the identities, interests and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer or deny access to goods and benefits.’’5 Applying this logic to the specific case of NATO, we can see the alliance not as the institutional expression of a pre-given community, but, rather, as an organization that has been deeply involved in power-filled practices of construction and reproduction of that community.6

Historical evidence indicates that the founders of NATO—policymaking elites from the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, France, and the Benelux states—did not take the Western security community for granted. Instead, they engaged in a systematic set of practices aimed at constructing a sense of community around a shared set of liberal-democratic norms in the Euro-Atlantic area, and placed the newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the heart of those practices. In the intergovernmental debates leading up to the establishment of NATO, the threat of military confrontation with the Soviet Union was regarded as less worrisome than the danger of communist subversion within the weakened societies of Western European states.7 In that context, as Louis St. Laurent—then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs—argued, the best way to prevent a third world war was by confronting ‘‘the forces of communist expansion with an overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic and military force on the side of freedom.’’8

At the level of top Western political elites, the fear of communism inspired a collective (re)definition of political identity in the Euro-Atlantic area. The ‘‘spectre of Communism’’ provided the defining other against which decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were able to subordinate their differences to a collective definition of a Western community. That community was seen as based on the common heritage of political and cultural ideas of member states; its defining mark was the set of shared values of individual liberal freedoms, the rule of law, and democracy.9 This view is clearly reflected in the preamble to the Washington Treaty (NATO’s foundational treaty), which stipulates that the alliance is based on principles of democracy, individual liberty, and law.

Contrary to what conventional (realist) wisdom suggests, NATO was not simply set up as the hegemonic instrument of the US. On the contrary, political actors from other states—most notably Canada—played key roles in driving the process of establishing NATO and defining its key foundational principles.10 In fact, one of the key articles in the Washington Treaty is informally known as the ‘‘Canadian’’ article, precisely in recognition of the influential role played by Canadian policymakers in its formulation.11 Article 2 clearly shows that NATO was expected to play a role that went far beyond that of a conventional military alliance. That article succinctly summarizes the precepts of the Kantian-inspired democratic peace theory, as it stipulates: ‘‘The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.’’

To decision-makers locked in a competition with forces regarded as representing communist otherness, it was imperative that countries of Western Europe, Canada, and the US cultivate a sense of shared liberal-democratic identity—set in opposition to communism—among their peoples. In that context, they sought to articulate a narrative of Western unity, and disseminate it as widely as possible in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. As Erik Ringmar has argued, identities are constructed, maintained, and transformed via the telling of ‘‘constitutive’’ narratives.12 Narratives provide a set of meanings within which an actor’s identity, the situation within which they are located and the actions deemed appropriate are brought together.13 The process of telling constitutive narratives is especially important during periods of fundamental transformation, when new identities are being formed and old ones are being pressured to evolve.14

In the eyes of Western leaders, the narrative of unity among NATO members had to not only cultivate a sense of shared identity, but also to delegitimize—by casting them as inconsistent with Western identity—communist forces that were becoming increasingly powerful in many allied states. Once again, some of the most influential voices in favour of disseminating a narrative of Western unity and using that to legitimize community-building practices within NATO were its middle powers—particularly Canada. For instance, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, repeatedly argued in the early 1950s that NATO’s long-term goal had to be the creation of a community of free nations in the Atlantic area. More broadly, Canadian officials, together with NATO supporters from Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK, were acutely aware of the fact that, in order for the alliance to be able to help build ‘‘a community of free nations’’ united around liberal values, it had to find a way to help publics from allied states transcend recent memories of war among Western states. What was required, in other words, was a collective reinterpretation—and a selective forgetting—of the recent past.15 After all, the newly identified enemy, communist Soviet Union, had emerged from the war as a hero in the eyes of many in the West.

The view of the ‘‘West as one’’ became central to a collective (re)reading of Western history following the establishment of the alliance.16 Collective efforts at history (re)writing found expression not only within the public discourse articulated by NATO, but also in confidential documents. Recently declassified documents from the 1950s reveal a set of shared understandings among NATO’s decision-makers regarding the way in which the history of member states should be interpreted in order to foster a sense of Western community. In addition, NATO mobilized its substantial material and symbolic power to widely disseminate the discourse on Western unity in all the allied states and, simultaneously, to delegitimize alternative readings of history—especially those that focused on ideas of solidarity—and memories of friendship—with the Soviet Union.17 In particular, as Patrick Jackson has demonstrated, the discourse of Western civilization played a key role in orchestrating the collective (re)reading of Germany as a member of the Western community, and on this basis legitimating its incorporation into NATO.

This is not to suggest that the West was an essential entity that objectively determined a field of outcomes. Rather, ‘‘Western civilization’’ needs to be understood as ‘‘rhetorical commonplace,’’ used by allied policymakers as a discursive resource for de-legitimating policy options opposed to Germany’s incorporation into American-led institutions.18 In the official NATO discourse, Germany was interpreted as a member of the Western family that, under the Nazi regime, had temporarily deviated from its core values. Following the end of that regime, however, (West) Germany—acting under the close supervision of allied states—could and should be reintegrated into the Euro-Atlantic community.

Against the background of the constitutive discourse on Western unity, disagreements and tensions that continued to occur among member states could be represented as ‘‘family’’ feuds, and managed within the framework of shared norms and a persisting sense of community. A full analysis of inter-allied disagreements during the Cold War is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worthwhile to briefly examine what could be seen as one of the most significant set of disagreements within NATO: arguments concerning the accession to the alliance of states that did not comply with the liberal-democratic norms and values around which the Western community defined itself. Particularly interesting were arguments over the inclusion of Portugal in 1949, as well as the accession of Greece and especially Turkey (completed in 1952). In that context, middle powers like Canada and Norway emerged as strong proponents of the view that countries which did not respect basic liberal-democratic values did not belong—and should not be included—in the alliance which represented the Western community.19 In the end, however, all the allies were persuaded to support the inclusion of those ‘‘problem’’ countries. Several factors were crucial to the emergence of that consensus: a shared recognition among the allies of the geostrategic importance of those countries in the context of growing confrontation with the Soviet Union, and a sense that, in that particular context, the inclusion of strategically vital but normatively deviant states was an acceptable compromise in the name of protecting the community of liberal values. The prevailing view came to be that the integration of states like Portugal and Turkey could be managed in a way that would not necessarily endanger the core values of the West. Furthermore, inclusion into the Western community was seen by some allied policymakers as a course of action that could help those countries evolve into stable liberal democracies. It is revealing, in fact, that a normative compromise that was eventually seen as reasonable in the cases of Portugal and Turkey was regarded as inappropriate in the case of a country whose political regime was perceived as an active threat to liberal-democratic values: Franco’s Spain.20 As Mark Smith put it, ‘‘Turkey could be accommodated, and Portugal’s dictatorship had less Fascistic origins than Spain’s. Significantly, neither had a history of active antagonism toward Western European liberalism. Admitting Franco would be admitting a regime of the very sort that had overturned European democracy in the 1930s and 1940s, and as such was wholly unacceptable.’’21

The ‘‘triumph’’ of the West and the spread of the liberal security community in the early post-Cold War period

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a sense of triumph by the West over its defining other, and, as a corollary to this, a shared view among allied decision-makers that a new security environment was emerging in Europe. In a context marked by the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the eruption of violence linked to ethnic conflict and the breakdown of states (most notably in the former Yugoslavia), there was a shift away from definitions of security focused on military power, and toward a heavy emphasis on ‘‘good governance’’ within states. In essence, security came to be associated with the liberal-democratic norms and institutions; negatively, risks came to be seen as emerging from the absence of liberal-democratic structures.22 In a situation in which there was no clearly identified enemy state, but in which developments within the transient former communist countries threatened to undermine international security, a consensus emerged that the promotion of ‘‘good’’ liberal-democratic norms and institutions within those states would be vital for European and international security in the new era. In that context, the project of disseminating liberal-democratic norms into the former Eastern bloc also became central to NATO efforts to redefine its mission—and thus demonstrate its continued relevance in the new era.23 In essence, NATO became deeply involved in reconstituting Central and Eastern European polities through systematic practices of socializing military and political elites as well as next generations of leaders into liberal-democratic norms and institutions.24

In other words, the alliance engaged in performing its liberal-democratic narrative via practices of disseminating liberal-democratic dispositions and institutions of ‘‘self-restraint’’ into the former communist bloc.25 The idea was to provide the Central/East European political and military elites with Western, liberal-democratic scripts for rebuilding their societies, and to turn those elites into ‘‘responsible,’’ self-disciplined actors, who would take Western-prescribed liberal-democratic norms for granted.26 Special emphasis was placed on socialising Central/Eastern Europeans into Western-defined norms in the area of security, including norms governing the relationships among different branches of the state involved in the formulation and implementation of defence policies, and the relationship between the state and civil society.27

NATO’s ability to provide authoritative definitions of the legitimate meaning of liberal-democratic identity, and more specifically, guidance on how to correctly enact norms of security provision that corresponded to that definition, was a reflection of the substantial symbolic power exercised by NATO vis-a-vis the pro-West elites of Central and Eastern Europe.28 That power was grounded in the latter’s recognition of NATO not just as a military alliance but as a key institution of the Western community with which Central/Eastern European reformers identified.29 In the early post-Cold War years, inter-allied disagreements continued to occur—but did so within the framework of common norms, and were generally cast as arguments within a community of liberal values. For instance, while member states often disagreed over the speed and desirable extent of NATO enlargement, they articulated those disagreements against the background of the common view that NATO enlargement was a key tool for the expansion of the liberal-democratic values around which the Western community defined itself.30 More dramatically, the allies disagreed sharply over the Iraq war. But even in the context of that crisis, they were able to draw on NATO norms of consultation to enable the alliance to survive.31

In light of all the above-mentioned developments, one might be tempted to conclude that the story of NATO’s post-Cold War evolution has been a very successful one. After all, in addition to enlarging and conducting ‘‘out-of-area’’ operations, NATO has expanded its international socialization programs via new partnership programs that stretch as far as the Middle East and former Soviet republics, and has taken steps to adapt its institutional structure to twenty-first century challenges (e.g. by developing new capabilities for addressing non-conventional risks and threats). In addition, in the context of an increasingly assertive Russia, members have once again articulated a discourse of allied unity—and have deployed multinational troop contingents to countries that feel vulnerable to Russia.

It is also interesting to note that the alliance’s middle powers continued to play key roles in the early years of the post-Cold War period. Just as they had done during the Cold War, countries like Canada and Norway have supported initiatives aimed at protecting and expanding NATO’s ability to act as the institutional expression of the Western community. For instance, these countries have been active participants in practices of socialization aimed at disseminating norms of liberal-democratic restraint, and have also been systematically involved in military exercises and recent multinational deployments. Canada, in particular, was central to NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan. Indeed, one could argue that ‘‘Canada has demonstrated a dedication to the alliance that seems stronger than NATO’s collective commitment to itself.’’32 More recently, Canada assumed a leading role within the framework of NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) Battlegroup Latvia.

Yet, a closer analysis reveals that the question of allied unity in the post-Cold War era is becoming increasingly complicated. In particular, the alliance is currently facing serious challenges that are connected not so much to external threats or enemies as to internal developments—specifically the rise of radical conservative ideas and political forces in several member states, including in key middle powers. This has translated into an unprecedented disagreement over the meaning of the Western community—a disagreement that threatens to pose serious challenges to inter-allied unity.

(Re)imagining the West: The radical conservative reply

One of the most significant challenges to the unity of NATO and its ability to continue to define itself as the institutional expression of a liberal-democratic community stems from recent developments in a powerful middle power: Turkey. As noted above, Turkey has always had a complicated history in NATO. But, since its inclusion in the alliance, the country of Atatu¨rk has never had a government that is as explicitly critical of Western values, and that has violated as many of NATO’s norms, as the current administration under President Erdog˘an. Despite being democratically elected, Turkey’s ruling AKP party has moved toward increasingly authoritarian measures. During the coup attempt in July 2016, the AKP government declared a state of emergency, purged the public sector of (allegedly) proGu¨lenist individuals, and criminalized opposition groups including Kurds, Alevites, leftists, and liberals. Furthermore, recent constitutional reforms have transformed the country from a parliamentary democracy into a ‘‘Turkish style’’ presidential republic.33 Erdog˘an, who emphasizes traditional Islamic morality and presents himself as a ‘‘conservative democrat,’’ has presided over a systematic crackdown on civil liberties and attacks on secular institutions.

To make matters worse, Turkey has recently adopted a series of worrisome foreign policies, which seem to signal a move away from Western partnerships. Since the failed coup, the government has engaged in a purge of military officers seen as pro-West, has explored military cooperation with China, and has expressed outrage over the US-led coalition’s support for Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq. In addition, despite months of warnings from NATO allies both publicly and privately, President Erdog˘an has decided to upgrade his country’s air defence with a US$2.5 billion (E2.03 billion) investment in a Russian surface-to-air missile system, the S-400 ‘‘Triumf.’’ From NATO’s perspective, the procurement of this missile system is deeply problematic as it means that Turkey will rely on new heavy weaponry that cannot be integrated within allied structures.34 In the longer term, Turkey’s new policy of rapprochement vis-a-vis Moscow raises difficult questions about the extent to which the allies can rely on Ankara to help maintain a united front on an increasingly aggressive Russia. Last but not least, Ankara’s very visible shift toward authoritarianism makes it increasingly difficult for NATO representatives to sustain the narrative that depicts the alliance as the institutional expression of a security community defined around liberal-democratic norms. This is particularly problematic in a situation in which, as noted above, the alliance has relied heavily on that narrative to secure post-Cold War legitimacy in the eyes of its publics, and also to exercise subtle but effective forms of power in its neighbourhood.

In response to Turkey’s deviation from democratic norms and military partnership with Russia, NATO has adopted a two-pronged strategy: expressing continued solidarity with Turkey in its fight against terrorism, while at the same time warning Ankara about potentially serious consequences if it does not change its domestic behaviour as well as refrain from further military cooperation with Russia.35

Yet, NATO’s ability to maintain a united front vis-a-vis Turkey—and apply sustained pressure in an effort to change Ankara’s behaviour—is likely to be seriously complicated by broader political developments in the Euro-Atlantic area. In particular, the alliance is witnessing the rise of radical conservative political forces in several other member states, and some of those states have expressed support for Turkey’s illiberal policies and practices. Increasingly, what seems to be taking shape is an informal ‘‘club’’ of countries dominated by far-right parties that are articulating an alternative, radical conservative vision of Western identity, and, on this basis, a different script for how to perform the role of members of the Western community.

A full analysis of these developments is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few brief examples can help to illustrate the growing challenge posed by radical conservative political forces in the Euro-Atlantic area. Consider, for instance, the evolution of another key NATO middle power, Poland. Similar to another NATO state, Hungary, Poland was until recently regarded as one of the chief success stories from the wave of democratization that accompanied the end of the Cold War. Yet, in the eyes of the leaders of the archconservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, Poland was a deeply troubled society whose system of government was in need of a top-to-bottom overhaul.36 Ahead of the 2015 elections, PiS appropriated a radical conservative vocabulary similar to that of Hungary’s Fidesz in its 2010 campaign. It depicted the centre-right government as the architect of a failed economy, and denounced mainstream leaders as more comfortable with the cosmopolitan liberal values of Brussels and Berlin than with the traditional Christian morality of rural Poland.

To put this in a broader perspective, the Polish and Hungarian political programs can be seen as part of an international wave of far-right protests against liberal-democratic values and institutions. Above all, in the eyes of the Hungarian and Polish leaders—similar to the far-right parties in other NATO member states—the focus needs to be on identity politics. Their vision of the world revolves around the idea of a division into competing groups, largely defined around racist and religious lines; in this zero-sum-game vision, the success of their group (white Christians) is their primary concern. Starting from this perspective, the governments of Poland and Hungary have identified Erdog˘an’s Turkey as a key ally in their struggle to ‘‘defend’’ their countries from what they regard as a key threat to their national identity and their European Christian heritage: refugees coming from Muslim countries.

In the eyes of Warsaw and Budapest, in particular, Erdog˘an’s willingness—and ability—to keep Muslim refugees away from Europe is much more important than any violations of human rights and democratic principles that his government might be responsible for. Revealingly, Poland was the first EU member state to host the Turkish leader after the unsuccessful coup attempt in Turkey, and wasted no time in expressing its unconditional support for Ankara.37 In a similar vein, speaking at a recent Turkish-Hungarian Business Forum in Ankara, Prime Minister Viktor Orba´n insisted that Hungary ‘‘stands by its friends,’’ and is ‘‘on Turkey’s side.’’38 In his speech, the prime minister emphasized that Hungary’s loyal support for Turkey is not a one-off event, but ‘‘a consequence of Hungary’s strategy, as a conservative country, of prioritising human values.’’ The reason is very clear: ‘‘Turkey is on the edge of Europe, protecting Europe’s interior,’’ and ‘‘if it had not fulfilled its obligations, Europe would have been flooded with many millions of immigrants—which it would not have known what to do with.’’39

According to the Hungarian leader, the support provided by Budapest and Warsaw to Ankara is neither an accident nor an isolated event. Rather, it reflects a shared commitment to the promotion of conservative principles as a radical constitutive narrative that is significantly different from the liberal narrative of the West. Thus, instead of emphasizing the liberal-democratic foundations of the Western security community, the focus—in the eyes of the Polish and Hungarian radical conservative governments—should be on the ‘‘true roots’’ of the West: its Christian traditions and values. It is the Christian heritage that, in this narrative, constitutes the most important element of Western identity. References to the Christian roots of the Western community embodied in NATO are, of course, not new. Even during the Cold War there were political parties and groups that stressed Christianity in their discourse on the West. But in that context, the Christian roots and values were generally seen as compatible with liberal democracy.40 By contrast, the radical conservative vision of the West depicts contemporary liberal institutions and practices as a threat to the Christian foundations of the Western community. In this view, it is the Christian heritage that needs to be prioritized in all debates and initiatives concerning Euro-Atlantic security—and that needs to be central to how states perform the role of members of the Western community. This, in the eyes of the Polish and Hungarian leaders, is particularly important in a situation in which the West is under serious threat, not only from the Muslim refugees that have arrived in Europe because of ‘‘irresponsible’’ measures adopted by countries like Germany and that are ‘‘unable to adopt Catholic culture,’’ but also from domestic liberal elites. Ironically, the ‘‘weakness’’ of liberal elites has led to a situation in which Europe needs to rely on Muslim Turkey to keep non-Christian refugees away from its shores. In a series of virulent outbursts, conservative leaders in Poland and Hungary have criticized liberal politicians for their ‘‘attacks’’ on national traditions, family values, and the religious foundations of society via their ‘‘corrupt’’ policies in favour of multiculturalism, homosexuality, and capitalist greed.41

It is interesting to note that the radical conservative model articulated in Warsaw and Budapest—and the strategies adopted to promote that model—are similar to the branch of conservatism pursued in the US under President Trump.42 What is involved here goes far beyond traditional conservative critiques of big, inefficient government and expensive welfare policies. From this particular conservative perspective, liberalism—which has had a corrupting effect on society—is supported not only by the key organs of representative government and the judiciary, but also by intellectuals and large numbers of bureaucrats. The excessively permissive multicultural values and the politically correct principles promoted by cultural and professional elites, and the institutions controlled by those elites, constitute the foundation of liberal power and allegedly undermine ‘‘authentic’’ (conservative) principles and national culture on a daily basis. On this logic, liberalism can only be effectively challenged, and eventually dismantled, via systematic attack on all those elites and institutions.

This view has translated into a number of policies and practices that have taken Poland as well as Hungary away from the path of liberal-democratic reforms. Contrary to the liberal belief in self-discipline and institutions that ensure a system of checks and balances and limit the power of the executive, from the perspective of conservative leaders in Warsaw and Budapest the focus needs to be on establishing and protecting a strong executive, capable of protecting not just the physical space of the state, but also its national identity and culture. Thus, since coming to power with a parliamentary majority in October 2015, Poland’s PiS has embarked on a course of change that mirrors the changes enacted by Fidesz in Hungary. As in Hungary, in Poland an initial focus for the new government was securing control of the Constitutional Tribunal. PiS has moved to pack the court with its own appointees, using tactics that are blatantly illegal according to Polish law, and which have drawn severe criticism from the EU. However, party leader Jaroslaw Kaczyn´ski, who holds a seat in the parliament but no formal government position, has much greater ambitions to refashion Poland along culturally conservative and politically illiberal lines. The media are a major target in this fight against ‘‘liberal corruption.’’ The government quickly asserted control over public broadcasters and purged them of (independent) journalists whom it regarded as loyal to the opposition.

The discourse—and practices—of allied solidarity around liberal norms and values have been further undermined by developments in the US following the election of Donald Trump. Given the similarities between the far-right ideas promoted by the Polish and Hungarian governments and some of the views articulated by President Trump, it is not surprising to see the friendship that seems to have emerged between these countries—particularly between Washington and Warsaw. For our purposes here, what is important to note is that this friendship has translated into special partnerships in the field of security, in ways that could further undermine unity within NATO. To give a brief example: echoing Trump’s discourse, the Polish government has repeatedly and explicitly called for increased spending on defence by the European allies, has adopted a massive defence budget (including purchases of expensive military equipment from the US), has invited large numbers of US and NATO troops on its territory, has signed bilateral military cooperation agreements with Washington, and has followed the US president in raising questions about the degree to which allies that refuse to increase their defence spending can rely on the alliance’s collective defence clause. Similar to Trump, senior Polish officials have been very critical of EU projects to promote closer European integration, particularly in the field of defence. To them, it would be unrealistic to assume that Europe can be self-sufficient in the realm of defence, and dangerous to allow supranational European institutions to control defence policies, which are central to a country’s national sovereignty. Instead, from the point of view of the Polish government, the focus should be on strengthening NATO—as the alliance of independent nation-states that can keep the US involved in European defence and can protect the (Christian) Western community from a wide range of threats.

Here, again, radical conservative statements about NATO involve not just an attempt to promote specific policies in the field of defence, but also—far more broadly—a move to (re)articulate the constitutive narrative about the Western community embodied in the Atlantic Alliance. Specifically, that community is now cast not in liberal-democratic terms, but rather as a civilizational entity in which Christianity plays a central role—and which is in danger due to liberal excesses and corruption. For instance, at a 2017 Warsaw Summit that brought together Central/East European countries and the US, the Polish leadership and President Trump were united in casting the West in radical conservative terms—as the civilization that places emphasis on God, tradition, and family values—and in presenting their countries as states that understand the true meaning of Western identity and are prepared to use their institutions (including NATO) to protect the West from all those ‘‘who hate us... and seek to undermine our strength.’’43 The alliance is especially important in a situation in which, Trump insisted, ‘‘[t]he fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive.’’44

When the Cold War ended, many analysts and policymakers expected NATO to become obsolete and possibly to be dismantled following the disappearance of threats to the community of states that the alliance had been set up to protect. Now, almost three decades later, the question is not whether NATO can survive in a situation marked by the absence of threats, but whether it has the ability and resources to adapt to the multitude of risks and challenges that it faces. Interestingly, today—just as in its early days—some of the most serious threats to NATO’s ability to survive stem not from external military threats but from its own internal weaknesses and tensions. In this instance, however, the danger is not one of subversion by communist forces, but rather a clash between liberal forces and (a particular version of) radical conservative ideas and projects, which have risen to prominence in several allied states. In this context, while certain middle powers—like Canada and Norway—remain some of the most significant defenders of liberal internationalism, other middle powers, most notably Turkey and Poland, have emerged as key advocates of the illiberal, radical conservative worldview. That clash is becoming increasingly acute—with some observers and policymakers, including France’s President Macron, arguing that the coming years will be marked by what amounts to a ‘‘civil war’’ between liberal and illiberal forces in the West. The outcome of that potential ‘‘civil war’’ is impossible to predict, but one can safely predict that its dynamics are going to be among the most important developments shaping the Euro-Atlantic world in the coming years.

### L – Cybersecurity

#### Securitizing “cybersecurity” is self-defeating – threats are inflated – undercut info-sharing in practice – AND spur self-authorization of offensive operations against constructed “non-Western” threats and global surveillance and control, triggering both their and our impacts

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5.1. “Perpetuall feare”

Cyber security is often characterised as fearful, with cyber threats being both permanent and evolving (Ehrlicher, 2021), and cyber attacks being seen as inevitable (Pearlson et al., 2021). The businesses in our study seemed to agree, with cyber threat appearing to be normalised. Participants, both CISO and non-CISO, considered these threats to be enduring and businesses needed to accept that they would be compromised. This implies a “perpetuall cyber warre” (Stevens, 2016, p. 120). These businesses existed in “continuall feare” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 186), threatened by “death, poverty, or other calamity” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 169) arising from something, i.e, cyber security, that was not well understood, even mystical,18 as “perpetuall feare, [is] always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 169-70).19 The role of the CISO may be valued as one “that can make the Holy Water” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 692) that provides protection from fearful things, and, therefore, is motivated to maintain the fear and dread that underpins their value.20

Survival was clearly a concern for these businesses. Cyber security was positioned as a threat to viability by many of these organisations, with fear of regulatory action and associated fines and reputational damage in particular being a prime concern. Such concerns with viability and survival, arguably the primary motivation for businesses (Beer, 1979), are analogous with seeking to avoid punishment that could lead to “pain, and disability” and, ultimately, “death” (Gert, 2001, p. 243). The punishments they sought to avoid were enacted by the larger Leviathan of the state and, as mini-Leviathans, these businesses cascaded this concept, instituting their own mechanisms of punishment for their employees, as we discuss below. Internal experts were positioned by many of these organisations as “guards” that protected them against the various harms that they faced. Cyber security functions were seen as assuagement against threats to business viability and helped these businesses to manage the uncertainty they experienced as a result of these threats and ensure their continued survival. This allowed them to shape their future to a certain extent, aligning with Hobbes’ encouragements towards continued attentiveness to threats (Stevens, 2016), but also provided a resource that articulated and predicted those threats, based on both past, and imagined future, events.

5.1.1. Permanent cyber emergency

Many of these organisations played a role in national cyber security, including participating in invitation-only national security working groups. Such fora, in which government intelligence services share details of cyber threats with specific industries, demonstrate the role that governments play in maintaining a state of permanent cyber emergency. They provide a mechanism through which governments can both maintain fear and amplify it. This could be achieved through exaggeration or even fabrication, particularly when considering the reliance of the state Leviathan on the persistence of this fear.21

A permanent emergency offers benefits as a “master narrative” (Smith and Sparkes, 2008, p. 18) that can be invoked to support actions taken by businesses and individuals within that business, whether to justify investment or to justify restrictive controls such as surveillance, as we discuss in Section 5.3. The positioning of cyber security as warfare, which is a narrative repeated by both media and governments (Stevens, 2016), establishes that concept in the minds of all parties to that war, whether attacker or attacked. Adversaries, or even just those who disagree, will respond to the narrative of cyber security-as-war and then treat it as such, focusing on attack and defence, rather than seeing it as anything else, for example, as a collective problem of identifying and addressing weaknesses that threaten all. This could lead to actions that have unintended consequences, such as state purchasing, and hoarding, of vulnerabilities, e.g. Hoeksma (2017). Cyber security-as-collective-problem could be considered a “flattened narrative” (Farley, 2001), with preference instead provided to the cyber security-as-war concept which supports the maintenance of existing power structures. This can also be considered as indexing a “meta-narrative” (Symon et al., 2014, p. 3) of existing or ‘traditional’ enemies (Stevens, 2016), and the “superiority of ...the West” (Neocleous, 2008, p. 172), as suggested by the references to (ex-)communist states22 observed in the data. There is an almost paradoxical relevance of both Foucault’s and von Clausewitz’s perspectives on war, with cyber war being a “mere continuation of policy by other means” (von Clausewitz, 1873, p. 12) and cyber politics being “the continuation of war by other means” (Foucault, 2004, p. 15).23 Each of these also provides economic benefits (Neocleous, 2008), as we discuss below.

Positioning cyber security as an existential threat, as a war with “apocalyptic” (Stevens, 2016, p 121) consequences, may also allow for exceptionalism and deviance from existing laws, both national and supranational. Hobbes explicitly permitted defiance of law if motivated “by the terrour of present death” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 345). Such exceptionalism based on existential threat can be observed in modern societies, e.g. Government, Government; USA (2001), including in relation to cyber security threats (Walker, 2006). References to national security also connect with this warfare motif. As the nation is ‘under threat’ then there is a collective sense of conflict and, therefore, a suggestion that everyone has to play their part.

The fear generated by these threats propels citizens into “the waiting arms of whoever might be ruling” (Chapman, 1975, p. 88). Such fear may be a “necessity-justification” (Chapman, 1975, p. 89) for enduring power, and, as Chapman suggests, it is straightforward to conceive of such “justification ...[occurring] at the state level, as a function of real or manufactured inter-state crises” (Chapman, 1975, p. 89), particularly with regard to threats that are hard to understand or somewhat ephemeral in nature, such as those related to cyber security. If cyber-security threats result in fearful and bewildered citizens, those citizens are easier to moderate. Educating citizens on, or even communicating the existence of, cyber threats may couple “paranoia with pacification” (Chapman, 1975, p. 90).

#### Securitization of “cybersecurity” and < “critical infrastructure” / “grid hacking” / “systemic risk” / “digital Pearl Harbor” / “cyber 9/11” / “digital authoritarianism” / “grey zone tactics” / “fake news” > is inflated – wrongly mapped to “non-Western” spaces – and broadly authorizes the surveillance and militarization of everyday life, domestically and globally

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In ‘Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School,’ published in 2009, Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum suggest ways in which securitization theory can help us understand the politics of cybersecurity and cyberwar, a complex terrain that brings together a variety of technical and policy challenges that range from individual cybersecurity problems (cybercrime) through to issues of national and economic cybersecurity (anxieties about attacks on ‘critical infrastructure’) (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). Some of the threats point to futuristic ‘black swan’ disasters that result from our high-speed networked society; some of the challenges are traditional problems – abuse and harassment, grooming and recruitment, identity theft and fraud – carried out with new technologies. The cyberterrain is one where there is an anxiety that an individual can become a national security problem in new and dangerous ways – and where cyber techniques and technologies of national security can play out at the level of the individual in new and unprecedented ways, with innovations in the surveillance and monitoring of everyday life: the security state becomes - to use the fashionable management term - increasingly granular. This essay returns to Hansen and Nissenbaum’s article, an article that introduced new complexities, questions and nuances to the study of cybersecurity in security studies and international relations, to think about the changing terrain of cybersecurity in the second decade of the Twenty First Century– and the importance (and problems) of thinking about the ‘non-West’ in research on (cyber)securitization.

Hansen and Nissenbaum are interested in how the collective ‘referent objects’ of ‘the state,’ ‘society,’ ‘the nation’ and ‘the economy’ are presented as being threatened through three types of securitization that ‘tie referent objects and securitizing actors together’(Ibid, p.1163): hypersecuritization, everyday security practices and technifications. On this view, hypersecuritzation refers to the expansion of a security problem into a realm where there is the danger that threats can be exaggerated, resulting in excessive countermeasures: these hypersecuritizations, according to Hansen and Nissenbaum, always ‘mobilize the spectre of the future’ while also using ‘the past as a legitmating reference’(Ibid, p.1164). In the public threat horizon of future threats and dangers, proponents of cyber fears often use historical analogies of ‘electronic pearl habors’ or ‘cyber 9/11s’ in speculations on new types of threats: for the securitization theorists, the ‘re-animation’ of past events works to give a ‘form’ or credibility to future threats that have yet to occur – or are yet to be imagined.

What was significant about Hansen and Nissenbaum’s essay was the way it attempted to add new approaches and questions to a topic that tended to occupy a space in an often highly technical discourse of security, technology and strategy, a discourse that extended in to all aspects of life in a digitizing society. Indeed, ‘everyday security practices’ in their work refers to the ways that individuals and organizations are integrated into the practices of securitization as ‘both a responsible partner in fighting insecurity’ and also as a potential threat, allowing for responses that can permeate all aspects of everyday life (Ibid, p.1165). This was a discourse of security that due to the technical complexity was presented as occupying the ‘cutting edges’ of security, a zone that few outside of computer science would be able to engage with. In this sense, ‘technification’ refers to the manner in which cybersecurity becomes a terrain that depends on the ‘expert authority’ of the computer scientist and policy expert for its legitimacy, a domain where ‘the experts’ are the securitizing actors in a manner that risks to detach the issues from critical scrutiny and dialogue. Using the case study of Estonia in April-May in 2007 the authors illustrate how securitization theory can bring conceptual clarity and complexity to a terrain that can either be reduced to simplifications using the past as a means of understanding – or taking the issues into a zone where it is beyond our means of critical understanding and comprehension, where we feel overpowered by our inability to engage critically with the issues, issues that can leave us with the feeling we are in the realm of geopolitical science fictions, a world that feels increasingly like the ‘cyberpunk’ novels of William Gibson or films such as Ghost in the Shell.

Hansen and Nissenbaum reach a conclusion that resonates with the broader objectives of securitization theory and ‘critical security studies’: to develop strategies to counter and interrogate the ‘exceptional’ status of security issues – where an issue might be presented as ‘exceptional’ due to the threat to the national interest and/or exceptional due to the technical knowledge needed to evaluate the threat:

Cyber securitizations are particularly powerful precisely because they involve a double move out of the political realm: from the politicized to the securitized, from the political to the technified, and it takes an inter-disciplinary effort to assess the implications of the move, and possibly to counter it…cyber security stands at the intersection of multiple disciplines and it is important that both analysis and academic communication is brought to bear on it. The technical underpinnings of cyber security require, for instance, that IR scholars acquire some familiarity with the main technical methods and dilemmas, and vice versa that computer scientists become more cognizant of the politicized field in which they design and how their decisions might impact the (discursively constituted) trade-offs between security, access, trust, and privacy (Ibid, p. 1172).

The implication of this argument is an important one: we should develop the tools that enable us to challenge the ethico-political dangers of hypersecuritization in this rapidly changing (cyber) space; to be able to see into this zone of expert knowledge and authority, the spaces where decisions are made on the policies and technologies that will shape all areas of war and security (see Balzacq, 2011). But this essay asks: what should IR scholars be doing in addition to the challenge and task – to become more inter-disciplinary in order to be able to engage with the potential technification and hypersecuritizations of cybersecurity policy and discourse – that was set out in Hansen and Nissenbaum’s article?

What we want to do in this essay is suggest that in the time since the essay was published there may be problems and trends that have emerged that require some additional approaches to this issue of hypersecuritization and technification. Simply put, we need to think again about the problems of cybersecurity in the ‘political realm’ and we need to develop research on cybersecurity and ‘political realms’ in different places around the planet; to go beyond the often hypersecuritizing images of digital danger and ‘otherness’ emerging from the ‘nonWest’ to explore the complexity of cybersecurity both from the perspective of new ‘everyday security strategies’ that individuals may confront but also in terms of the potential for ‘digital disasters’ that might emerge from specific technological, legal, political and security contexts.

Following on from Hansen and Nissenbaum, our position in the paper begins from the view that inter-disciplinary attempts to engage critically with hypersecuritization is the primary task of work in this space: to be able to counter hypersecuritizations where threats are ‘hyped up’ - or unspecified future cyber dangers are invoked - is the first move for scholars who want to think critically about the ‘threat horizons’ that we are presented with on the (not so) clear and present/future dangers. In the time since the essay has been published (2009) much of the debate has centred around the hyper securitization of the concern with all things digital and the implications for the future of security and war (most notably in Thomas Rid’s book Cyberwar Will Not Take Place). At the same time, there have also been events that have pointed to the possibility of the types of future problems that we could confront – from events that fit with the type of warnings on digital disaster that many have been making since the issue emerged (the hacking of Ukrainian power grids, the Central Bank of Bangladesh bank heist) to the emergence of events that were not considered in previous speculations on digital disaster (Zetter, 2016a; Zetter, 2016b) : attempts to shape the political direction of other states through a combination of disruptive ‘gray zone’ tactics that may involve hacking and new uses of social media (the debate over ‘fake news’ and social media, the U.S. Presidential election in 2016). The problem now is not simply hypersecuritization but the problem of what Ulrich Beck describes as ‘organized irresponsibility’ where the ‘state administration, politics, industrial management and research negotiate the criteria of what is ‘rational and safe.’’ Discussing environmental risks, Beck asks ‘do we live in the context of ‘organized irresponsibility’?’(Beck, 1999, p.6). We would suggest the same question needs to be asked in the context of the securitization of digital risks and insecurities.

What we suggest in the article is this: once we have established that the first move in this area is think critically about cyber securitizations and the potential problems of the move from the political to the technified, we can consider the concerns of those who we describe as the ‘cyber catastrophists’ – those who continue to be concerned about the digital disasters that could impact on all aspects of life. We suggest that in this realm of cybersecurity we see three positions that shape the ideas that are contributing to vibrant debate and discussion of the future of cyberwar and cybersecurity: the cyber catastrophist, the digital realist and the techno optimist. The essay rests on the position that each perspective presents us with questions about cybersecuritizations that we need to constantly remain open to – given the fast-moving and disruptive pace of geopolitical and technological change. We suggest that the point in Hansen and Nissenbaum’s essay about the need to counter hypersecuritizations needs to be supplemented by more exploratory questions about whether we confront the issue of organized irresponsibility in this space. The problem of technification is not simply on how it might add legitimacy to hypersecuritization, in what it enables us to visualize in the imagination of digital disaster – it is what it fails to see or ignores, the construction and legitimation of what is rational and safe. In other words, we need to examine the politics – and the different positions that may shape policy – in the spaces where important ‘expert’ decisions are made: to examine, for example, how risk and unintended consequence are being integrated into planning. But the questions opened up by the ‘deconstruction’ of cybersecurity and cyberwar by Hansen and Nissenbaum also point to inquiry on the changing nature of ‘everyday security practices’ and here we suggest that is clearer now is the need for IR scholars to examine the specific contexts, controversies and challenges in diverse spaces beyond the often simplistic geographies of cyber-threat that often serve to fuel the hypersecuritized visions of geopolitical imaginaries.

One of the geopolitical anxieities that circulates in many of the key positions we discuss is a concern with the cyber insecurities that we confront from the non-West or that may result from poor cyber governance in the non-West. While this use of the term ‘non-West’ can be problematic and limiting it does remind us to think beyond the simplistic geography of ‘cyber’ danger that is often central to the debates about cybersecurity, the geopolitical imaginary filled with devious Bond- villains from former Communist-countries, cunning- ‘Oriental’ cyber criminals from a cyberpunk movie, totalitarian states experimenting with new technologies of Minority Report-like control and ‘feral’ digital environments in states outside the ‘tame zones’ of global politics. Securitization perspectives – along with work influenced by poststructuralist writers – are often a call to see beyond the simplistic representations of global politics that continue to imagine the future through the same geographies of otherness and difference that shaped the past (Hansen, 2006). This article suggests that – in the spirit of Hansen and Nissenbaum’s essay – we need to keep searching for the questions that need to be asked about a terrain that more than ever needs to be examined in its fast moving complexity and messiness: to examine the difference, complexity and messiness of new trends, practices and behaviours in environments that are often ignored or reduced to the ‘same’ in a supposedly homogenizing and universalising global technological culture.

### L – Democracy / LIO

#### Securitizing “democracy” is self-defeating – perceived illiberalism is wrongly mapped to “non-Western” spaces – and any manifestation of inevitable value pluralism is perceived as an existential threat, enabling a culture of self-authorization that collapses democracy in practice

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Yet, to treat democratic values or human rights, for instance, as attributes that specific societies possess or acquire is to conceal the intersubjective construction of these concepts and to ignore their productive, even hegemonic power. This is the reason why Iver Neumann and Michael Williams have proposed that constructivist analyses of NATO's enlargement should consider the alliance's self-description as a ‘democratic security community’ not as an unproblematic fact but as a way of exercising symbolic power. Claiming a democratic identity can then be interpreted as a political practice that assigns legitimacy to NATO's actions and at the same time structures the realm of possibilities for acceptable Russian self-conceptions. Hence, the ‘capacity to claim such identities, and to grant and deny them to others, is a source of social power’ (Williams and Neumann 2000: 364).

An approach that treats references to common Western values as evidence for an alleged reality — the existence of a transatlantic security community — risks committing an essentialist fallacy by taking the invocation of these depictions at face value. One problematic consequence of such an account is that it becomes methodologically impossible to distinguish between a political assertion of ‘shared values’ and its performative effects. Assuming an already existing transatlantic security community with certain ‘shared values’ and a ‘collective identity’ tends to reify prevalent notions of political discourse instead of interpreting them as an element in processes of social construction. In our view, claims to a democratic identity of NATO or public commitments to human rights constitute a valuable body of empirical material that social scientists ought to be interested in. However, instead of treating them as evidence for an alleged ‘Western’ identity, we suggest treating them as a distinct and powerful move in a political struggle (Jackson 2006b). Invocation of ‘Western values’ or a ‘democratic identity’ can then be interpreted with regard to their performative effects and institutional consequences.

Thus, instead of presupposing the existence of an Atlantic security community, we are interested in reconstructing processes of community formation, that is, processes that lead to the evolution, reproduction and transformation of an inter-state political space commonly described as ‘the West’ (e.g., Jackson 2003; Bially Mattern 2005). Just like Deutsch and his colleagues, we assume that political orders are integrated via the construction and reproduction of a sense of community in complex and non-linear dynamic processes. However, in contrast to the initial work on security communities, which focused on measuring the quantity and density of transactions, we propose that the emergence and the reproduction of a sense of community should be studied by focusing on the productive power of representations in contingent processes of signification. As these processes of community formation are open ended and non-linear, they can be reconstructed from within by interpreting how contentious references to ‘the West’ operate in political discourse.

A securitising community — theorising ‘the West’

In contrast to the usual descriptions of a culturally defined ‘Western civilisation’ with a stable essence, we thus start from the premise that ‘the West’ is first and foremost a semantic category used within contentious processes of signification (Jackson 2006a: 3–12). ‘The West’ is only real in the sense that it is used as a concept by people who presume its existence and who act upon such a presumption. It is a ‘tool to think with’ that allows one to ‘characterize and classify societies into different categories — i.e. “western”, “non-western”’ (Hall 1992: 277). If ‘the West’ constitutes a powerful semantic category that shapes action, then discursive shifts in its meaning are of paramount importance, and its meaning has indeed changed repeatedly throughout history. However, strictly speaking, we are not interested in ‘the West’ as such but rather in its performative power to construct politically relevant distinctions such as between ‘the West’ and the ‘non-West’, and how these distinctions operate in political discourse. In this vein, we argue that since the end of World War II, the signifier of ‘the West’ has been a useful tool in the construction of a common identity because actors could attach different meanings to it, for example, ‘democratic’, ‘capitalist’, or ‘free’. As a rather diffuse we-concept, the proclamation of ‘the West’ mostly triggers associative links to human rights, democracy, and a liberal market economy without necessarily specifying these individual components — let alone discussing them in their mutual relations.

This structure of common usages of ‘the West’ in political discourse is instructive from both an empirical and a normative point of view. It seems to succeed in exerting an integrative function in transatlantic communications precisely because it is a concept that bears a positive normative marker both strong enough to lend legitimacy to political claims articulated in the name of ‘the West’ and weak enough to avoid the escalation of conflicts. Such an ambivalent usage of ‘the West’ becomes interesting because it points to the potential and the danger of rhetorical instrumentalisation. At best, the inherent vagueness of ‘the West’ simply leads to unfulfilled promises because the allusive references to an impressive phalanx of feel-good concepts remain without political consequences. In a worse scenario (which is at the same time more interesting from an IR point of view), a self-image cast in terms of a community of superior values can trigger processes of self-assertion and illicit authorisation. For postcolonial scholars the concept of the ‘the West’ also implies connotations of ‘imperialistic’ and ‘racist’ power and global domination.

These possible consequences of usages of ‘the West’ direct our attention to the question of how to identify such processes and their dynamics. Having argued that the second generation of security community research mainly ignored the incremental processes and open-ended dynamics of community formation and regression, their rather static concept of security relations has to be modified. Along these lines, most strands of critical security studies are interested in the question of how social interaction produces an intersubjective understanding of what counts as a threat and what measures are considered appropriate to provide security (Weldes et al. 1999; Buzan and Hansen 2009). Security is seen as a social construction, a specific field of practice, or — as Ole Wæver has argued — a performative act. A key merit of securitisation theory in particular is that it introduces the distinction between dynamics of securitisation and desecuritisation in terms of their performative character as speech acts without presupposing a definition of what counts as a proper security issue (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Hansen 2006; Huysmans 2006). It thereby exempts the field of security studies from a narrow focus on the defence of alleged national interests and opens it up to a wide field of articulations and social transactions without sacrificing conceptual specificity.

Securitisation theory thus focuses on a particular mode of political agency characterised by a rhetoric of exception, which uses presumably existential threats as a trigger to set off extraordinary measures. In terms of its practical consequences, securitisation performatively engenders a state of emergency. Working against the procedures of normal political communication revolving around alternative courses of action, securitisation reduces the possibility of choice to an either–or level, that is, whether we act or not. Securitisation dynamics can lead to the authorisation of extraordinary measures that otherwise could not have been used. Desecuritisation, by contrast, refers to the gradual process of ‘rhetorical disarmament’, which aims at the withdrawal of a particular issue off the security agenda and replaces the logic of exception, immediate necessity and emergency with the routinised patterns of normal politics (e.g., Williams 1998; Aradau 2004; Huysmans 2006). Such an understanding of securitisation and desecuritisation as processes focuses our attention on the practical consequences of ‘speaking security’. Hence, as Ole Wæver (1995: 54–57) has pointed out, declaring something as an issue of security is an inherently political act with de-politicising consequences attaching priority to the problem at hand and narrowing the range of legitimate alternatives.

Historically, the formation of Western order has typically been described as such a process of desecuritisation, in which a ‘culture of legal formalism’ (Koskenniemi 2001: 494–509) has gradually replaced old-style power politics which, in turn, could be described as a network of interconnected securitisations. Focusing, in particular, on processes of securitisation and desecuritisation seems warranted as ‘the West’ is increasingly portrayed as a threatened, endangered space. Looking at the West from a security perspective that is informed by the Copenhagen School by no means confines ‘the West’ to the realm of security policy. It simply provides an angle that allows us to trace a particular kind of transformation of Western order as a political space by observing how different issues are being securitised or desecuritised, that is, moved on and off the security agenda. The larger theoretical point here is that securitisation processes are exemplary vehicles for the transformation of order triggered through the institutional consequences of performative acts. Securitisation, therefore, can be regarded as an ordering mechanism that takes ‘politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 23).Footnote4

In Regions and Powers, Buzan and Wæver (2003) jointly address the question of regional security and the ordering effects of securitisation dynamics at a regional level. Surprisingly, they take entities like ‘North America’, ‘Asia’, or ‘Europe’ as unproblematic givens rather than as categories of political struggle. They clearly state that ‘the existence of an RSC (regional security complex) is not in terms of the discursive ‘construction of regions’ (ibid.: 48). While, by definitional fiat, Buzan and Wæver split the US and Europe into two different security complexes, the long and powerful history of ‘the West’ stands in sharp contrast to such a distinction, especially if we consider its prominence as a referent object in post-9/11 securitisation dynamics, where an immediate sense of danger was shared in both the US and Europe precisely because the attacks were targeting ‘the West’ at large. Hence, for the purpose of our project, it is important to focus precisely on the discursive construction of political spaces and imaginative geographies in order to understand how a Western order is re-constituted.

So far, we have argued that securitisation triggers potentially far-reaching institutional consequences, which may add up to a state of emergency where the conduct of public life is subordinated to a defence against existential threats. Institutional consequences are thus the result of performative acts that can be understood as a form of ‘creative action’: social action that aims at solving problems where routinised patterns of interpretation no longer seem to fit (Joas 1996). In particular, framing an issue in security terms entails the pressure to accelerate the decision-making process so that securitising moves might add to the impression that normal procedures have become inappropriate. In contrast to standard conceptions of order where conflicts pose a dramatic challenge to some taken-for-granted normative foundations, we conceive of order as an historically contingent arrangement of institutional consequences (Wendt 1992, 1999; Herborth 2004). Here the conceptual counterpoint to order is not ‘anarchy’, ‘chaos’, ‘instability’, or ‘institutional breakdown’, whereby order is still marked as the normatively preferable (and superior) concept (Ashley 1988). In our understanding, order is conceptually related first and foremost to agency in such a way that it is essentially made up of different institutions resulting from the creativity of social transactions. What appears to us as a relatively stable institution or a fixed order is thus nothing but a sedimentation of routinised patterns of signification (Dewey 1938/1991: 105–22). To the extent that such processes of signification refer to ‘contentious politics’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) we can encounter manifold forms of contestation and crisis as well as cooperation among and within Western societies that may sum up to processes of community formation. Thus, conceptualising institutional consequences as the result of creative action enables us to reconsider the transformation of Western order without pre-judging whether its normative foundation is eroding or lasting. Disparate accounts of the nature of transatlantic relations notwithstanding, the collective wisdom of available scholarship nevertheless suggests good reasons to assume that there may indeed be something specific to such ‘Western’ forms of conflict and cooperation. Yet, what precisely those are remains open to empirical investigation.

Securitising ‘The West’: Three dimensions

Having emphasised, at a general theoretical level, that ‘the future of the West’ hinges on contingent processes of signification rather than transhistorical macro-dynamics, we have committed ourselves to tracing particular instances of signification instead of partaking in pundit-like speculations as to where ‘the West’ may go, get stuck, or eventually end up. Rather we intend to reconstruct transformations of ‘Western order’ by focusing on the actual meanings actors attach to ‘the West’. Given limitations of space, we can only summarise the main results of our more in-depth reconstruction of transformations of Western order. In selecting and delimiting research areas we have been guided by our judgment as to what is usually represented as the characteristic and defining sets of interaction in the literature on transatlantic relations and ‘Western order’. Most scholars in the field would contend that in order to assess current dynamics of conflict and cooperation in transatlantic relations and in order to appraise the status of ‘the West’ as a security community, one would have to address at least three substantive issues.

First, one would have to investigate the impact of the current ‘power transition’ with Asia gradually displacing Europe and North America as the centre of world politics. Objectors of the ‘unipolarity’ thesis had first insinuated that this was about to happen (Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Mearsheimer 2001: 396–402; Pape 2005). More recently, the debate has evolved into the more explicit question of what the ‘rise’ of states such as China and Russia would mean for the future of ‘the West’ and whether ‘the liberal international order’ could ‘survive’ when faced with ‘authoritarian capitalism’ as an alternative model to liberal democracy (e.g., Gat 2007; Kagan 2008; Ikenberry 2008; Deudney and Ikenberry 2009; Kupchan 2012). Accordingly, the first research area focuses on the macro-dimension of Western self-conceptions vis-à-vis China and Russia and boundary-creating processes that go along with them.

The second issue commonly regarded as indispensable for assessing the present condition of transatlantic relations is the contested status of NATO. Whether it is regarded as an interstate alliance that has lost its purpose (Waltz 2000: 18–27), as a security community of liberal democracies (Risse-Kappen 1996) or else as an adaptable security management institution (Wallander 2000), each conceptualisation involves a diagnosis on the main factors of transatlantic cooperation and, quite often, a diagnosis of the presumable fate of ‘the West’ (cf. Hellmann 2008; Franke 2010: 19–53). The tendency to link NATO's likely or unlikely survival with the ‘future of the West’ more recently manifested in the debates about the consequences of the transatlantic conflict over the war against Iraq and over the prospects in Afghanistan (e.g., Asmus 2003; Cox 2005; Pouliot 2006; Anderson et al. 2008). As NATO still figures prominently as the key transatlantic security institution, the second research area will reconsider institutional dynamics and discursive shifts relating to the alliance.

The third prominent topic in scholarly debates about ‘the West’ concerns the responses to global terrorism after 9/11. Frequently interpreted as a direct assault on ‘the West’ and its ‘way of life’, the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, London, and Madrid have been answered in a way that arguably undermines the very normative foundations they are designed to protect. Scholars and journalists have pointed out that the legislative, military, and penal measures used in the ‘war on terror’ directly suspend the civil rights and contradict the democratic ideals ‘the West’ claims for itself (Hersh 2004; Rejali 2007; Prantl 2008; Mayer 2008). The effects of transatlantic responses to global terrorism demarcate a field in which the traditional borders between domestic and foreign policy problems begin to blur. The third research area therefore refers to internal struggles in which normative requirements derived from a particular Western self-image are confronted with the factual or putative imperatives of preventing further terrorist attacks.

To sum up, focusing on great power rivalry with China and Russia, the re-constitution of NATO as the primary transatlantic security institution, and the responses to global terrorism within a ‘Western order’ accesses the main sites of ongoing scholarly discussion about transatlantic relations and ‘the West’. From the point of view of a reconstructive logic of enquiry, the selection of more specific cases and texts within each research area was guided by internal standards as it is recommended, for instance, by the methodology of grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1998). As the method ought to fit the subject matter rather than vice-versa, these choices need to be ‘field-specific’ and continually improved and adjusted according to field-specific experiences (ibid.; Strübing 2004). What we found is not a single overarching macro-dynamic under which a multitude of individual observations could be subsumed, but rather different, field-specific responses to an open-ended tension between two conflicting principles (or articulations) of a ‘Western order’, namely, self-assertion and self-restraint. In all three research areas we reconstructed an ongoing tension between the self-assertive dynamics of a ‘securitised West’ and a legalist culture of formalism (Koskenniemi 2001) that imposes explicit limitations on the use of violence.

The ‘West’ vis-à-vis ‘Authoritarian Great Powers’

Many books and articles have recently diagnosed an ongoing global transition of power to the detriment of ‘the West’. It has become common practice to address countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China as ‘rising powers’ and to assume that they will translate their economic growth rates into ever-greater political influence on the global stage.Footnote5 The impact of the financial crisis since 2008 and the ensuing enlargement of the traditional G7/8 club into the G20 lent further credibility to this belief. While the ascendency of democratic countries such as Brazil and India is largely regarded as unproblematic, the alleged ‘return of authoritarian great powers’ is often presented as a potential challenge to the ‘Western liberal order’ (e.g., Gat 2007). A dominant discourse in Europe and North America subsumes China and Russia under the category of ‘authoritarian great powers’ and pits them against ‘the West’ in a scenario of upcoming great power competition.

This story with its audacious simplifications and its bold predictions has been told many times in different variations, most prominently by Robert Kagan. In his book The Return of History and the End of Dreams, he warns against an anti-Western conspiracy, construing China's and Russia's ‘rise’ as an omen for an emerging ‘association of autocrats’ who are unfavourably disposed towards ‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy’. Assuming both their hostile intentions and their successful cooperation allows him to draw a worst-case scenario in which the shape of the ‘future international order’ hinges upon the determination of ‘the world's democracies’ to ‘protect their interests and defend their principles in a world in which these are once again powerfully challenged’ (Kagan 2008: 53–59, 105, 97). To be sure, prophecies of imminent decline have permeated the discourse of ‘the West’ from the very beginning (Jackson 2010). However, in contrast to a pessimistic Spenglerian view of history, contemporary warnings usually do not present Western demise as an inevitable fact. They rather paint worst-case scenarios that legitimise different strategies to maintain the status quo.

In order to ascertain to what extent public–political rhetoric is infused by this discourse, we analysed two concrete transatlantic struggles over the right strategy to deal with China and Russia, namely, the controversy about the European weapons embargo on China and the debate about Russia's eventual membership in NATO. Both instances featured a quite similar structure of conflict in dealing with ‘authoritarian great powers’. They also revealed a strong sense of superiority and an alert defence preparedness to be central for processes of transatlantic community formation.

Attempts of the Chinese and Russian governments to improve security relations with Europe and North America encountered a heterogeneous and often discordant group of states. When individual governments proposed to cooperate with China and Russia on the basis of national interests, others immediately reminded them that those countries did not share basic values and therefore did not qualify as viable partners. At the centre of the controversy over the European Union (EU) weapons embargo on China between 2003 and 2005 stood the question of whether a more powerful China should be approached as an equal partner, especially whether it could be trusted in the sensitive area of military cooperation. The French and the German government, as well as officials of the EU Commission, opted for great power cooperation with China and seemed determined to go through with this plan despite stern US objections. In the case of Russia's membership in NATO, policymakers in Great Britain, Germany, and the US showed themselves open minded towards Putin's 2001 proposal to put the relationship between NATO and Russia on a new basis. In the face of terrorist threats, a fundamental ‘realignment’ between Europe, America, and Russia seemed possible.

Both the proponents of lifting the arms embargo on China and the advocates of granting Russia equal participation in NATO decision making were emphatically reminded by their partner states and their national parliaments that they were obliged to defend identity-establishing values that could not be sold out or be disregarded. Although security concerns were an important element in some of these objections, transatlantic political elites could not agree on whether these countries posed an actual ‘threat’. They did, however, ultimately reach a consensus that security cooperation with China and Russia was only acceptable as far as they would democratise and respect human rights. Abstract references to these values enabled a common transatlantic position.

The analysis of these two cases demonstrates that there are indeed attempts by European and North American governments to cooperate with China and Russia on the basis of geostrategic calculations. However, as soon as officials undertake serious steps in this direction, they are disciplined by a vague commitment to a common foundation of values. Thus, the moral distinctiveness that allegedly is wedded to being a part of ‘the West’ has to be reiterated time and again. Interestingly, this particular talk only makes sense if there is a foil, in this case ‘authoritarian great powers’. In both of the analysed transatlantic conflicts, articulations re-established and validated a normative boundary separating China and Russia as ‘authoritarian great powers’ from the liberal democracies of ‘the West’. Constructing such a fundamental difference proves to be essential for the fabrication of a transatlantic sense of community. In both debates, European and North American elites claimed to speak on behalf of a ‘community of values’ that was in a position to define normative standards of universal validity and to judge whether other countries conformed to these standards. The precondition thus seemed to be an unspoken and unquestioned consensus on two interrelated beliefs: first, that is was clear how human rights and democracy had to be understood and, second, that North Americans and Europeans carried a special responsibility for their worldwide dissemination and implementation.

In a nutshell, the re-constitution of a transatlantic community is based on an idealisation of distinct value commitments and the consequent normative demarcation from authoritarian states such as China and Russia. What is often described in static terms as the ‘cohesion’ of transatlantic relations proves to be a process of self-affirmation that relies on the construction of fundamental differences and the moral de-legitimation of the ‘non-West’. This finding confirms postcolonial and poststructuralist analyses of how Eurocentric patterns of thought shape the relations between ‘the West’ and its Other(s). In this sense, the attitudes and patterns of interpretation at work in processes of ‘Western’ community formation are just one further episode to deal in a self-righteous way with differences in world politics. In the relations towards China and Russia, however, an important aspect is added to the equation. Both are regarded as powerful countries, a fact that apparently makes it more delicate when they fail to adopt liberal democracy as the superior model of political rule. The refusal by the Chinese and Russian governments to acknowledge such universalist claims makes them appear as incalculable or even hostile opponents.

China apparently is about to surpass liberal countries in economic development without the anticipated democratic reforms taking place. Russia in turn is attributed with the potential to provoke Eastern European countries militarily or blackmail them economically. When the prospects for a transformation of these countries seem to diminish, the self-confidence of North American and European elites easily turned into the fear that precious normative achievements may be in danger and must be defended against possible assaults. Thus, when it comes to China and Russia, the already present sense of superiority combines with diffuse fears of a shrinking material power basis for projecting allegedly universal norms and institutions. As a result, a morally superior but materially declining ‘West’ is called upon to safeguard the liberal international order before it falls prey to ‘rising’ authoritarian great powers. This is the case-specific pull towards the securitisation pole. The normative demarcation vis-à-vis unpredictable and morally questionable authoritarian great powers engender a latent confrontational posture against these states. As long as they have not transformed into liberal democracies, their moves tend to be observed with fearful scepticism.

In sum, a strong sense of superiority, which is semantically linked to the notion of ‘the West’, provides the basis for diffuse threat scenarios in transatlantic discourse on ‘authoritarian great powers’. The idea that non-Western others might propose acceptable alternatives to existing rules and institutions is hard to reconcile with the self-conception of European and North American elites as representing the vanguard of the political and moral development of humankind. This self-conception predisposes these elites to interpret those Chinese and Russian positions, which run counter to such pretensions either as ‘challenges’ for the stability of the ‘liberal international order’ or even as potential long-term security threats to ‘the West’ as a community of values.

NATO's strategic discourse and the self-authorisation of ‘the West’

While the first research area dealt with representations of ‘authoritarian regimes’ that are by definition categorised as being outside of the boundaries of ‘the West’, this research area focuses on the transformation of NATO, that is, the military alliance that is considered to be the institutional core of what we usually call ‘the West’ (e.g., Gress 2004; Brzezinski 2009). Obviously, transatlantic security cooperation has been a classical theme in IR, either from a realist vantage point, where NATO is primarily described as a defence alliance subordinated to national purposes (Waltz 2000: 18), or from a liberal perspective, where NATO is understood as an alliance of democracies (Risse-Kappen 1995: 4). In both perspectives, however, the dynamics of security cooperation between North America and Europe seem unproblematic as long as the allies are convinced of their common interest or their shared values.

NATO's (lasting) ability to voice in-/securities — for example a ‘Soviet threat’, ‘terrorism’, or ‘new challenges’ — directs our attention to highly institutionalised dynamics of securitisation that, as the subsequent analysis will show, manifest themselves as a self-authorisation of ‘the West’ in order to defend its normative foundation. Such a tendency towards self-authorisation has become visible in different forms since the North Atlantic alliance was founded in 1949. During the Cold War, it primarily enabled a rather deep institutionalisation of military cooperation with an integrated command structure including US nuclear weapons, as well as common strategic planning and defence exercises. After the Cold War, this project was continued but it has certainly changed in form. Out-of-area operations and the development of a globally active alliance is one of the most visible expressions of such self-authorising practices. These dynamics were central to re-constitute NATO during critical junctures and have been productive of a highly self-confident Western alliance today (Jackson 2003; Bially Mattern 2005; Behnke 2013).

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in April 1949 by representatives of nine Western European states, Iceland, Canada, and the US, provided the Western alliance with a legal basis and outlined the key principles of cooperation, that is, consultation (Article 4) and collective defence (Article 5). Although the formulation of Article 5 was highly contested between the US and its European allies, it was perceived as the cornerstone of transatlantic security cooperation (Kaplan 2004: 4). In contrast to such a legal framing of Western security cooperation, the preamble of the Treaty invoked an inherently normative rhetoric when it stated that the parties ‘are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people, founded on the principle of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’ (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949). The construction of unity based on a common culture and even ‘civilisation’ (rather than merely a shared threat perception) transferred military cooperation and integration far beyond an interest-driven alliance (e.g., Klein 1990; Jackson 2003, 2006a). During these formative years of NATO, one central aim of formulating ‘strategic concepts’ was to construct a common security interest of the US and Western European states that was metaphorically framed in terms of an ‘indivisibility of allied security’.Footnote6

Bearing these normative foundations in mind, NATO gradually evolved as a cultural project that was directed against communism — which made the inclusion of an autocratic state such as Portugal possible — rather than as a community of democratic states (Klein 1990; Jackson 2003; Sjursen 2004). The invoked narrative of shared norms, values, and a common heritage provided a sufficiently strong rationale for defending the North Atlantic Area against any potential threat. Moreover, it also legitimised taking whatever measures were deemed ‘necessary’ to defend its members. ‘Forward defence’ and ‘massive retaliation’ turned out to be such legitimate means. Nevertheless, in many ways the strength of Western rhetoric was also intended to polish over and counterbalance many of the underlying political conflicts that persisted throughout NATO's post-war history. As a matter of fact, over the years it had become a standard formula in political discourse to refer to an alliance in ‘crisis’ as proof of its uniquely transatlantic vitality. In this sense the invocation of a normative foundation of shared ‘Western’ values, heritage and civilisation even against the background of internal political dissent was as much a securitising move as it was an expression of a particular ‘Western’ structure of conflict. One could conclude that transatlantic security cooperation was only manageable by invoking such a normative foundation of shared values, heritage, and civilisation.

The subsequent strategic concepts DC 6/1 (December 1952), MC 14/2 (May 1957) and the amended strategic guidelines were written with the intention to both ‘convince the USSR that war does not pay’ (NATO 1950) and to reassure the allies that continued and even intensified that security cooperation was necessary. Changing strategic concepts, most prominently from ‘massive retaliation’ to ‘flexible response’, restored the reliability of mutual defence because of altered security circumstances (e.g., Haftendorn 1996; Tuschhoff 1999; Kaplan 2004: 100). Although the concept of ‘flexible response’ eventually satisfied all allies and remained valid until the end of the Cold War, different interpretations of deterrence and its operational implications persisted (Daalder 1991: 41; Risse-Kappen 1995: 184–7). Once again a particular structure of conflict among NATO allies was observable in the sense that although a ‘crisis’ occurred, references to the common heritage, shared norms and values of the ‘free world’ restored sufficient coherence among them. In this sense, the decision over West Germany's membership in 1955, the Suez Crisis in 1956, the withdrawal of France from the integrated military command structure in 1966, or NATO's double track decision in 1979 were all incidents of alliance disruption that nevertheless did not lead to a break-up of the Atlantic alliance. In these situations strategic concepts turned out to be crucial in re-establishing coherence and unity by reaffirming the authority of the alliance and its ability to (re-)act. The strengthening of consultation mechanisms in the 1950s, the formation of ‘Allied Mobile Forces’ (AMF) in the 1960s, or the deployment of additional Pershing II missiles in the 1980s embodied the institutional consequences of these strategic re-orientations.

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, many commentators expected that the Atlantic alliance would sooner or later vanish as well. Thus, NATO's post-Cold War strategies of 1991 and 1999 were primarily aimed at justifying the institutional continuity of the Western alliance against the new setting of a decreasing Eastern threat (e.g., Ringsmose and Rynning 2009: 5). At the beginning of the 1990s, ‘Europe, whole and free’ (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept 1991) became the obvious new rhetorical commonplace to legitimise a different future for NATO compared with the fate of the Warsaw Pact. It opened up the possibility of Eastern enlargement and paved the way for the institutionalisation of a new relationship with Russia (Wallander 2000; Williams and Neumann 2000; Schimmelfennig 2003; Adler 2008; Pouliot 2008) as well as initiatives for cooperation in the Mediterranean (Masala 2003).

In the same vein of institutional and geographical expansion, the ‘out-of-area’ debate in the mid-1990s rearticulated the necessity for a political and military engagement far beyond alliance territory and territorial defence.Footnote7 While the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War had largely constrained the alliance's global military engagement, ‘safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilisation’ now ascribed a global mission to NATO's members. Instead of supporting a culture of self-restraint and legal formalism, the allies even intensified a tendency towards self-authorisation in the name of defending human rights and the achievements of ‘Western civilisation’. Disregarding United Nations’ formal legal provisions in the case of Kosovo, NATO itself became a producer of a common law where the protection of human rights was deemed more important than respecting state sovereignty and non-intervention. The specific formation of NATO's strategic discourse made such ‘humanitarian interventions’ intelligible as the new raison d’être. Public justifications for military interventions in Serbia or Afghanistan, for example, cited the attack on ‘Western’ values as a determining reason for taking military action. Ultimately, in its statement on terrorism, the North Atlantic Council said that ‘the lives of our citizens, and their human rights and civil liberties’ were threatened by terrorism and reaffirmed that the allies ‘condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We, the 19 NATO Allies, are determined to combat this scourge. Our security requires no less’ (NATO 2001).Footnote8

During the Cold War, such a project of self-authorisation was primarily realised by institutionalising an integrated command structure, coordinated defence planning and common exercises. Today, the rhetoric of unpredictable risks and the global war on terrorism assigns an almost universal authority to NATO, in particular when ‘the challenge is not just to make our populations secure, but feel secure’ (de Hoop Scheffer 2009, emphasis added). ‘Europe’ and the ‘transatlantic area’ is the endangered subject of NATO's strategic discourse justifying a durable and institutionally dense military cooperation of its member states and a nuclearisation of its defence strategy. Whenever allies pursued (national) security policies without consultation, conflicts and crisis within the alliance ensued. It was only through NATO that ‘the West’ could materialise its power position through a specific form of self-authorisation. NATO, respectively Western states, presented ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, the ‘rule of law’, and ‘market economy’ as normatively unquestioned principles they had already realised. Others had only one choice: to comply or to resist. The normative attractiveness of ‘the West’, thus, also directs our attention to the temptations of securitising practices where a formalisation of IR through law is marginalised by unilateral acts of self-authorisation.

The Western ‘War on Terror’: Torture and extraordinary rendition

At first sight, NATO's self-authorising tendencies and Western claims to universality might stand in sharp contrast to how ‘the West’ is commonly perceived in its more favourable readings. Among the broad array of Western self-descriptions, allegiance to the rule of law stands out as a bedrock principle. The difference between the ‘West and the rest’ (Hall 1992) can be accounted for in many different ways, yet the normative quality of a distinctive set of legal–political routines stands out as the one most commonly in use. Considerations of due process and the legal writ of habeas corpus are more than derivative characteristics, they — rather than military strength or an advanced form of capitalist organisationFootnote9 — are held to define Western societies and states as such.

Unlawful detention, extraordinary rendition, and torture would thus seem to constitute an obvious and flagrant violation of the normative infrastructure of ‘the West’. Moreover, yet all of this did take place in the wake of ‘Western’ responses to the atrocities of 9/11 that are now by convention referred to as the global ‘war on terrorism’.Footnote10 To the extent that such transgressions were justified in a language of necessity, we seem to encounter a showcase example of securitisation. Both the symbolic value of targeting the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, and the subsequent narratives of justification issued by Al-Qaeda, signify that this was not an attack directed against the US as a state, but more broadly an attack on ‘the West’ at large. Defending ‘the West’ and its unique form of life then might even justify torture — and paradoxically the defence of the ‘West’ thus invoked becomes in itself a threat to ‘the West’ in its own right, undermining the very principles it set out to protect.Footnote11

Hence, the interesting research question here is not whether torture and extraordinary rendition constitute instances of securitisation — they obviously do. The challenge is rather to reconstruct carefully the ways in which such securitisation dynamics play out, what institutional consequences they yield, what patterns of justification they involve, and how they contribute to transforming the normative infrastructure of ‘the West’. What is at stake, then, is a reconstruction of the legal–political ramifications of torture and extraordinary rendition, not the question of whether transgressions have taken place and whether this conforms to antecedent expectations of securitisation theory. We know that democracies do torture. As Darius Rejali (2007) has shown in great detail, democracies have not abolished torture but rather made it invisible by inventing ‘stealth techniques’, which leave no trace. Interrogation techniques such as waterboarding are thus, in an irritating way, specifically democratic forms of torture. They respond to the legal and public constraints imposed on such practices by norms against torture by removing them from the public eye. In fact, this pattern holds for all of the ‘techniques’ discussed in the notorious torture memosFootnote12 — dietary manipulation, nudity, the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap or insult slap, cramped confinement, wall stranding, stress position, water dousing, sleep deprivation of more than 48 hours, and the waterboard. The very term applied to such measures, ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, testifies to a specific trait of what Rejali calls ‘clean torture’. None of them leaves a visible mark, none of them seems as outrageously brutal as medieval forms of torture, and thus they provide a comfortable degree of deniability to those in authority.

Hence, it is all the more important to focus on how specific ‘techniques’ have been administered and how this has been justified. ‘In the study of torture’, Rejali (2007: 63) rightly observes, ‘hell is in the details’. One of the detailed questions raised in the torture memos concerns the ‘Combined Use of Certain Techniques’. Having stipulated that each of the single ‘techniques’ listed above does not constitute a violation of the anti-torture statute, the ‘Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency. Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value Al-Qaeda Detainees' discusses the question of how things may change when several of these techniques are used in combination. If sleep deprivation of more than 48 hours is not considered to be legally problematic, then how about sleep deprivation in combination with cramped confinement, dietary manipulation, and repeated insult slaps? The way in which the question is posed in the torture memos presupposes that this is all about navigating a legal grey zone, where an imaginary torture threshold must not be crossed in order to avoid legal repercussions. Within the rationality of the torture memos it is very possible that any particular combination of techniques does not constitute torture in a legal sense. It is also very possible that any particular combination of techniques does constitute torture in a legal sense. It all becomes a question of dosage. Here the memos are being unspecific in a very specific way. What we can observe is an instance of intra-institutional buck-passing, which exempts both the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Justice from being charged with explicitly advocating or conducting torture. From the point of view of the CIA, they just did what was explicitly authorised by the Department of Justice; from the point of view of the Department of Justice, ultimately crossing the torture threshold would have to take place in specific instances of interrogation and thus under the auspices of the CIA. A middle ground is achieved when the memo calls for ‘trained interrogators’. ‘Trained interrogators’ are individuals capable of understanding what precise dosage and combination of such ‘techniques’ can be administered in order to remain on the safe side of legality. Hence, from the point of view of both the CIA and the Department of Justice, transgressions can be attributed to a situative misjudgement on the side of the trained interrogator. The buck finally stops amidst a newly inaugurated class of torture professionals, which specialises in remaining invisible to any form of public and legal scrutiny.

Such a logic of self-immunisation repeats itself at the transatlantic level. We know that CIA flights transported suspects to foreign detention camps, that they used European airports and European infrastructure, and that apparently some of those camps were located in Eastern member states of the EU. As a matter of fact, and contrary to a public self-image that Europeans occasionally tend to cast, Europe has been integral in practices of torture and extraordinary rendition in the wake of the global war on terror. The relevant information is contained in a report by Dick Marty, a Swiss representative to the Council of Europe, on ‘Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers Involving Council of Europe Member States'. Yet, while stirring up a great deal of public interest, the report was ultimately of little consequence. It fell victim to the problem it described. In the wake of an effective buck-passing of political responsibility, all it could do was diligently compile information that had already been available in the news media. The major finding of the report — that there were indeed secret detentions and extraordinary renditions, yet no one was accountable for them — defined precisely the limit of the report's political effect. The transatlantic division of labour thus operates much like the division of labour between the CIA and the Department of Justice. From the point of view of the US, Europe is not quite living up to its commitments to burden sharing, being only of tacit and reluctant help. Hence, the US has to carry most of the weight in the war on terror, and, by implication, needs ‘to get her hands dirty’. From a European point of view, the factual degree of involvement comfortably pales in comparison with US transgressions. From the moral high ground, then, how precisely Europe has been and still is involved becomes almost invisible. Both Europe and the United States can cast their definitions of the situation in terms of ‘the West’. Europe holds up Western values damaged in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and Fallujah. The US, on the other hand, actually does defend ‘the West’. In between such conflicting understandings of ‘the West’, political accountability evaporates.

This is precisely how a political logic of risk management Footnote13 operates: by delegating away political responsibilities to anonymous layers of technocratic and expertocratic competency, all the more clandestine if intelligence agencies are involved. The depoliticising effect of securitisation is thus routinised and tacitly institutionalised. Rather than a situative response to a particular threat, which may be countered and then go away, the practical consequences of securitisation can thus be extended for an indefinite period of time — by translating the hyper-political logic of security into a bureaucratic logic of risk management.

Conclusions

Giving up on an essentialist conceptualisation and focusing instead on performative references to and invocations of ‘the West’ by no means dilutes the resulting image, as essentialisers often seem to fear. On the contrary, it was only through an open, reconstructive focus on manifold and fragmented uses of the West that we could render visible a dynamic of genuinely ‘Western’ securitisation. Different articulations in scholarly and political discourse do not add up to a coherent entity that can then be tagged as ‘the West’. Rather, ‘the West’ is quite literally an essentially contested concept as it becomes politically efficacious only to the extent that it is articulated in specific, locally and contextually circumscribed situations. However, all three research fields support the conclusion that ‘the West’ tends to be marked as normatively valuable and preferable to that which is not Western. Furthermore, to the extent that it is cast as a threatened entity that ought to be defended at all cost, that is, to the extent that ‘the West’ is being securitised, it assumes the role of a discursive attractor, as if it were a ‘gravitational centre’ that channels political communication through a securitisation filter. With a ‘securitised West’ looming in the background, transatlantic discord might not escalate to the point of open conflict and antagonism but might rather remain tied to a particular structure of conflict, in which different articulations of how precisely ‘the West’ ought to be defended are at stake.

References to ‘the West’ as a carrier of collective identity, then, account for the rapid build-up of rhetorical heat, yet these very references also delimit the possible scope of antagonism. At the same time, however, as a self-securitising community ‘the West’ exerts a discursive pull, which places the semantics of security and thus the authorisation of extraordinary measures squarely at the centre of political conduct. Self-assertion, self-authorisation, and self-immunisation are just three institutional consequences of such a securitisation pull. In the case of NATO, these dynamics of self-authorisation seem to be most obvious regarding the reconstituting effects of its strategic discourse and its global projection of (military) power today. The debate on ‘China's rise’ and its consequences for the coherence and future of ‘the West’ brings to mind the potential differences between the US and European states where references to assumed universal values might enhance a self-assertion of ‘the West’. In the field of torture and extraordinary renditions we can observe how the very principles of ‘the West’ are undermined by the bureaucratic self-immunisation against political accountability.

Obviously, the freelance authorisation of means of violence in the wake of securitisation processes and the accompanying tendencies of self-assertion and self-immunisation are diametrically opposed to the self-understanding of ‘the West’ as a community of liberal democracies. Nested in such self-descriptions, processes of securitisation cannot be conceptualised as a one-way street, where a secular trend of militant depoliticisation relentlessly rolls over whatever modest barriers to the unilateral use of force have been erected. By prioritising executive authorisation and a technocratic output orientation, securitisation dynamics invoke, if only negatively, a legal–democratic ‘culture of formalism’ (Koskenniemi 2001, 2009), which insists on input legitimation, due process norms, and a rigid oversight of executive authority. Bearing this in mind, both securitisation and desecuritisation can be framed as uniquely and characteristically Western projects. Hence, Western securitisation dynamics can only be understood as a discursive shift away from a legally enshrined culture of restraint and towards self-reinforcing processes of dramatisation and escalation. In other words, while processes of securitisation are indeed dangerously self-reinforcing, they do not operate in a vacuum, thus triggering escalation spirals and a contact surface for public counter-reactions at the same time. They are nested not in a fixed set of shared values, but rather in a distinctly Western structure of conflict where securitisation dynamics and the desecuritising safeguards of legal formalism stand in polar opposition. As discursive attractors they constitute gravitational centres in an open force field of social interaction. They provide alternative rationales and justification narratives, which collide in everyday political practice. Whether securitisation dynamics successfully trump attempts at politicisation, democratisation, or constitutionalisation is a matter of open-ended social struggles where each discursive shift alters a complex relational configuration, thus opening up new avenues of contestation.

Historically contingent and reversible as it may be, however, in all three cases we do observe a significant bias towards more assertive forms of self-authorisation to the detriment of formal-legal restraint. At present, the securitisation pull seems to be stronger than the appeal of what used to be hailed as core commitments of the Western community of states. Specifically, to the extent that the institutional infrastructure of the West revolves centrally around NATO as a classical security institution turned global security player, institutional reform is predicated on imaginaries of the relative geopolitical position of ‘the West’. As China (and probably Russia) are being portrayed not only as competitors but as potential threats to Western supremacy, realist sticks may gain more leverage than liberal carrots in Western external relations. Internally, the ‘securitised West’ further undermines what used to be hailed as its normative foundation in the name of inevitable steps towards its defence. In short, Western integration operates less on the basis of shared norms and values of liberal democracies and more and more through the institutionalisation of paranoia.

### L – Disease

#### Securitizing disease is a means of threat projection on the non-West that causes the imposition of violent management mechanisms---it also turns the case by pushing responses away from civil society, causing the state to hoard treatment, and overfocusing on specific threats at the expense of general health

Balzacq 16 – Thierry Balzacq, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Namur University, The Institute for Strategic Research, Sarah Léonard University of Dundee, and Jan Ruzicka, Aberystwyth University, “‘Securitization’ Revisited: Theory and Cases”, International Relations, Vol. 30(4), p. 512-513

Global health

Health issues have also received growing attention, notably as a result of the dramatic increase in the volume and density of global forms of mobility, which have affected global pandemics.142 Scholars have mainly focused on the normative and methodological dimensions of the securitization of health issues. The normative question has taken the following form: should health problems be securitized? The methodology-related enquiries have questioned what accounts for the success of securitizing moves concerning health issues. The answers provided to these questions have also had broader implications for securitization theory.

Elbe highlights, for instance, the normative dilemma inherent to the securitization of HIV/AIDS.143 On the one hand, securitization has the benefits of raising awareness, which enables a wider recognition of the deleterious effects of the issue and a more resolute commitment of resources in order to curb the pandemic. On the other hand, securitization also carries costs. One is that the securitization of HIV/AIDS could lead to a massive state involvement obscuring the role of other actors. For example, responses to the disease could be ‘pushed away from civil society toward military and intelligence organizations with the power to override the civil liberties of persons with HIV/AIDS’.144 Another negative feature of the securitization of HIV/AIDS is the activation of a ‘threat-defence logic’. Particularly in developing countries, armed forces would receive high priority for medical treatment. It can therefore be concluded that securitizing an issue should not be the a priori preferred option. Thus, one of the strengths of securitization theory is that it highlights the ‘normative choices that are always involved in framing issues as security issues and [… warns] of potential dangers inherent in doing so’.145

In addition, Youde argues that the disadvantages of securitizing health issues, in general, and the avian flu, in particular, ‘strongly outweigh the positives’.146 He builds his argument upon detailed empirical analysis of official statements and identifies three main costs of the securitization of avian flu. First, the securitization of avian flu can mobilize inappropriate responses, as it leads to health issues being addressed with traditional security means, such as armed forces. Second, securitization can prompt governments to devote a disproportionate amount of resources to counter a specific threat at the expense of tackling other issues.147 An extreme focus on a single disease can actually render a state particularly vulnerable to other threats, as its bureaucratic structures and human and financial assets all become focused on an ‘absolute priority’. Third, Youde argues that the securitization of avian flu has worsened the gap between Western states and the rest of the world. By often blaming the South for spreading the disease, Western states have imposed their anxieties, perception of the problem and specific management mechanisms upon the Third World.

### L – Economy/Trade

#### Dystopian threats of economic and trade collapse are a tired interventionist script that repeat reductive and Orientalist claims to justify full-spectrum military dominance

Morrissey 15 – Dr. John Morrissey, Professor in the School of Geography and Archaeology at the National University of Ireland, PhD in Geography at the University of Exeter, “Securitizing Instability: The US Military and Full Spectrum Operations”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Volume 33, p. 614-618

The remit of securitizing political economy under the broad sign of ‘stability operations’ features even more prominently in the subsequent joint publication of the US Department of State and the US Joint Warfighting Center on the emergent framework of US overseas reconstruction and stabilization strategy. In it, “American military power” is tasked with “vital roles” in the full spectrum of “peace, crisis, and conflict”, and the following economic mechanisms are underscored at length as “essential components” of intervention to be supported: “bilateral and multilateral economic relations”, the “commercial sector”, “trade”, “foreign direct investment”, “sanctions”, “regulatory frameworks”, and “policy towards international financial institutions” (US Department of State and US Joint Warfighting Center, 2005, pages 33–34). In support of these and other interventionary components under the umbrella of ‘stability operations’, the US government was not slow in committing additional DoD funding. Just over a month after Directive 3000.05 was issued, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Section 1206) authorized the spending of up to $200 million per annum by military commanders on the ground to train and equip foreign military forces for stability operations and counterinsurgency (Congressional Research Service, 2008, page 2). This was increased to $300 million the following year and $500 million by 2011. All of this occurred in addition to the initiation of CERP in postinvasion Afghanistan and Iraq to “meet urgent humanitarian relief requirements or urgent reconstruction requirements” (US Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center, 2013, page 238). Between 2004 and 2010, Congress approved almost $4 billion for CERP in Iraq and over $1.6 billion in Afghanistan (Morrison Taw, 2012a, page 133).(7)

As a legal-policy directive, Directive 3000.05 also assumes a certain organizational salience within the US military, and this appears to be playing out in military doctrine, education, and training. At the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, for instance, the School of International Graduate Studies launched a new Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies in late 2004, to complement its existing Center for Civil– Military Relations established ten years earlier. They now offer dedicated curriculums on ‘stabilization and reconstruction’, ‘strategic studies’, and ‘civil–military relations’, and run MA and PhD programs in security studies comprising modules such as: ‘war and its impact on postconflict reconstruction’; ‘economic development for security building’; and ‘stability operations’ (Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). Elsewhere, Air Force officers too are being increasingly equipped with expertise that overlaps economics, law, and strategic studies (Air Force Academy, 2013). In terms of revised field operations, the Army and the Marine Corps jointly published their much heralded Counterinsurgency field manual in late 2006, which referenced at length the importance of stability operations in training and overseas interventions (US Army and US Marine Corps, 2006).(8) And in 2008 the US Army published a new version (the first since the September 11th attacks in 2001) of its capstone doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3-0: Operations, which outlined the new elevated role of stability operations. (7) Although some of these monies were used for the establishment of such initiatives as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, much of it ended up being used for buying short-term local security support (Bachman, 2010; Patrick and Brown, 2007).

(8) In 2009 the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency Operations on behalf of the five core military branches of the DoD, the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. It was revised in November 2013. Soon thereafter, they published a follow-up manual specifically on stability operations, FM 3-07: Stability Operations (US Department of the Army, 2008a; 2008b).

It is worth considering in some detail the envisioning of stability operations in these two instructive US Army field manuals. Operations begins by declaring that not only is “America at war”, but “it should remain fully engaged for the next several decades in a persistent conflict against an enemy dedicated to U.S. defeat as a nation and eradication as a society” (US Department of the Army, 2008a, page viii). With this doomsday dystopia established, it then sets out stability operations as “as important as—or more important than—offensive and defensive operations”, and envisages ‘full spectrum operations’ as a historic and revolutionary shift from “an ‘either–or’ view of combat and other operations to an inclusive doctrine that emphasized the essentiality of nonlethal actions with combat actions” (US Department of the Army, 2008a, pages vii–viii). With the publication of Operations, the US Army formally adopted full spectrum operations as its new broader military doctrine, which it defined in its subsequent 2009 Posture Statement:

““Full spectrum operations apply combat power through simultaneous and continuous combinations of four elements: offense, defense, stability, and civil support. The Army must defeat enemies and simultaneously shape the civil situation through stability or civil support operations. … The Army recognizes that the new century is characterized by ‘persistent conflict’ that will test Soldiers and the Nation for an unknown period” (US Department of the Army, 2009, no page number).

Presumably, one of the ways in which soldiers will be tested is in taking on the new responsibilities of full spectrum operations, such as “economic stabilization and infrastructure”, “restoring economic production and distribution”, and “initiating market reform”, as outlined in Operations (US Department of the Army, 2008a, page 3-16). Throughout the course of the document, however, none of these responsibilities are detailed in any significant way. In Stability Operations the US Army’s broader mission “to generate ‘soft’ power to promote participation in government, spur economic development, and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world” is initially announced (US Department of the Army, 2008b, page C2). To this end, a “comprehensive approach to stability operations” is then proclaimed, which “integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector”— all in the name of an “American policy of internationalism” that “promotes political and economic freedom” (US Department of the Army, 2008b, pages C2, 1-10). Across six chapters, Stability Operations subsequently elaborates the US Army’s new doctrinal approach to stability operations. Although vague in detail throughout, the word ‘economic’ is the overwhelmingly dominant adjective describing stability operations and responsibilities, appearing over 200 times (more than the combined total for ‘political’, ‘social’, ‘moral’, ‘ethical’, and ‘environmental’). Supporting ‘economic and infrastructure development, furthermore, is outlined as one of five ‘primary stability tasks’, the other four related tasks being ‘essential services’, ‘civil security’, ‘civil control’, and ‘governance’ (US Department of the Army, 2008b, chapter 3). In addition, the legal architectures of occupation and reconstruction are posited as critical, as “legal framework development makes the legal and regulatory changes necessary to enable organizations, institutions, and individuals at all levels and in all sectors to perform effectively and to build their capacities” (US Department of the Army, 2008b, page 1-8, 1-9). The other point to note in Stability Operations is the positioning of ‘exceptional’ practices which further enable military intervention under ‘extreme circumstances’ where, for example, “the host-nation government has failed completely or an enemy regime has been deposed”; in such a case, the “intervening authority has a legal and moral responsibility to install a transitional military authority” (US Department of the Army, 2008b, page 5-1).

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Stability Operations begins with a bleak geopolitical envisioning involving necessary US military global leadership. A world replete with “societal abysses”, “precipitous divides”, and a “fundamental clash of ideologies and cultures” is scripted for a future of “persistent conflict against enemies intent on limiting American access and influence throughout the world”; meanwhile, Global South development is effectively posited as a nuisance for the United States (US Department of the Army, 2008b, page vi). There are multiple Malthusian and Orientalist resonances here, of course, and these have long been mirrored in the abstracted and reductive geographical writing so common to Strategic Studies and defense policy institutes more generally (cf Morrissey et al, 2009). In the foreword to Stability Operations, Lieutenant General William Caldwell outlined the global security challenge facing the United States using the familiar register of the ‘long war’ against radical Islam: “we have been engaged in epic struggle unlike any other in our history” and face “challenges of an uncertain future” in “a persistent conflict” (US Department of the Army, 2008b, page C2). A few months earlier, General William Wallace in his foreword to Operations began with a similar geopolitical formulation, priming once again the notions of “persistent conflict” and “protracted confrontation” (US Department of the Army, 2008a, page C2). With the ‘instability register’ successfully mobilized, Wallace then heralds the doctrinal shift to full spectrum operations as “a revolutionary departure” and a commitment to a new operational concept where “commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously” (US Department of the Army, 2008a, page C2). The discursive binary of identifying instability and promising anew its securitization is an old tactic of interventionism, of course. The US armed forces overseas have long been tasked with a remit of military–economic securitization, particularly in the Middle East via US Central Command (CENTCOM). I have previously outlined the development of CENTCOM’s neoliberal interventionary mission since the early 1980s and shown how it reveals a conjoined history of military and economic securitization, involving practices of deterrence, policing, and regulation (Morrissey, 2011a; cf Palmer, 1992). I consider below some of the most recent imaginings of the deployment of the US military in this role globally and reflect on where stability operations are being envisaged therein.

4 Military and economic stability operations

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense is the Obama administration’s latest expression of US global strategic vision. It proclaims that in the aftermath of “large-scale, prolonged stability operations” in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will increasingly “emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability” (US Department of Defense, 2012, page 6). Securing ‘instability’, moreover, involves protecting US economic and security interests, orienting a focused geographic mission on what CENTCOM calls the ‘Central Region’, and championing a neoliberal global economic order that necessitates securitization of military force: ““U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia … . The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence. … The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in … a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability” (US Department of Defense, 2012, page 2).

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The US role, furthermore, in policing the “global commons” and enabling “economic growth and commerce” is also laid out:

““[The US] will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the global commons— those areas beyond national jurisdiction that constitute the vital connective tissue of the international system” (US Department of Defense, 2012, page 3).

A broader commitment to commerce and its securitization is evident elsewhere too. An additional 2012 national security document, National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security, published by the White House, is a case in point. The document is shot through with an unambiguous binding of ‘economy’ and ‘security’, and a rejection of “the false choice between security and efficiency” (The White House, 2012, page 2; cf Harcourt, 2012). Extensively registered too are universalist calls for partnerships “with state, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and the international community”—to realize “our shared goal of building a new framework to strengthen and protect this vital [global economic] system” (The White House, 2012, page C3). And once again we get a firm intermeshing of military and economic security logics:

““while the security of our citizens and our nation is the paramount concern, we must work to promote America’s future economic growth and international competitiveness by remaining open for businesses to the world” (The White House, 2012, page 6).

The ‘security’ and ‘economic’ interests equation is not new, of course, and dates back to at least the immediate post-WW2 era and the signing of the Roosevelt–Aziz pact, which I have documented elsewhere (Morrissey, 2009). The conjoined military–economic national security discourse became solidified in the aftermath of a series of crises threatening the free flow of oil in the 1970s and culminated in the emergence of the ‘Rapid Deployment Force’ concept in late 1979. Subsequent to the enunciation of the Carter doctrine in January 1980, a new responsibility was tasked to the US military in protecting US interests in the Persian Gulf region. The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was established in March 1980 and in 1983 became a unified command, CENTCOM. CENTCOM’s annual posture statements (delivered by the command’s head each year to the Senate Armed Services Committee) have consistently presented a focused military–economic securitization strategy ever since. Its current envisioning of its role in the Middle East by Commander General James Mattis underlines once again what will centrally “keep U.S. attention anchored in this region”: “oil and energy resources that fuel the global economy” (US Central Command, 2013). A notable departure in Mattis’s presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2013, however, was his signaling of the fiscal restraints within which the DoD are operating and his acknowledging of a broader interagency approach to US interventionism overseas: ““U.S. Central Command’s approach—working in tandem with the State Department and other agencies through a whole of government approach—is to protect our interests using fewer military resources in an era of fiscal restraint and political change” (US Central Command, 2013).

CENTCOM’s primary role in militarily policing and protecting the ‘global economy’ remains, however, and signaling a ‘whole of government’ approach to that end reads as merely an additional rhetorical justification for a universalist neoliberal mission. CENTCOM has not deviated from its long-established remit of ‘shaping’ the political economy of its ‘area of responsibility’, the energy-rich region of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia—enabled by the most extensive overseas basing structure of any nation in history (Morrissey, 2011b). From its inception, CENTCOM has consistently relied upon a common-sense understanding of the use of Western interventionary force to guard against threat and political economic instability. In what is now a proliferated discourse of military–economic securitization, CENTCOM’s presence in the Middle East, including of course its interventionary violence, assumes both a regulative and a generative function in the international economic system (Morrissey, 2011a). For this key notion of ‘generative’ interventionism, stability operations can, of course, be usefully incorporated. The JAGC, for instance, advises its judge advocates in the field that stability operations primarily involve establishing “essential services, economic and infrastructure development, and governance” (US Department of the Army, 2013, page 5-4). As I have outlined elsewhere, the contemporary US military’s overseas mission is discursively built upon a well-registered risk-securitization equation, which firmly binds military concerns with economic concerns, and works to justify interventionary force for two key ends: to militarily combat and deter threat, volatility, and instability; and to enable, regulate, and stabilize a free market system for the good of the global economy (Morrissey, 2011a; cf Dalby, 2009; Neocleous, 2008; Williams, 2007). In the preface to Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, US President Barack Obama invokes a common temporal and geopolitical register synonymous with the US military at this point: the notion of an ‘uncertain future’ and the US military’s necessary role in securing it. Obama speaks of a “moment of transition” in which the US is endeavoring to “end today’s war”, “reshape [the] Armed Forces”, and ensure that they are “agile, flexible, and ready for the full range of contingencies” (US Department of Defense, 2012, page iii).(9) And despite the Budget Control Act of 2011, Obama is adamant in outlining America’s prioritized and enduring national security interests, which are explicitly tied to economic interests:

““We seek the security of our Nation, allies and partners. We seek the prosperity that flows from an open and free international economic system” (US Department of Defense, 2012, page iii).

### L – Environment

#### Centering environmental securitization on NATO is self-defeating – inevitably coopted by entrenched discourses of survivability that cement inaction in practice – and spurs environmental weaponization

Caygill 19 Daniel Caygill, professor of modern European philosophy at Kingston University, “Anthropokenosis and the Emerging World of War,” Chapter 3, *War and Algorithm*, eds. Liljefors, Noll & Steuer, Rowman & Littlefield, 2019, ISBN 9781786613660, pp.58-59 /GoGreen!

Perhaps more attention needs to be paid to the historic matrix for our current thinking of catastrophe, along with its limits and effects, in the Cold War strategic planning that contemplated initiating and surviving military and environmental catastrophe. In the conception of catastrophe that emerged in U.S. strategic discussions of the 1950s and early 1960s, the risk or possibility of nuclear catastrophe was secondary to the importance of surviving it. A major element in the proposition that catastrophe was survivable was the immunizing of civil populations against its threat; the strategic assumption that catastrophe was in principle survivable became a cultural and political fact that both encouraged the dissemination of the idea of catastrophe while immunizing us against its horror through the conviction that it was survivable. The dangerous legacy of this paradigm is evident in the sluggish response of state and international actors to the threat posed by systemic planetary instability to the survival of human life on this planet.

Most genealogies of geological catastrophe begin in eighteenth- and earlynineteenth-century debates between catastrophic and continuist approaches to the fossil and stratigraphic records—such as Charles Lyell’s arguments against Georges Cuvier in the early nineteenth century. However, it is important not to underestimate the importance of the more recent and uncanny mobilization of the idea of survivable catastrophe as an organizing principle of the strategic doctrine of total war during the Cold War. What Eisenhower criticized as the “military-industrial complex,” or the immense investment in military research and development central to U.S. strategy in the Cold War, was organized not only around the concept of catastrophe—especially how to inflict it upon adversaries—but also around how to survive catastrophe. It was not just confined to the closed doors and secret meetings of strategic debate but became a cultural fact whose legacy continues, even in ways that seem remote from its military sources.

Jacob Hamblin has traced some aspects of this genealogy in his challenging Arming Mother Nature: The Birth of Catastrophic Environmentalism. Hamblin makes a powerful contribution to an emergent counter-history of the environmentalist movement by tracing the notion of environmental catastrophe to the strategic planning for environmental war. He shows that the discourses of world war and environmental catastrophe are closely related: “The language of the Cold War’s global crisis and that of environmental crisis are strikingly similar. That left room for alternative views that postwar affluence, dissatisfaction with pollution and a new understanding of environmental hazards were the most important factors.”17 In the emergent counter-history of environmentalism, the global theater of the Cold War and the destructive effects of nuclear weapons, along with civil/military initiatives dedicated to survival, led to the elaboration of a planetary consciousness but one firmly rooted in a strategy of survivable catastrophe.

Hamblin examines a wide range of military discussions dedicated to combining atomic bombs with natural forces, to extending the possibilities of biological warfare, to gathering information and data about the coming planetary battlefield, and to achieving the satellite mapping of the planet. With respect to the last initiative, his analysis of the drive to gather planetary data during the International Geophysical Year in 1957 offers invaluable background to the circumstances that subsequently led not only to the measurement of global carbon dioxide levels but also to NATO’s discussions of environmental/ecological warfare in the early 1960s Von Kármán Committee. He shows how catastrophe, both how to inflict and how to survive it, is at the center of all these discussions: “Environmental cataclysms could become part of the alliance’s arsenal, with the help of a well-placed nuclear explosion.”18 Hamblin shows how this strategic attention to environmental war passed over—often through the same scientists—into a civil environmental critique of planetary degradation and became part of the intellectual legacy of strategic environmental warfare. The measurements and data collected under the aegis of a willed global conflict between human adversaries using the weapon of artificially stimulated environmental catastrophe19 came to serve the emergent idea of an unintended global environmental catastrophe—induced by human actions, suffered by the planet, but also in principle survivable. The data collection, the programs for processing it, and the interpretative protocols for making sense of it all emerged from this matrix of survivable catastrophe.

Hamblin’s account of the role of survivable catastrophe in environmental discourse may be supplemented with two further examples, one from the RAND Corporation20—the research and development think tank associated with the U.S. Air Force and dedicated, at the height of the Cold War, to theorizing nuclear deterrence and first-strike capability—and the other from NASA’s earth systems theory, which became the condition of possibility for conceptualizing the Anthropocene. Both cases offer examples of survivable catastrophist discourses at work and give a sense of how deeply they inform contemporary attitudes toward the future, especially the blithe inaction in the face of acknowledged catastrophe.

### L – Extinction

#### Framing threats as “extistential” uniquely removes all caps on the self-authorization of genocidal violence against all threatening Others

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Necessary Violence

Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of the threat that is now from the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for political modernity to function one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living:

Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137).

When Foucault refers to ‘killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’ (Foucault, 2003: 255). While killing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian, hence altogether more frightening:

When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-power’ or ‘bio-politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’.

### L – Heg Transition / LIO

#### Securitizing “great power transition” is self-defeating – reflects paranoia, NOT reality – that institutionalizes preemptive confrontation, accelerating counterbalancing, violent interventionism, and conflict escalation

Hellmann 17 Gunther Hellmann, Professor of Political Science at the Department of the Social Sciences, Goethe University, Frankfurt; Benjamin Herborth, Assistant Professor of International Relations and International Organization, History and Theory of International Relations, at the University of Groningen; Gabi Schlag, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg; Christian Weber, Goethe-University Frankfurt; “The West: a securitising community?” Journal of International Relations and Development, vol.20, 2017, pp.301-330, DOI 10.1057/jird.2013.9 /GoGreen!

Securitisation theory thus focuses on a particular mode of political agency characterised by a rhetoric of exception, which uses presumably existential threats as a trigger to set off extraordinary measures. In terms of its practical consequences, securitisation performatively engenders a state of emergency. Working against the procedures of normal political communication revolving around alternative courses of action, securitisation reduces the possibility of choice to an either–or level, that is, whether we act or not. Securitisation dynamics can lead to the authorisation of extraordinary measures that otherwise could not have been used. Desecuritisation, by contrast, refers to the gradual process of ‘rhetorical disarmament’, which aims at the withdrawal of a particular issue off the security agenda and replaces the logic of exception, immediate necessity and emergency with the routinised patterns of normal politics (e.g., Williams 1998; Aradau 2004; Huysmans 2006). Such an understanding of securitisation and desecuritisation as processes focuses our attention on the practical consequences of ‘speaking security’. Hence, as Ole Wæver (1995: 54–57) has pointed out, declaring something as an issue of security is an inherently political act with de-politicising consequences attaching priority to the problem at hand and narrowing the range of legitimate alternatives.

Historically, the formation of Western order has typically been described as such a process of desecuritisation, in which a ‘culture of legal formalism’ (Koskenniemi 2001: 494–509) has gradually replaced old-style power politics which, in turn, could be described as a network of interconnected securitisations. Focusing, in particular, on processes of securitisation and desecuritisation seems warranted as ‘the West’ is increasingly portrayed as a threatened, endangered space. Looking at the West from a security perspective that is informed by the Copenhagen School by no means confines ‘the West’ to the realm of security policy. It simply provides an angle that allows us to trace a particular kind of transformation of Western order as a political space by observing how different issues are being securitised or desecuritised, that is, moved on and off the security agenda. The larger theoretical point here is that securitisation processes are exemplary vehicles for the transformation of order triggered through the institutional consequences of performative acts. Securitisation, therefore, can be regarded as an ordering mechanism that takes ‘politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 23).Footnote4

In Regions and Powers, Buzan and Wæver (2003) jointly address the question of regional security and the ordering effects of securitisation dynamics at a regional level. Surprisingly, they take entities like ‘North America’, ‘Asia’, or ‘Europe’ as unproblematic givens rather than as categories of political struggle. They clearly state that ‘the existence of an RSC (regional security complex) is not in terms of the discursive ‘construction of regions’ (ibid.: 48). While, by definitional fiat, Buzan and Wæver split the US and Europe into two different security complexes, the long and powerful history of ‘the West’ stands in sharp contrast to such a distinction, especially if we consider its prominence as a referent object in post-9/11 securitisation dynamics, where an immediate sense of danger was shared in both the US and Europe precisely because the attacks were targeting ‘the West’ at large. Hence, for the purpose of our project, it is important to focus precisely on the discursive construction of political spaces and imaginative geographies in order to understand how a Western order is re-constituted.

So far, we have argued that securitisation triggers potentially far-reaching institutional consequences, which may add up to a state of emergency where the conduct of public life is subordinated to a defence against existential threats. Institutional consequences are thus the result of performative acts that can be understood as a form of ‘creative action’: social action that aims at solving problems where routinised patterns of interpretation no longer seem to fit (Joas 1996). In particular, framing an issue in security terms entails the pressure to accelerate the decision-making process so that securitising moves might add to the impression that normal procedures have become inappropriate. In contrast to standard conceptions of order where conflicts pose a dramatic challenge to some taken-for-granted normative foundations, we conceive of order as an historically contingent arrangement of institutional consequences (Wendt 1992, 1999; Herborth 2004). Here the conceptual counterpoint to order is not ‘anarchy’, ‘chaos’, ‘instability’, or ‘institutional breakdown’, whereby order is still marked as the normatively preferable (and superior) concept (Ashley 1988). In our understanding, order is conceptually related first and foremost to agency in such a way that it is essentially made up of different institutions resulting from the creativity of social transactions. What appears to us as a relatively stable institution or a fixed order is thus nothing but a sedimentation of routinised patterns of signification (Dewey 1938/1991: 105–22). To the extent that such processes of signification refer to ‘contentious politics’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) we can encounter manifold forms of contestation and crisis as well as cooperation among and within Western societies that may sum up to processes of community formation. Thus, conceptualising institutional consequences as the result of creative action enables us to reconsider the transformation of Western order without pre-judging whether its normative foundation is eroding or lasting. Disparate accounts of the nature of transatlantic relations notwithstanding, the collective wisdom of available scholarship nevertheless suggests good reasons to assume that there may indeed be something specific to such ‘Western’ forms of conflict and cooperation. Yet, what precisely those are remains open to empirical investigation.

Securitising ‘The West’: Three dimensions

Having emphasised, at a general theoretical level, that ‘the future of the West’ hinges on contingent processes of signification rather than transhistorical macro-dynamics, we have committed ourselves to tracing particular instances of signification instead of partaking in pundit-like speculations as to where ‘the West’ may go, get stuck, or eventually end up. Rather we intend to reconstruct transformations of ‘Western order’ by focusing on the actual meanings actors attach to ‘the West’. Given limitations of space, we can only summarise the main results of our more in-depth reconstruction of transformations of Western order. In selecting and delimiting research areas we have been guided by our judgment as to what is usually represented as the characteristic and defining sets of interaction in the literature on transatlantic relations and ‘Western order’. Most scholars in the field would contend that in order to assess current dynamics of conflict and cooperation in transatlantic relations and in order to appraise the status of ‘the West’ as a security community, one would have to address at least three substantive issues.

First, one would have to investigate the impact of the current ‘power transition’ with Asia gradually displacing Europe and North America as the centre of world politics. Objectors of the ‘unipolarity’ thesis had first insinuated that this was about to happen (Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Mearsheimer 2001: 396–402; Pape 2005). More recently, the debate has evolved into the more explicit question of what the ‘rise’ of states such as China and Russia would mean for the future of ‘the West’ and whether ‘the liberal international order’ could ‘survive’ when faced with ‘authoritarian capitalism’ as an alternative model to liberal democracy (e.g., Gat 2007; Kagan 2008; Ikenberry 2008; Deudney and Ikenberry 2009; Kupchan 2012). Accordingly, the first research area focuses on the macro-dimension of Western self-conceptions vis-à-vis China and Russia and boundary-creating processes that go along with them.

The second issue commonly regarded as indispensable for assessing the present condition of transatlantic relations is the contested status of NATO. Whether it is regarded as an interstate alliance that has lost its purpose (Waltz 2000: 18–27), as a security community of liberal democracies (Risse-Kappen 1996) or else as an adaptable security management institution (Wallander 2000), each conceptualisation involves a diagnosis on the main factors of transatlantic cooperation and, quite often, a diagnosis of the presumable fate of ‘the West’ (cf. Hellmann 2008; Franke 2010: 19–53). The tendency to link NATO's likely or unlikely survival with the ‘future of the West’ more recently manifested in the debates about the consequences of the transatlantic conflict over the war against Iraq and over the prospects in Afghanistan (e.g., Asmus 2003; Cox 2005; Pouliot 2006; Anderson et al. 2008). As NATO still figures prominently as the key transatlantic security institution, the second research area will reconsider institutional dynamics and discursive shifts relating to the alliance.

The third prominent topic in scholarly debates about ‘the West’ concerns the responses to global terrorism after 9/11. Frequently interpreted as a direct assault on ‘the West’ and its ‘way of life’, the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, London, and Madrid have been answered in a way that arguably undermines the very normative foundations they are designed to protect. Scholars and journalists have pointed out that the legislative, military, and penal measures used in the ‘war on terror’ directly suspend the civil rights and contradict the democratic ideals ‘the West’ claims for itself (Hersh 2004; Rejali 2007; Prantl 2008; Mayer 2008). The effects of transatlantic responses to global terrorism demarcate a field in which the traditional borders between domestic and foreign policy problems begin to blur. The third research area therefore refers to internal struggles in which normative requirements derived from a particular Western self-image are confronted with the factual or putative imperatives of preventing further terrorist attacks.

To sum up, focusing on great power rivalry with China and Russia, the re-constitution of NATO as the primary transatlantic security institution, and the responses to global terrorism within a ‘Western order’ accesses the main sites of ongoing scholarly discussion about transatlantic relations and ‘the West’. From the point of view of a reconstructive logic of enquiry, the selection of more specific cases and texts within each research area was guided by internal standards as it is recommended, for instance, by the methodology of grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1998). As the method ought to fit the subject matter rather than vice-versa, these choices need to be ‘field-specific’ and continually improved and adjusted according to field-specific experiences (ibid.; Strübing 2004). What we found is not a single overarching macro-dynamic under which a multitude of individual observations could be subsumed, but rather different, field-specific responses to an open-ended tension between two conflicting principles (or articulations) of a ‘Western order’, namely, self-assertion and self-restraint. In all three research areas we reconstructed an ongoing tension between the self-assertive dynamics of a ‘securitised West’ and a legalist culture of formalism (Koskenniemi 2001) that imposes explicit limitations on the use of violence.

The ‘West’ vis-à-vis ‘Authoritarian Great Powers’

Many books and articles have recently diagnosed an ongoing global transition of power to the detriment of ‘the West’. It has become common practice to address countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China as ‘rising powers’ and to assume that they will translate their economic growth rates into ever-greater political influence on the global stage.Footnote5 The impact of the financial crisis since 2008 and the ensuing enlargement of the traditional G7/8 club into the G20 lent further credibility to this belief. While the ascendency of democratic countries such as Brazil and India is largely regarded as unproblematic, the alleged ‘return of authoritarian great powers’ is often presented as a potential challenge to the ‘Western liberal order’ (e.g., Gat 2007). A dominant discourse in Europe and North America subsumes China and Russia under the category of ‘authoritarian great powers’ and pits them against ‘the West’ in a scenario of upcoming great power competition.

This story with its audacious simplifications and its bold predictions has been told many times in different variations, most prominently by Robert Kagan. In his book The Return of History and the End of Dreams, he warns against an anti-Western conspiracy, construing China's and Russia's ‘rise’ as an omen for an emerging ‘association of autocrats’ who are unfavourably disposed towards ‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy’. Assuming both their hostile intentions and their successful cooperation allows him to draw a worst-case scenario in which the shape of the ‘future international order’ hinges upon the determination of ‘the world's democracies’ to ‘protect their interests and defend their principles in a world in which these are once again powerfully challenged’ (Kagan 2008: 53–59, 105, 97). To be sure, prophecies of imminent decline have permeated the discourse of ‘the West’ from the very beginning (Jackson 2010). However, in contrast to a pessimistic Spenglerian view of history, contemporary warnings usually do not present Western demise as an inevitable fact. They rather paint worst-case scenarios that legitimise different strategies to maintain the status quo.

In order to ascertain to what extent public–political rhetoric is infused by this discourse, we analysed two concrete transatlantic struggles over the right strategy to deal with China and Russia, namely, the controversy about the European weapons embargo on China and the debate about Russia's eventual membership in NATO. Both instances featured a quite similar structure of conflict in dealing with ‘authoritarian great powers’. They also revealed a strong sense of superiority and an alert defence preparedness to be central for processes of transatlantic community formation.

Attempts of the Chinese and Russian governments to improve security relations with Europe and North America encountered a heterogeneous and often discordant group of states. When individual governments proposed to cooperate with China and Russia on the basis of national interests, others immediately reminded them that those countries did not share basic values and therefore did not qualify as viable partners. At the centre of the controversy over the European Union (EU) weapons embargo on China between 2003 and 2005 stood the question of whether a more powerful China should be approached as an equal partner, especially whether it could be trusted in the sensitive area of military cooperation. The French and the German government, as well as officials of the EU Commission, opted for great power cooperation with China and seemed determined to go through with this plan despite stern US objections. In the case of Russia's membership in NATO, policymakers in Great Britain, Germany, and the US showed themselves open minded towards Putin's 2001 proposal to put the relationship between NATO and Russia on a new basis. In the face of terrorist threats, a fundamental ‘realignment’ between Europe, America, and Russia seemed possible.

Both the proponents of lifting the arms embargo on China and the advocates of granting Russia equal participation in NATO decision making were emphatically reminded by their partner states and their national parliaments that they were obliged to defend identity-establishing values that could not be sold out or be disregarded. Although security concerns were an important element in some of these objections, transatlantic political elites could not agree on whether these countries posed an actual ‘threat’. They did, however, ultimately reach a consensus that security cooperation with China and Russia was only acceptable as far as they would democratise and respect human rights. Abstract references to these values enabled a common transatlantic position.

The analysis of these two cases demonstrates that there are indeed attempts by European and North American governments to cooperate with China and Russia on the basis of geostrategic calculations. However, as soon as officials undertake serious steps in this direction, they are disciplined by a vague commitment to a common foundation of values. Thus, the moral distinctiveness that allegedly is wedded to being a part of ‘the West’ has to be reiterated time and again. Interestingly, this particular talk only makes sense if there is a foil, in this case ‘authoritarian great powers’. In both of the analysed transatlantic conflicts, articulations re-established and validated a normative boundary separating China and Russia as ‘authoritarian great powers’ from the liberal democracies of ‘the West’. Constructing such a fundamental difference proves to be essential for the fabrication of a transatlantic sense of community. In both debates, European and North American elites claimed to speak on behalf of a ‘community of values’ that was in a position to define normative standards of universal validity and to judge whether other countries conformed to these standards. The precondition thus seemed to be an unspoken and unquestioned consensus on two interrelated beliefs: first, that is was clear how human rights and democracy had to be understood and, second, that North Americans and Europeans carried a special responsibility for their worldwide dissemination and implementation.

In a nutshell, the re-constitution of a transatlantic community is based on an idealisation of distinct value commitments and the consequent normative demarcation from authoritarian states such as China and Russia. What is often described in static terms as the ‘cohesion’ of transatlantic relations proves to be a process of self-affirmation that relies on the construction of fundamental differences and the moral de-legitimation of the ‘non-West’. This finding confirms postcolonial and poststructuralist analyses of how Eurocentric patterns of thought shape the relations between ‘the West’ and its Other(s). In this sense, the attitudes and patterns of interpretation at work in processes of ‘Western’ community formation are just one further episode to deal in a self-righteous way with differences in world politics. In the relations towards China and Russia, however, an important aspect is added to the equation. Both are regarded as powerful countries, a fact that apparently makes it more delicate when they fail to adopt liberal democracy as the superior model of political rule. The refusal by the Chinese and Russian governments to acknowledge such universalist claims makes them appear as incalculable or even hostile opponents.

China apparently is about to surpass liberal countries in economic development without the anticipated democratic reforms taking place. Russia in turn is attributed with the potential to provoke Eastern European countries militarily or blackmail them economically. When the prospects for a transformation of these countries seem to diminish, the self-confidence of North American and European elites easily turned into the fear that precious normative achievements may be in danger and must be defended against possible assaults. Thus, when it comes to China and Russia, the already present sense of superiority combines with diffuse fears of a shrinking material power basis for projecting allegedly universal norms and institutions. As a result, a morally superior but materially declining ‘West’ is called upon to safeguard the liberal international order before it falls prey to ‘rising’ authoritarian great powers. This is the case-specific pull towards the securitisation pole. The normative demarcation vis-à-vis unpredictable and morally questionable authoritarian great powers engender a latent confrontational posture against these states. As long as they have not transformed into liberal democracies, their moves tend to be observed with fearful scepticism.

In sum, a strong sense of superiority, which is semantically linked to the notion of ‘the West’, provides the basis for diffuse threat scenarios in transatlantic discourse on ‘authoritarian great powers’. The idea that non-Western others might propose acceptable alternatives to existing rules and institutions is hard to reconcile with the self-conception of European and North American elites as representing the vanguard of the political and moral development of humankind. This self-conception predisposes these elites to interpret those Chinese and Russian positions, which run counter to such pretensions either as ‘challenges’ for the stability of the ‘liberal international order’ or even as potential long-term security threats to ‘the West’ as a community of values.

NATO's strategic discourse and the self-authorisation of ‘the West’

While the first research area dealt with representations of ‘authoritarian regimes’ that are by definition categorised as being outside of the boundaries of ‘the West’, this research area focuses on the transformation of NATO, that is, the military alliance that is considered to be the institutional core of what we usually call ‘the West’ (e.g., Gress 2004; Brzezinski 2009). Obviously, transatlantic security cooperation has been a classical theme in IR, either from a realist vantage point, where NATO is primarily described as a defence alliance subordinated to national purposes (Waltz 2000: 18), or from a liberal perspective, where NATO is understood as an alliance of democracies (Risse-Kappen 1995: 4). In both perspectives, however, the dynamics of security cooperation between North America and Europe seem unproblematic as long as the allies are convinced of their common interest or their shared values.

NATO's (lasting) ability to voice in-/securities — for example a ‘Soviet threat’, ‘terrorism’, or ‘new challenges’ — directs our attention to highly institutionalised dynamics of securitisation that, as the subsequent analysis will show, manifest themselves as a self-authorisation of ‘the West’ in order to defend its normative foundation. Such a tendency towards self-authorisation has become visible in different forms since the North Atlantic alliance was founded in 1949. During the Cold War, it primarily enabled a rather deep institutionalisation of military cooperation with an integrated command structure including US nuclear weapons, as well as common strategic planning and defence exercises. After the Cold War, this project was continued but it has certainly changed in form. Out-of-area operations and the development of a globally active alliance is one of the most visible expressions of such self-authorising practices. These dynamics were central to re-constitute NATO during critical junctures and have been productive of a highly self-confident Western alliance today (Jackson 2003; Bially Mattern 2005; Behnke 2013).

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in April 1949 by representatives of nine Western European states, Iceland, Canada, and the US, provided the Western alliance with a legal basis and outlined the key principles of cooperation, that is, consultation (Article 4) and collective defence (Article 5). Although the formulation of Article 5 was highly contested between the US and its European allies, it was perceived as the cornerstone of transatlantic security cooperation (Kaplan 2004: 4). In contrast to such a legal framing of Western security cooperation, the preamble of the Treaty invoked an inherently normative rhetoric when it stated that the parties ‘are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people, founded on the principle of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’ (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949). The construction of unity based on a common culture and even ‘civilisation’ (rather than merely a shared threat perception) transferred military cooperation and integration far beyond an interest-driven alliance (e.g., Klein 1990; Jackson 2003, 2006a). During these formative years of NATO, one central aim of formulating ‘strategic concepts’ was to construct a common security interest of the US and Western European states that was metaphorically framed in terms of an ‘indivisibility of allied security’.Footnote6

Bearing these normative foundations in mind, NATO gradually evolved as a cultural project that was directed against communism — which made the inclusion of an autocratic state such as Portugal possible — rather than as a community of democratic states (Klein 1990; Jackson 2003; Sjursen 2004). The invoked narrative of shared norms, values, and a common heritage provided a sufficiently strong rationale for defending the North Atlantic Area against any potential threat. Moreover, it also legitimised taking whatever measures were deemed ‘necessary’ to defend its members. ‘Forward defence’ and ‘massive retaliation’ turned out to be such legitimate means. Nevertheless, in many ways the strength of Western rhetoric was also intended to polish over and counterbalance many of the underlying political conflicts that persisted throughout NATO's post-war history. As a matter of fact, over the years it had become a standard formula in political discourse to refer to an alliance in ‘crisis’ as proof of its uniquely transatlantic vitality. In this sense the invocation of a normative foundation of shared ‘Western’ values, heritage and civilisation even against the background of internal political dissent was as much a securitising move as it was an expression of a particular ‘Western’ structure of conflict. One could conclude that transatlantic security cooperation was only manageable by invoking such a normative foundation of shared values, heritage, and civilisation.

The subsequent strategic concepts DC 6/1 (December 1952), MC 14/2 (May 1957) and the amended strategic guidelines were written with the intention to both ‘convince the USSR that war does not pay’ (NATO 1950) and to reassure the allies that continued and even intensified that security cooperation was necessary. Changing strategic concepts, most prominently from ‘massive retaliation’ to ‘flexible response’, restored the reliability of mutual defence because of altered security circumstances (e.g., Haftendorn 1996; Tuschhoff 1999; Kaplan 2004: 100). Although the concept of ‘flexible response’ eventually satisfied all allies and remained valid until the end of the Cold War, different interpretations of deterrence and its operational implications persisted (Daalder 1991: 41; Risse-Kappen 1995: 184–7). Once again a particular structure of conflict among NATO allies was observable in the sense that although a ‘crisis’ occurred, references to the common heritage, shared norms and values of the ‘free world’ restored sufficient coherence among them. In this sense, the decision over West Germany's membership in 1955, the Suez Crisis in 1956, the withdrawal of France from the integrated military command structure in 1966, or NATO's double track decision in 1979 were all incidents of alliance disruption that nevertheless did not lead to a break-up of the Atlantic alliance. In these situations strategic concepts turned out to be crucial in re-establishing coherence and unity by reaffirming the authority of the alliance and its ability to (re-)act. The strengthening of consultation mechanisms in the 1950s, the formation of ‘Allied Mobile Forces’ (AMF) in the 1960s, or the deployment of additional Pershing II missiles in the 1980s embodied the institutional consequences of these strategic re-orientations.

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, many commentators expected that the Atlantic alliance would sooner or later vanish as well. Thus, NATO's post-Cold War strategies of 1991 and 1999 were primarily aimed at justifying the institutional continuity of the Western alliance against the new setting of a decreasing Eastern threat (e.g., Ringsmose and Rynning 2009: 5). At the beginning of the 1990s, ‘Europe, whole and free’ (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept 1991) became the obvious new rhetorical commonplace to legitimise a different future for NATO compared with the fate of the Warsaw Pact. It opened up the possibility of Eastern enlargement and paved the way for the institutionalisation of a new relationship with Russia (Wallander 2000; Williams and Neumann 2000; Schimmelfennig 2003; Adler 2008; Pouliot 2008) as well as initiatives for cooperation in the Mediterranean (Masala 2003).

In the same vein of institutional and geographical expansion, the ‘out-of-area’ debate in the mid-1990s rearticulated the necessity for a political and military engagement far beyond alliance territory and territorial defence.Footnote7 While the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War had largely constrained the alliance's global military engagement, ‘safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilisation’ now ascribed a global mission to NATO's members. Instead of supporting a culture of self-restraint and legal formalism, the allies even intensified a tendency towards self-authorisation in the name of defending human rights and the achievements of ‘Western civilisation’. Disregarding United Nations’ formal legal provisions in the case of Kosovo, NATO itself became a producer of a common law where the protection of human rights was deemed more important than respecting state sovereignty and non-intervention. The specific formation of NATO's strategic discourse made such ‘humanitarian interventions’ intelligible as the new raison d’être. Public justifications for military interventions in Serbia or Afghanistan, for example, cited the attack on ‘Western’ values as a determining reason for taking military action. Ultimately, in its statement on terrorism, the North Atlantic Council said that ‘the lives of our citizens, and their human rights and civil liberties’ were threatened by terrorism and reaffirmed that the allies ‘condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We, the 19 NATO Allies, are determined to combat this scourge. Our security requires no less’ (NATO 2001).Footnote8

During the Cold War, such a project of self-authorisation was primarily realised by institutionalising an integrated command structure, coordinated defence planning and common exercises. Today, the rhetoric of unpredictable risks and the global war on terrorism assigns an almost universal authority to NATO, in particular when ‘the challenge is not just to make our populations secure, but feel secure’ (de Hoop Scheffer 2009, emphasis added). ‘Europe’ and the ‘transatlantic area’ is the endangered subject of NATO's strategic discourse justifying a durable and institutionally dense military cooperation of its member states and a nuclearisation of its defence strategy. Whenever allies pursued (national) security policies without consultation, conflicts and crisis within the alliance ensued. It was only through NATO that ‘the West’ could materialise its power position through a specific form of self-authorisation. NATO, respectively Western states, presented ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, the ‘rule of law’, and ‘market economy’ as normatively unquestioned principles they had already realised. Others had only one choice: to comply or to resist. The normative attractiveness of ‘the West’, thus, also directs our attention to the temptations of securitising practices where a formalisation of IR through law is marginalised by unilateral acts of self-authorisation.

The Western ‘War on Terror’: Torture and extraordinary rendition

At first sight, NATO's self-authorising tendencies and Western claims to universality might stand in sharp contrast to how ‘the West’ is commonly perceived in its more favourable readings. Among the broad array of Western self-descriptions, allegiance to the rule of law stands out as a bedrock principle. The difference between the ‘West and the rest’ (Hall 1992) can be accounted for in many different ways, yet the normative quality of a distinctive set of legal–political routines stands out as the one most commonly in use. Considerations of due process and the legal writ of habeas corpus are more than derivative characteristics, they — rather than military strength or an advanced form of capitalist organisationFootnote9 — are held to define Western societies and states as such.

Unlawful detention, extraordinary rendition, and torture would thus seem to constitute an obvious and flagrant violation of the normative infrastructure of ‘the West’. Moreover, yet all of this did take place in the wake of ‘Western’ responses to the atrocities of 9/11 that are now by convention referred to as the global ‘war on terrorism’.Footnote10 To the extent that such transgressions were justified in a language of necessity, we seem to encounter a showcase example of securitisation. Both the symbolic value of targeting the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, and the subsequent narratives of justification issued by Al-Qaeda, signify that this was not an attack directed against the US as a state, but more broadly an attack on ‘the West’ at large. Defending ‘the West’ and its unique form of life then might even justify torture — and paradoxically the defence of the ‘West’ thus invoked becomes in itself a threat to ‘the West’ in its own right, undermining the very principles it set out to protect.Footnote11

Hence, the interesting research question here is not whether torture and extraordinary rendition constitute instances of securitisation — they obviously do. The challenge is rather to reconstruct carefully the ways in which such securitisation dynamics play out, what institutional consequences they yield, what patterns of justification they involve, and how they contribute to transforming the normative infrastructure of ‘the West’. What is at stake, then, is a reconstruction of the legal–political ramifications of torture and extraordinary rendition, not the question of whether transgressions have taken place and whether this conforms to antecedent expectations of securitisation theory. We know that democracies do torture. As Darius Rejali (2007) has shown in great detail, democracies have not abolished torture but rather made it invisible by inventing ‘stealth techniques’, which leave no trace. Interrogation techniques such as waterboarding are thus, in an irritating way, specifically democratic forms of torture. They respond to the legal and public constraints imposed on such practices by norms against torture by removing them from the public eye. In fact, this pattern holds for all of the ‘techniques’ discussed in the notorious torture memosFootnote12 — dietary manipulation, nudity, the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap or insult slap, cramped confinement, wall stranding, stress position, water dousing, sleep deprivation of more than 48 hours, and the waterboard. The very term applied to such measures, ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’, testifies to a specific trait of what Rejali calls ‘clean torture’. None of them leaves a visible mark, none of them seems as outrageously brutal as medieval forms of torture, and thus they provide a comfortable degree of deniability to those in authority.

Hence, it is all the more important to focus on how specific ‘techniques’ have been administered and how this has been justified. ‘In the study of torture’, Rejali (2007: 63) rightly observes, ‘hell is in the details’. One of the detailed questions raised in the torture memos concerns the ‘Combined Use of Certain Techniques’. Having stipulated that each of the single ‘techniques’ listed above does not constitute a violation of the anti-torture statute, the ‘Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency. Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value Al-Qaeda Detainees' discusses the question of how things may change when several of these techniques are used in combination. If sleep deprivation of more than 48 hours is not considered to be legally problematic, then how about sleep deprivation in combination with cramped confinement, dietary manipulation, and repeated insult slaps? The way in which the question is posed in the torture memos presupposes that this is all about navigating a legal grey zone, where an imaginary torture threshold must not be crossed in order to avoid legal repercussions. Within the rationality of the torture memos it is very possible that any particular combination of techniques does not constitute torture in a legal sense. It is also very possible that any particular combination of techniques does constitute torture in a legal sense. It all becomes a question of dosage. Here the memos are being unspecific in a very specific way. What we can observe is an instance of intra-institutional buck-passing, which exempts both the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Justice from being charged with explicitly advocating or conducting torture. From the point of view of the CIA, they just did what was explicitly authorised by the Department of Justice; from the point of view of the Department of Justice, ultimately crossing the torture threshold would have to take place in specific instances of interrogation and thus under the auspices of the CIA. A middle ground is achieved when the memo calls for ‘trained interrogators’. ‘Trained interrogators’ are individuals capable of understanding what precise dosage and combination of such ‘techniques’ can be administered in order to remain on the safe side of legality. Hence, from the point of view of both the CIA and the Department of Justice, transgressions can be attributed to a situative misjudgement on the side of the trained interrogator. The buck finally stops amidst a newly inaugurated class of torture professionals, which specialises in remaining invisible to any form of public and legal scrutiny.

Such a logic of self-immunisation repeats itself at the transatlantic level. We know that CIA flights transported suspects to foreign detention camps, that they used European airports and European infrastructure, and that apparently some of those camps were located in Eastern member states of the EU. As a matter of fact, and contrary to a public self-image that Europeans occasionally tend to cast, Europe has been integral in practices of torture and extraordinary rendition in the wake of the global war on terror. The relevant information is contained in a report by Dick Marty, a Swiss representative to the Council of Europe, on ‘Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers Involving Council of Europe Member States'. Yet, while stirring up a great deal of public interest, the report was ultimately of little consequence. It fell victim to the problem it described. In the wake of an effective buck-passing of political responsibility, all it could do was diligently compile information that had already been available in the news media. The major finding of the report — that there were indeed secret detentions and extraordinary renditions, yet no one was accountable for them — defined precisely the limit of the report's political effect. The transatlantic division of labour thus operates much like the division of labour between the CIA and the Department of Justice. From the point of view of the US, Europe is not quite living up to its commitments to burden sharing, being only of tacit and reluctant help. Hence, the US has to carry most of the weight in the war on terror, and, by implication, needs ‘to get her hands dirty’. From a European point of view, the factual degree of involvement comfortably pales in comparison with US transgressions. From the moral high ground, then, how precisely Europe has been and still is involved becomes almost invisible. Both Europe and the United States can cast their definitions of the situation in terms of ‘the West’. Europe holds up Western values damaged in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and Fallujah. The US, on the other hand, actually does defend ‘the West’. In between such conflicting understandings of ‘the West’, political accountability evaporates.

This is precisely how a political logic of risk management Footnote13 operates: by delegating away political responsibilities to anonymous layers of technocratic and expertocratic competency, all the more clandestine if intelligence agencies are involved. The depoliticising effect of securitisation is thus routinised and tacitly institutionalised. Rather than a situative response to a particular threat, which may be countered and then go away, the practical consequences of securitisation can thus be extended for an indefinite period of time — by translating the hyper-political logic of security into a bureaucratic logic of risk management.

Conclusions

Giving up on an essentialist conceptualisation and focusing instead on performative references to and invocations of ‘the West’ by no means dilutes the resulting image, as essentialisers often seem to fear. On the contrary, it was only through an open, reconstructive focus on manifold and fragmented uses of the West that we could render visible a dynamic of genuinely ‘Western’ securitisation. Different articulations in scholarly and political discourse do not add up to a coherent entity that can then be tagged as ‘the West’. Rather, ‘the West’ is quite literally an essentially contested concept as it becomes politically efficacious only to the extent that it is articulated in specific, locally and contextually circumscribed situations. However, all three research fields support the conclusion that ‘the West’ tends to be marked as normatively valuable and preferable to that which is not Western. Furthermore, to the extent that it is cast as a threatened entity that ought to be defended at all cost, that is, to the extent that ‘the West’ is being securitised, it assumes the role of a discursive attractor, as if it were a ‘gravitational centre’ that channels political communication through a securitisation filter. With a ‘securitised West’ looming in the background, transatlantic discord might not escalate to the point of open conflict and antagonism but might rather remain tied to a particular structure of conflict, in which different articulations of how precisely ‘the West’ ought to be defended are at stake.

References to ‘the West’ as a carrier of collective identity, then, account for the rapid build-up of rhetorical heat, yet these very references also delimit the possible scope of antagonism. At the same time, however, as a self-securitising community ‘the West’ exerts a discursive pull, which places the semantics of security and thus the authorisation of extraordinary measures squarely at the centre of political conduct. Self-assertion, self-authorisation, and self-immunisation are just three institutional consequences of such a securitisation pull. In the case of NATO, these dynamics of self-authorisation seem to be most obvious regarding the reconstituting effects of its strategic discourse and its global projection of (military) power today. The debate on ‘China's rise’ and its consequences for the coherence and future of ‘the West’ brings to mind the potential differences between the US and European states where references to assumed universal values might enhance a self-assertion of ‘the West’. In the field of torture and extraordinary renditions we can observe how the very principles of ‘the West’ are undermined by the bureaucratic self-immunisation against political accountability.

Obviously, the freelance authorisation of means of violence in the wake of securitisation processes and the accompanying tendencies of self-assertion and self-immunisation are diametrically opposed to the self-understanding of ‘the West’ as a community of liberal democracies. Nested in such self-descriptions, processes of securitisation cannot be conceptualised as a one-way street, where a secular trend of militant depoliticisation relentlessly rolls over whatever modest barriers to the unilateral use of force have been erected. By prioritising executive authorisation and a technocratic output orientation, securitisation dynamics invoke, if only negatively, a legal–democratic ‘culture of formalism’ (Koskenniemi 2001, 2009), which insists on input legitimation, due process norms, and a rigid oversight of executive authority. Bearing this in mind, both securitisation and desecuritisation can be framed as uniquely and characteristically Western projects. Hence, Western securitisation dynamics can only be understood as a discursive shift away from a legally enshrined culture of restraint and towards self-reinforcing processes of dramatisation and escalation. In other words, while processes of securitisation are indeed dangerously self-reinforcing, they do not operate in a vacuum, thus triggering escalation spirals and a contact surface for public counter-reactions at the same time. They are nested not in a fixed set of shared values, but rather in a distinctly Western structure of conflict where securitisation dynamics and the desecuritising safeguards of legal formalism stand in polar opposition. As discursive attractors they constitute gravitational centres in an open force field of social interaction. They provide alternative rationales and justification narratives, which collide in everyday political practice. Whether securitisation dynamics successfully trump attempts at politicisation, democratisation, or constitutionalisation is a matter of open-ended social struggles where each discursive shift alters a complex relational configuration, thus opening up new avenues of contestation.

Historically contingent and reversible as it may be, however, in all three cases we do observe a significant bias towards more assertive forms of self-authorisation to the detriment of formal-legal restraint. At present, the securitisation pull seems to be stronger than the appeal of what used to be hailed as core commitments of the Western community of states. Specifically, to the extent that the institutional infrastructure of the West revolves centrally around NATO as a classical security institution turned global security player, institutional reform is predicated on imaginaries of the relative geopolitical position of ‘the West’. As China (and probably Russia) are being portrayed not only as competitors but as potential threats to Western supremacy, realist sticks may gain more leverage than liberal carrots in Western external relations. Internally, the ‘securitised West’ further undermines what used to be hailed as its normative foundation in the name of inevitable steps towards its defence. In short, Western integration operates less on the basis of shared norms and values of liberal democracies and more and more through the institutionalisation of paranoia.

### L – Hybrid War

#### Securitizing“hybrid war” is self-defeating – does NOT represent material danger – NOR can the AFF solve – BUT their framing as existential DOES produce a paranoid Western subjectivity that authorizes extreme violence in over-reactions AND social controls

--HW = hybrid war

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Apart from being a highly relevant problem, HW also presents a particularly fitting case to be analysed as an instance of anxiety geopolitics. First, the close link between HW and anxiety has been explicitly recognised by Maria Mälksoo, who shows how HW triggers ‘anxiety about the difficulties of concretising unknown and indeterminate threats’ (Mälksoo, 2018, p. 378). Second, the relation between HW and geopolitics is at the same time strongly pronounced and marked by a profound tension. On the one hand, HW ostensibly departs from a ‘modern’ geopolitical imagination based on territorial states and borders (Ó Tuathail, 1998). After all, it is about information operations in deterritorialised spaces of the globalised public sphere, unattributable cyberattacks carried out by non-state groups, or the incitement of horizontal protest movements discontent with the present political order. On the other hand, this ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination (ibid.) has been very often subdued to the much more traditional and ‘modern’ vision of a ‘new Cold War’ between Russia and ‘the West’ (for critical analyses of this discourse see Browning, 2018; Ciută & Klinke, 2010; Toal, 2017). Thereby, HW has been incorporated into the civilisational mode of geopolitical thinking that divides the world along an East/West axis.

Approaching HW as a case of anxiety geopolitics allows us to analyse this tension and unpack the underlying puzzle: Why is it that the ostensibly novel, networked and deterritorialised phenomena associated with hybrid warfare get so easily submerged under such an old, static and territorial geopolitical imagination? We argue that the allure of East/West geopolitics lies in its familiarity, as it provides a well-worn map that promises to ‘make sense’ of the anxiety-inducing manifestations of ‘hybrid warfare’. Yet, we also show that these attempts eventually fail and the HW discourse ends up perpetuating the insecurities and anxieties, which it was supposed to resolve. As such, it serves well to ‘a ‘hybrid-industrial complex’ of government agencies, think-tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and pundits’ that emerged around it (Galeotti, 2019, p. 11). By pointing out to the role of anxiety geopolitics in this economy of power/knowledge that emerged around HW, this article provides both an analysis and a political intervention.

The article proceeds as follows. First, we start by a theoretical discussion, crafting the notion of anxiety geopolitics by developing and connecting insights of the literatures on critical geopolitics, ontological security, and politics of anxiety. Second, we argue that the amalgamation of the hybrid warfare discourse and East/West geopolitics presents a particular case of anxiety geopolitics, which oscillates between the promise to repress anxiety and the repeated failures in doing so. This is illustrated by examples from Czechia, a country considered as playing a pioneering and outsized role in the European HW debate (Daniel & Eberle, 2021; Jankowicz, 2020), which offers plenty of empirical material for developing our theoretical argument and drawing some more general implications. By way of conclusion, we discuss the broader take-aways for critical geopolitics and IR, as well as for policy debates on how (not) to address the threat posed by Russia.

2. Anxiety geopolitics: space, affect, and ontological insecurity

Our research is located in critical geopolitics, from which we borrow the understanding of geopolitics as discourses and practices through which people ‘‘spatialize’ international politics and represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas’ (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, p. 192). Critical geopolitics focuses on how political events are articulated as somehow related to or driven by geographic phenomena, or how issues are ‘geopoliticised’, that is constructed as geopolitical problems (Cadier, 2019, p. 71). These ideas are best captured by the concept of geopolitical imagination: ‘Geopolitical imaginations are the result of subjects’ attempt to make sense of the world by associating political values with various parts of that map. They can also be spoken of in the collective sense, in which a group can be said to have similar (if ultimately unique) visions of the world.’ (Dittmer & Dodds, 2008, p. 447) More recently, critical geopolitics has paid increased attention to affects and emotions (Gökarıksel & Secor, 2020; Laketa, 2019; Müller, 2013; Pain, 2009).1 Such affective geopolitics explores how affects are an indivisible part of social construction of space, as they are intimately entangled with languages and images through which our ‘mental maps’ are produced and disseminated. Summarising this broader argument, Laketa argues that geopolitics should be understood ‘both as socially produced and intimately experienced’ and, consequently, ‘the emotional and the affective become the site of the geopolitical’ and vice versa (Laketa, 2019, pp. 156, 160). Therefore, international politics is spatialised also by engaging subjects at the affective level, which is an essential part of the production of geopolitical imaginations through which subjects view the world and their place within it. This links critical geopolitics to a range of literatures that deal with the relationship between identity, emotions and affects, including the scholarship on ontological security and anxiety in IR.

The rapidly growing literature on ontological security is concerned with how subjects – individuals, groups, or states – deal with the uncertainty of modern life without losing the ‘security of the self, the subjective sense of who one is’ (Mitzen, 2006, p. 344) that defines ontological security and makes life bearable. Building mainly upon the work of Anthony Giddens (1991), classical contributions agree that ontological security is sought through an active process of constructing the self and anchoring it in the social world, which happens through the establishment of routines (Mitzen, 2006), creation of biographical narratives (Kinnvall, 2004; Steele, 2008; Subotić, 2016), or maintenance of relationships (Berenskoetter & Giegerich, 2010). The key underlying purpose of ontological security-seeking is to avoid anxiety, which Giddens, following Freud, understands as an elusive and paralysing ‘generalised state of […] emotions’ that is different from fear (Giddens, 1991, p. 44). Fear is ‘a basic emotion directed at a specific object that prompts an adaptive response: fight or flight.’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 241). In contrast, ‘anxiety is diffuse, it is free-floating: lacking a specific object’, which makes it possible to ‘pin’ it to different things and concepts (Giddens, 1991, p. 44). Repressing the elusive anxiety by this ‘pinning’, which transforms it into the manageable fear of something, is then one of the key motives of human behaviour. As anxiety is considered overwhelming and paralysing; the ‘chaos’ that ‘threatens on the other side of the ordinariness of the everyday conventions’ (1991, p. 37), subjects often prefer to deal with it through the production of fear via the discursive construction of ‘specific objects and threats’ (Chernobrov, 2019, p. 39). This involves reaching to well-worn identity discourses, which serve as vehicles for ‘[t]ransforming the anxiety of the unknown into the security of the known (recognizable, even if illusory) [that] affirms the identity of the perceiving subject and enables it to confidently interact with the international other.’ (ibid.)

These arguments have a direct purchase for critical geopolitics, as geopolitical imaginations are good examples of how such sense-making and anxiety-managing discourses can look like. Some have already recognised and developed this link. For Guzzini, the ‘revival of geopolitical thought’ in Europe is directly linked to ontological insecurity stemming from ‘the sense of disorientation and foreign policy identity crises which followed 1989.’ (Guzzini, 2016, pp. 14–15) Making a more explicit link between anxiety and fear, Browning develops a very similar argument: ‘The attraction of tropes of a new Cold War and a return of geopolitics is precisely that they solve anxiety about current events by fitting them into clearly established systems of meaning, though doing so entails reducing anxiety by emphasising a world of threats and fears’ (Browning, 2018, p. 113).

Both Guzzini and Browning are critical of using geopolitics as a tool of anxiety management, citing its adverse effects both in normative terms (creation of enemy-images, building an exclusionary ‘Fortress Europe’), and in the consequential decrease in physical security (e.g. as a result of escalating tensions between antagonists locked-in in their hardened identities). However, both also appear to ground their argument in the assumption that anxiety ultimately can be managed (more or less) successfully, one that is shared by the Giddensian mainstream of ontological security studies. While scholars making such arguments would consider the price of anxiety-management via geopolitics as too steep, they still accept that such a trade-off can be made in the first place and that one's ontological security can in fact be gained at the expense of physical security or the well-being of others. As some of the most recent debates in ontological security scholarship recognise (Browning, 2019; Cash, 2020; Gustafsson & Krickel-Choi, 2020; Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020; Rumelili, 2020), these issues stem from Giddens' problematic conceptualisation of anxiety that is adopted by most ontological security work in critical geopolitics and IR. To sharpen the analysis of the role of anxiety in geopolitics and deepen the critique made by Guzzini and Browning, an additional theoretical step is needed.

For this purpose, we reach to the literature on the politics of anxiety drawing mainly on the work of Jacques Lacan, a psychoanalyst whose ideas have been increasingly prolific in IR (for an authoritative overview see Zevnik & Mandelbaum, 2021), and, to a lesser extent, critical geopolitics (Klinke, 2016; Laketa, 2019; Müller, 2013). Our approach shares the Giddensian notion that anxiety is an inarticulable, traumatic and potentially paralysing affect that subjects attempt to avoid and repress. However, instead of seeing it as merely something that ‘lurks’ behind as the dark other of normal life, anxiety is understood as a durable affective condition interwoven in everyday experiences as well as social processes and political institutions. It doesn't just lurk, it is always already there, as it is present in the key mechanisms that hold society together: in the production of social subjects and the creation of rules through which these are regulated and bound together.

In this reading, anxiety is correlative to the very emergence and existence of the subject as such. It is ‘a type of expectant dread’ or ‘a crushing experience of ‘out of placeness’’ that arises ‘when the subject, unable to ground themselves in either a functional horizon of values or a reliable social or subjective identification, fears that they might be somehow swallowed up, devoured’ (Hook, 2015, pp. 117, 119). It is less about the disorientation and uncertainty caused by one particular crisis (e.g. Russia invading Ukraine, Covid-19 arriving) and more about being reminded of the ultimately irreducible fragility of all things, including human lives and social orders. In this sense, anxiety is an affect linked to experiencing the limit of one's own existence as a subject, something that signifies the encounter with ‘the real’, to use the Lacanian term for the internal limit of social order and/or the biological limit of human existence. Anxiety can never be fully managed or repressed, as it is a reaction to being confronted with what is for Lacan the ultimate reality of human existence: the fundamental ‘groundlessness of meaning’ (Balaska, 2019, p. 25) and, therefore, the impossibility of ever achieving a coherent and stable identity. In this sense, anxiety is the affect that ‘does not deceive’ (Lacan, 2014, p. 160), as it does not cover over the void at the heart of every social identity, but rather confronts us with it at the level of bodily sensation. To put it differently, subjects are always ultimately ontologically insecure, as no narratives, routines or relationships – personal or geopolitical – can ever fully deal with the omnipresent possibility that things may not make sense and everything can break down any minute. Anxiety emerges as the affect that signifies ‘the need for the stabilisation of the subject’ (Burgess, 2017, p. 29), yet this stabilisation is doomed to fail in the longer term.

Therefore, in contrast to readings that see it as an aberration, anxiety is omnipresent, even though it clearly varies in its intensity across time and space. Sometimes it is experienced more often and more strongly, while there may be other, less anxious times (Solomon, 2012 makes this argument with respect to affects in general). The current social condition is arguably one when anxiety is on the high; leading some authors to argue that we are now living in an ‘anxious society’, ‘a society on constant alert, despite having no identifiable existential threat. Instead, there is the constant presence of the possibility of that threat, and with it, the sense that government cannot fully protect the people and that danger resides in the everyday’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 247, emph. added; Eklundh et al., 2017). Such (highly) anxious society was created by the congruence of a range of factors. Some point to the effects of neoliberalism and austerity that produce the widespread feelings of powerlessness and loss of control (Hirvonen, 2017). Others focus on the social media economy that requires users who are constantly obsessively checking for news updates, notifications and the affective gratification coming from ‘retweets’ and ‘likes’ (Davies, 2019). For yet others, the proliferation of anxiety is connected to the societal changes linked to gender, race and immigration (Ali & Whitham, 2018; Klinke, 2016; Zevnik, 2017b), or the ‘security creep’ perpetuated by discourses and practices of counterterrorism and cybersecurity (Heath-Kelly, 2018; Jacobsen, 2020).

This extended understanding of anxiety as ontologically conditioned and socially circulated ‘nervous states’ (Davies, 2019) without a clear and concrete referent object opens the possibility to think (geo)politics of anxiety in broader and arguably more critical terms than in conventional ontological security literature. On the one hand, the Lacanian approach broadly agrees with the Giddensian ontological security framework with respect to how subjects try to deal with anxiety: by ‘pinning’ it onto an object and transforming it into a more tangible fear of something. In this manner, ‘fear becomes a way of easing anxiety; of attaching a signifier (an object of fear) to what is otherwise an unfounded experience of unease’ (Zevnik, 2017a, p. 237). Such ‘politics of fear’ then transforms the crushing and paralysing experience of anxiety into the management of ‘concrete objects that we have invented’ (Hirvonen, 2017, p. 261), such as the geopolitically coded ‘Muslim terrorists’ or ‘Russians hackers’. In this step, anxiety is ostensibly eased or repressed by the production of (geopolitical) narratives that ‘make sense’ of the unpleasant experience by giving it a name and placing it on a map.2

On the other hand, however, the Lacanian take allows us to account also for the politics that is imminent in the failure of these anxiety-managing attempts. As we have argued, all narratives built around particular objects of fear, including geopolitical ones, are eventually failing, as these objects are ultimately ‘false targets’. They are merely temporary discursive vessels functioning as placeholders for expressing deeper ontological anxiety, which is bound to strike back. Consequently, attempts to make societies (feel) more secure, habitually end up making them (feel) equally, or even more, insecure and anxious, regardless of how much effort is invested into fighting this or that particular threat. As Heath-Kelly (2015, 2018) and Jacobsen (2020) have shown, successful security discourses like counter-terrorism or cybersecurity have actually managed to internalise this ‘failure to secure’ (Heath-Kelly, 2015) by incorporating it into their very structure. According to them, counter-terrorism and cybersecurity are constructed as dangers so slippery and multifaceted that once we resolve one problem (by killing Osama bin Laden, resolving a particular cyberthreat), a whole new range of terrorist groups or cyber issues emerges to occupy their place.

Consequently, and in contrast to conventional ontological security literature, politics of anxiety is not only about managing and repressing it through narratives, routines and relationships. It is also about other ways of manipulating anxiety for political purposes, including reproducing, nurturing and spreading it via the construction of threats so opaque and widespread that they cannot be possibly resolved, like terrorism, cybersecurity – or hybrid warfare. By its repeated failure to secure, such discourses hold societies in the anxious ‘state of constant and heightened alertness’ (Davies, 2019, p. xii), making them ready to accept a range of pre-emptive security measures across all possible areas of social life.

Bringing the argument together, by the notion of anxiety geopolitics we conceptualise the politics of dealing with anxiety by linking it to objects and issues spatialised through the means of geopolitical imaginations. By references to geographical categories, such as states, regions, continents or civilisations, this type of affective geopolitics promises to transform the amorphous and ambiguous anxiety stemming from range of different issues into tangible and manageable objects of fear taking the form of geopolitical threats. Yet, as all such narratives and images are ultimately bound to fail to resolve the underlying anxiety, the analytical focus must be extended also to how these failures are accounted for and how anxiety is being further reproduced with the help of geopolitical imaginations. Therefore, anxiety geopolitics is ultimately about the oscillation between repressing anxiety through the geopoliticisation of both the ‘threat’ and the self, as much as it is about dealing with the recurring failures to secure the subjects produced by such geopoliticisation, which result in reproduction of social anxiety.

3. Hybrid warfare as anxiety geopolitics: learning from the Czech case

We will now further develop our conceptual argument by discussing hybrid warfare as a case of anxiety geopolitics. Some have already shown that HW plays an ontological security role at the level of NATO and EU, as it ‘links the uncertainty emanating from the hybrid nature of the new threats to the known and routine relationship with its traditional antagonist’, that is Russia (Mälksoo, 2018, p. 380). Following this argument, Russia's aggression suddenly gave meaning to a range of hitherto unconnected, yet omnipresent, and, therefore, anxiety-inducing problems that NATO, EU and their member states were facing. Polarisation and the rise of populism, widespread distrust in institutions, erosion of international norms, cyberattacks, propaganda and disinformation campaigns suddenly all ‘made sense’, if they could be discursively linked to Moscow as instances of ‘Russian hybrid warfare’. HW thus provided NATO and EU, with the elusive ‘security’ of knowing one's enemy (also Browning, 2018).

Similarly, in Czechia, the HW discourse arrived at a time of intense social anxieties emerging from a range of different cultural, economic or geopolitical factors. For many in Czechia (and Central Europe more broadly), post-Cold War sense of ontological security had been provided through a civilisational geopolitical imagination of ‘the West’, which Central Europe supposedly (re)joined after 1989 (Cadier, 2019; Kuus, 2007; Todorova, 2009). Best captured by the slogan of a ‘return to Europe’, the vision of embracing liberal democracy, capitalism and Euro-Atlantic political structures was seen as a panacea that would resolve all big (geo)political questions once and for all. However, these very principles and structures arguably started crumbling precisely at the time that the Central Europeans were finally admitted in EU and NATO. The Iraq War laid bare the rifts within the West, calling in question its further relevance as a coherent geopolitical entity (Browning & Lehti, 2010; Jackson, 2006). Resurgent Russia challenged Western hegemony in Europe and led ‘an influential part of the Czech political and intellectual elite [to] succumb[…] to anxiety’ (Drulák, 2012, p. 79). Central European countries were hit particularly hard by the economic crisis and further hurt themselves by the (foreign- or self-imposed) ‘Western’ medicine of austerity (Tooze, 2018, pp. 220–238). In the Czech case, this led to one of the longest periods of economic recovery in Europe, accompanied by a free-fall in public trust in institutions, with only one in ten Czechs expressing trust in the government (11%) and the Chamber of Deputies (10%) at the lowest point in 2012/2013 (CVVM, 2013). Add to this the rise of illiberalism at home and increasing divides between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member states, laid bare especially during the so called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015–2016. As a consequence, you end up with a region that is not so sure about its feeling about and towards ‘the West’ any longer (Kazharski, 2018; Krastev & Holmes, 2019).

Put differently, by mid-2010s, the Czech society was already in a state of anxiety and uncertainty about its own geopolitical identity and in search for ontological fixes.3 This is where the HW discourse clicks in following Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014. To the liberal voices that dominate security debates, hybrid warfare could be used to put a name on this anxiety and thereby attempt to suppress it by the construction of familiar geopolitical narratives. By invoking the prism of a conflict between a liberal-democratic West and an authoritarian Russia, all sorts of problems – spread of misinformation, return of nationalism, technological transformations or global power shifts – could be reduced to the logic of civilisational confrontation. This is the conventional ontological security part of the story, to which we add another step by showing how this promise of security is never actually fulfilled. Due to the supposed invisibility and omnipresence of hybrid threats and the insecure position the Czechs occupy in their own East/West geopolitical imagination, there is a surplus of anxiety that cannot be successfully managed.

The case study is structured according to the two ‘faces’ of the Janus-faced politics of anxiety. First, we show how hybrid warfare was used as a sense-making device promising to manage anxiety by providing a conceptual link between a broad range of social issues and anchoring them within the familiar East/West geopolitical imagination. This linking could simultaneously make hybrid warfare meaningful by geopoliticising it, and reinforce the crumbling East/West geopolitical imagination by showing its renewed relevance in facing hybrid warfare. Second, we show how the fleeting sense of ontological security achieved via this articulation gets undone by the recurring re-emergence of surplus anxiety and how HW ends up reproducing and perpetuating the sense of insecurity and anxiety it was supposed to resolve. The analysis is grounded in a range of empirical materials from 2014 to 2020, including official documents, media articles, popular books and parliamentary debates. Two caveats are in order. First, both Czech government and civil society have responded to the perceived threat of HW in many ways, including creating new official institutions and informal initiatives tailored to deal with it (Daniel & Eberle, 2018). In this article, we focus on the discourse that made these responses possible. Second, as shown elsewhere (Daniel & Eberle, 2021), the Czech HW discourse is not monolithic and includes different understandings of what exactly constitutes a threat to whom, ranging from military operations targeting public infrastructures all the way to individual citizen's struggles with media literacy. In this article, though, we downplay these differences and instead focus on the commonalities that tie these different notions together as parts of ostensibly the same problem of Russia's ‘hybrid warfare’.

3.1. Repressing anxiety: making sense of hybrid warfare through East/West geopolitics

Starting with the repression side of anxiety geopolitics, this can be observed in the successive steps through which ontological security is sought by associating a range of issues with hybrid warfare and then pinning HW onto the familiar map of East/West geopolitical imagination. This consists of four interrelated discursive moves: identifying the supposed ‘origin’ of societal unease, putting a name of the problem, localising it in space, and endowing it with broader geopolitical meanings. In this particular case, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014 serves as the supposed original moment and ‘cause’ of anxiety, hybrid warfare is the name presented to make sense of what is going on, Russia is constructed as the threat, and civilisational East/West geopolitics is used to give the situation broader meaning. Let us now discuss each of these steps in turn.

First, a certain event needs to be constructed as a supposed point of origin of the perceived unease, a ‘crisis’ that dislocates the symbolic order (Nabers, 2015). This is the first move in the repression of anxiety, one in which an ‘actually existing’ empirical event is discursively presented as the apparent cause of the deeper ontological crisis that is affectively experienced as anxiety. In the HW discourse in Czechia, Russia's aggression against Ukraine of 2014 is presented as such profoundly shocking and dislocating event. As the otherwise rather down-to-earth and matter-of-fact military intellectual, Karel Řehka, puts it: ‘the Russian Federation shocked the whole world. The unimaginable was broken into.’ (Řehka, 2017, p. 199) ‘Shock’ and ‘helplessness’ are words used also by a high-ranking Czech diplomat (personal interview, Prague, August 4, 2020). A leading Czech think-tanker then recalls how ‘surprised’ he was by Russia's invasion and how ‘disorganised and fragmented’ the security debates were in the months that followed (Janda, 2017). The affective experience is captured well also in a widely cited and circulated popular book, which vividly describes how ‘we are walking on the edge of a cliff’ and ‘[u]ncertainty is the only thing that you can count on these days’ (Alvarová, 2017, p. 20). Therefore, 2014 was constructed as a radical breakthrough into a much more insecure world. Yet, this move of identifying the supposed origin of these dizzying feelings of anxiety in one particular event was at the same time already the first step of seeking ontological security by making sense of it.

A second step is putting the name on the problem. It is only the performative and affect-laden performance of naming that connects disparate phenomena together and creates a discursive ‘object’ that can be then dealt with politically (Laclau, 2005). In our case, this leads to the creative appropriation of the concepts of ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘hybrid threats’, which were virtually non-existent in the Czech public discourse prior to 2014 (Daniel & Eberle, 2018), and using them as a linchpin that connects all sorts of societal problems. For an authoritative Czech security document, ‘hybrid threat’ is a ‘way to wage a confrontation or a conflict’, one that is characterised by an extraordinarily broad spectrum of measures: ‘a wide, complex, adaptable, and integrated combination of conventional and unconventional means, overt and covert activities, characterised primarily by coercion and subversion’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). The range of actors that can execute such methods is similarly broad, including ‘military, paramilitary, and various civilian actors’ (ibid.). Similarly, an overview of a ‘Russian hybrid strategy’ provided by the counterintelligence service includes ‘interpretation of modern history’, different ways of ‘information warfare’, ‘networking/infiltration’ across the fields of politics, economy, crime, espionage, culture and education, and military/guerrilla operations alike (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 7). In statements like these, hybrid warfare is stretched so as to incorporate almost anything that can be understood as a hostile activity. A such, it becomes an universal object of fear, broad enough to be used as a placeholder for all sorts of anxieties.

In the third move, hybrid warfare is territorialised by pointing to Russia as its ultimate source. The ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of hybrid warfare in terms of flows, clouds and infrastructures, is backgrounded in favour of the ‘modern’ territorial East/West geopolitics of a Russian threat. In certain cases, this means little more than merely pointing out that it is indeed Russia that ‘has executed hybrid operations [ …], including targeted disinformation activities and cyber-attacks’, as the Defence Strategy (Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2017, p. 7) puts it explicitly and other documents hint at implicitly (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2015). More interesting are the instances which present Russia not only as one source of threats, but as an orchestrator coordinating all possible means and actors. In such cases, the ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of networks is used and reproduced, yet with a key twist: such networks are seen as hierarchical, with centre in Moscow. In this logic, different domestic actors – ‘alternative news’ websites spreading anti-Western narratives, right-wing populists, even contrarian intellectuals – can ultimately be tied to an overall Russia's masterplan (for an example see Janda & Kundra, 2016). The counterintelligence agency reports are an example of this ‘puppet-master’ approach. One of them lists ‘covert infiltration of Czech media and the Internet’ and ‘foundation of puppet organizations, covert and open support of populist or extremist subjects’ among the key activities of Russia's ‘information operations’ (Security Information Service, 2016, p. 9). Another outlines this logic in colourful detail, claiming that ‘Russia is creating a structure in Europe drawing on the concept of the Comintern (the Communist International; the Third International) founded by the Soviet Union’ (Security Information Service, 2015, p. 11), an organised network of all sorts of actors ‘with pro-Russian stances or fighting against the system’ (ibid., 12).

However, different actors can be labelled as agents or instrument of HW and then geopoliticised and linked to Russia not only by direct association, but also because they are merely voicing opinions that can be somehow qualified as ‘pro-Russian’. As a more recent counterintelligence report puts it, actually an ‘overwhelming majority of disinformation websites in Czech are the work of Czech […] citizens, who are not supported by Russian entities.’ (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 8) Nevertheless, this still makes them a part of a broader geopolitical threat, as ‘these people and their internet projects are misused by Russia to spread propaganda or support other components of the hybrid strategy.’ (ibid., 8) It is this imagination of a Russian-orchestrated networked threat that enables a leading Czech journalist to blankly dismiss the prominent disinformation website, Aeronet. cz, as ‘writing for Putin’ (Kundra, 2016b), without any evidence of links to the Russian state known at that point and with his own subsequent investigations showing that this is most likely not the case. It also makes it possible to deal with anxieties by externalising the problem, such as when a popular book argues that ‘Furious hate […] is not Czech, it is something new, foreign. It came from the outside and ‘somehow’ entered into us.’ (Alvarová, 2017, p. 88).

In the fourth and final move, this ‘hybrid’ struggle with Russia is endowed with meaning by being inserted into the whole symbolic structure of East/West civilisational geopolitics, in which ‘[i]ssues of security and geopolitics are […] reframed in cultural terms. They become simultaneously geographical, cultural and strategic concepts, and they diffuse into ever more spheres of political life.’ (Kuus, 2007, p. x) The societal anxieties that are managed via the narrative of hybrid warfare emanating from Russia, are now also made part of an eternal struggle between the East and the West. This reactivates the ‘mental maps’, in which ‘the West’ functions as a desired point of identification and a promise of security and prosperity, whereas ‘the East’ is seen as ‘an abyss’, a notion ‘which in the Czech political discourse refers less to a geographical space than to ontological categories defining the alienated past of the Czech Republic.’ (Cadier, 2019, p. 84) As one member of parliament, Jan Bartošek, put it, the Czechs are left with an unequivocal choice: ‘either we will be part of NATO as a firm ally of our pro-Western orientation, or we will be just one of Russia's many colonies. There is no third way.’ (in Chamber of Deputies, 2018a).

In statements like these, Russia is presented as a fundamentally different entity, a quintessentially Oriental actor, belonging to a different ‘universe’ that ‘until nowadays has not met’ with the European one (Alvarová, 2017, p. 70). Echoing classical Orientalist tropes, Russians supposedly rely on ‘[m]ysticism, irrationality, associational instead of logical thinking – thus, a model of thinking that is of different civilisation, the one we know rather from the Orient’ (Alvarová, 2017, p. 193). The potentially catastrophic consequences of allying with Russia are then often presented through references to the past, reinforcing the notion that what is at stake in HW is in fact yet another instance of a historical struggle between civilisations. ‘Many of us probably know our modern history, from 1945 through 1948, Russian advisers, death of [foreign minister] Jan Masaryk, occupation in 1968. The Russian influence, which simply broke us away from the West, ripped us from [our] democratic development, and has incalculable economic consequences stretching to this day.’ (Helena Langšádlová in Chamber of Deputies, 2018b).

This idea that issues like propaganda, misinformation or rise of populism are instances of a dramatic geopolitical confrontation, is finally driven home also by the notion that it is the West as a whole that is under attack, not just any individual country. According to a counterintelligence report, ‘the goal of the Russian hybrid campaign’ is ‘primarily to weaken NATO and the EU internally, e.g. by weakening individual member states’ (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 7). Therefore, should the Czechs fail to defend themselves, they are supposedly endangering something much bigger. According to a member of parliament, Jan Lipavský, what the Russians want is ‘to break European unity’ (Chamber of Deputies, 2018b). Such ideas connect hybrid warfare squarely to the Messianistic undertones of the East/West geopolitical imagination, in which the Central Europeans serve as guardians defending the West at its limit. To paraphrase Milan Kundera's (1984) foundational essay on Central European civilisational geopolitics, by fighting hybrid warfare, the Czechs are risking ‘dying for Czechia and the West’, which indeed gives a sense of deep purpose and meaning to their cause and produces a strong anxiety-repressing narrative.

To sum up this part, one important aspect of the anxiety geopolitics of hybrid warfare lies in the way how it allows channelling deeper anxieties by using the East/West geopolitical imagination to produce familiar storylines, identities and objects of fear. Despite being constructed as multifaceted, broad and difficult to detect, hybrid warfare is made legible by being projected on a familiar ‘mental map’, where it becomes merely the most recent instance of long-lasting struggle between the West and a fundamentally different, antagonist Russia. However, the relationship between the discourses of hybrid warfare and East/West geopolitics goes both ways: HW is not only territorialised by, but also gives broader meaning to and, in a way, promises to reinforce the East/West civilisational geopolitics. It is in and through HW that Russia is constructed as fundamentally different and the West presented as a coherent entity under attack, as well as something worth defending against the potentially tragic alternatives. Through the discourse of hybrid warfare, doubts about the relevance or resilience of a West-centric geopolitical order are seemingly brushed away and old geopolitical identities are hardened. This is precisely the logic of ontological security that makes the ideas of a ‘return of geopolitics’ and the ‘new Cold War’ so appealing, as shown by Guzzini (2012, 2016) and Browning (2018).

3.2. Reproducing anxiety: danger is everywhere and the East is already within

The HW discourse arguably succeeds on the level of meaning, that is in ‘making sense’ of the new threats by geopoliticising them in East/West terms. In contrast, its success is only fleeting at best as an anxiety-repressing ontological fix. In this section, we focus on the other face of anxiety geopolitics, showing how the HW discourse also contributes to the reproduction of anxiety. The argument that security discourses end up perpetuating the very insecurity they promise to deal with is not new (e.g. Campbell, 1998). More recently, Heath-Kelly (2018) and Jacobsen (2020) have advanced it from an explicitly Lacanian perspective and shown how the discourses of terrorism and cybersecurity are inherently bound to disappoint the underlying desire for security. The endurance of these discourses is made possible by the way how they pre-emptively incorporate an explanation for their own failure. Terrorism and cyberthreats are constructed in such a broad, complex and omnipresent manner that no individual achievement can lead to the resolution of the problems presented by these discourses. There are always new risks and vulnerabilities, as the destruction or neutralisation of no actually existing objects of fear (e.g. Osama bin Laden) can ultimately satisfy the underlying ontological anxieties. There is always something else to worry about.

Building on Heath-Kelly and Jacobsen, our final argument is that hybrid warfare works exactly like their examples, as HW, too, is a discourse that is simultaneously anxiety-repressing and anxiety-reproducing. In fact, we argue that the linking of HW and East/West geopolitics produces a particularly strongly anxiety-ridden discourse. While hybrid warfare presents threats as invisible and omnipresent due to their covert and networked nature, the East/West imagination further raises the stakes and salience of such threats by painting them as parts of a titanic civilisational struggle. The subjects produced by such discourse can never rest, as what may be going on right behind their noses is not just one particular cyber-attack, a single conspiracy theory that has gained traction on Facebook, or merely one instance of information stolen by a spy. Instead, it is a battle for the future of ‘the West’ and the Czech belonging to it, one where the alternative option is the most tragic one: a descent deep into the ‘abyss’ of ‘the East’ (Cadier, 2019). We will now illustrate these arguments by focusing on the unfathomability of HW, the shifting nature of the threats it produces, and the anxieties inherent in the East/West geopolitics that underpin it.

First, the ‘failure to secure’ (Heath-Kelly, 2015) is pre-emptively incorporated in the HW discourse by its portrayal of the looming dangers as insidious, invisible and even impossible to detect. As a key security document states, ‘[t]he principal risk to which a subject attacked by a hybrid campaign is exposed lies in the fact that they will not be able to identify the hybrid campaign – in time, in its full scale, or at all’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 129). According to the deputy Helena Langšádlová, what we are supposedly facing are highly dangerous, yet ‘creeping threats’, which we ‘cannot see on a day by day basis’ (in Chamber of Deputies, 2019). This leads some to claim that ‘at no point in history was it so extremely difficult to decide, if we are at war, or not’ (Táborský, 2019, p. 164). While there may be little drama on the surface, no one can ever rest in this logic. An attack may be already underway, one that can even be approximated to war, literally at any minute. As the Special Forces general, Karel Řehka, put it at a conference organised in the Czech parliament: ‘In a way, we are already at war, we just do not realise it or are not able to admit it.’ (Lang, 2015) This is a mode of thinking that produces highly anxious subjects, in a constant sense of the ‘expectant dread’ that is anxiety (Hook, 2015, p. 117), one not yet having a clear referent and directed towards all possible yet still unknown dangers that may materialise at any time.

It is in these notions that an unspecified existential threat may be hidden behind mundane events that the otherwise backgrounded ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of HW suddenly kicks back in. If the ‘modern’ East/West geopolitical imagination ‘made sense’ and provided at least some fleeting ontological security by pointing to Russia, this is frustrated by the surplus anxiety produced via this ‘postmodern’ imagination of insidious, hidden networks operating in physical and cyberspace alike. In fact, as the discourse postulates, we may not even know that it really is Russia in the first place that is behind a particular incident, as hybrid attackers seek to create ‘an environment where responsibility for these activities cannot (at least formally) be attributed to them, or at least only speculatively and with great difficulty’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). We may ultimately never know if this or that mundane event is actually not a part of something much bigger, as it is the very aim of the attacker to ‘prevent a clear interpretation of events and the discovery of their interconnectedness’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). Therefore, while the prevalent ‘modern’ geopolitical reading of HW enables channelling anxiety by constructing Russia an object of fear, it still remains far from the manageable fear of ‘fight or flight’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 241). This is because these supposedly known aspects of the danger are constantly being accompanied and disrupted by the surplus anxiety of the ‘unknown unknowns’ stemming from the partial inclusion of the ‘postmodern’ geopolitical reading. This effectively pre-empts the HW discourse from ever solving the problems it is supposedly designed to tackle, as it is wholly unclear how to act upon threats that we are not yet aware of or do not know how to make sense of.

Second, this oscillation between the known and the unknown and between fear and anxiety manifests itself in the constantly shifting construction of what is supposed to be the exact nature of the threat coming from Russia. This is best illustrated in the wording of the annual reports of the Czech counterintelligence agency (SIS), which reinforce the notion that Russia is indeed a severe threat, yet the precise character and shape of this threat appears to be changing year after year. As already mentioned, in first annual public report reflecting on the situation after Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the SIS warned that their assessment showed the formation of what was spectacularly labelled as the ‘New Reincarnation of the Comintern’ – a loose network of allied actors, similar to the Cold War Soviet-controlled network of ideologically affiliated political parties, agitators and agents. The danger was portrayed as a new version of this tried and tested strategy, which Russia supposedly employs to connect different groups dissatisfied with the Western liberal democracy (Security Information Service, 2015, pp. 11–12).

However, the spectre of the Comintern was a one-off, never to appear again. Instead, SIS later concluded that the threat resided in a much looser combination of often uncoordinated actions of Russian intelligence, authentic Czech individuals not in any way linked to Moscow but ‘only’ spreading their own ‘pro-Russian’ worldviews, and finally, even in the lack of education about modern history in schools (Security Information Service, 2018, pp. 6–8). This trend of diffusing the danger from a Kremlin-coordinated network to seeing the threats in mere ideological resonances further continued. The most recent report notes that there is a ‘transition from state-controlled or directed activities to spontaneous actions’ of like-minded actors. ‘When Russian state officials express what they desire to happen (for instance by spreading manipulative information), proxy actors without any links to the Russian state proceed to action on their own initiative and based on what they think the officials might want’ (Security Information Service, 2020, p. 9).

Through this move, the spectre of ‘Russian hybrid warfare’ can now encompass virtually anything that can be somehow interpreted as matching with the desires or interests of the Kremlin, without any need for proving direct links, as these are no longer considered necessary. The construction of ‘a threat’ now includes even situations when ‘a foreign power does not engage in any direct action and keeps its distance, while using various ways (PR, instigating statements, propaganda etc.) to inspire individual persons to take action’ (Security Information Service, 2020, p. 9). Put differently, Russian threat can be present even where there is no direct Russian hand whatsoever. Literally any individual with views somehow similar to those of the Russian state can be seen as part of it, which makes the idea that security can ever be achieved virtually impossible. Instead, this logic contributes to the reproduction of an anxious society, defined by ‘the constant presence of the possibility of that threat, and with it, the sense that government cannot fully protect the people and that danger resides in the everyday’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 247).

Third, this notion that the possibility that something ‘Russian’ may be insidiously present deep within the Czech society then revives also the old anxieties inherent in the ‘modern’ East/West geopolitical imagination itself. Central Europeans' self-positioning in East/West geopolitics is highly ambivalent (Kuus, 2007; Todorova, 2009). On the one hand, being or becoming part of ‘the Western civilisation’ is a source of ontological security. On the other hand, this security is never quite complete or permanent. This is because Central Europeans locate themselves at the very limit of the West, as ‘European edge-men’ (Mälksoo, 2010, p. 5), whose membership in the civilisation must constantly be proved as it can always be taken away – especially by the forces of the ‘East’. The ‘old shadow of Yalta’, the feeling that the region's ‘freedom could yet again be expendable in times of crisis’ is constantly present (Mälksoo, 2010, p. 75). Put differently, East/West geopolitics equips the Czech ‘pro-Western’ security intellectuals with a ‘mental map, where the country is depicted as being on the “edge” of Europe and constantly risking to “fall” into an abyss […] traditionally characterised as the “East”’ (Cadier, 2019, p. 84). While the East/West geopolitical imagination can succeed in spatialising the threat in the Russian ‘other’, the position it grants to the self is always potentially insecure. Therefore, it is also East/West geopolitics itself that produces subjects that are constantly on alert, facing the constant ‘possibility of loss of one's soul’ (Balaska, 2019, p. 8) that defines the experience of anxiety.

Such fragile geopolitical self-positioning further fuels the search for new and new sources of hybrid threats, as failing to uncover and face them may have existential consequences, especially given that ‘Easternness’ may have already infiltrated and compromised the Czech social body. This notion of ‘East within’ links to the above discussed unfathomability and invisibility of HW and manifests itself in multiple ways. For one counterintelligence report, it takes the form of smuggled ideas and narratives, presented ‘in a way leading Czech citizens to believe they are recipients of opinions held by fellow citizens not of Russian propaganda’ (Security Information Service, 2015, p. 11). Similarly, a popular book on ‘fake news’ geopoliticises social attitudes en bloc by identifying them along East/West axis, presenting the ‘disappointed’ part of society as ‘seeing a model in Russia, or perhaps China’ (Gregor, Mlejnková, & Zvolsi.info, 2018, p. 62). For others, the ‘East within’ takes the form in the physical presence of ‘Putin's agents’ who supposedly ‘quite likely teach your children at universities, you meet them for a coffee in your favourite café or work in normal jobs.’ (Kundra, 2016a, p. 88).

The anxiety geopolitics of hybrid warfare is thus also about creating the normatively highly disturbing ‘“red under every bed” mentality’ (Fridman, 2018, p. 3) and applying ‘the ethics of total war […] even to the smallest skirmish’ (Galeotti, 2019, p. 8). Therefore, viewing security threats through the prism of hybrid warfare reproduces a highly anxious society and perpetuates the justification for those ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992) that would not hesitate to provide the sort of geopolitical fixes that were discussed in the previous sections. Thereby, the discourse ends up reproducing itself, as the two faces of anxiety geopolitics not only disrupt, but also dialectically reinforce one another: geopolitical discourse emerges to repress anxiety and provide ontological security, yet the anxiety inherent in the discourse disrupts ontological security and, to come full circle, creates the need for geopolitical discourses. The result is a society oscillating between its desire to avoid anxiety and the repeated frustration thereof; an affective pulsation that has arguably been elevated to a dominant mode of politics of (in)security in our present time (Eklundh et al., 2017), of which hybrid warfare is a prime example. As similar patterns of anxious over-reaction and securitisation of broad areas of social life have been recognised by authors writing about HW in different empirical contexts (Fridman, 2018; Galeotti, 2019; Mälksoo, 2018; Ördén, 2019), we believe that the problem with ‘hybrid warfare’ is of a more general nature and the relevance of our analysis reaches beyond the Czech case.

4. Conclusion

Introducing anxiety geopolitics as a conceptual linchpin between disparate arguments from debates on critical geopolitics, ontological security, and politics of anxiety, this article made two central contributions. First, we have theorised the relationship between geopolitics and anxiety, moving beyond the existing accounts above all by pointing out the Janus-faced character of anxiety geopolitics, in which anxiety is both repressed and reproduced. Second, using the case of Czechia, we have argued that hybrid warfare is a discourse that constantly oscillates between repressing anxiety by geopoliticising the source of danger in East/West terms, and subverting its own constructions by presenting the threats as insidious, invisible, and constantly shifting. Therefore, we contend that the HW discourse is structured in a way that cannot achieve its purported ambition to secure populations against ‘hybrid threats’ and instead ends up producing more insecurity and anxiety.

Our argument has clear normative implications that expand the existing criticisms of HW by putting the underlying civilisational geopolitics in spotlight. This should help us challenge the technology-centred presentism of the HW discourse, showing that many of the ostensibly unprecedented concerns are in fact reheated versions of narratives that date back decades if not centuries. More importantly, it enables us to point to the presence of some of the highly problematic aspects of East/West thinking, especially those that have been rightly criticised as Orientalist, chauvinist or even racist (see e.g. Said, 1978; Todorova, 2009). Realising the presence of civilisational geopolitics makes it possible to ask whether certain portrayals of Russia in HW debates – e.g. as barbaric, irrational, irredeemable – may not represent narcissistic projections of the ‘Western’ self, rather than credible threat assessments (Chernobrov, 2019). Importantly, these are not scholastic matters of concern just for ivory-tower peaceniks, as the proponents of HW sometimes like to put it. Instead, these criticisms have clear implications for security policy. As recognised even among NATO's own analysts and officials (Caliskan & Liégeois, 2020; Rühle, 2019), adopting the prism of HW and labelling Russia as an inherently irrational enemy is detrimental to leading a productive debate on the exact nature of the challenges that Putin's regime poses and formulating appropriate and efficient strategies to respond to it. We add to it by highlighting that the HW discourse not only ‘undermines strategic thinking’ (Caliskan & Liégeois, 2020), but also never actually manages to provide security and creates highly concerning societal side-effects (perpetuation of anxiety, proliferation of Orientalist images).

There are also important qualifications of our argument and avenues for further research. First of all, we certainly do not claim that everyone who ever spoke of ‘hybrid threats’ or ‘hybrid warfare’ would find themselves in agreement with the examples used in our analysis, or be instantly guilty of Orientalism. While the article focused on overarching themes, there is certainly variation within the HW discourse, not only in Czechia (Daniel & Eberle, 2021), but also in Germany, UK or EU (Janičatová & Mlejnková, 2021; Monsees, 2020; Ördén, 2019). One intriguing possibility for further research is in showing the variation in the way how geopolitical thought is invoked and anxiety repressed and reproduced within the different versions of the HW discourse. More generally, the theoretical argument should also be tried and developed in other contexts.

### L – Russia

#### Fear of Russian conflict is rooted in a racist and exceptionalist mythology that necessitates the construction of threats to justify militarism---this straight-turns the case---their claims are false peddlings of neo-cons, but their framing makes them real through spiraling antagonism

Roberts 16 – Dr. Kari Roberts, PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Economics, Justice, and Policy Studies at Mount Royal University, Senior Fellow at the Canadian International Council, “Why a Normal Relationship With Russia Is So Hard: Russophobia in Clinton-era American Foreign Policy Discourse and The Decision to Expand NATO”, Prepared for presentation at the Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA) Annual Conference, 5-17, https://cpsa-acsp.ca/documents/conference/2016/Roberts.pdf

Conceptualizing Russophobia

As Time magazine’s person of the year in 2007, Vladimir Putin took the opportunity to publicly address the negative views of Russia that exist in the West, accusing “some” Americans of perpetuating false view of Russians as “a little bit savage still or they just climbed down from the trees, you know, and probably need to have their hair brushed or their beards trimmed. And have the dirt washed out of their beards and hair. That’s the civilizing mission to be accomplished.”14 Though Putin’s characterization may be somewhat extreme, Russophobia is well documented in Russia, with politicians and analysts giving voice to this phenomenon and its influences on policy makers. However, much less has been written on Russophobia in English, and for Western audiences. But if we ever hope to truly understand the many facets of the Russia-US relationship, we must consider the ways in which attitudes toward Russia may be influencing American decision making.

Western characterizations of Putin are that he is an evil dictator, abusing democracy, human rights and the rule of law, bent upon re-drawing Europe’s map, asserting Russia’s influence and balancing against American power at every turn. This characterization of Russia’s president is reflected in a 2009 Economist article in which Putin was said to be looking for a war with the West, having “tantrums” over controversial disagreements in the Middle East and Georgia, “stumbling” into disputes with the West, and driven by “paranoia” and “encirclement.”15 While some of these criticisms of Putin may not be entirely unreasonable, there is more to such critiques of Putin than simply policy disagreement. An inherent mistrust of Russia and of Russians themselves, has colored western, and especially American, views about post-Soviet Russia dating back to the Yeltsin presidency.

DW Benn, writing about the misunderstanding of Russia in the West, notes the presence of these ideas in the centuries old words of Lord Palmerston himself, who once described a Russian colleague as “’civil and courteous’ but with ‘all the cunning of a half-educated savage.’”16 According to Benn, a special disdain for the Russian people permeates the discourse about Russia, and is easily hidden in the above criticisms about contemporary Russian politics and foreign policy.17 George Kennan once famously wrote that the political personality of the Soviet Union was one that could not tolerate rivals, and was too “insensitive,” “fierce” and “jealous” to share power. The Soviets were absorbed with securing absolute power consistent with an ideology that instructs them to believe that the outside world is hostile and must be resisted.18 One does not have to look very hard to find these same sentiments about contemporary Russian leaders.

Andrei Tsygankov accurately identifies anti-Russianism, or Russophobia, in American decision making, defined as “a fear of Russia’s political system on the grounds that it is incompatible with the interests and values of the West in general and the United States in particular. This fear finds expression in various forms of criticism of Russia that are unbalanced and distorted. No matter which independent actions Moscow may pursue, they are sure to be perceived… as reflecting Russia’s expansionist interests, not as a legitimate pursuit of national interests.” 19 Russophobia transcends ideological and partisan lines, as both neo-conservative and liberal minded groups demonize Russia in fairly equal measure. These attitudes are more than simply a cultural animosity toward Russians; rather, they reflect “a very real fear of Russia’s political influence” that finds expression in a distorted critique of Russia and its politics.20 This animosity results in a persistent need to contain Russia’s influence, even in times of relative peace and cooperation between the two nations. This is evidenced by the impulse to expand NATO just a few short years after the end of the Cold War and before the reversal of early expectations for Russia’s democratic consolidation. This will be discussed later in the paper.

For Tsygankov, Russia is viewed as an expansionist state that refuses to abide by “acceptable rules of international behavior,” owing either to its political culture or its questionable leadership; either way, it must be “contained or fundamentally transformed.”21 Russophobia is informed by a misinterpretation of Russia’s history, one in which Russia has been forced to respond to the actions of the West, rather than represent some sort of ingrained need to conquer and dominate.22 Russia is viewed as an autocratic empire that perpetually oppresses nationalities, denies its citizens basic rights, “concentrates economic and military resources in the hands of the state,” and doggedly pursues its inherent and illegitimate expansionist national interests.23 This last point bears re-stating: Russia is not accorded the courtesy of being seen to possess legitimate national interests, owing to the above assumptions about its nature and motivations. Tsygankov notes that, “even during the 1990s, when Russia looked more like a failing state than one capable of projecting power, some members of the American political class were worried about the future revival of the Eurasian giant as a revisionist power.”24 He attributes the rampant triumphalism in the US at the end of the Cold War to this fear of Russia, noting it reached its zenith in the mid-1990s.25 In fact, it was actually the Clinton administration that “entrenched the rhetoric of victorious thinking by drawing the analogy between Russia and the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II.”26 This triumphalism implied something inherently superior, and therefore inferior, about the US and Russia, respectively.

Tsygankov is quick to label American Russophobia as a political phenomenon rather than a cultural phenomenon, leaving open the possibility for its willful reversal.27 While it may be the case that Russophobia’s presence in American foreign policy making may not be a fait accompli, its presence in the American discourse may reflect more of a cultural presence of anti-Russianism that is self-reinforcing. In fact, Tsygankov himself notes that public opinion followed elite opinion and policy,28 which testifies to its presence in the popular discourse. Tsygankov claims that the infusion of Russophobia into elite and popular attitudes about Russia is the result of a willful construction of an anti-Russian lobby in order to advance a particular foreign policy agenda. “The Lobby,” is a deliberate cabal of anti-Russian military hawks, or those who presume American geopolitical hegemony can best be achieved by the military defeat of Russia, as well as those who assertively presume the hegemony of so-called liberal values of democracy, rule of law and human rights.29 This Lobby allegedly dates back to the early 20th Century, its views solidified by the Cold War, to which members of Congress and policy makers in the White House have been sympathetic.30 While Tsygankov acknowledges that some of the Lobby’s success could be attributed to the absence of a pro-Russia lobby in the US,31 his attention is trained on the Lobby’s political goal of fostering anti-Russian sentiment in the West in support of a “global power struggle” against a potential “resurgent” Russia, rife with what Zbigniew Brzezinski once labeled “neo-colonial thinkers.”32

Tsygankov seeks to explain the construction and persistence of an anti-Russian lobby that is purposefully distorting Russia’s role in the world, its history and its interests to advance an anti-Russia agenda; however, this is not the precise case made herein. Tsygankov’s premise is not fundamentally rejected here, but it is not fully embraced either. There does seem to be a culture of anti-Russianism present in Washington that has influenced foreign policy elites, but it may not necessarily be the result of an intentional drive to keep Russia down. What this paper shares with Tsygankov is the conviction that Russophobia exists, has a significant influence on American foreign policy concerning Russia, and therefore must be better identified and understood. The goal here is not to reveal malevolence toward Russia, but rather to name this Russophobia, discuss its genesis, and connect it with foreign policy outcomes in the hope of illuminating what remains a significant impediment to a more constructive Russia-US relationship.

In his writing on Russophobia, Anatol Lieven suggests that anti-Russianism is derived in part from the myth of America’s own exceptionalism. This mythology sees the US standing taller than other nations, able to make objective observations about other states’ motives, and thereby construct appropriate policy in response. Lieven warns of the dangers of such assumptions, because they render US policy makers “incapable of understanding the opposition of other nations” to its own policies.33 Lieven takes on NATO expansion directly, noting that, among the many reasons Russia opposes it, is the US’ failure to appreciate what it means for Russia. US policy makers have been genuinely puzzled by Russia’s failure to perceive its enlargement as benign, which is due in part to the American rhetoric that exists alongside the policy decision itself. It is not only the physical expansion of NATO that is problematic, but the corresponding failure to bother understanding Russia’s interests. This unwillingness to understand Russia, combined with the embrace of longstanding and outworn stereotypes about Russia, assumptions about the pattern of history in Russia, as well as a Cold War “hangover” of sorts, which cannot shake the image of Russia-as-threat, all contribute to define Russophobia and the discourse within which American foreign policy is made.

Lieven speculates that the intellectual basis for this Russophobia may stem from 19th Century British propaganda regarding Russian expansionism and its inherent wickedness. Lieven notes that this demonization of other peoples, sometimes taking on a racist tone, has long been present within Western, and American, foreign policy making.34 Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that what was once assumed about a nation and its peoples shall forever be true about them, even in the absence of supporting evidence. This sort of historical determinism denies a nuanced appreciation for cultural evolution and very much denies the potential for American leaders to view post-Soviet Russia’s disappointing struggles with democracy for what they are. Instead, they have been viewed against the backdrop of Russia’s Tsarist and Communist experiences and are therefore “wicked.”35 This is evidenced by Henry Kissinger’s 2000 remark that Russian imperialism has continued for centuries, characterized by subjugation of its neighbours and “overawing those not under its direct control” and in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assigning of blame for Stalinist-era policies to present day Russians.36 For Lieven, to view past conduct as less a product of history and more a product of culture or “national DNA” of sorts, comes perilously close to racism. There is a certain essentialism in the American discourse on Russia that equates these acts with “Russianness.” Perhaps, as Tsygankov suggests, demonizing Russia continued to help justify US strategy toward the USSR in the Cold War. For Lieven, this legitimized the military buildup, the containment, the worldview and actions that stemmed from the need to balance Soviet power.37 Yet, as Lieven importantly notes, even those who demonize Russia for its past seem to have little problem embracing Communist China,38 so perhaps it is not communism in Russia’s past the Western leaders fear, but rather something cultural, something innately “Russian.”

Lieven concurs about the self-reinforcing nature of Russophobia, noting the US’ “need for enemies”39 as an instrumental component of its own narrative of exceptionalism. Perhaps the result of viewing Russia as the enemy for so long is the reason it has become one. Russophobia has enabled the judging of Russia “by utterly different standards than those applied to other countries.”40 Tsygankov and Lieven are correct to suggest a linkage between Russophobia and America’s own mythologies about its place in the world. America’s destiny is to be a cultural hegemon atop the global hierarchy of nations. The perception of American superiority seems to require an “other” to assume a position of inferiority. Russia has long represented a new cultural frontier and a divergent history, one that was assumed to be far less “exceptional” than the American experience. Challenges to the presumption of American hegemony have often been met with not simply disagreement, but a de-legitimizing of the very existence of the ‘other.’ Russia is not immune from ideas of exceptionalism and the two nations have perpetuated a soft rivalry that possesses “nationalist phobias”41 that can be mutually reinforcing.

Gertan Dijkink acknowledges that this “gross distinction between East and West as opposite cultures” is part of the US discourse on Russia.42 For Dijkink, this does not have to be addressed directly, or be part of a public discussion, because it has become “naturalized,” or considered to be common sense. He notes that experience and discourse create an imaginative geography of the outside world, which contributes to the construction of visions of the world.”43 Dijkink notes that, after all, “American foreign policy aims to perpetuate, serve and affirm the American way of life,”44 thus helping to explain why Russia’s alternative to “the American way,” presents a challenge. Georg Lofflman confirms the impact of mythology on discourse and the influence on foreign policy outcomes.45 Myths shape identity, become themselves part of identity, and influence action. It is reasonable to suggest that American exceptionalism influences Russophobia. If the US is unique, its values superior, and therefore its preeminence in the international system assumed, and if Russia fundamentally challenges these values – America’s very identity – in some way, then fear of what Russia represents may be a consequence. Putin himself famously warned Americans in 2013 of the dangers of seeing themselves as exceptional.46

Richard Sakwa notes the difficult time US leaders have had accepting Russia as an equal.47 Russia did not see itself as a defeated power after the Cold War and conducted itself as such, a view in opposition to the prevailing Washington narrative. Sakwa notes that Russia as a democratic state was no less revisionist than Russia as a communist state and that this was threatening to the existing world order that presumed the hegemony of western liberal ideas.48 Even though Russian foreign policy was actually fairly unthreatening, and could even be characterized as collaborative for many years, it was not universally viewed this way because of the geopolitical threat it was perceived to represent.49 Sakwa also claims that some of the anti-Russianism has a strong basis in history, as Russia has never really been considered to be a part of Europe. Its very presence has motivated European integration; post WWII European identity was constructed on the basis of Russian exclusion, a reality that was confirmed by decades of the Cold War. That the fear of Russia and the exclusionary attitude toward Russia persist, driven largely by the United States and the derivative suspicion of Russia from the Cold War period, is problematic but not surprising.50

Russophobia in Western discourse has been written about, by Russians themselves - poets and writers - for nearly two centuries.51 Some have suggested that Russian fears of American Russophobia fuel a siege mentality present within Moscow since the end of the Cold War. Russophobia has had an impact; it has influenced the manner in which Russia approaches its own relations with the West. Valentina Feklyunina confirms that the assumption of American Russophobia by Russians themselves has shaped Russia’s self perception, and more importantly it has shaped Russia’s expectations for how foreign nations will engage with them.52 Russian leaders anticipate anti-Russianism in their dealings with the West, which shapes and perpetuate an “us vs. them” discourse among Russian decision makers that may be reinforcing the narrative of fear in Washington.

Russophobia ought not be confused with criticism of Russia. Heikki Luostarinen cautions that Finland, for example, no longer exhibits Russophobia, but that it remains free to offer social and political criticism.53 Russophobia is more than a disagreement or even competing values; in fact, during the Cold War, Russophobia took on what Luostarinen identifies as racist tones reflected in movies about the evils of the Soviet empire.54 The USSR was often cast not simply as the enemy, but as an evil villain, which justified its complete evisceration and for which no action taken toward this goal could be considered illegitimate. This demonization of the enemy may have parallels with the post 9/11 discourse about terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). During the Cold War, hostilities with the Soviet Union gave way to “fear, moral disgust and ignorance,” which were coupled with a lack of knowledge about the Soviet Union. Luostarinen explains that this enemy imaging involves the belief, by a cultural or political group and even a nation state itself, that one’s very security and fundamental values are purposefully and meaningfully threatened by the other.55 This enemy becomes essential to identity construction and may even serve some collective psychological need to perceive a threat for which a harsh response is justified. Externalizing a common threat can be essential to legitimizing a collective identity and historical experience.56 This “us vs. them” narrative can feed a powerful nationalism, which can provide a context for behaviors that might otherwise be difficult to legitimize. This enemy construction can become ingrained as mythology among members of a society. The “enemy image may strengthen integration within a given group and moderate internal conflicts; it may help to bring the rank and file behind the group leaders; it may be used (scapegoat) to explain any injustices within the group.”57 Luostarinen is careful to note that the construction of an enemy image does not mean that the so-called enemy itself is not guilty of actions that contribute to its demonization. The construction of an enemy image of Russia stems largely from the very real fact that, for centuries, Russia has stood for much of what Western values opposed: “autocracy, national repression, and conservatism” and later “radicalism and social revolution.”58 Fear of Russian aggression has been in place since the 16th Century, blossoming alongside the growth of Russian power.59 But this fear was coupled with the racist view of Russians as an inferior, inherently violent race that could not be trusted, thereby necessitating the conclusion that peaceful coexistence could not be countenanced; mistrust of the Russian leadership transformed into a cultural loathing of Russians themselves.60 John Gleason describes as deep seated fear or dislike of Russia, which is the result of misunderstanding of Russian history and culture, rooted in “competitive imperial ambitions.”61 Gleason notes that it may be a natural inclination to fear that which we know the least,62 which could help to explain the presence of Russophobia in earlier periods when connection with cultures across the globe was a rare occurrence. It does far less to explain the persistence of Russophobia in a time in which, notwithstanding the warnings of Samuel Huntington and others for whom cultural difference is a basis for conflict,63 contemporary access to a diversity of cultures can prompt cultural awareness, acceptance, and even fusion. This does not appear to be the case with American views of Russia, which remain imbued with an air of repugnance in which even minor differences take on elevated significance.

This lingering hostility toward Russia – Russophobia - has fostered an environment in which cooperation is difficult and missed opportunities abound. As a consequence of the perpetual misinterpretation of Russia, US leaders miss key opportunities for finding compatibility with Russia, particularly in key matters of security such as fighting terrorism, dealing with weapons proliferation, illegal drugs, energy security and working together to address instability in strategic and volatile regions64 and informs the pursuit of a foreign policy agenda that needlessly antagonizes Russia in an already uncertain international system. Moreover, the expansion of NATO eastward is evidence for some that the US continues to fight the Cold War and has perpetuated in response an extant anti-Americanism in Russia that will continue to make it difficult for the US to pursue its interests.

### L – Terrorism

#### Their advantage is a sham rooted in vested interests and violent national identity formation—the impact is expansive structural violence and racist political subjectivity

Desiree Bryan 12, Research Assistant at Middle East Institute. MScECON Candidate: Security Studies at Aberystwyth University, The Popularity of the ‘New Terrorism’ Discourse, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/22/the-popularity-of-the-new-terrorism-discourse/

The opening sentence of a textbook on terrorism states, “Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behavior since the dawn of recorded history” (Martin, 2010, 3). If this is the case, what makes the ‘new terrorism’ different from the old? According to the mainstream orthodoxy on terrorism, the old terrorism was generally characterized by: left wing ideology; the use of small scale, conventional weapons; clearly identifiable organizations or movements with equally clear political and social messages; specific selection of targets and “explicit grievances championing specific classes or ethnonational groups” (Martin, 2010, 28). Also according to the orthodoxy, the shift to the new terrorism, on the other hand, is thought to have emerged in the early 1990s (Jackson, 2011) and took root in mass consciousness with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. (Martin, 2010, 3). The new terrorism is characterized by: “loose, cell-based networks with minimal lines of command and control,” “desired acquisition of high-intensity weapons and weapons of mass destruction” (Martin, 2010, 27), “motivated by religious fanaticism rather than political ideology and it is aimed at causing mass causality and maximum destruction” (Jackson, 2007, 179-180). However, these dichotomous definitions of the old and new types of terrorism are not without problems. The first major problem is that terrorism has been characterized by the same fundamental qualities throughout history. Some of the superficial characteristics, the means of implementation (e.g. the invention of the Internet or dynamite) or the discourse (communism vs. Islam) may have evolved, but the central components remain the same. The second major problem is that the characterization of new terrorism is, at best, rooted in a particular political ideology, biased and inaccurate. At worst, it is racist, promotes war mongering and has contributed to millions of deaths. As David Rapoport states: Many contemporary studies begin … by stating that although terrorism has always been a feature of social existence, it became ‘significant’ … when it ‘increased in frequency’ and took on ‘novel dimensions’ as an international or transnational activity, creating in the process a new ‘mode of conflict’ (1984, 658). Isabelle Duyvesteyn points out that this would indicate evidence for the emergence of a new type of terrorism, if it were not for the fact that the article was written in 1984 and described a situation from the 1960s (Duyvesteyn, 2004, 439). It seems that there have been many new phases of terrorism over the years. So many so that the definition of ‘new’ has been stretched significantly and applied relatively across decades. Nevertheless, the idea that this terrorism, that which the War on Terror (WoT) is directed against, is the most significant and unique form of terrorism that has taken hold in the popular and political discourse. Therefore, it is useful to address each of the so-called new characteristics in turn. The first characteristic is the idea that new terrorism is based on loosely organized cell-based networks as opposed to the traditional terrorist groups, which were highly localized and hierarchical in nature. An oft-cited example of a traditional terrorist group is the Irish Republican Army (IRA), who operated under a military structure and in a relatively (in contrast to the perceived transnational operations of al-Qaeda) localized capacity. However, some of the first modern terrorists were not highly organized groups but small fragmented groups of anarchists. These groups were heeding the call of revolutionary anarchist Mikhail Bakunin and other contemporary anarchists to achieve anarchism, collectivism and atheism via violent means (Morgan, 2001, 33). Despite the initial, self-described “amorphous” nature of these groups, they were a key force in the Russian Revolution (Maximoff, G.). Furthermore, leading anarchist philosophers of the Russian Revolution argued that terrorists “should organize themselves into small groups, or cells” (Martin, 2010, 217). These small groups cropped up all around Russia and Europe in subsequent years and formed an early form of a “loosely organized cell-based network” not unlike modern day al Qaeda. Duyvesteyn further notes that both the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was founded in 1964, and Hezbollah, founded 1982, operate on a network structure with very little central control over groups (2004, 444). The second problematic idea of new terrorism is that contemporary terrorist groups aim to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This belief is simply not supported by empirical evidence. One of the key problems with this theory is that WMDs are significantly more difficult to obtain and utilize than most people understand. Even if a terrorist group were to obtain a biological WMD, “Biologist Matthew Meselson calculates that it would take a ton of nerve gas or five tons of mustard gas to produce heavy causalities among unprotected people in an open area of one square kilometer” (Mueller, 2005, 488). And that’s only an example of the problem with the implementation of WMDs, assuming they are acquired, transported and desirable by a terrorist group in the first place. Additional problems, such as the fact that WMDs “are extremely difficult to deploy and control” (Mueller, 2005, 488) and that making a bomb “is an extraordinarily difficult task” (Mueller, 2005, 489), further diminish the risk. It is interesting to note that, while the potential dangers of WMDs are much lauded, the attacks of September 11th were low tech and had been technologically possible for more than 100 years. Mueller also states, “although nuclear weapons have been around for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state (much less a terrorist group) a nuclear weapon that the recipient could use independently” (2005, 490). All of this talk about the difficultly of acquiring and deploying WMDs (by non-state agents), is not to diminish the question of what terrorists have to gain by utilizing these weapons. It is important to question whether it would even further the aims of terrorists to use WMDs. The evidence suggests otherwise. In the “Politics of Fear” Jackson states, “Mass casualties are most often counterproductive to terrorist aims – they alienate their supporters and can provoke harsh reprisals from the authorities […]” in addition, “[…] they would undermine community support, distort the terrorist’s political message, and invite over-whelming retaliation” (2007, 196-197). Despite popular rhetoric to the contrary, terrorists are “rational political actors and are acutely aware of these dangers” (Jackson, 2007, 197). Government appointed studies on this issue have supported these views. This leads us to the third problem with new terrorism, which is the idea that we are facing a new era of terrorism motivated by religious fanaticism rather than political ideology. As stated previously, earlier, so-called traditional forms of terrorism are associated with left wing, political ideology, whereas contemporary terrorists are described as having “anti-modern goals of returning society to an idealized version of the past and are therefore necessarily anti-democratic, anti-progressive and, by implication, irrational” (Gunning and Jackson, 3). Rapoport argues the idea that religious terrorists are irrational, saying, “what seems to be distinctive about modern [religious] terrorists, their belief that terror can be organized rationally, represents or distorts a major theme peculiar to our own culture […]” (1984, 660). Conveniently for the interests of the political elites, as we shall see later, the idea of irrational fanaticism makes the notion of negotiation and listening to the demands of the other impossible. In light of this, it is interesting to note that the U.S. has, for decades, given billions of dollars in aid to the State of Israel, which could be argued to be a fundamentalist, religious organization that engages in the terrorization of a group of people. Further, it is difficult to speak of The Troubles in Northern Ireland without speaking of the religious conflict, yet it was never assumed that the IRA was “absolutist, inflexible, unrealistic, lacking in political pragmatism, and not amenable to negotiation” (Gunning and Jackson, 4). Rapaport further reinforces the idea that religious terrorism goes back centuries by saying, “Before the nineteenth century, religion provided the only acceptable justifications for terror…” (1984, 659). As we have seen here, problems with the discourse of new terrorism include the fact that these elements of terrorism are neither new nor are the popular beliefs of the discourse supported by empirical evidence. The question remains, then, why is the idea of new terrorism so popular? This question will be addressed next. Political Investment in New Terrorism There are two main categories that explain the popularity of new terrorism. The first category is government and political investment in the propagation of the idea that a distinct, historically unknown type of terrorism exists. The mainstream discourse [1] reinforces, through statements by political elites, media, entertainment and every other way imaginable, the culture of violence, militarism and feelings of fear. Through mass media, cultural norms and the integration of neoliberal ideology into society, people are becoming increasingly desensitized to human rights issues, war, social justice and social welfare, not to mention apathetic to the political process in general. The discourse of the WoT is merely the contemporary incarnation of this culture of fear and violence. In the past, various threats have included American Indians, women, African Americans, communists, HIV/AIDS and drugs, to name but a few (Campbell, 1992). It can be argued that there are four main political functions of terrorism discourse. The first is as a distraction from other, more immediate and domestic social problems such as poverty, employment, racial inequality, health and the environment. The second, more sinister function is to control dissent. In looking at both of these issues Jackson states: There are a number of clear political advantages to be gained from the creation of social anxiety and moral panics. In the first place, fear is a disciplining agent and can be effectively deployed to de-legitimise dissent, mute criticism, and constrain internal opponents. […] Either way, its primary function is to ease the pressures of accountability for political elites. As instrument of elite rule, political fear is in effect a political project aimed at reifying existing structures of power. (Politics of Fear, 2007, 185). Giroux further reinforces the idea that a culture of fear creates conformity and deflects attention from government accountability by saying, “the ongoing appeal to jingoistic forms of patriotism divert the public from addressing a number of pressing domestic and foreign issues; it also contributes to the increasing suppression of dissent” (2003, 5). Having a problem that is “ubiquitous, catastrophic, and fairly opaque” (Jackson, Politics of Fear, 2007, 185) is useful to political elites, because it is nearly impossible to address the efficacy of combating the problem. At least, empirical evaluation can be, and is, easily discouraged in academic circles through research funding directives. Domestic problems such as the unemployment rate or health care reform, on the other hand, are directly measurable and heavily monitored by domestic sources. It is possible to account for the success or failure of policies designed to address these types of problems and the (re)election of politicians often depends heavily on success in these areas. However, the public is neither involved on a participative level nor, often, socially aware of what is happening in murkier and unreachable areas like foreign policy. The third political investment in maintaining the terrorism discourse has to do with economics. “At a material level, there are a great many vested interests in maintaining the widespread condition of fear, not least for the military-industrial complex which benefits directly from increased spending on national security” (Jackson, Politics of Fear, 2007, 186). This is true with all forms of crime and insecurity as all of them factor into the greater security-industrial complex. Not only do these industries employ millions of people and support their families, they boost the economy. Barry Buzan talks of these the importance of these issues to both the government and the public in terms of a ‘threat-deficit’ – meaning that U.S. policy and society is dependent on having an external threat (Buzan, 2007, 1101). The fourth key political interest in terrorism discourse is constructing a national identity. This will be discussed more thoroughly in the following section, however, it is important to acknowledge the role the WoT (and previous threats) has had on constructing and reinforcing a collective identity. Examples of this can be seen in the discourse and the subsequent reaction to anyone daring to step outside the parameters of the Bush Administration-established narrative in the days immediately following the September 11th attacks. A number of journalists, teachers and university professors lost their jobs for daring to speak out in criticism of U.S. policy and actions following the attacks. In 2001, Lynne Cheney attacked the then deputy chancellor of the New York City Schools, Judith Rizzo, for saying “terrorist attacks demonstrated the importance of teaching about Muslim cultures” (Giroux, 2003, 22). According to Giroux, this form of jingoistic patriotism “becomes a euphemism for shutting down dissent, eliminating critical dialogue, and condemning critical citizenship in the interest of conformity and a dangerous departure from what it means to uphold a viable democracy” (2003, 24). The message is, we are not the other (Muslims), patriotism equals agreement and compliance and our identity is based on the shared values of liberty and justice. According to Carol Winkler, “Negative ideographs contribute to our collective identity by branding behavior that is unacceptable … American society defines itself as much by its opposition to tyranny and slavery as it does by a commitment to liberty” (Winkler, 2006, 12). Terrorism, and by association in this case, Islam, functions as a negative ideograph of American values. It thereby tells us what our values and our identity are by telling us who the enemy is and who we are not. According to Jackson, “[…] some have argued that Western identity is dependent on the appropriation of a backward, illiberal, violent Islamic ‘other’ against which the West can organize a collective liberal, civilized ‘self’ and consolidate its cultural and political norms” (Jackson, Constructing Enemies, 2007, 420). Through this analysis we can see there are four key ways in which the hegemonic system is invested in propagating a culture of fear and violence and terrorism discourse. Not only is it key for political elites to support this system, it is also crucial that there be an ever renewingthreat that is uniquely different from past threats. These new threats allow for the investment of significantly more resources, the continuation of the economy, the renewal of a strong sense of cultural identity and the indoctrination and obedience of new generations of society. This essay will now look at how individual and collective psychology supports the popularity of the new terrorism discourse. Psychology of the Masses The second category of reasons why new terrorism discourse is popular can be called the psychology of the masses. There are a number of factors that fall under this category such as: the hyper-reality of the modern era; the culture of fear; the carryover of historical archetypes and the infiltration of neoliberal values into cultural norms. The topic of social and individual psychology and how it relates to the propagation and acceptance of hegemonic discourse is broad. It is also an important aspect of critical terrorism studies and merits further exploration. However, in this section will outline the basis for the popularity of new terrorism discourse and discuss several ways in which this popularity is manifested and reinforced in contemporary society.

# AFF AT: K—Security

## FW

### Framework – 2AC

#### Framework: only compare competitive policy options

#### First, predictability – checks infinite regress to nit-picking individual words – incentive to shift goalposts to moot the 1AC and preclude AFF offense is unfair and disincentivizes in-depth research and analytical skills

#### Second, rejoinder – turns their offense – centering stasis on comparative solvency is key to critical purchase and avoiding cooption – if ALT solvency does NOT match the scope of their impacts, then links are NOT offense

Visoka 19 Gëzim Visoka, Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Dublin City University, “Critique and Alternativity in International Relations,” International Studies Review, 21(4), 2019, pp.678-704, DOI 10.1093/isr/viy065 /GoGreen!

More broadly, alternativity in critical IR theory needs to be rescued from never-ending conceptual reifications, which have ended up making ontological assentation about the world become completely detached from the world. In this regard, there is a growing realization in IR that “critique is a necessary but secondary task; the priority is to return to practical theory as quickly as possible” (Levine 2012, 69). Recalibrating the purpose of alternativity in critical theory requires recalibrating knowledge production, not only to unmask power relations and the dynamics of dominance and to create space for a politics of resistance but also to generate practical knowledge for political action that challenges, confronts, and disrupts existing power relations and offers alternative solutions for reshuffling social relations on more emancipatory and inclusive terms (see Duvall and Varadarajan 2003, 85; Murdie 2017; Deiana and McDonagh 2018). A feature of critical peace and conflict studies is a congruence between the emancipatory and problem-solving perspectives, which should be predicated on the conciliation of knowledge, the expansion of onto-politics of peace, and the pluralization of epistemological and methodological approaches. The recent methodological work by J. Samuel Barkin and Laura Sjoberg (2017) on interpretive quantification is a promising move toward this much-needed pluralist fertilization within critical theory. In particular, a stronger linkage between criticality, alternativity, and practicality could help critical security, peace, and conflict theories to offer alternatives that would maintain critical impetus while simultaneously strengthening ties to practical and societal problem-addressing solutions. Genealogical studies would blend well with a critical analysis of conceptual and policy alternatives (see Milliken 1999). Statistical analysis with an emancipatory hypothesis coupled with critical analysis would contribute to subverting policy practices and would normalize alternative knowledge about peace, justice, and emancipation.

The recent practice-turn in IR offers new bridges between scholars and practitioners, making it possible to translate critical knowledge into practice without compromising the normativity and criticality of scholarly works (see Bigo 2011). A forum on pragmatism published in this journal has implicitly highlighted the importance of alternativity in understanding global politics and generating impactful knowledge beyond the existing epistemological and methodological divides (see Hellmann 2009). Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009, 701) have argued for “the orientation of research toward the generation of useful knowledge.” Practicality is essential for generating alternatives. For instance, Jonna Nyman (2016, 142) argues that “a pragmatic, practice-centred approach . . . can help us gain practical knowledge of how security works and understand the value of security better, as well as help us to suggest alternative possibilities.” Similarly, Navnita Chadha Behera (2016, 154) argues: “theorizing in IR needs to step out of the rarefied atmosphere of its academe, develop a healthy scepticism toward its canonical frames, and open up to the possibilities of learning from everyday life and experiences of people and their living traditions and practices.” Practicality shifts the focus from abstract criticality and normativity to contextual critiques that account for everyday practices and interactions. This would be essential for rescuing critique from becoming a postempirical endeavor.

Critical knowledge that engages with policy alternatives “is not only pragmatic, it is also politically enabling: it forces us away from instrumental problem-solving perspectives towards a wider framework of pragmatic thought where narrow instrumental goals are overridden by wider normative and political concerns” (Kurki 2013, 260). Such grounded critiques are crucial in order to expand non-prescriptive alternativity and exploring practical possibilities for social emancipation and change. For Steve Smith (2002: 202), “the acid test for the success of alternative and critical approaches is the extent to which they have led to empirically grounded work that explores the range and variety of world politics.” This would also be congruent with Daniel Levine's (2012, 30) concept of sustainable critique, which entails thinking in both practical and critical terms at once so that “IR could create a sustainably critical perspective on global politics that might then be turned back onto, and made to inform, ongoing policy debates and discourses.” Behera (2016, 154) further maintains that the “state-centric ontology of IR has effectively ended up dehumanizing the discipline in a way so that normally it has little to do with human relations, human needs, and the larger imperatives of humanity.” Generating practical alternatives would therefore require endorsing situated knowledge as an epistemological and methodological basis for any engagement with the real world. The work of feminists such as Donna Haraway (1988, 584) on situated standpoints is also relevant here because they offer “more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the world.” Situated knowledge is, mostly, nonrepresentational knowledge, in that it is not firmly mediated through preexisting discourses. In this regard, promoting subjugated knowledge discourses and practices could be central to rejuvenating the emancipatory commitment of critical theory (see Doty 1996).

Situated alternatives could derive from emplaced and embodied knowledge and could have a more emancipatory character as they “bring forth the importance of recognizing, valuing, and employing marginalized voices by working from this perspective, as well as by reshaping research to include marginalized communities as part of knowledge production” (McHugh 2015, 62). For Robson and McCartan (2016, 3), “real world research looks to examine personal experience, social life and social systems, as well as related policies and initiatives. It endeavours to understand the lived in reality of people in society and its consequences.” Milja Kurki's (2013, 245) recent study of democracy promotion has approached alternativity from the perspective of policy provocations, which focus “on not prioritising one or another perspective, but rather on encouraging self-reflection by all practitioners, which in turn is considered as a key condition of seeking adequately pluralism-fostering reforms in concrete policy frameworks.” Kurki (2013, 248–51) further maintains that “instead of relying on objective knowledge and criteria, policy process can and should be attuned to the logic of interpretive, politicised and participatory judgements.” Her study is an excellent example of pragmatic congruence between criticality and alternativity, whereby policy alternatives are not geared toward totally improving or enhancing the current system but openly promote more pluralistic, reflexive, and emancipatory policies for democratization and peacebuilding.

Moreover, for these new grounds of critical alternativity to be introduced in practice, knowledge production should be decentered, decolonized, and “de-methodolised” (see Lisle 2014). R. B. J. Walker (2002, 265) has argued that “the key achievement of supposedly alternative and critical literatures over the past two decades has been to open up at least some possibility of asking questions about the location and character of the political.” As elaborated in this study, knowledge production in peace and conflict studies is predominantly based on Western epistemologies, which are shaped by specific cultures of thought, self-perpetuated epistemological superiority, and codified academic practices. Most of the international scholarship on postconflict societies derives from an unrepresentative body of knowledge, which tries to mediate, deviate, reinterpret, and, consequently, construct a different social reality that is interpreted through different measurements, reference points, and analytical concepts (see Latour 2005). This has greatly limited the possibility for proposing realizable alternatives. Due to these epistemological anomalies, there are growing calls in scholarship to decolonize knowledge from Eurocentric and Western dominance and instead to pursue more pluralist and particularist modes of knowledge (Smith 2012). For instance, Acharya and Buzan (2010, 2) have argued that IR theory should be “an open domain into which it is not unreasonable to expect non-Westerners to make a contribution at least proportional to the degree that they are involved in its practice.” Similarly, Andrew Hurrell (2016, 151) has proposed that “the pathway to a global IR will need to look beyond ‘IR’ and is likely to require new models for organizing social science research and knowledge production.” Decolonized epistemologies of peace would reverse the order of knowledge, placing the local first and then the regional and international as spatial and ontological scales for understanding peace processes (Visoka 2017). They would not operate in isolation but would engage in shaping global IR knowledge. Therefore, a genuine search for achievable alternatives should try to decolonize peace knowledge from Western and Eurocentric frameworks, interrogate decolonized knowledge and agencies, and explore the joint constitution of international intervention and local resistance (see Smith 2012; Memmi 2006). Local scholars often have rich knowledge, but the primary usage of it is not for instrumental purposes or for transferring and sharing with audiences of outsiders. Local knowledge is very much used to respond to narrow practical and everyday interests and needs and, as such, is embedded in the logic of generating sufficient knowledge to respond to specific circumstances.

In the context of peacebuilding, as examined in this article, generating alternatives from the ground up has the potential to bring about more sustainable forms of peace and reconciliation for groups and societies affected by violent conflict. Situated alternatives for emancipatory peace are more prone to avoiding co-optation by positivist and problem-solving epistemic predators, resulting thus in developing pluriversal political and peace orders beyond liberal peacebuilding and other Eurocentric impositions. From this situated perspective, emancipation could take the shape of “the transformation of structures and relationships of vulnerability through localized political action, aimed at the creation of spaces in people's lives so that they are enabled to make decisions and act beyond mere survival” (Basu and Nunes 2013, 69). Emancipatory alternatives would not be universal in their applications because such an attempt is not viable. Rather the focus should be on searching for practical emancipatory possibilities within a given context, time, space, and place (see Fierke 2007, 24). In other words, critiques with an adequate dose of alternativity are more likely to generate globally understandable and locally impactful knowledge. Nevertheless, alternativity does not necessarily have to be predicated on representative views of the world—it can also be a by-product of performing hope and imagined possibilities in global politics. Shapiro (2013, xiv) argues that critical thinking helps to “create the conditions of possibility for imaging alternative worlds.” That said, as the purpose of critical theory is emancipatory change, any alternative theoretical and empirical observation in service of improving the human conditions should generate a morally and practically acceptable standpoint. Because any attempt to establish an alternative interpretation inevitably “empowers a particular social and political standpoint” (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 261). According to Ní Mhurchú and Shindo (2016, 5), “critique can help us to develop different ways of talking about, evaluating, doing and interrogating the changing nature of politics, relations and experiences of the international in a globalising world.” Hence, critique is inevitably implicated in world-making and, with a much clearer understanding of alternativity, can steer the thrust for world-changing in a more emancipatory, just, and inclusive direction.

Conclusion

Emancipation is a central feature of critical IR debates, but scholars often fail to develop alternatives or solutions achieving emancipation in practice. This article has examined the relationship between criticality and alternativity in IR in order to shed light on some of the most contested issues of critical theory, namely, the epistemological pathways for identifying the inconsistencies and flaws in existing knowledge and practices and the extent to which critical knowledge should generate alternative emancipatory possibilities. The article has argued that alternativity provides an opportunity for critical scholars to remain relevant without being affiliated with positivist logics of inquiry. In unpacking the conceptual contours, the article first explored how different branches of critical IR engage with the episteme of alternativity. The analysis found that although alternativity is often affiliated with problem-solving epistemologies, it has played a major role in shaping critical knowledge in IR. While this is acknowledged and endorsed at the epistemological level by a branch of critical scholars who engage in normative and reconstructive modes of critique, other scholars embedded in deconstructive modes of critique have disregarded the merits of alternativity in IR. The article has argued that, contrary to what is often assumed, alternativity is not incompatible with deconstructive or reconstructive critiques across different subdisciplines of IR. Yet critical IR debates, which have now become the new mainstream in IR, have failed to engage with the episteme of alternativity in a more empirical and practical sense. They preach emancipation but fail to develop tangible emancipatory alternatives.

As a result, there is a growing realization that, without tangible alternativity, critical theory risks losing its normative impetus and its ethical and emancipatory commitment, potentially becoming a post-epistemological vocation without politics. Critical knowledge without a dose of alternativity may examine the causes and consequences of subject matters but could fall short of reaching out to the wider policy community and the affected subjects where power relations reside, thus missing the opportunity to transform the structural, discursive, and performative practices that reproduce violence, inequality, and injustice on human and nonhuman ecology. To bridge this epistemological gap, the analysis in the second part of this article examined how alternativity features in peace and conflict studies, a disciplinary field known for adding normative, empirical, and practical substance to critical IR debates. The analysis offered a conceptual scoping of three modes of critique and alternativity in peace and conflict studies. The three modes of critique showed that a conjunction between criticality and alternativity is possible and that it is necessary to renew the practical and emancipatory potential of critical theory in IR. The three modes of alternativity in peace and conflict studies expose a spectrum of different critiques, ranging from those perspectives that disengage completely from conceptual and empirical alternatives, to more pragmatic and prescriptive approaches.

Critique-without-alternative represents one strand, which tends to avoid offering normative and practical alternatives to their critical reflections aimed at maintaining the conservative and radical impetus of critical theory and dissociating from problem-solving and policy-relevant methods of inquiry. This mode of critique is committed to revealing the weaknesses of peacebuilding interventions but refuses to offer any emancipatory and practical alternative on how to build sustainable peace after violent conflict. If the end goal of critical perspectives is achieving emancipation, then critique should not only be directed toward problematizing dominant discourses, practices, and policies but also needs to envisage political and practical alternatives rooted in ideational and material elements. In turn, the lack of an explicit emancipatory agenda limits their social and political impact and unintentionally validates the existing order. In response to this challenge, a new mode of critique has emerged, namely, critique-as-alternative, which exemplifies the optimal approach. Proponents of critique-as-alternative have remained committee to critical analysis, but most importantly, they have taken up the challenge of offering emancipatory knowledge that has practical relevance for vulnerable societies in global politics. Their main flaw, however, has been their inability to elaborate sufficiently their practical and emancipatory alternatives—a flaw that has opened up space for epistemic contestation and policy co-optation. Finally, the third mode of critique—critique-with-alternative—which is embedded in a positivist, problem-solving, and policy-driven logic of inquiry, offers alternatives that seek either to verify existing knowledge and the existing interventionary order or to reject other critical alternatives.

Looking at different modes of critique through the lens of alternativity in IR's subdiscipline of peace and conflict studies has provided interesting insights on the promise and limits of critical IR in shaping global politics. The analysis found that existing modes of critique have failed to develop elaborative emancipatory alternatives at both the conceptual and the practical levels. To infuse critique-with-alternative with emancipatory elements, expand the epistemological scope of critique-without-alternative, and operationalize further the practical solutions offered by this mode of critique, substantial changes are needed. This article has suggested exploring postparadigmatic approaches of inquiry in order to avoid existing epistemological entrapments and limitations, reclaiming the practical relevance of critical theory through pragmatic, reflexive, and situated alternatives—across the conceptual, normative, and empirical spectrums—and promoting decolonized, bottom-up methods of knowledge production. The existing modes of critique require pursuing more nonconflictual and postparadigmatic epistemologies, embracing situated knowledge and reclaiming and expanding its practical relevance, breaking away from geo-epistemological hierarchies, and opening up to post-Western IR. To conclude, promoting alternativity has the potential to rejuvenate critical scholarship embedded in the ethos of impactful engagement with the world without being co-opted by the policy world. The next challenge for scholars should not be whether alternativity and criticality are congruent but how emancipatory alternatives can renew the social and political purpose of critical theory and make an impact in the real world.

### Framework – 1AR

#### Reject their “critical theory *only*” framework — it precludes actually emancipatory scholarship.

Andrews 13 — Nathan Andrews, Trudeau and Vanier Scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta (Canada), former Banting Postdoctoral Fellow at Queen's University (Canada), holds a Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada), 2013 (“Beyond the Ivory Tower: A Case for ‘Praxeological Deconstructionism’ as a ‘Third Way’ in IR Theorising,” *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 34, Number 1, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis Online, p. 72)

Conclusion

IR theory has undoubtedly been ‘in a state of disarray’ for several decades now,96 and the approach espoused above does not necessarily seek to turn things around. One thing that praxeological deconstructionism, as a ‘third way’, seeks to do, however, is to show that efforts at theory building and social transformation are complementary in most cases; hence researchers should maintain the liberty to pick and choose from various perspectives to inform their particular case studies. Many theoretical approaches have had similar ambitions but I find that IR is still taking baby-steps towards what I have envisioned as a ‘third way’, which grows from the continuous frustration with the problem-solving/critical theory binary in the field. I insist on intellectual diversity and theoretical pluralism but at the same time diversity and pluralism should be underpinned by the need for genuine cross-communication and multi-disciplinarity. This escapes the ‘paradigmatic paramountcy’ of either rationalist or critical approaches,97 thereby improving dialogue and furthering disciplinary growth.

In sum, the case this paper has made is that, without the careful synthesis of the multiplicity of approaches and perspectives that best capture the field as ‘international’, thereby incorporating alternative and marginalised perspectives, the future of IR as a field that contributes meaningfully to addressing the problems of the day will remain untapped. So far, I have argued that deconstruction alone is not enough. One has to have a conversation after deconstruction and then try to reconstruct in both theoretical and pragmatic ways, bearing in mind the dangers of reconstruction. This would allow research not only to understand the world but also to change it. Some theorists who are set in their ways will ask: is synthesis of the IR field possible? Is it even desirable? I would say ‘yes’ to both questions. The need for a synthetic ‘third way’ has arisen; one that is neither essentialised as problem-solving nor critical, but which embraces some relevant assumptions of both. More importantly, nevertheless, IR theorists (particularly of the ‘post’ tradition) should get out of their ivory tower to espouse theories that are self-critical, meaningful and continually relevant to the human experiences of the agents/subjects they study. This is the purpose of theory!

#### Our framework solves their offense, but their framework links to ours.

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The second premise derives from some critical scholars’ refusal to offer specific alternatives. Richard Ashley (as well as many post-structural, postcolonial, and post-development scholars), for instance, will argue that it is not the goal of critical theory to provide alternatives, as such an endeavour defeats the self-reflexivity that undergirds the theory. But this is problematic because, while these theories reveal the agency in the theory, there is no clarity of purpose in terms of ‘actionable’ leeway for the agent. Also, instead of glorifying realism, for instance as offering a ‘timeless wisdom’,66 the followers in this camp should be more reflexive so as to overcome the inert determinism and parochialism that underpin their theorising. Closely related to the second justification is the argument that the purpose of both theoretical and empirical analyses is not only to understand the world but also to change it. This change is not possible if critical theorists engage solely in inward-looking critiques of existing theories without providing a programmatic understanding of what their perspectives entail or how the existing condition can improve. [end page 67] Additionally, as the need for theoretical pluralism becomes more apparent, PD assists in making sure the notion of ‘pluralism’ moves from being a buzzword to an actual practice. Essentially most IR theories have four main themes in common: power, order, structure and agency—although the emphasis placed on each of these elements differs from theory to theory. Praxeologically oriented deconstruction helps to elucidate these four components without taking any aspect of them for granted. The argument here recognises the ontological and epistemological difficulties one falls into when thinking of a ‘third way’—the difficulty of having so many established scholars and theorists disagree with the approach on many grounds, even including grounds of originality and usefulness. But the point is that, while we emphasise, for instance, what Ashley calls the ‘four p’s’—process, practice, power and politics67—we need to explore the structure and utility of the state in contemporary world politics—and by so doing unveil the axes of domination in existing structures. This is therefore an approach which symbolises the mutually constitutive synergies between knowledge/theory and praxis/practice, as explained below, rather than one that seeks to revolutionise the entire field of study by turning it upside down.

This approach does not simply seek to reimagine ‘deconstruction’ but rather attempts to show that deconstruction, without praxis, ends at a point which leaves the individual subject unable to ascertain what options of social transformation are available.68 The main contention in recent times has been between those who call themselves ‘rationalists’ and the ‘constructivists’, although neither possesses a concise set of theoretical and methodological assumptions that explain the entirety of IR. As the socio-political phenomena IR addresses are often subjective and context-specific, there is no ‘scientific truth’ to be had which will transcend space and time. The ontology of PD, as evident from Figure 1, is that there is no one world or ‘truth’ out there, if any, and in the same manner there is no single way of knowing or standard by which ‘good’ knowledge is measured. In this case ‘truth is always contingent, always a matter for debate and always partial’, meaning that ‘truth is not “out there”, waiting to be discovered’.69 Rather, there are multiple understandings which reside in [end page 68] different sites—times and spaces. A ‘third way’ is thus crucial, especially for people who are concerned with both discursive interpretations and real (emancipatory) alternatives.70 It is only in this way that the discipline can become transformative or pro-change while taking into cognisance the fact that change can occur from both within and outside established arenas of power. PD also shows that there is no point in ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’; although the water is dirty, the baby can be saved lest the purpose of bathing the baby itself becomes self-defeating. This speaks to the freedom and flexibility this approach gives to the researcher in choosing from multiple perspectives.71

#### The most important question is: How can we actually make the world a better place? Only our framework asks it.

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Contours of praxeological deconstructionism: research programme54

It remains problematic to think along the lines of the strict distinction Robert Cox makes between problem-solving or rationalist theories and critical or interpretivist theories of IR because in essence ‘[all] theory is political and [all] political action is theory-laden’.55 The rigidity that comes with the two main approaches, or ‘theoretical churches’, does no specific good to the field in general. While there is dignity in difference, there is hope in some degree of commonality. The approach being promoted here is more congenial to critical theory thanks to its reflexivity but it also embraces mixed methods. The quest is to problematise the ‘problem-solving/critical theory’ binary that we have been presented with in the field of IR, based on the argument that it is arbitrary and often a misrepresentation of the many theories and research traditions that often attempt to exhibit both characteristics. In some cases what is considered to be solving a problem actually solves nothing, since the theory can be so removed from the world ‘out there’ that it attempts to describe, revealing an overpowering ‘practicality deficit’ in the theory’s core assumptions.56

My proposition for a ‘third way’ is based on these premises: First, historically some critical theorists have borrowed from problem-solving theorists, and vice [end page 66] versa. For instance, a feminist theorist like Ann Tickner has attempted to reformulate realism.57 While there are many variants of feminism, some of them appear to begin their theorising with an acknowledgement of traditional realists such as Hans Morgenthau.58 The point here is that some critical theories seem to have built upon some of the assumptions of problem-solving theories, although others deconstruct and reject them outright. After all, Cynthia Enloe has argued that a book about international politics should leave one with a sense that ‘I can do something’, a more instrumental and affirmative orientation that most IR books lack.59

Let me note at this point that I find this approach receptive to the kind of scholarship being pursued by some critical feminist scholars. Such scholars have been successful at borrowing from problem-solving theories, yet still with a quest for progressive change. In their analysis of social movements, for instance, Meyer and Lupo argue that feminism’s uniqueness derives from its ability to consistently illuminate the relationship between self and community.60 Critical feminist scholarship is interested in processes of domination that are often silenced by the mainstream’s fetishism with the state, power and anarchy, a commitment that results from the ‘lived injustices’ or sufferings of marginalised groups.61 Thus, feminist scholars’ commitment to emancipatory politics is ‘aimed at transforming relations of inequality and domination’.62 Additionally, feminist scholars have carefully examined the concept of intersectionality, which mainly emphasises the interwoven nature of race, class, gender and sexuality in order to show the mutually constitutive nature of identity and structures of inequality.63 And ‘because intersectional knowledge is grounded in everyday lives of people of diverse backgrounds, it is seen as an important tool linking theory with practice’.64 These ‘feminist characteristics’ are elements that the approach espoused below identifies with and, in fact, I hope that the notion of PD will encourage discussions among scholars interested in progressive social change through research. As some critical scholars are already doing, we should particularly ask: ‘how should we do our research in order to increase the likelihood that it will actually help make the world a better place?’.65

#### No neg offense — critical theory and problem-solving theory aren’t mutually exclusive.

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International Relations (IR) theory is typically divided into two: traditional (often known as problem-solving/rationalist) theory and critical (often referred to as reflectivist/interpretivist) theory. Traditional theories remain the most predominant in the field of study as they often have powerful proponents and a larger number of disciples. The Oxford English Dictionary defines tradition as ‘a long established and generally accepted custom or method of procedure, having almost the force of a law’.3 In this context anything ‘traditional’ is ‘observant [end page 59] of, bound by tradition’.4 The origins of the theories are what make them cohere as traditional theories of IR and include realism (neorealism and critical realism); the English School; and liberal theories (liberalism, neoliberalism, global governance and cosmopolitanism). These are theories that often dwell on ancient and classical writings from Aristotle to Voltaire, and are sometimes committed to (re)interpreting these writings as though they were written for this contemporary age. They are also traditional because they possess the force of law where, for instance, the ‘realist gambit’5 has been dominant as well as the (neo)liberal ‘common-sense’.6

Theories considered to be critical include feminism, post-structuralism, securitisation and postcolonialism, among others. The question then is: what makes them ‘critical’? As Steven Roach asserts, ‘what makes critical IR theory “critical” is its self-awareness as a theory’—an awareness woven into the critical traditions of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Habermas, Derrida and Butler7—and we can certainly add Michel Foucault among other post-Enlightenment French philosophers. It is argued that critical theory was introduced into IR in 1981 with the publication of Robert Cox’s Social Forces, States and World Orders and Richard K Ashley’s Political Realism and Human Interests.8 A discussion of the so-called ‘great debates’ will show that critical theorists are generally post- positivist and to a large extent anti-foundationalist in that they do not accept any objective, Archimedean point or standard by which ‘legitimate’ knowledge should be measured. And they are also postmodern in the sense that they oppose the teleological measurement of human progress that characterises Enlightenment thinking, in addition to their quest to deconstruct established interpretations (discourse) in order to ascertain their embedded ‘silences’. It is based on this common ontological and epistemological orientation that neo- Gramscian theory and deconstructionism manage to fit under critical IR theory.

The problem, however, is that couching the broader field into two binaries— what Cox in 1981 classified as problem-solving and critical theory, respectively—is a problematic simplification of the discussion of international relations. Although many people will agree that there is no pure form of these two main schools, some IR textbooks, course syllabuses and journal articles perpetuate this trend.9 This configuration of the field inhibits the multidimensional nature of the subject matter. In an attempt to reconcile the binary between problem-solving (rationalist) theories and critical (interpretivist) theory, this paper also tries to construct what can be considered a ‘third way’ in IR theorising for those who seek to transcend what is usually characteristic of either of these theoretical traditions. The crux of the entire paper is to explain why the contention here is to adopt a ‘third way’ (what I refer to as ‘praxeological deconstructionism’10) as opposed to the rationalist and reflectivist/interpretivist schools in IR theory. The quest is to make the discipline practically relevant in explaining the ‘here and now’ while not abandoning the need to be critical and self-reflexive in its theorising. Overall the paper initiates a purposive call for the dual goal of deconstruction and reconstruction, a normative and instrumental position that the ‘thick descriptions’ of most critical theorists (particularly those belonging to the ‘post-’ approaches) often fail to emphasise.11

### AT: Policy Failure

#### Reversing policy failure does NOT require methodological consistency, merely causal policy relevance – ALT makes it worse through theoretical reification and alienating policymakers

--reification = confusing deliberately oversimplified theory with the complex reality it attempts to describe

Desch 19 Michael C. Desch, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Notre Dame International Security Center at the University of Notre Dame, “Conclusions, Responses to Objections, and Scholarly Recommendations,” Chapter 9, *Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security*, Princeton University Press, 2019, ISBN 978-0-691-18121-9, pp.250-251 /GoGreen!

There are, of course, some nuts-and-bolts issues that scholars should be mindful of if they want to participate in the broader policy debate. Since policymakers have short attention spans given the number and breadth of issues they have to deal with, scholarly efforts to engage them need to be brief in conveying their ideas.70 This explains why Op/Eds are particularly influential and why so many are optimistic that blogs could play a similar role. Moreover, policymakers find much current scholarly work—from across the methodological spectrum—inaccessible. The common sentiment animating their views is that scholars should cut the jargon. Policymakers don’t want scholars to write in Greek or French, but rather just plain English.71

There are also some much bigger issues undergirding the relevance question.72 To begin with, political science needs to rethink how it balances scholarly rigor with practical application. There is a middle ground between policy analysis and journalism, on one side, and scholastic irrelevance on the other.73 The best approach to balancing scholarly rigor with continuing policy relevance is methodological pluralism, which includes a commitment to using not any particular method (or all of them) but rather just the approach most appropriate for the question at hand. But methodological pluralism, by itself, is not sufficient. The latest trend in political science requiring the simultaneous use of multiple methods could, ironically, prove to be even more limiting of policy relevance. Indeed, given the need to employ all of these methods simultaneously, it is potentially even more constraining in terms of the problems it can address because it has to be limited to those which can be quantified, modeled, and studied in depth at the same time.74 Therefore, reinforcing methodological pluralism must also be a commitment to problem-, rather than method-, driven research agendas. It is only the combination of these two principles that will ensure that policy-relevant security studies can not only survive, but thrive, in political science.75

Scholars also need to think carefully about the role of theory in policy-relevant security studies scholarship. While there is no doubt that theory is important to policymakers, scholars need to be aware that as with many other things, too much of it can be a bad thing. In particular, the effort to cram the rich complexity of the social world into universal models can do intellectual violence to the phenomenon under study as well as produce suboptimal policy. Paul Nitze, then the director of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, readily conceded policymakers’ need for theory but also noted that “there is the opposing consideration .. . that [theoretical] oversimplification presents great dangers.”76 Albert Wohlstetter advocated a balanced approach to theory, noting that the key to his success throughout his career “was the practical experience I had in working with engineers. I worked with them from two sides, so to speak, as someone who had been concerned with very abstract theory more basic than that familiar to design engineers, but on the other hand, I was also concerned with production, and therefore generally trying to get them to do things more practical than they wanted to do.”77 Theory is a powerful tool of statecraft, but when scholars embrace universal models they also risk irrelevance or worse.

Likewise, the transmission belts conveying scholarly findings to the policy world must be repaired. Kennan envisioned the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in the late 1940s serving this function, and in some respects it continues to do so to this day.78 However, there are limits to how effectively a part of the bureaucracy can serve as an honest research broker. A plethora of think tanks in Washington are also supposed to translate knowledge into action, though the trend in recent years has been toward the establishment of overtly political and advocacy organizations, rather than nonpartisan, translational research centers.79 Reinventing the role of think tanks as bridges between the Ivory Tower and the beltway is long overdue.

While nonacademic transmission belts can mediate between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway, they are no substitute for the scholars who produce knowledge to themselves serve as their own translators of it into policy. To be sure, scholars should not stop writing scholarly books and monographs utilizing the most sophisticated techniques of their discipline, if appropriate. In addition to doing these things, scholars should address pressing real world problems, not just chase after disciplinary fads. No one is in a better position to highlight the policy implications of a given piece of research than the individual who conducted it. Academic social scientists, if they want to be heard by senior policymakers, and heard correctly, need to be their own policy “transmission belts.”80

The role of the Democratic Peace Theory in the recent Iraq war demonstrates the problems with scholars not specifying the concrete policy implications of their research.81 Drawing on DPT, some officials in the George W. Bush administration justified the invasion of Iraq as part of a larger strategy to bring peace to the region by spreading democracy.82 Democratic Peace proponent Bruce Russett objected to this conclusion after the fact though his voice had been largely mute in the run up to the war.83 Had he and other democracy scholars participated more actively in the prewar debate, this rationale may have been less credible.

### Scenario Analysis Good

#### Descriptive scenario analysis is vital to critical reflexivity – deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed epistemological assumptions, and empowers creativity and flexibility in thinking and advocacy

Barma 16 Naazneen Barma, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, PhD Political Science, UC-Berkeley; Brent Durbin, Professor of Government, Smith College, PhD Political Science, UC-Berkeley; Eric Lorber, attorney at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, JD University of Pennsylvania, PhD Political Science, Duke University; and Rachel Whitlark, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, PhD Political Science, The George Washington University; “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives, 17(2), 2016, pp.1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf> /GoGreen!

Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric.

Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas.

This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world.

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science?

Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created.

The Art of Scenario Analysis

We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way.

While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector.

Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013).

Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present.

Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry

The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation.

Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8

An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools.

In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas.

The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance.

The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

## IMPACT

### ! – Case Outweighs

#### Our threats are real and endorsing analysis of attendant existential risks is the only ethical approach

Baum 18 Seth D. Baum, and Anthony M. Barrett, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks,” *Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing*, ed. Vicki Bier, Routledge, 2018, pp.174–184 /GoGreen!

1. Introduction

The most extreme type of risk is the risk of a global catastrophe causing permanent worldwide destruction to human civilization. In the most extreme cases, human extinction could occur. Global catastrophic risk (GCR) is thus risk of events of the highest magnitude of consequences, and the risks merit serious attention even if the probabilities of such events are low. Indeed, a growing chorus of scholars rates GCR reduction as among the most important priorities for society today. Unfortunately, many analysts also estimate frighteningly high probabilities of global catastrophe, with one even stating “I think the odds are no better than fifty-fifty that our present civilization on Earth will survive to the end of the present century” (Rees 2003:8).

Regardless of what the probabilities are, it is clear that humanity today faces a variety of serious GCRs. To an extent, humanity always has faced GCRs, in the form of supervolcano eruptions, impacts from large asteroids and comets, and remnants of stellar explosions. Events like these have contributed to several mass extinction events across Earth’s history. The Toba volcano eruption about 70,000 years ago may have come close to bringing the human species to a premature end. However, scholars of GCR generally believe that today’s greatest risks derive from human activity. These GCRs include war with biological or nuclear weapons, extreme climate change and other environmental threats, and misuse or accidents involving powerful emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and synthetic biology. These GCRs threaten far greater destruction than was seen in the World Wars, the 1918 flu, the Black Death plague, or other major catastrophes of recent memory.

The high stakes and urgent threats of GCR demand careful analysis of the risks and the opportunities for addressing them. However, several factors make GCR difficult to analyze. One factor is the unprecedented nature of global catastrophes. Many of the catastrophes have never occurred in any form, and of course no previous global catastrophe has ever destroyed modern human civilization. The lack of precedent means that analysts cannot rely on historical data as much as they can for smaller, more frequent events. Another factor is the complexity of GCRs, involving global economic, political, and industrial systems, which present difficult analytical decisions about which details to include. Finally, the high stakes of GCR pose difficult dilemmas about the extent to which GCR reduction should be prioritized relative to other issues.

In this paper we present an overview of contemporary GCR scholarship and related issues for risk analysis and risk management. We focus less on the risks themselves, each of which merits its own dedicated treatment. Other references are recommended for the risks, perhaps the best of which are the relevant chapters of Bostrom and Ćirković (2008). Instead, our focus here is on overarching themes of importance to the breadth of the GCRs. The following section defines GCR in more detail and explains why many researchers consider it to be so important. Next, some of the analytical challenges that GCR poses and the techniques that have been developed to meet these challenges are explained. There follows a discussion of some dilemmas that arise when GCR reduction would require great sacrifice or would interfere with each other. Finally, conclusions are drawn.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important?

Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004).

A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species.

Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives.

Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives.

Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization.

The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them.

While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

### Consequentialism Good

#### Evaluate causal consequences – subsumes the effects of representations – BUT conflating “causes” with “justifies” is ethically bankrupt

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The term ‘discourse ethics’ is Habermas’s (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 30-34), but we are using it here in a general sense: for the view that an adequate framework for ethical evaluation and critique must include the comparison and evaluation of different arguments for different lines of action in a process of deliberation. Such assessments of arguments pose difficult problems, and deliberation is by no means guaranteed to produce consensus. Nevertheless, deliberation can contribute to the quality of ethical critique by ensuring that a wide range of arguments are considered in making decisions, that all alternatives are taken into account and thoroughly criticized, and that people have to (at least) moderate their own partialities in evaluating a range of arguments collectively. To illustrate this, we shall refer to two ethically contentious political decisions and the courses of action which they led to. The first is the decision by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to advocate Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (we have discussed this in Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 96-97). The second is the decision by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to open Germany’s borders to the refugees coming from the Middle East in the autumn of 2015. In so doing, we will illustrate the relevance of ethical critique from all three of the major ethical positions: deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. CDA and practical argumentation CDA is mainly concerned with critical analysis of discourse which is oriented to action, including political discourse, but also managerial, organisational and other forms of discourse. The primary activity in such discourse is practical argumentation, argumentation over action, over what is to be done (e.g. what policies should be adopted). Practical argumentation should accordingly be the primary analytical focus in CDA (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This does not exclude other familiar forms of analysis (such as analysing representations) but subsumes them. The point of representing (or ‘framing’) an issue in a particular way is to create particular public attitudes and opinions, and thus legitimize or facilitate a particular course of action. Critique of discourse is the focal concern for CDA, but critique of discourse is by no means exclusive to CDA. On the contrary, critique of discourse is a normal part of all discourse. It is a normal part of everyday practical argumentation: people find reasons in favour and against proposals for action, they consider alternatives, adopt them or discard them, and so on. A course of action worthy of being adopted is one that has withstood criticism. Agents may decide to discard proposals either because they are likely to be instrumentally inadequate in relation to the goals they are supposed to achieve, or because they find them ethically problematic, for example because the values or goals they are motivated by are unacceptable. Ethical critique is a concern for CDA at three levels: as an aspect of agents’ reasoning, for example as an aspect of politicians’ deliberation over what policy to adopt; as an aspect of the normative critique of those deliberative practices which CDA carries out; as an aspect of the critique that CDA itself is open to. There are therefore three main places where ethical values come into the picture: what values are arguers (e.g. politicians) arguing from? what are the values that CDA analysts are espousing, from the perspective of which they are evaluating the arguments of those arguers? what are the values of other critics (including critics of CDA)? CDA is itself a form of discourse, which is specialized for academic critique of social actions, events, practices and structures, with a focus on discourse. It can itself be viewed as a form of practical argumentation (Fairclough 2013), open to the same critical questions that it directs at the discourse it subjects to critique. CDA practitioners are bound by an obligation to address ethical evaluations that are critical of their work. Moreover, the ethical judgement which is part of the normative critique carried out in CDA does not come out of thin air, but is built upon elements drawn selectively from ethical judgement and critique in public discourse. And CDA needs to rethink its own critique in response to shifts in public discourse and political reality, such as the emergence of controversy over ‘political correctness’ (Fairclough 2003). We have argued that the primary focus of critical analysis in CDA should be practical argumentation and deliberation (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This was based upon a claim about the character of political discourse, which we saw as primarily concerned with the question of what is to be done. Deliberation is an abstract genre in which (alternative) proposals are being tested. The framework for critical analysis of practical argumentation and deliberation which we have developed since 2012 provides CDA with an effective way of evaluating and critiquing discourse from an ethical point of view. One of its strengths is that it allows different approaches to thinking about ethical questions (deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics) to be combined within an ethical deliberative procedure for achieving impartiality. In a more recent version of this framework (Fairclough, I. 2016, 2018), deliberation is modelled as a critical procedure designed to filter out those practical conclusions (and corresponding decisions) that would not pass the test of critical questioning. Two distinct argument schemes are involved in deliberative activity types: an argument from goals, circumstances and meansgoal relations, and an argument from (negative or positive) consequences. Proposals are tentatively supported by practical arguments from goals, and are tested in the light of their potential consequences, via practical arguments from consequence. Goals are generated by various sources of normativity, and these can be what conventionally is called ‘values’, but can also be obligations, rights and duties. Critical questioning seeks to expose potential negative consequences of proposals and thus evaluate them in terms of their acceptability or reasonableness: if the consequences are on balance unacceptable for those affected, then it would be more reasonable not to engage in the proposed course of action. Unacceptable consequences are critical objections which can conclusively rebut a proposal. Where two or more proposals survive critical testing, one may be chosen as the better proposal on nonarbitrary grounds (e.g. being simpler to enact). In our view, the most significant perspective in the light of which proposals are to be tested is a consequentialist one (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, Fairclough, I. 2016). The term ‘consequence’ is however used here broadly to refer to several types of states-of-affairs: the goals of the proposed action (the intended consequences); the potential unintended consequences (or risks) involved; various known and predictable impacts, including impacts on institutional, social facts. If a proposal is likely to result in a situation that is illegal or unjust, then the proposal can be evaluated as unacceptable from both a consequentialist ethics and a deontological ethical position. Our framework can therefore accommodate deontological ethical issues within a broader consequentialist perspective. By inquiring into the motives of action, the framework can also accommodate a virtue-ethical perspective.

### AT: ! – Self-Authorization

#### Their self-authorization internal link is backwards – NATO’s liberal identification empirically constrains exceptional justifications for violence – which do NOT map to a West/non-West divide

Gill-Tiney 22 Patrick Gill-Tiney, Stipendiary Lecturer in Politics, St. John’s College, Oxford, “A Liberal Peace?: The Growth of Liberal Norms and the Decline of Interstate Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 66(3), 2022, pp.413-442 /GoGreen!

This article shows that liberal interpretations of sovereignty, which emphasize international law, interdependence, free trade, democracy and individual rights and freedoms, have become increasingly prevalent in UN Security Council resolutions since 1970. Given that two non-western states, Russia/Soviet Union and China, are permanent members, I argue that the content of these resolutions reflects broad consensus between major powers—both western and non-western—as how these norms should be interpreted. This is not the same as arguing that these states share preferences or interests, rather, substantial differences remain, largely along the cleavage between the United States, Britain and France on the one hand and China and Russia on the other (Einsiedel and Malone 2018, 156-58).1 Yet, the collective positions of these states have evolved over time, suggesting a shift in how sovereignty is understood. The dominant role that these states have in shaping the international order means that their collective understandings may be taken as representative of the normative structure of international society at any point in time, with the expectation that this impacts all states in the system.2

I argue that as liberal interpretations of these fundamental norms increase, the likelihood of a dispute participant resorting to violence decreases. Through content analysis of all UN Security Council resolutions between 1970 and 2014 I first create a measure of the strength of liberal interpretations of sovereignty. This is then utilized in quantitative analysis of dispute participants in the period to explain the variation in the level of violence employed. I find statistical and substantive support for my theory, showing empirically that the growth in liberal norm interpretations is negatively associated with the likelihood of a state resorting to violence in an interstate dispute.

This is not to argue that structural arguments are wrong, far from it, nor is it to reject the roles of conventional and nuclear capabilities in shaping interstate conflict behavior. Rather, state power does matter, that is why the collective interpretations of the permanent members of the UN Security Council are used to understand the system. Domestic veto players, intergovernmental enforcement mechanisms, and trade dependency all do shape the responses of policymakers during an interstate dispute. However, the intersubjective ideas they carry with them into disputes are also crucial to understand why some disputes escalate, and others do not.

This article contributes to our understanding of the role that ideas have in shaping interstate conflict in two ways. Firstly, I contribute to the large literature which has sought to understand the role which norms play in selecting for certain behaviors over others. Most of the work within this area has been qualitative and has either charted the development of specific bundles of norms over long periods (Keene 2012, 2013; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Sandholtz 2007) or focused on the life-cycle of specific norms (Eckstein 1988; Finnemore 2000; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Krook and True 2012; Nadelmann 1990; Sandholtz 2007; Sandholtz and Stiles 2008). I build upon these insights by arguing that the norm of sovereignty has been re-interpreted over time, and that the collective nature of reinterpretation means that it can be used to examine its impact in interstate conflict.

Secondly, this article provides an innovative means of exploring ideas in a quantitative framework. The quantitative interstate conflict literature has heavily favored structural and power-based explanations for actor behavior. This has come at the particular expense of norms. Whilst there is widespread acceptance that norms matter amongst these scholars, they have tended to set aside norm-based explanations given the difficulty of objective measurement. This difficulty revolves around the problem of having surety that multiple actors share an idea, that is, intersubjective understanding. The most obvious sources of data to assess this would be a survey of policymakers or the content of international legal documents. This first avenue is incredibly difficult to gain anything but anecdotal responses too. Policymakers are hard to get access to and may misrepresent their own thoughts and actions to show themselves in as best light as possible. Ensuring that any respondents have understood the survey in the same way is difficult given language differences, whilst response rates are likely to be so low as to prevent a non-random sample from being acquired, even if the potential pool of relevant participants is widened to include all senior politicians and bureaucrats, both incumbent and preceding.

Some of these problems are resolved by utilizing the texts of international legal documents. Given that these are generally carefully and cautiously written the researcher is more certain that the drafters actually share an understanding of the topic. Recent work by Allee and co-authors (Allee, Elsig, and Lugg 2017; Allee and Lugg 2016) have innovatively utilized content analysis of interstate trade deals to explore how much is replicated in subsequent deals, which sheds light on the relative power of the participants. This has certainly gained deeper understanding of the topic, but is not a suitable approach for this research questions for two reasons. Firstly, these deals are generally drafted by small numbers of states, that is, they may not be assumed to represent the preferences and interests of nonparties. Secondly, whilst interpretations are spelled out, these may be mechanistic rather than ideational, making it unclear what the broader normative position may be. This is made more acute by the drafting being down by bureaucrats and lawyers rather than policymakers themselves. Whilst some direction is no-doubt given by the latter, assuming a high level is problematic. Utilizing the content of UN Security Council resolutions addresses these problems because the documents may be assumed to be political, that is, though member states are represented by ambassadors, a high-level of involvement by their state governments is typical given the importance attached to security issues. Moreover, since the permanent membership is diverse in interests and preferences, and these members can veto unpalatable resolutions, they may be reasonably assumed to provide insight into intersubjective understandings.

Existing Explanations of Interstate Conflict and the Role of Norms

Two existing literatures are built on here, firstly, the broad democratic peace literature, including its offshoots and opponents, and secondly, scholarship on the evolution of international norms. The former literature initially focused upon regime type, and over time has been widened to include more fine-grained analyses of domestic political structures in any state (Bell and Quek 2018; Fearon 1994; Gries et al. 2020; Huth and Allee 2002; Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2020; Weeks 2012; Weiss 2013; Weiss and Dafoe 2019). However, the approach in all of these works is to examine structures, that is, formal institutional constraints encountered by decision makers, rather than norms, that is, the role of shared principles, perceptions and expectations of behavior. The distinction between norms and structure is not rigid. This is most clearly seen in the term “institution” which is commonly used to mean both formal structures which limit the agency of decision makers, but also a set of norms, rules, and practices which govern a specific area. To clarify the distinction being made in this article, I adapt the nomenclature used by Reus-Smit (1999) who distinguishes between constitutional institutions, norms without which a society of states could not exist, and fundamental institutions, which facilitate cooperation. The former includes sovereignty, as well as the rights of self-determination and nonintervention, and the latter contractual international law and the organizations which enforce it (both internal and external to states). In this article, I term the former “norms” and the latter “structures.”

The democratic peace literature has spurred several offshoots, the most relevant of which are those which have argued that rather than regime type the “peace” is generated by economic factors including trade interdependency and level of development (Gartzke 2007; Hegre 2000; Kim 2014; Kinne 2012; McDonald 2009, 2010; Mousseau 2013; Schneider and Gleditsch 2010) or shared intergovernmental organization membership (Appel 2018; Kinne 2013a, 2013b; Prorok and Appel 2014). More general critiques have argued that any effect seen is due to the prior settlement of territorial disputes (Gibler 2012; Gibler and Tir 2014; Owsiak 2012), nuclear weapons (Waltz 1990), alliances (Kydd 2005), unipolarity (Monteiro 2014) or military power (Layne 1994; Rosato 2003) instead. With the exception of the latter critiques, this debate has broadly accepted the importance of norms (Doyle 1986; Moravcsik 1997; Owen 1994; Russett and Oneal 2001), especially as the “good” functioning of domestic and international structures, particularly veto players, requires political actors to have the right norms.

This relationship between norms and structures has been more closely addressed through the focus on contracts, that is, to hone in on specific economic norms and structures characterized as allowing an economic market to function “with extensive and regularized transactions among strangers that require an element of trust” (Mousseau and Xiongwei 2018, sec. Emergence Contractualist Peace). This literature argues that the relationship between peace and democracy is spurious, and rather, that both are explained by “contracturalist” norms and structures (Gelpi and Grieco 2008; Mousseau, Hegre, and O’Neal 2003), which builds upon the work of (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Dahl 1997; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Yet, the literature still relies upon operationalizations which are essentially structural, that is, whilst recognizing the importance of norms, the empirical testing has fallen short.

A comparatively small subset of the literature has examined norms as an explanation for the democratic peace. For Deutsch (1957), though NATO is understood as a structure, a security community is more crucially formed around shared values (norms). Kahl argues that the basis of the democratic peace is collective identity rooted in liberal democracy interlinked by intergovernmental organizations (1998). For Risse, the influence of NATO allies upon the foreign policy of the United States demonstrates the importance of liberal norms, through a mechanism which relies upon the similarity of domestic political institutions in these liberal democracies and coalition-building (1995). Though valuable additions to the literature, and in Deutsch’s case systematic in its treatment of the subject, these works fail to tackle the question of whether the democratic peace is structural or norm based since the two are entwined throughout. The difficulty in conceptualizing, isolating and operationalizing norms is a clear problem. Broadly, it is hard to isolate a norm from either the structure in which it exists or from other norms for analysis. It is also a challenge to show that any norm is truly intersubjective in understanding or to measure its effect upon some outcome of interest. Yet, without attempts to do so we are left with a partial picture, particularly for those emphasizing the importance of structures—be these domestic or international—for reducing interstate conflict. In short, the existence of a domestic legislature, independent judiciary, or interstate treaties, is only relevant if the individuals which employ them do so appropriately. To understand this necessitates exploring the ideas in the heads of these individuals, and particularly, how these ideas are shared.

In contrast to the large, predominantly quantitative, literature which has examined the democratic peace and wider questions linking regime type to the onset, conduct and termination of interstate disputes and wars, the broader literature on interstate norms has tended to be qualitative and highly focused. This has resulted in detailed work on human rights (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), humanitarian intervention (Wheeler 2000), and nuclear weapons (Rublee and Cohen 2018; Tannenwald 1999). There is no doubt that this has contributed to our understanding of interstate relations, yet the clear shortcoming is generalizability. That is, the specificity of these approaches, necessary to make any form of causal claim, is in a sense also the undoing.

In this article I focus on the reinterpretation of the sovereignty norm by powerful states. I argue that they have a dominant role in shaping the normative landscape of the international system by being tasked with the interpretation of norms and the maintenance of international society (Hurrell 2007; Wight 1978; Saunders 2006). Operationalizing this, I utilize UN Security Council resolutions as a means of assessing what the consensus position of the permanent members is. Content analysis is used to examine the normative framing of resolutions, allowing both an exploration of change over time, and quantitative measures of the relative strength of these ideas to be derived which can then be used in regression analysis.

The Constraining Effect of Liberal Interpretations of Sovereignty

Norms are dynamic, and undergo processes of evolution, creation and destruction. Change may occur gradually as actors shift their understandings towards an alternative, or suddenly through systemic, and thereby social, change. In international relations, the latter is tightly linked to sudden shifts in great power authority, which has typically occurred due to defeat and a subsequent realignment of international order. War, and its aftermath, can lead to substantial rearrangements of international order, meaning both a new distribution of power, but also a re-interpretation of international society. In examining change in understandings of sovereignty I term gradual change “evolution” and sudden change “tectonic.”

Interpretations of Sovereignty

The post-World War Two era allows examination of both evolutionary and tectonic change in understandings of sovereignty. Evolution occurs during relative peace, whilst tectonic change is part of major realignments of international order. The end of the Cold War, though non-violent certainly led to significant power shifts, resulting in a tectonic change. The pre- and post-Cold War eras are eras of evolution. Assessing rivalrous interpretation of norms is crucial to understanding these changes. I outline a divergence between traditional and liberal interpretations which are used to examine change in norms, and the effect upon international conflict.

Over the post-World War Two period two interpretations of sovereignty have existed, firstly, that emphasizing territorial sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, and secondly, that emphasizing international law, interdependence, free trade, democracy and individual rights and freedoms in international affairs. I term the former approach to sovereignty “traditional,” and the latter “liberal.” A liberal interpretation of sovereignty, therefore, is one which places emphasis upon the actions of states, particularly those between a government and its citizens. Sovereignty in this understanding implies not only the exercise of power over a territory and people (as in the traditional understanding), but also that there are limits to the exercise of power and duties to a people (Sandholtz and Stiles 2008, 287-88).3 This has been most clearly stated in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. I examine the relative balance between these two interpretations over time, arguing that this balance alters how sovereignty is understood, and thereby is related to the likelihood of escalation in interstate disputes.

My expectation is that the relative balance between these two modes of interpretation has shifted over the post-World War Two period to favor a liberal interpretation. This does not mean that traditional interpretations are irrelevant, rather, that they have been de-emphasized in international discourse relative to the latter. A spectrum in which purely traditional and purely liberal interpretations mark the poles is conceived of as existing, with great powers occupying positions between the two. The effect that this shift toward a liberal interpretation of sovereignty has occurred on international conflict escalation is now examined.

Understandings of Sovereignty and Conflict Escalation

How understandings of sovereignty impact international disputes may be explored in terms of the conflict life-cycle, that is, why a dispute emerges, why violent conflict breaks out, and how the conflict ends, or in terms of participant conduct during war. Here, I examine the effect of change in the collective understanding of sovereignty upon escalation, meaning that I assume the prior existence of international disputes. Whilst the effect of norms upon the onset of disputes is an important question, very few disputes result in the use of violence, that is, though onset is a necessary condition for violence, it is far from sufficient. I examine escalation from a nonviolent dispute to a violent dispute—the use of armed force in international relations—because this is of greater substantive significance to state leaders and their citizens. Moreover, whilst reducing the likelihood of dispute onset would likely result in less international violence, the more normatively important question is how to avoid escalation, as this reduces the costs of war: human death and economic destruction.

This is not to trivialize dispute onset, and logically we might expect the growth of liberal understandings of sovereignty to also reduce onset rates as well as escalation likelihood. However, there are two reasons why we may doubt the substantive significance of this, firstly, dispute onset is a relatively low threshold, and secondly, onset is often triggered by events beyond the direct control of a state. To this first point, a dispute simply means that two or more actors disagree over something, oftentimes the behavior of the other side or the distribution of some good (for instance, territory). This article utilizes Militarized Interstate Disputes as the operationalization of dispute, and many disputes are comparatively minor events, with the threshold being that one of the two parties has a minimum level of militarization as part of the dispute (for example, the issuance of a deterrent, or compellent, threat). A focus on onset, therefore, would prevent observation of substantively more important actions, that is, the actual use of force against another. Secondly, many disputes begin due to accident and/or the decision making of low-level military commanders or political officials who are neither in the position to consider national interests nor strategic interactions. This means that onset may essentially be an apolitical decision which takes little or no account of the broader strategic landscape nor the structural and normative context. It is after onset, that is, when escalation is considered by policymakers, that the stakes are higher and when causal mechanisms common to this topic are most active.

Escalation then, is a political decision. In making the choice to escalate, or not, policymakers are impacted by a range of strategic factors, but crucially, are also constrained by norms. The use of force in international relations must be justified, and since 1945 the UN Charter specifies just two: self-defense and collective peace enforcement. To this, we might also add humanitarian intervention, though this remains contested. As a baseline, therefore, when faced with dispute onset, policymakers must justify their actions with reference to one of these reasons. Moreover, in making the decision to escalate, policymakers are also constrained by liberal values which emphasize diplomacy, cooperation, international law, international organizations, the rights of the individual, and to question the legitimacy of the march to war. Taken together, this slows the decision to escalate, since legal justification is needed, diplomacy is necessary, and potential economic and human costs understood, calculated and defended. A shift toward liberal interpretations thereby means a reduced probability of escalation to violence, tacitly assuming that the risk of a dispute arising in the first-place is unchanged. This leads me to my first hypothesis, which relates to the evolution mechanism of change:

Hypothesis 1: Given an international dispute, the risk of escalation decreases as liberal interpretations increase.

An alternative explanation is that any impact of normative change is actually a result of the end of the Cold War, that is, the redistribution of power between great powers, typically resulting from system-wide conflict results in qualitative differences in interpretations of fundamental norms between peace-periods. Whilst the end of the Cold War did not involve a system-wide war, it did mark the end of sustained rivalry between great powers. The pre- and post- periods can thereby be compared. Given the rivalry of the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, and the relative dominance of the United States post-Cold War, we might expect qualitative differences in conflict behavior to be observable in the two time periods, attributable, perhaps, to a greater emphasis upon liberal interpretations in the post-Cold War era. The dramatic change in the distribution of power triggered a significant change in the consensus surrounding interpretation of fundamental norms of international society. This leads me to my second hypothesis, which captures the tectonic change mechanism:

Hypothesis 2: The risk of dispute escalation decreases given a systemic increase in liberal interpretations of sovereignty attributable to the end of the Cold War.

### AT: ! – Endless War

#### No endless wars – “Western” liberalism’s NOT the only cause NOR justification – AND the ALT doesn’t solve any of it – BUT even if it did, would result in comparably unethical forms of violence that liberal interventionism prevents

Davidson 12 Joanna Davidson, BA International Politics, Italian, University of Leeds, “Humanitarian Intervention as Liberal Imperialism: A Force for Good?” POLIS Journal, vol.7, Summer 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20180419183752id\_/http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/joanna-davidson.pdf /GoGreen!

5.2. The Consequences of Non-Intervention

The War on Terror has raised concerns over the future of the practise of humanitarian intervention. Indeed it would seem the liberal agenda, despite its ideological foundations of universalism and cosmopolitanism, has exhausted what little political will and strategic capabilities existed for true humanitarian intervention in the pursuit of Western security in an increasingly insecure world. Yet to respond to the ever darkening cloud the War on Terror is casting over humanitarian intervention by dismissing the practise entirely is to render a valuable instrument in the protection of human rights as undeservedly useless (Heinze 2006: 31). Proponents of humanitarian intervention have argued that those who dismiss humanitarian intervention as simply a vehicle through which liberal regimes wish to extend their control are ―condemning other people to death‖ (Rieff 1999) and ―leaving the innocent to suffer the world over‖ (Ramos-Horta 2005: 284) through being overtly politically correct. It is difficult to counter such arguments when we consider the consequences of nonintervention in Rwanda, as well as the consequences of intervention where political commitment to the cause is lacking, as was the case with the Srebenica massacre. Such morally abhorrent events were allowed to happen as a direct consequence of a lack of strategic interest for the states with the power to intervene, and have led to commentators such as Richard Just to argue that despite the controversies the War on Terror has wrought upon the practise of humanitarian intervention, to respond by saying that it is wrong for the United States to intervene to spread its own moral universal values is to condemn the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo which stopped ethnic cleansing and possibly genocide, and to agree with the decision not to intervene in Rwanda as right (Just 2005: 212), a position which most would find morally unacceptable. Here then we can clearly see the crux of the problem, in that non-intervention is intolerable, but humanitarian intervention, as has clearly been demonstrated in previous chapters, remains impossible (Falk 1993: 757).

Such a problematic of humanitarian intervention requires confrontation if future human rights atrocities are to be halted, and if the unchecked spread of liberal technologies of governance and control is to be challenged. It is not enough simply to denounce humanitarian intervention as reflecting only the imperial interests of ˑpowerful western governments, as ex-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan highlighted when he posed the question, ―If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?‖ (Annan 2000) Even if one were to argue for an absolute rule of non-intervention so as to avoid abuse of the humanitarian sentiment by liberal regimes, one need only look at the interventions in Kosovo and Iraq to note that international legitimization is not a necessary precursor to liberal intervention. Given the power Western liberal states have to override international legal norms to intervene in situations which threaten their interests and security, and given the fact that there exists many parts of the world where the humanitarian situation remains intolerable, to respond to the liberal crusade towards intervention by calling for a steadfast rule of non-intervention is not only impossible, but also immoral.

Conclusion

The debate over the legitimacy and conduct of humanitarian intervention continues to rage fiercely within the international community, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the declaration of the War on Terror. From growing calls for more humanitarian action and political involvement to solve the humanitarian crises of the 90s, to international scepticism and condemnation of the liberal interventions in the Middle East following the events of 9/11, it comes as no surprise that humanitarian intervention is generally deemed to be ―in crisis‖ (Rieff 2002). As this essay has demonstrated, the waning of state sovereignty and the subsequent rise in humanitarian‘ interventions has been an emergent reality throughout the 1990s; yet far from being the result of a growing humanism amongst the powerful liberal states, such a shift in concern from the state to the individual is in reality part of a much more sinister liberal enterprise which is quintessentially concerned with the art of global governance (Gordon 1991: 14). The repercussions of the implication of liberal self- interests alongside the achievement of humanitarian goals has been highlighted only too clearly in an analysis of the development of humanitarian intervention throughout the 1990s, during which time it became painfully clear that intervention undertaken for purely humanitarian concerns, if it occurs at all, has generally been underfunded and insufficient (Falk 2000: 333), therefore leading to interventions which arguably did more harm than good. Rwanda provides us with a clear example of what happens when, despite grave humanitarian concerns, there exists no strategic interests for the states with the power to intervene, whilst events in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo illustrated the fact that in the absence of state self-interest, there exists little political will to pay the costs of blood and gold in order to ensure that ―humanitarian war is conducted in a humanitarian manner.‖ (Falk 2000: 331) The 1990s then, far from being the ‗golden era of humanitarian intervention‘ (Bellamy and Wheeler 2008), were in reality an experimentation in liberal expansionism, yet where there existed few security concerns for the liberal states, there existed little political will to commit to the mission. It is only when national interests are implicated that states are willing to accept the costs and stay the duration necessary to alter the humanitarian situation in any meaningful way (Weiss 2004: 37).

As has been noted throughout this essay, the vital interests of the intervening states are grounded in liberal notions of human security; that is to say entire swathes of the world‘s population are re-conceptualized as a threat to humanity which requires pacification through assimilation into the liberal world order or, failing that, destruction. In liberalisms quest to expand its control and influence across the world, the remit of intervention has been broadened to include within its scope democracy spreading, nation building, and regime change, as has been demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and more recently, Libya. It would seem undeniable that humanitarian intervention is essentially a veil behind which liberal imperialism can disguise itself, despite protestations of liberals heralding a ―revolution of moral concern‖. Indeed, we can see clear similarities between the old rhetoric of empire and current discussions surrounding liberal imperialism. As Nardin has noted, in the old days of empire humanitarianism was used to justify the imposition of foreign power on populations at the margins of the ‗civilized‘ world in order to uphold the standards of civilized morality; essentially in order to protect the population from themselves. We can see that little has changed between then and now when we note that current rhetoric on humanitarian intervention constructs the third world as a threat to itself and to the rest of the world, and therefore the barbarity of tyranny and terrorism that these ‗uncivilized‘ regions breed ―must be countered, in the name of humanity, by the exercise of imperial power‖ (Nardin 2006: 25). In construing humanitarian intervention as liberal imperialism, the motives behind liberal intervention become clearer, in that essentially liberal regimes wish to subjugate and impose indirect control on those portions of the population securitization discourse has constructed as a threat to global security. Whilst it is true that the days of territorial expansion are over, what we are experiencing now is by no means a waning of imperial ambition, as through the spread of liberal values and the imposition of liberal structures, through force if necessary, liberalism is extending its ‗universal‘ values across the world, justifying any means by the end which is indisputably morally right (Bishai 2004: 51).

Indeed, as was highlighted in chapter four, there exists a significant cognitive dissonance between liberal universalism, with its proclaimed notions of a cosmopolitan humanitarianism, and liberal imperialism, which finds its expression through intervention which is justified on a humanitarian basis, yet which in reality functions through the eradication or exclusion of all life forms which do not conform to liberalism (McCarthy 2009: 166). It would seem that the obvious conclusion to draw would be one which wholly condemns the practise of humanitarian intervention as a front for the furthering of a liberal ideology which functions through the subjugation of morally inferior‘ populations so as to extend its own remit of control and power. Humanitarian intervention is less about a moral concern for the suffering of people, than a method through which Western liberal states can secure their own populations from a global imaginary of threat. Yet such a damning analysis of liberal intervention is incomplete, as it fails to give a sufficient analysis of the effects these interventions have on the populations concerned, not to mention the effects non-intervention could have on those populations suffering human rights abuses. Of course a proclaimed interest in saving strangers‘ will only ever be put into action when the strategic interests of liberal states are at stake, meaning liberal cries of a duty to intervene‘ and a responsibility to protect‘ in those situations that shock the moral conscience of mankind must be regarded with scepticism. Such scepticism, however, should not be translated into an absolute rule of nonintervention, as to do so would be to turn our backs completely on the suffering of those that need our help, in whatever form such help may come in. Indeed, the spread of liberal imperialism does not necessarily signify the death of humanitarian sentiments; rather the two can coincide, and when they do, a greater window of opportunity is created for those wishing to act on the humanitarian impulse in the Security Council (Weiss 2004: 37).

When we consider the globalizing effect the War on Terror has had on liberal intervention, however, as we move further into the new millennium it is becoming ever clearer that liberal intervention is being stretched to its limits. Ten years after the invasion of Afghanistan and eight years after the invasion of Iraq, 99,000 and 46,000 US troops remained in each country respectively (New York Times 2011), highlighting the extensive nature of the liberal imperial mission in the aftermath of 9/11. The ‗unending war‘ against terrorism seems to have taken its toll on Western liberal states capacity to intervene, meaning that, rather than coinciding, the requirements of the war against terrorism will have to be balanced against the more distant demands of humanity (Macfarlane et al 2007: 985), and it is not difficult to work out which will prevail. Indeed, since the coming to power of the Bush administration in 2001, humanitarian intervention where no national interests were at stake has been dismissed as ―blunting the purpose of the military‖ (Ignatieff 2003), yet quite paradoxically Bush pinned continuing support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on humanitarian rhetoric regarding nation-building and the promotion of democracy for the Afghan and Iraqi people. In doing so it would seem that the US has manipulated the idea of a responsibility to protect to include a much broader remit for intervention, embracing not just the ―responsibility to react‖ but the ―responsibility to prevent‖ and the ―responsibility to rebuild‖ as well (Evans and Sahnoun 2002: 101), stretching the language of humanitarianism to suit liberalisms own political agenda. As has been evidenced by the growing disillusionment with the on-going operations in the Middle East in which thousands of western troops have been killed, the continued threat of terrorist attacks, and more recently the lack of political support for further meaningful interventions in Libya and Syria, it would seem that liberal interventionism has not only lost sight of the universal humanitarian notions that lie at its roots, but is struggling to retain its omnipotence in the face of widespread opposition to the invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whilst the 9/11 attacks may have had a ‘rally round the flag’ effect within the US, the most ardent exporter of international liberalism, it has had the opposite effect across the rest of the international community, which has sought to distance itself from the aggressively Western liberal interventionist stance that provoked such terrorist attacks (Ignatieff 2003).

All things considered, it would seem that Fukuyama‘s prediction in 1992 that the rise to predominance of Western liberal democracy would signal the ‗End of History‘ in that it would become the universal and final form of human government (Fukuyama 1992) is increasingly being challenged. The rise in militant Islam and terrorist attacks against the West highlights inescapably that the proclaimed universal moral righteousness of the liberal mission is in reality far from universal, whilst the rising spectre of China as the new superpower on the international stage could diminish Western liberalisms power and influence in years to come. This being said, the reality remains that, for now at least, Western liberal regimes retain hegemony on the global stage, and therefore hegemony in decisions to intervene or not. As we have seen, liberal humanitarian‘ intervention is deeply flawed; oftentimes the primary motives for intervention are far from humanitarian, and there is much resentment in the international community regarding the omnipotence of the Western liberal states wishing to impose their world view on weaker states. What is more, the War on Terror has only exemplified such concerns, highlighting the way in which liberal states have manipulated humanitarian sentiments to justify intervention with other motives (Ayoob 2002) and allowed liberalism to broaden its scope of expansion globally (Evans 2010). Yet the reality is that liberal intervention, however imperfect and unpalatable it may be is currently the only choice the international community has if it is to avoid another Rwanda, or another Srebenica, to avoid once again becoming a bystander to genocide. As we have seen, where no other interests exist, attempts at humanitarianism will flounder. To argue for intervention motivated by purely humanitarian motives and conducted in a completely humanitarian manner is to ignore the realities of the world in which we live. The reality is that, as Weiss quite succinctly put it, the rise to predominance of liberal imperialism and the resultant convergence of humanitarian values and liberal security interests ―has not brought utopia, but made the world a somewhat more liveable place than it would have been otherwise‖ (2001: 104). Whether this remains the case in the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in a seemingly endless War against Terror, and in a world where Western liberalism is increasingly feeling threatened yet where political support and capacity for liberal intervention is low, remains to be seen.

#### Prefer induction to deduction – their impacts are hasty overgeneralization from an unnecessarily totalizing ontological commitment – no relationship between intervention and violence is inevitable, and the perm’s self-reflexive communication can overcome the link

Borg 17 Stefan Borg, postdoctoral research fellow in International Relations at the Department of Economic History, Stockholm University, associated research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, “Genealogy as critique in International Relations: Beyond the hermeneutics of baseless suspicion,” Journal of International Political Theory, 14(1), 2017, pp.41-59, DOI: 10.1177/1755088217707225 /GoGreen!

Conclusion

This article has examined genealogy as a form of critique in IR. The first part of the article demonstrated that Foucault’s genealogy was an important component in the work of the first generation of post-structuralist IR as well as in contemporary scholarship informed by frameworks of governmentality and biopolitics. It was shown that when genealogy is understood as critique, violence risks being inscribed as foundational to global political life. However, despite the fact that it is virtually impossible to understand the meaning of “critical” in this work without a grasp of genealogy, the assumptions of genealogy have been insufficiently engaged. To rectify this, the second part of the article critically examined the philosophical underpinnings of genealogy. Through a close reading of three core texts where Foucault grapples with genealogy, it was shown that genealogy relies on an ontology of forces, which are postulated as arbitrarily and violently related. Genealogy therefore tends to inscribe violence as foundational to social relations. It was further noted that genealogically informed critique brings a peculiar form of suspicion to all that is presented as common, shared, and universal. This suspicion was traced back to Nietzsche and characterized as “baseless,” which again reflects a set of particular ontological commitments idiosyncratic to genealogy. These commitments, which inscribe violence as foundational, were finally contrasted to an ontology which follows the genealogical understanding of emergent forces, but refuses the assumption of them as arbitrarily and violently related.

Finally, what are the implications for empirical Foucauldian work for the argument I have pursued in the article? In empirical work informed by governmentality and biopolitics, IR scholars often examine the encounter between Western and non-Western countries. The problem to which I ultimately want to draw attention is not that such scholarship is often critical of military intervention undertaken by Western powers. On the contrary, it is important to bring out and critically scrutinize the paternalistic and indeed hierarchical renditions that no doubt are common in, for instance, the liberal peace project (e.g. Richmond, 2011). The problem is rather that the genealogical ethos risks turning into a global interpretive disposition, with which all global interactions by whatever means are made a priori suspect. Instead of seeking to engage in a careful empirical consideration of the merits of forms of intervention in each case, the generalized genealogical suspicion [hinders] disables any other understanding of global political life than a ceaseless unfolding drama of clashing wills to dominate and conquer. Since the liberal project is exposed as just a particular will to power, it must inscribe a relation of violent hierarchy to non-Western localities, as opposed to an understanding of similar and harmoniously overlapping subjectivities already existing in those places. On such a pre-methodological genealogical disposition, intervention becomes suspicious in whatever form it may take. Whether it is in the form of peacekeeping troops or rule of law advisors assisting local actors in security sector reform, any involvement can only be read as a manifestation of “the West’s” ongoing will to colonize and impose its will on others.

The genealogical disposition easily lends itself to an assertion of incommensurability, more often than not coded in terms of “culture,” since the clashing wills to power in Foucault’s ontology of emergence do not belong to a common space; they have nothing in common. What is made suspect to the extent of [hindered] disabled is genuine social learning through communication, which presupposes that different sociocultural settings may display profound similarities of aspirations of what is desired. For instance, holding out the possibility that whatever goes under the label of human rights, and especially its minimalist rendition of what human means, is compatible with a range of walks and ways, may harmoniously blend with, and may resonate with many traditions around the world is perhaps the ultimate hope on which the liberal peace project rests (e.g. Moyn, 2010). This hope, however, is disabled [hindered] by a peculiar form of genealogical faith which lures the researcher to interpret all human interaction as disguising a ceaseless and primordial clash of wills to power.

Following the argument pursued in this article, one needs to realize that the genealogical disposition is reflective of certain ontological assumptions which are but one option. Empirical work in IR informed by governmentality frameworks is no doubt valuable in that such work opens up for a much more extensive power analysis than approaches that reify state actors as the only relevant actors in global politics. Moreover, Foucault’s writings on biopolitics have served as a starting point for examining what happens when life rather than territory become the object of rule, thus broadening the traditional focus in IR to include geopolitics and biopolitics (e.g. Vaughan-Williams, 2015). However, when conducting empirical work in such traditions, it is important to refrain from reading an ontology of violence into the empirical analyses, or at the very least, reflect on the ethico-political stakes involved in doing so.

#### No “liberal wars”

David Chandler 9, Professor of IR at University of Westminster, "Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics", Review of Dillon and Reid’s *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live*, www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/chandler\_18-1.pdf

This is a book about the ‘liberal way of war’. But the liberal referred to in the title remains under theorized. On several occasions the authors highlight the distinction between the liberal way of war and the general framing of war in the modern liberal era as a geo-strategic contestation, taking the territorial state as its referent object. For Dillon and Reid, ‘liberalism never fitted this model of modern politics and the modern problematization of war very well’（p.83). They therefore seek to define liberalism and the liberal way of war as distinct from war in the liberal era. The liberal way of war refers not to real wars and conflicts but to an abstract model of conflict, defined as a desire to‘remove war from the life of humanity’which‘derives from the way in which liberalism takes the life of the species as its referent object of politics ─ biopolitics’（p.84）. In this framing, the liberal nature of war very much depends on the self-description of the conflict by its proponents: these range from Gladstone’s occupation of Egypt in the cause of‘suffering humanity’, to US liberal ideological constructions of the cause of‘freedom’in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union up to Bush and Blair’s war on Iraq in the cause of humanity（p.6）. As the authors state, of course, wars may be fought on other grounds than universal humanity: ‘liberal states may…also act as geopolitical sovereign actors as well…and may also have geopolitical motives for the wars they wage’（p.84）.¶ It is clear from the beginning that the distinctiveness of ‘the liberal way of war’ which they seek to explore cannot be more than a fool’s quest. They assert that they will critically uncover the paradox of liberal war: why it is that Realist or geostrategic war accepts the necessity of war but attempts to limit it, while liberals wish to end war but, to do so, are willing to fight unlimited wars. Yet, they admit that this starting point is already an ideological dead end ─ the wars of the twentieth century give the lie to the idea that there is some distinction between ‘unending crusades’ and ‘limited jousts between rationally calculative political subjects’: war has its own dynamic（p.7). Nevertheless, Dillon and Reid press on and seek to go beyond a Schmittian critique to ground this paradox in the biopolitical‘driver’of the liberal way of rule ─ biopolitics: wars waged under the banner of the human（against humans）are liberal and, allegedly biopolitical, as human life is declared to be the referent in need of being secured. These wars are alleged to be fought differently to geo-political wars for territory, because the ‘drivers’ of war are not territorialized interests but the biopolitical framings of the needs of the human, how human life can and should be lived. Inevitably there are insuperable methodological hurdles to this Sisyphusian task. Already, there occurs the first fundamental aporia: how do we tell the difference between a liberal and non-liberal war? There appears to be no way of preventing the category of liberal war from becoming a lifeless and descriptive one: wars are liberal and fought biopolitically only if we are told that these are the motives by those fighting them.¶ This separation of liberal ways of war from territorialised framings of geostrategic contestation makes little sense as a framework for understanding either liberal rule or liberal ways of war. In fact, in defining liberal war in this way the connection between liberal rule and war is entirely severed. ‘Liberal war may on occasions also be geopolitical; which is to say that war may be simultaneously geopolitical as well as biopolitically driven since the imperatives behind war are never uniform or simple; but what distinguishes the liberal way of war as liberal are the biopolitical imperatives which have consistently driven its violent peace-making.’（p.85）Liberal rule has also resulted in wars for territory or in defence of territories; nevertheless, a story, of course, could have been told about how views of the human fitted those of struggles to command territory. This is acknowledged, but sits uneasily with the narrow view of liberal war for species life. If the racial doctrines of European empires, up to and including the genocidal racism of the Nazi regime, were also biopolitically driven ─ and the authors, indeed, write of race as part of the‘liberal biopolitics of the seventeenth century’─ then it seems difficult to separate a liberal way of war from allegedly ‘non-liberal’ wars of territorial control.¶ It seems clear that Dillon and Reid do not seek to take the logical step of arguing that the view of the human reflects, and is reflected by, how the human is ruled and how wars are both thought and fought. Why? Because for them there is something suprahistorically unique and distinct about the liberal way of war: a distinctly liberal view which foregrounds the human as the referent of security. Therefore, a second aporia arises: on what basis is this specifically ‘liberal’? It would appear that every form of rule and of war has at least an implicit view of the ‘human’ and through this view of the human the form of rule and the way of war are rationalized. There is not and cannot be anything specifically ‘liberal’ about this. The humanity in need of securing, through war on other humans, could be formed by Alexander the Great’s stoic cosmopolitan vision, or could be‘God’s chosen people’, ‘the master race’, or ‘the gains of the proletarian revolution’: there is little doubt that beliefs of what the human is, or could become, were a vital part of many non-Liberal dispositifs ─ the discourses and practices - of both rule and war. ¶ The key starting assumption, that the liberal way of war can be isolated from any other - and its alleged specific form, of ‘unending violence’, explained by its referent of the human - appears to be a particularly unproductive one. At the level of abstraction at which Dillon and Reid choose to work, there is very little here that would help to distinguish between a liberal and a non-liberal way of war（the asserted purpose of the book）. Of course, what matters is what this view of the human is. Here Dillon and Reid appear to recognise the limits of their essentializing approach: …just as the liberal way of rule is constantly adapting and changing so also is the liberal way of war. There is, in that sense, no one liberal way of rule or one liberal way of war. But there is a fundamental continuity which justifies us referring to the singular…the fact that each takes the properties of species existence as its referent object…finding its expression historically in many changing formations of rule according…to the changing exigencies and understanding of species being…（p.84）¶ Rather than understand our forms of post-political rule and post-territorial war today on their own terms and then consider to what extent this way of rule and war can be theorized, and to what extent, if any, Foucault’s conception of biopolitics may be of assistance, Dillon and Reid start out from the assumption that we live in a liberal world of rule and war and that therefore both can be critiqued through the framework developed by Foucault in his engagement with understanding the rise and transformation of liberal forms of rule. In transposing Foucault’s critical engagement with liberal ways of rule to an understanding of liberal ways of war, Dillon and Reid take a body of historical work about the changing political nature of liberal rule and transpose it into an essentialised and under theorized understanding of liberal war. This is no mean feat; how they manage this accomplishment will be discussed in the next two sections.

### AT: ! – Structural Root Causes

#### They have everything backwards – no structural root causes – AND radical transformation wouldn’t solve – BUT proximate focus does

John Horgan 14. Director of the Center for Science Writings at Stevens Institute of Technology, “To End War, Focus on Culture Rather than "Root Causes"”, Scientific American, 8-18, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/to-end-war-focus-on-culture-rather-than-root-causes/

When I started researching war, I also assumed that to get rid of war, we have to get rid of its root causes. The trouble is, scholars have identified countless causes of war. One pseudo-explanation (which I'm glad Kloor does not mention, and which I rebut early on in my book and in posts such as this) is that war stems from a compulsion bred into our ancestors by natural selection. Biology underpins war, as it underpins all human behaviors. The crucial question is, why does war break out in certain places and times and not others? The most popular non-biological explanations of war are what I call the Malthusian and Marxist hypotheses. The first posits that war stems from our tendency to over-reproduce and hence fight over land and other resources. The second holds that war stems from inequality, the tendency of societies (especially capitalist ones) to divide into haves and have-nots. Scholars have also blamed wars on religion, racism and nationalism, which Kloor mentions above, as well as such fundamental social traits as hierarchy, sexism and injustice. If you cherry pick, you always find evidence to support your favorite theory. But as scholars such as Lewis Fry Richardson (whom my friend David Berreby recently profiled) have shown, neither the Malthusian and Marxist theories nor any of the other explanations above can account for the vast diversity of wars. Moreover, some factors that provoke conflict, such as religion, can also inhibit it. Religion has inspired some of our greatest antiwar leaders, notably Gandhi and Martin Luther King. I have found only one theory of war that fits the facts. The theory holds that war is a self-perpetuating, contagious meme, which can propagate independently of other social and environmental factors. As anthropologist Margaret Mead put it in a famous 1940 essay, "Warfare Is Only an Invention—Not a Biological Necessity." In other words, the major cause of war is war itself, which has a terrible tendency to spread even to societies that would prefer to remain peaceful. I make this point in my book and in a 2010 blog post, "Margaret Mead’s war theory kicks butt of neo-Darwinian and Malthusian models." Here is an edited excerpt: In his 1997 book War Before Civilization, anthropologist Lawrence Keeley notes that war among North American Indians often stemmed from the aggression of just a few extremely warlike tribes, "rotten apples that spoiled their regional barrels." He added, "Less aggressive societies, stimulated by more warlike groups in their vicinity, become more bellicose themselves." Societies in a violent region, the political scientist Azar Gat emphasizes in his 2006 book War in Human Civilization, have a strong incentive to carry out preemptive attacks. Societies may "attack the other side in order to eliminate or severely weaken them as a potential enemy. Indeed, this option only makes the other side more insecure, rendering the security dilemma more acute. War can thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fear of war breeds war." Many people are pessimistic about ending war because they assume it will require radical social engineering. World peace will require eliminating poverty, inequality, sexism, racism or [fill in the blank]. We will need to eradicate religion, or all embrace the same religion. We will need to get rid of all nation states and become anarchists, or form a single global government. My analysis of war suggests that if we want to end war, we don't need to create a society radically different from our own, let alone a utopia. If we want to end war, we should focus on ending war and the culture of war rather than on supposed causal factors. If we can do that, we will take a major step toward solving many of our other social problems, as I argued in my previous post. And that brings me to Keith Kloor's final challenge to me. He devotes much of his column to a discussion of how extremists on both sides of the conflict between Israel and Palestine have "hijacked the peace process. Horrific spasmodic cycles of violence and death is the result." He asks me how we can "rid the world of extremist groups that sow the seeds of war." Kloor has his causation backwards. Just as war promotes poverty, tyranny, inequality and resource depletion at least as much as vice versa, so war promotes fanaticism. Once militarism seizes hold of a society, it can transform vast populations into virtual sociopaths. It turns decent, ethical, reasonable people into intolerant fanatics capable of the most heinous acts. Breaking out of what Kloor calls "spasmodic cycles of violence and death" can be extraordinarily difficult, but history offers many examples of societies that have done just that. Germany and France were bitter, bloody rivals for centuries. But it is now inconceivable that Germany and France—or any members of the European Union--would go to war against each other. One of my favorite examples of a nation that has renounced militarism is Costa Rica. Like many of its neighbors in Central American, Costa was once wracked by terrible violence. But after a bloody civil war in the 1940s, Costa Rica disbanded its army, freeing up more funds for education, health care, transportation and tourism. It is often ranked as one of the most peaceful, healthy, "happy" nations in the world.

### AT: ! – Value To Life

#### Value to life is inevitable and subjective – their assertions are the only scenario for negative value

Schwartz, et al 2 Lisa, Lecturer in Philosophy of Medicine, Department of General Practice, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK; Paul Preece, Theme Coordinator of Medical Ethics, Dundee Medical School, Ninewells, Dundee, UK; and Rob Hendry, Medical Advisor, Medical & Dental Defense Union of Scotland, Mackintosh House, Glasgow, UK, Medical Ethics: A Case-Based Approach, p. 112, November 2002 /GoGreen!

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

#### Extinction must precede ethics – their prioritization of ideology turns value to life and makes extinction inevitable

Schell 82 Jonathan, writer for the New Yorker and nuclear weapons expert, The Fate of the Earth

For the generations that now have to decide whether or not to risk the future of the species, the implication of our species’ unique place in the order of things is that while things in the life of mankind have worth, we must never raise that worth above the life of mankind and above our respect for that life’s existence. To do this would be to make of our highest ideals so many swords with which to destroy ourselves. To sum up the worth of our species by reference to some particular standard, goal, or ideology, no matter how elevated or noble it might be, would be to prepare the way for extinction by closing down in thought and feeling the open-ended possibilities for human development which extinction would close down in fact. There is only one circumstance in which it might be possible to sum up the life and achievement of the species, and that circumstance would be that it had already died, but then, of course, there would be no one left to do the summing up. Only a generation that believed itself to be in possession of final, absolute truth could ever conclude that it had reason to put an end to human life, and only generations that recognized the limits to their own wisdom and virtue would be likely to subordinate their interests and dreams to the as yet unformed interests and undreamed dreams of the future generations, and let human life go on.

### !/T – NATO Peace

#### Studies confirm NATO’s net violence-reducing – because of its liberalism

Recchia 11 Stefano Recchia, Assistant Professor in International Relations at the University of Cambridge; and Michael Doyle, Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science at Columbia University; “Liberalism in International Relations,” *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, eds. Badie, Berg-Schlosser and Morlino, Sage, 2011, pp.1434-1439 /GoGreen!

Relying on new insights from game theory, scholars during the 1980s and 1990s emphasized that so-called international regimes, consisting of agreed-on international norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, can help states effectively coordinate their policies and collaborate in the production of international public goods, such as free trade, arms control, and environmental protection. Especially, if embedded in formal multilateral institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), regimes crucially improve the availability of information among states in a given issue area, thereby promoting reciprocity and enhancing the reputational costs of noncompliance. As noted by Robert Keohane, institutionalized multilateralism also reduces strategic competition over relative gains and thus further advances international cooperation. Most international regime theorists accepted Kenneth Waltz's (1979) neorealist assurription of states as black boxes-that is, unitary and rational actors with given interests. Little or no attention was paid to the impact on international cooperation of domestic political processes and dynamics. Likewise, regime scholarship largely disregarded the arguably crucial question of whether prolonged interaction in an institutionalized international setting can fundamentally change states' interests or preferences over outcomes (as opposed to preferences over strategies), thus engendering positive feedback loops of increased overall cooperation. For these reasons, international regime theory is not, properly speaking, liberal, and the term neoliberal institutionalism frequently used to identify it is somewhat misleading. It is only over the past decade or so that liberal international relations theorists have begun to systematically study the relationship between domestic politics and institutionalized international cooperation or global governance. This new scholarship seeks to explain in particular the close international cooperation among liberal democracies as well as higher-than-average levels of delegation by democracies to complex multilateral bodies, such as the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NAFTA, and the WTO (see, e.g., John Ikenberry, 2001; Helen Milner & Andrew Moravcsik, 2009). The reasons that make liberal democracies particularly enthusiastic about international cooperation are manifold: First, transnational actors such as nongovernmental organizations and private corporations thrive in liberal democracies, and they frequently advocate increased international cooperation; second, elected democratic officials rely on delegation to multilateral bodies such as the WTO or the EU to commit to a stable policy line and to internationally lock in fragile domestic policies and constitutional arrangements; and finally, powerful liberal democracies, such as the United States and its allies, voluntarily bind themselves into complex global governance arrangements to demonstrate strategic restraint and create incentives for other states to cooperate, thereby reducing the costs for maintaining international order. Recent scholarship, such as that of Charles Boehmer and colleagues, has also confirmed the classical liberal intuition that formal international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) or NATO, independently contribute to peace, especially when they are endowed with sophisticated administrative structures and information-gathering capacities. In short, research on global governance and especially on the relationship between democracy and international cooperation is thriving, and it usefully complements liberal scholarship on the democratic peace.

### !/T – Liberal Peace

#### Liberalism is resilient to the ALT – and even if imperfect, it’s the most practical way of organizing power for radical change – ALT throws fifty years of positive change out the window and only empowers worse illiberal populists

Isaac, 18—James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington (Jeffrey, “Putting Liberal Democracy First,” Dissent, Volume 65, Number 2, Spring 2018, pp. 151-159, dml)

Those of us who consider ourselves “left liberals” have expressed particular alarm about the symbolic and practical dangers posed by leaders such as Donald Trump and his supporters. To name but a few: mass rallies denouncing “the liberal media”; inciting and sometimes enacting violence against critics or protestors; calling for the imprisonment of political adversaries; racist and xenophobic rhetoric invoked to support Muslim bans, border walls, and mass deportations; conspiracy-mongering attacks on career civil servants as agents of “the deep state,” and on journalists as “enem[ies] of the American people”; and orchestrated campaigns of lying and disinformation under the banner of speaking “truth” directly to the people and opposing “fake news.” In many ways, these tactics and actions are all too reminiscent of the “origins of totalitarianism” discussed by Hannah Arendt in her 1951 classic of that title. To note this is not to deny the profound differences between the global crises of 1914–1945 and today. But it is to register profound fear for the future of liberal democracy.

Colleagues further to my left have been critical, sometimes harshly, of this liberal response. They insist that Trump is not quite so dangerous, and that the dangers he does pose are largely expressions of deeper tendencies of neoliberalism that require more fundamental challenge. It thus makes little sense, they argue, for the left to reflexively defend liberal democracy— liberal democracy itself is the problem, and the solution is its transformation. While tactically these arguments track the 2016 debates between supporters of Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, they also run deeper. Some on the left—whether enthusiastic Bernie supporters, or unenthusiastic supporters who nonetheless saw his candidacy as an opening—reviled Clinton for her neoliberalism, and could not bring themselves to vote for her even once she won the Democratic nomination. They argued that the threat posed by Trump was overstated since both parties are oligarchical and capitalist (they are), and thus essentially similar (they are not). This contingent believed that the real danger is not Trumpism but the corruption, hypocrisy, inequality, and violence plaguing liberal democracy itself.

To be clear, the majority of Sanders supporters did vote for Clinton in the general election. Moreover, I have no interest in “blaming” people with such convictions for Clinton’s defeat, however they voted (and in a liberal democracy each individual has the fundamental right to vote as he or she chooses). Further, many Sanders activists have been involved in important long-term organizing efforts that are in no way reducible to the terms of a single election. At the same time, in the debates about the election and since Trump’s inauguration, there have been serious differences of opinion between those who are greatly alarmed by Trumpism and who regard the defense of liberal democracy as an urgent imperative, and those who regard it as nothing more than a symptom of a deeper and more fundamental crisis. “Socialism or barbarism” is a slogan rarely heard. But something like it seems to represent the logic of an anti-liberal position with real traction on the left.

It is important to acknowledge that what we call “liberal democracy” is a complex, novel, imperfect, and ultimately fragile form of politics, created after the Second World War through an accommodation between liberalism and democracy that was neither inevitable nor innocent. It required the buyin of social democratic and Christian democratic movements and parties; it relied on the unique conditions of postwar growth, class compromise, and Cold War “vital center” anticommunism; and it incorporated from the start some profoundly illiberal policy commitments (the national security state, post-colonial counter-insurgency, an uncritical embrace of “modernization,” and compromises with racial and gender inequality, to name a few). This regime was flawed from the start: it was already in crisis by 1965, and much of the politics of the past sixty years can be seen as an intensification of this crisis. Such an arrangement hardly represents a “riddle of history solved.”

Yet liberal democracy—in spite of its corruptions, failings, and complicity with injustice—represents the most practical and normatively legitimate way of organizing political power at the level of the nation-state. And every effort to install an alternative has resulted in disaster.

Liberal democracy is both limited and precarious. And simple appeals to liberal values are insufficient, either to defend liberal democracy under siege, or to further advance the causes of social justice and deepen democracy. For this reason, I disagree with self-identified liberal democrats who regard populism in any form as a danger to liberal democracy. I would instead agree with those such as Chantal Mouffe and Étienne Balibar, who argue that new forms of left populism and new left movements and parties (exemplified by Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, and Demos in Romania) are important to advance the cause of social justice, to counter the rise of right-wing populism, and thus to defend liberal democracy itself.

At the same time, I believe that calls to unambiguously embrace a new left populism, or to declare one’s goal to be socialism (or for some, even communism) are seriously misguided, at least for those who take liberal values seriously. There are two reasons why.

The first is broadly political: because a new socialist or left populist hegemony faces profound and probably insuperable obstacles, and these are not gainsaid by the obvious failings of capitalism. Marx was simply wrong when he declared that “Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve.” And the fact that capitalism is the source of profound harm to social justice and environmental sustainability does not mean that there is any obvious way to “solve,” rather than simply to remedy, these harms.

In their recent Jacobin piece “Social Democracy Is Good. But Not Good Enough.” Joseph Schwartz and Bhaskar Sunkara take issue with recent advocacy of liberal versions of socialism. They argue that “history shows us that achieving a stable welfare state while leaving capital’s power over the economy largely intact is itself far from viable. Even if we wanted to stop at socialism within capitalism, it’s not clear that we could.” But it is much less clear that it is possible to institute a wholesale socialist transformation. And, as Schwartz and Sunkara themselves concede: “To chart a different course, we would need a militant labor movement and a mass socialist presence strengthened by accumulated victories, looking to not merely tame but overcome capitalism.” But such a socialist mass politics is rather unlikely given the current forms of social and economic life, which differ dramatically from the forms of industrialism that gave birth to the modern socialist movement in the mid-nineteenth century.

“Post-Fordist” forms of flexible accumulation, automation, neoliberal forms of consumerism, new digital means of communication, new forms of “liquid modernity”—such developments have promoted new forms of inequality, but they have also eroded the social, cultural, and economic bases of working-class formation that grounded socialist politics in the past. In countries such as the United States, there is no mass proletariat to mobilize or organize. And while there is a working class, not many of the individuals inhabiting this class regard wage-labor as the defining feature of their experience or identity under capitalism.

In fact, a range of struggles for recognition now flourish in real tension with class politics—including civil rights, women’s rights, and gay rights. Right-wing populism represents a powerful backlash against these struggles that has successfully garnered substantial white working-class support. The identities of many members of the white working class are deeply and profoundly constituted by sexism and resentment toward immigrants and people of color in ways that make them poor targets for socialist advocacy.

It does not follow from this that socialist political organizing ought to be disparaged. But it does follow that left liberals have every reason to approach the aspiration to transcend capitalism, and liberal democracy, with skepticism. And so, when socialist colleagues challenge us from the left, insisting that we “reify” liberal democracy and fail to understand the “real” sources of our difficulties, we have every reason to question who exactly is doing the reifying.

The second reason to keep a liberal distance from invocations of socialist transformation relates to questions of ethical and political judgment. Even if one were to believe that the only way to defend liberal democracy and to defeat the forces of the right is to join the struggle for a more radical challenge to capitalism itself, this would not mitigate some very difficult and consequential political choices that present themselves in the here and now.

Thus after Hillary Clinton was nominated, many Sanders supporters who sincerely believed that something more radical than Clintonism was necessary were faced with a stark choice: on the one hand, voting for and supporting Clinton, and, on the other hand, refusing to support Clinton, by abstaining or supporting Jill Stein, and thus making it more likely that Donald Trump would be elected. To support Clinton in this context was not to repudiate Sanders or the importance of the political “revolution” he led. It was simply to acknowledge that the danger to liberal democracy represented by Trump was too great—and that neoliberalism with a human face is always to be preferred to right-wing authoritarianism. A similar dilemma presented itself to many French leftists in the May 2017 presidential elections. During the first round, a number of center and left candidates decided to run, including left socialist Jean-Luc Mélenchon, along with Marine Le Pen of the right-wing National Front. But in the runoff, the choice was stark: support Emmanuel Macron against Le Pen, on the grounds that the danger from the right must be averted, or refuse to do so, on the grounds that Macron is a neoliberal. Yanis Varoufakis, self-described “erratic Marxist” and former Greek Finance Minister, explained the stakes in Project Syndicate: Progressives have good reason to be angry with a liberal establishment that feels comfortable with Macron. . . . Moreover, it is not hard to identify with the French left’s feeling that the liberal establishment is getting its comeuppance with Le Pen’s rise. . . . But the decision of many leftists to maintain an equal distance between Macron and Le Pen is inexcusable. There are two reasons for this. First, the imperative to oppose racism trumps opposition to neoliberal policies. . . . Just like in the 1940s, we have a duty to ensure that the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of violence is not controlled by those who harbor violent sentiments toward the foreigner, the cultural or sexual minority member, the “other.” . . . But there is a second reason for backing Macron. . . . My disagreements with Macron are legion. . . . [yet] I support Macron . . . [for I] refuse to be part of a generation of leftists responsible for allowing a fascist and racist to win the French presidency. Naturally, if Macron wins and becomes merely another functionary of Europe’s deep establishment, my comrades and I will oppose him no less energetically than we are—or should be—opposing Le Pen now.

Yet there are those on the left who view the neoliberal as no less of a threat than the neo-fascist. The philosopher Slavoj Žižek, for example, refused to support Macron against Le Pen, echoing a stance he had taken in the Clinton-Trump contest. Similar sentiments have been expressed by the scholar Nancy Fraser, a harsh critic of Clinton. Like Žižek, Fraser insists that “far from being the antidote to fascism, (neo)liberalism is its partner in crime. . . . the left should refuse the choice between progressive neoliberalism and reactionary populism.”

But there are times when such a choice is necessary, and making the right choice is not a form of capitulation but political responsibility. The making of such a choice does not preclude other choices as well, and it makes perfect sense to say “I support this candidate or policy now, when the alternative is much worse, at the same time that I will continue to work for a future in which better choices are available.”

And so on May 15, 2017, shortly after Macron’s victory, Varoufakis, as promised, published a follow-up: “Congratulations, President Macron—Now We Oppose You.” There may be a vantage point from which it makes sense to denounce Varoufakis for refusing to refuse the choice between “progressive neoliberalism and reactionary populism.” But it is a vantage point from which the fate of liberal democracy, with its civil liberties, ethnic and religious tolerance, and political pluralism—and the fate of those constituencies who need these very things to survive—would seem to matter all too little. As Varoufakis stated in another op-ed for Le Monde, “Of course we all wish, at least those of us on the left, that the French electoral system were not binary. But it is. And given that it is, I refuse to be part of a generation of European progressives who could have stopped Marine Le Pen from winning France’s Presidency but didn’t.” Varoufakis describes the refusal of this choice as “scandalous.” To choose against right-wing authoritarianism is to put liberal democracy first, and to treat it not as the end, but as an essential means of any ends worth pursuing.

The questions of means and ends raised by such electoral choices are even more pressing when it comes to another set of tactics supported by some on the left—tactics of sometimes violent direct action represented by antifa. Natasha Lennard explained in the Nation last August that “the antifascist project is not one of asking for better statutes or a reconfiguration of rights. . . . antifa is a promise to neo-Nazis and their bedfellows that we will confront them in the streets; we will expose them online and inform their place of employ.” She makes clear that such a politics has little regard for the discourse of human rights or the rule of law. Last summer, Lennard also pursued this anti-liberal theme in Dissent: Time and again in recent months I have seen political writers apoplectic over alleged rips in the social contract, as wrought by Trump, anti-immigrant policy, or austerity, or any number of political plagues. The liberal response has been outrage and disbelief that the state can fall so far from its alleged foundation as a contract forged by the will of equal pledgers. . . . Calling upon some mythic social contract to deliver us from evil is not just futile, it’s downright religious, as Nietzsche would see it. Liberal outrage peddles Christian morality in a world where God is dead, and we have killed him. . . . Power determines which narratives about reality get to count as truth. Recognizing this is a political necessity for those who would challenge the Trumpian Weltanschauung.” Antifa historian and organizer Mark Bray similarly writes that “anti-fascism is an illiberal politics of social revolutionism applied to fighting the Far Right, not only literal fascists [emphasis added].” The roots of antifa lie in the most radical forms of anarchism. As the journalist Chris Hedges (and also Noam Chomsky) have argued, “The focus on street violence diverts activists from the far less glamorous building of relationships and alternative institutions and community organizing that alone will make effective resistance possible.” Moreover, antifa rhetoric, like the “alt right” and neo-Nazi rhetoric it despises, is Manichean. Instead of efforts to forge broad coalitions capable of defeating right-wing authoritarians at the ballot box, antifa tactics promote cycles of recrimination, giving public credibility to right-wing authoritarians, such as Trump, who valorize police brutality and claim to represent “law and order.” There is a long history of Manichean “friend/enemy” thinking on the left, represented by polemics such as Lenin’s 1918 “The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky” and Trotsky’s 1938 Their Morals and Ours. It was, in part, to counter such thinking that Dissent magazine was founded. That generation of democratic socialists, shaken by the experiences of Stalinism, totalitarianism, genocide, and world war, and hemmed in by McCarthyism and what Irving Howe called a deadening “age of conformity,” created a journal committed to a critical and liberal version of socialism centering on the importance of vigorous disagreement. In its sixty-four years, Dissent has experienced generational changes and featured many important debates. But at no time since the journal’s founding has the very existence of liberal democracy seemed more in danger.

The illiberal forces on the rise threaten to reverse every important achievement, however limited, of the past five decades of liberal democracy. These achievements include reproductive freedom and domestic violence legislation; environmental and workplace health and safety regulation; civil rights and voting rights enforcement; moderate forms of consumer protection; and press freedom and protection against censorship. All deserve to be defended, not because of their role in advancing us toward a future beyond capitalism, but because they represent real improvements in our lives. The fear-mongering, repression, and evisceration of public criticism promoted by right-wing populism diminish democratic citizenship for everyone. They are harmful to left organizing and to anyone who believes in defending political freedom. Resisting these assaults on liberal democracy through the political means made available by liberal democracy is an urgent task. This does not prevent one from also seeking to build a movement beyond “resistance.” But resistance is important work in its own right and, for many of us, it is the work that is currently most important.

Sarah Leonard, a Dissent editor-at-large and former editor at the Nation, recently remarked about the uncertainties of liberals: The problem with many prominent representatives of liberalism today . . . is that they don’t seem to know which side they’re on. Say Bernie, vote Hillary; say universal health care, but condemn its advocacy; say electable, lose everywhere; say you’ll don sneakers to walk the picket line, don’t show up. The name of my desire is socialism; do liberals know the name of theirs? This reluctance to pick “a side” that disturbs Leonard—which I prefer to describe as ambivalence—is real, and while it can be bridged, I doubt it can be eliminated. For to be a left liberal is to be troubled by the hesitations and inconsistencies of which Leonard writes but also to believe that a pluralistic politics of freedom in our complex world requires such tribulations. I supported Sanders and voted for him in the Indiana primary. But I doubted he could win the Democratic nomination, much less the general election, and I worried about the harshness with which some of his supporters attacked Clinton, a harshness that has persisted over the past year. I support universal healthcare, and welcome the shift by many important Democratic leaders to support the Sanders plan. Still, I wonder whether the plan itself is viable, and whether it is the most compelling issue on which to mobilize the Democratic Party to electoral victories in 2018 and 2020. Because I so profoundly fear Trumpism, I regard Democratic victories as critical—even if they involve compromises on healthcare and even as they will likely bring disappointments. Am I confused? Am I lacking in conviction? Or am I simply unable to believe there are easy, clear-cut answers to many current political questions?

And so “liberal” works for me as a political identity in a way that “socialist” does not. It places a priority on the civil and political freedoms that make it possible for us to argue about how to challenge injustice and work for greater justice. It furnishes peaceful channels of political participation and contestation that allow for provisional agreements to be reached about how to move forward.

Again, Lennard writes, disparagingly, that: “The liberal response has been outrage and disbelief that the state can fall so far from its alleged foundation as a contract forged by the will of equal pledgers.” But liberals such as myself do not believe that the liberal democratic state was ever founded through an idyllic process of egalitarian consent. We believe only that liberal democracy is a flawed outcome of struggle worth defending, and that the idea of free and equal democratic will formation has furnished, and continues to furnish, a powerful normative ideal. There is no “mythic social contract” that can “deliver us from evil.” There is no such contract, and there is no such deliverance. There is only ongoing debate and contestation.

It is perhaps that fundamental commitment to ongoing political contestation that marks the difference between left liberals and those to our left who embrace a more “radical” and often emphatically socialist politics. To note this is not to disparage those to my left. It is to identify points of honest difference as well as commonalities, on which agreements and alliances are possible.

In December 2001, Robert Kuttner published a short piece in the liberal journal he co-edits, the American Prospect, with the self-explanatory title “Why Liberals Need Radicals.” In June 2013, Bhaskar Sunkara, editor of Jacobin, published a piece in the Nation, entitled “Letter to ‘The Nation’ From a Young Radical.” Sunkara explains why he and his colleagues have embraced a new radicalism with strong Marxist roots. He too makes the case that liberals and radicals need each other. At the same time, from the radical and not the liberal side, Sunkara’s view of this association is rather harsh: “American radicalism has had a complex and at times contradictory association with liberalism. At the peak of the socialist movement, leftists fed off liberal victories. Radicals, in turn, have added coherence and punch to every key liberal struggle and advance of the past century. Such a mutually beneficial alliance could be in the works again. The first step is to smash the existing liberal coalition and rebuild it on a radically different basis.”

I share Sunkara’s belief that now is the time for mutually beneficial connections and alliances between democratic socialists and liberals. But I am rather wary—perhaps for reasons of generational experience—of calls to “smash the existing liberal coalition.” I am skeptical of that “radically different basis.” Most importantly, I believe that the danger posed by the radical right, to the political conditions and elemental life chances of many millions of individuals, makes it important to defend, to build, and to extend the liberal coalition rather than disrupt or destroy it. Because in the struggle between socialism and barbarism, it is barbarism that has the advantage. And because the civil and political freedoms and forms of responsive public policy made possible by liberal democracy are a necessary condition of any social or economic justice worth having.

#### Ks of lib-ism link to themselves by dismissing post-colonial liberal perspectives and the concrete needs of colonial subjects—rejecting lib-ism all too easily feeds into the growing wave of global fascism

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Too often, with liberalism, we throw the baby out with the bathwater. In contemporary critical and cultural theory, criticisms of liberalism are almost mandatory. This is most true in the field of postcolonial theory or in philosophies of the Global South. For many postcolonial scholars, “western” liberalism is the common enemy of the politics and ideas from the margins of global knowledge production. At times, one may be led to think that, without liberalism as a common target, postcolonial theory would lose its cohesion. Postcolonies are, after all, different, and the philosophies their intellectuals have espoused have likewise been varied. Without a positive notion of theory from the Global South, scholars have turned to denigrating “liberal” modernity.1

Of course, some anti-liberal scholarship has surfaced dark legacies of the European tradition. But even these turn critique into blanket dismissal. For example, the scathing work of Uday Singh Mehta (1999) proves how British liberal intellectuals like Jeremy Benthan, James and John Stuart Mill, and Lord Macaulay defended imperialism, particularly in India. The idea of Western tutelage for “backward” societies, he contends, stems from the liberal embrace of universal values to the exclusion of different cultures and belief systems. Hence, “the liberal involvement with the British Empire is broadly coeval with liberalism itself” (ibid., 4). Echoing Mehta, the sociologist Julian Go (2017, 74) contends that “civic-liberal nations” are “empire-states” (emphasis in original) because they “are predicated upon a core hierarchized binary of citizen and Other—that is, between those who are members of the community because they are rational, mature, and civilized, and those who are not.”

These scholars are sympathetic to the concerns of postcolonies and the Global South. But they have unwittingly wedded themselves to the study of the Global North. In studying liberalism, they privilege the voices of liberals from Europe, while neglecting how liberalism has been articulated in postcolonies themselves. A global history of liberalism must acknowledge the contributions of colonial thinkers in its development. True enough, we may condemn thinkers like Mill for their defense of imperialism, but we must also celebrate their counterpoints from within the liberal tradition. We must celebrate thinkers like Rizal.

Rizal would have accepted many of the objections of scholars like Mehta and Go. He too knew how liberals from colonial metropoles could use their ideas to support colonialism. But Rizal would have rejected the reduction of liberalism’s vast history to the actions of colonizers. In this book, I hope to have shown that, while Rizal criticized Spanish liberals, he never abandoned the liberal project. Rather, he believed that liberalism could be renewed, even purified, in the colony, through the painful experiences of colonials like himself.

Rizal too would not have dismissed liberalism simply because it could create “Others.” For he knew that any political community needs to have an inside and an outside: nations have foreigners, religions have non-believers, and socialist movements have class enemies. In this regard, liberalism is no different from other political ideals that form bonds of community. Rizal knew, however, that the bonds of community within liberal republics could be expansive and cosmopolitan. He saw how the category “Filipino” could expand from only referring to creoles to include all those who identified with the emergent nation. He believed in communities not bound by race or religion, but adherence to Enlightenment philosophy.

Such a worldview is simple, but it comes to us with a certain urgency today, at a time when “illiberal democracy” is one the rise. For much of the post-Cold War world, progressive and radical thinkers insisted that there was more to human political development than the mere liberal “end of history.” There had to be more radical ways to imagining politics. Amid this desire, much anti-liberal thinking became nihilistic, and those who condemned liberalism rarely thought of concrete alternatives. At worse, they denigrated the basic tenets of liberalism, without care for the possible repercussions.

The disillusionment with liberalism is, of course, nothing new. Even as Rizal was articulating a liberalism for the colonized in the nineteenth century, many Europeans were already becoming sick of the liberal project. Francois Furet (2000, 11) explains that many radicals from that period had come to believe “that modern liberal democracy was threatening society with dissolution because it atomized individuals, made them indifferent to public interest, weakened authority, and encouraged class hatred.” This disillusionment would eventually lead to the twin illiberal philosophies that dominated the twentieth century: fascism on the right and Communism on the Left.

History, of course, does not repeat itself. But there are echoes of the illiberal early twentieth century today. If the present moment prompts comparisons with the 1930s and 1940s, it is not because we are about to enter another period of global warfare. Rather, it is because, our present, like those years, teems with illiberalism. And, like the early twentieth century, intellectuals in the West have been averse to defending liberal values, preferring instead utopian visions of politics that can neither be tested nor implemented. For much of the twentieth century, as Hollander (2016) explains, the illiberalism of intellectuals was evident in the hero worship of dictators in places like Germany, China, Cuba, the Soviet Union, Cambodia, and Venezuela. Western intellectuals looked to strongmen on both the left and the right as figures of inspiration because of a “painful awareness of the inability of Western, pluralistic, capitalist societies to deliver sustaining values and beliefs that would enable them to confront and weather the endemic crises and frustrations of life, and especially modern life” (ibid., 294).

These same frustrations not only led Western intellectuals to admire dictators; they also brought them to nihilistic positions against Enlightenment traditions like liberalism. The identification with authoritarian figures and the rejection of “Western liberalism” are impulses of what Pascal Bruckner (2010, 21) calls a masochistic “penitential class,” who, because of their guilt about colonialism, turn their back on the values of the Enlightenment. Today, radical scholars from the Global North seek to theorize the Global South in opposition to a static, liberal North/West. Some are so cavalier that they dismiss even the most humane of Enlightenment traditions such as human rights. For example, Jean and John Comaroff (2001, 39–40), purveyors of “theory from the south,” diminish the value of human rights by comparing rights-based thinking to contemporary capitalism, contending that “If law underpins the langue of neoliberalism, constitutionalism has become the parole of universal human rights, a global argot that individuates the citizen and, by making cultural identity a private asset, rather than a collective claim, transmutes difference into likeness.”

Such purple prose is merely academese for the tired argument that individualistic human rights are incompatible with collectivist societies. In fact, the same argument was better phrased by the spokesperson of the authoritarian Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, when he was justifying the murder of thousands of drug suspects. “The liberal Western values being imposed upon an Asian nation that places premium on common good,” he argued, “is both insensitive and displays a lack of appreciation for the diversity of global culture” (Quoted in Esmaquel 2017). Western intellectuals do not always directly endorse demagogues, but they are tempted by cool detachment to speak like them.

Hollander (2016, 9) contends that many pro-dictatorship intellectuals endorsed authoritarianism from a distance, and many of them “had little to gain, or lose” in their judgments. Until today, many illiberal commentators on the Global South from the Global North do so from far away, secure that constitutional rights do not collapse overnight in places like the United States or Europe—Donald Trump and the European far-right notwithstanding. Unfortunately, for those of us in places like the Philippines, a human rights regime may disintegrate overnight, as in the case of Duterte’s Philippines. Rizal’s country was once a broken, if relatively stable, liberal democracy. After the collapse of Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship in 1986, it slowly inched its way toward some semblance of a liberal democracy, where regular elections occurred, civil society movements focused on institution building, and relatively open elections occurred (Quimpo 2008; Curato 2015; Thompson 1996). In 2016, the country was taken over by a murderous demagogue.

This collapse of liberal democracy occurs amid thunderous applause, with Duterte remaining popular despite a drug war that has killed thousands. Because Duterte has devalued his country’s human rights tradition—“If it concern human rights, I don’t give a shit”—he once claimed (Quoted in Holmes 2016)—he has also devalued life. Survey data shows that the majority of Filipinos believe that extra-judicial killings are occurring under the drug war, yet a significant majority remain supportive of the government’s draconian campaign (Pulse Asia Research Inc. 2017). Such is the moral crisis that Duterte has created.

When Rizal argued that pain purified liberalism, he was expressing a profound but obvious insight: Those who have had liberty denied them value it even more. Those who believe that liberty may slip away are more cautious in their criticisms of basic freedoms. For a liberal in the Philippines, the truth of this message can be found in the most quotidian contexts. Many liberals in my country have had to fight for liberal values in religious schools, patriarchal families, and other conservative institutions. Under Duterte , they fight amid an electorate that is increasingly proving susceptible to the temptations of authoritarianism. It is an everyday struggle for everyday changes.

Liberalism continues to be pragmatic. It is pragmatic for those who see the concrete needs of postcolonies, for thinkers like Rizal who seek evolving modernities for their nations. For Nigerian philosopher Olúfẹmi Táíwò (2014, 10), seeking these modernities requires being less concerned with the provenance of ideas and more with their usefulness. He contends “that the countries of Asia and Latin America that have transformed themselves for the better are precisely the ones that have wised up to the idea that—regardless of what they think of modernity and the West, which has most benefited from its proliferation—a good way to improve their lot in the world is to borrow some pages from the West’s playbook.”

While liberalism is an inadequate philosophy—it constantly has to grapple with its bourgeois origins—many of its principles are necessary checks against the excesses of political power. The fault of liberalism’s critics has been to view it as an ends in itself instead of a system of guarantees, a bare minimum of treating citizens in a political community with what Orwell called “common decency.” The history of liberalism has shown how many ideas can be grafted onto the liberal project. Social democracy, for example, represented liberalism coming to terms with class inequality. And, indeed, as Tony Judt (2010, 52) has argued, it was the welfare that bound citizens to the state’s liberal institutions.

Liberalism grows. Liberal America once had slaves. Liberal countries from across the world refused women the right to vote. And many liberal states once had colonies, which they exploited. But because of anti-colonial liberals like Rizal, we now recognize colonialism as a contradiction of the liberal project. This recognition is a gift of the Enlightenment, and someone like Rizal had no qualms about appropriating what he saw in Europe, and grafting them into colonial contexts. He would have agreed with Bruckner (2010, 28) who contends that “There is no doubt that Europe has given birth to monsters, but at the same time it has given birth to theories that make it possible to understand and destroy these monsters.”

The rise of global populism and authoritarianism means we can no longer dismiss liberal principles as lightly, since anti-liberalism feeds into the rhetoric of present-day dictators. The Philippine liberal tradition runs deep, but it is always in a precarious position, especially now. For those of us who seek comfort amid the tribulations of the present, we may return to Rizal’s enigmatic vision of liberalism being a “plant that never dies.” The liberal tradition may be in tatters, but we only need to replant its seeds and await its resurrection.

#### Abdicating a defense of lib-ism’s self-correcting capacities leaves the vacuum open for authoritarianism while removing any checks on its rise

Claudio, 17—Associate Professor at De La Salle University Manila's College of Liberal Arts (Lisandro, “Defending Liberalism in the Global South: Notes from Duterte's Philippines,” The Global South, Volume 11, Number 2, Fall 2017, pp. 92-107, dml) [gendered language modifications denoted by brackets]

In all the criticisms cited above, critics reduce liberalism to a static idea, holding it up to the most stringent criteria, which are not equally applied to other existing political models. (To muster such vitriol against Marxism would certainly elicit accusations of fascistic anti-Communism). But any nuanced history of liberal thought must acknowledge the steady expansion of liberalism’s political and ethical horizons. Edmund Fawcett, for example, has shown how liberalism, which began as a credo of the elites (liberty for a select few) grew into liberal democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and thus became a grammar for mass politics (2014, 143). Thus, while we may concede that liberal ideas have previously marginalized women, the poor, and various racial others, we must also note its historical capacity for self-correction. Scholars like Mehta or Go are quick to point out liberalism’s sins but neglect how relatively quickly some of these sins were rectified.

Liberalism’s expansiveness is present even in the US-based civic-liberalism that scholars like Go deride. For, as Richard Rorty reminds us, while the United States has had a history of subjugation and hypocrisy, its greatest minds, such as Walt Whitman and John Dewey, constantly infused their critiques with a vision of what a more inclusive US society could be in the future (1997, 8). The liberal experiment, always in the process of becoming, was premised on “replacing shared knowledge of what is already real with social hope for what might become real” (18). Liberalism is an idea centered on progress, and progress assumes that mistakes were once made. Otherwise, what are we to progress from?

Much of anti-liberal postcolonial theorization is built on straw men [straw persons], based on incomplete histories of both Northern and Southern liberalisms, and on assumptions about political models that have not or cannot be tested. More importantly, these critiques do not seriously consider their implications in the Global South, where problems like poverty and violence are immediate and pressing, making ameliorative reform more urgent. Moreover, the institutional blueprint of a liberal democracy is necessary to maintain a baseline of politics that prevents the excesses of authoritarianism and the ethical relativism that enables it. As Dipesh Chakrabarty prosaically yet correctly concedes, “we do not in modernity and as yet, know of desirable institutional arrangements in public life that could be seriously built on principles other than those of liberalism” (emphasis in original, 2001, 126). When those desirable institutional arrangements collapse, polities enter periods of violent crisis. This is currently happening in the Philippines.

Duterte and the Attack on the Liberal State

Anti-liberalism in aid of authoritarianism has a long tradition in Asia. Pitting “Asian” communal values against Western individualism has served to justify various repressive measures, from racist bumiputra laws in Malaysia to press censorship in Singapore. In India, the communalist rhetoric of the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party) positions itself against the “foreign” liberalism of intellectuals. For this final section, I want to examine how this same rhetoric has been reproduced in the Philippines by the populist strongman Rodrigo Duterte, who has not only prosecuted a bloody war on drugs, but has also denigrated and weakened the liberal democratic institutions of his country.

As we saw earlier, the anti-colonial liberalism of figures like Rizal birthed the Philippine nation. The prominence of liberal intellectuals continued throughout the American colonial period and the postwar period of independence. Educators pushed for pedagogy that was informed by John Dewey’s liberal internationalism (Claudio 2015a), diplomats were integral to the formation of a global human rights architecture at the United Nations (Claudio 2015b), and economic debates were centered on the liberal management of an export industry (Claudio 2017, 45–71). For many Filipinos, the claim that their country represented the success of a US-style liberal democracy in Asia was more than postcolonial lip service.

The country’s liberal experiment ground to a halt in 1972, when President Ferdinand Marcos implemented martial law to perpetuate himself in power. The dictator padlocked congress, arrested activists and opposition leaders, and shut down what many considered the freest press in Asia. Marcos’s downfall in 1986 restored liberal democracy, but this restored democracy was fragile. Thirty years after the fall of Marcos, another budding dictator has emerged to challenge the country’s liberal tradition. As a candidate in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte ran on a wave of popular disillusionment with the liberal reformism of his predecessor, Benigno ‘Noynoy’ Aquino III (2010–2016)—son of former president Corazon Aquino (1988– 1992) and martyred anti-Marcos opposition senator Benigno Aquino Jr. Though President Aquino and his Liberal Party were consistently popular for the majority of his six-year term, a congressional corruption scandal and a botched military operation dented the president’s reputation during his final years in office. Moreover, quotidian problems such as worsening traffic in the already gridlocked Metropolitan Manila area raised frustration with government.

Duterte emerged seemingly out of nowhere, a little-known mayor from the southern city of Davao. Commentators thought he would fail to compete with the popularity and machinery of the three leading mainstream candidates, which included the daughter of the country’s most famous action star, the incumbent vice president, and Aquino’s interior secretary. Duterte’s rise was first a blip that became unstoppable, and it caught Filipino pundits off guard. Yet his campaign tapped into multiple dormant impulses in the electorate: authoritarian nostalgia, a disdain for Manila-based politicians, and impatience with reformism. His campaign tagline, “change is coming,” as Anne Applebaum correctly notes, had “the same empty appeal as ‘make American great again’” (2016). Like the United States’ Donald Trump, it was this emptiness, couched in unbridled anger, which turned Duterte into an empty canvas for various forms of disaffection.7

From the fall of the Marcos in 1986 to Duterte’s assumption of power, the Philippines had been involved in a slow if uneven process of redemocratization. Within this period, memories of the bloodless EDSA “People Power” revolution that unseated Marcos became the organizing mnemonic template of the post-Marcos state.8 Its heroes, particularly Corazon Aquino (widow of a slain opposition senator and Marcos’s successor), became enshrined as the secular saints of the post-authoritarian republic in a Manichean divide that separated the forces of democracy and those of the dictatorship (Claudio 2013). During this period, the country developed a robust, grassroots democratic culture—largely a product of the various civil society organizations that emerged from the ashes of the anti-Marcos opposition. Despite the vibrancy of what political scientist Nathan Quimpo labeled the Philippine “contested democracy,”—led by a free-flowing, non-Communist Left—certain problems remained intractable (2008). In particular, violent political dynasties and local machine politicians continued to dominate regional politics. As Benedict Anderson explains, the end of the Marcos regime may have ended authoritarianism, but it brought back the system of oligarch-led “cacique democracy” (1998). Many voters and commentators saw Duterte as a cure to the dominance of the oligarchs. That Duterte himself came from a local oligarchic background became irrelevant. His anti-elitism manifested in a rough-talking rhetorical style that separated him from the cultivated candidates of the “establishment.” The violence began even before Duterte took office, with drug-related vigilante killings spiking mere days after the election. As president, Duterte has overseen the bloodiest display of state power in Philippine history. Conservative estimates place the death toll at 7,000 as of August 2017 (Kine 2017). Although there are no accurate statistics for the death toll under Marcos (the mass killings occurred in remote provinces), the velocity of killing under Duterte is unprecedented. Beyond the violence, Duterte has also poisoned public discourse and damaged political institutions. Apart from destroying the reputation of Aquino’s Liberal Party, he has also challenged the country’s liberal tradition by glorifying the late dictator Marcos, whose remains the president buried in the country’s hero’s cemetery. As with most populists, it is sometimes difficult to determine what Duterte stands for. It is clear, however, what he is against. For Duterte, notes Walden Bello, “the target is liberal-democracy—the dominant ideology and political system of our time” (2017, np). Much like Trump and Vladimir Putin, Duterte’s propaganda machinery relies heavily on networks of social media trolls who share fake news and promote conspiracy theories. A primary target of trolling operations and presidential pronouncements has been the beleaguered Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an independent constitutional body that seeks to investigate the state’s alleged human rights violations. In late 2017, the Duterte-controlled House of Representatives (the lower house) voted to allocate a mere P1,000 Philippine pesos (20 USD) for its annual budget, a stunt celebrated by Duterte’s online supporters (Cupin 2017). Though the defunding was soon corrected by a more circumspect Senate (upper house), it sent a message that the liberal constitutional framework of the Philippines was collapsing with thunderous applause. Duterte and his allies represent institutions that promote human rights as hindrances to the president’s mission of national renewal. When the United Nations special rapporteur on summary executions requested to investigate the killings, Duterte’s government rejected the offer. The president’s spokesperson justified the decision by claiming that the UN was seeking to impose “liberal Western values” on “an Asian nation that places premium on common good” The UN was, he concluded, “both insensitive and display[ed] a lack of appreciation for the diversity of global culture” (quoted in Esmaquel 2017, np). Always more pithy, Duterte himself claimed that, “if it involves human rights, I don’t give a shit” (quoted in Holmes 2016, np).

Alas, Duterte’s rhetoric has worked. Into his second year in office, the President enjoys over 80% approval rating (“Pulse: Duterte...” 2017), largely from a population that does not care how many die as long as it does not affect them. The triumph of what commentators have called “Dutertismo” is complete, and it proves that there are, indeed, alternatives to liberal politics. Whether these alternatives are desirable is a different matter.

Conclusion

Global liberalism is in crisis. Duterte’s rise in the Philippines is just one example of the illiberal, populist backlash triggered by multiple causes, including the inequalities of economic globalization, the smugness of the liberal elite, and the appeal of strongman rule.

It would be extreme and certainly false to claim that anti-liberal postcolonial theory or theory from the South caused or even contributed to the rise of global populism. Doing so would confuse the symptom for the cause. Yet we must also hold intellectuals to task for failing to rise to the defense of basic common principles anchored on liberal ideals of dignity, tolerance, human rights, and, yes, a certain degree of universalism. For the historian Tony Judt (1988), what is necessary is a renewed moralism in intellectual life—the responsibility to confront political excesses and intellectual flights of fancy. Such an approach would temper the cynicism, cool detachment, and disdain for the Enlightenment that defines much writing on the Global South.

The anti-liberal theorizing on the Global South by scholars working in the Global North may be a safe exhaust valve for their frustrations and boredom with the liberal democracy they experience every day. Trump notwithstanding, liberal institutions are stronger in places like the United States and Europe and can therefore be taken for granted, even maligned. But the same cannot be said of the Global South, where liberal democratic institutions can collapse almost overnight, as they have in Duterte’s Philippines. To put things in blunt and moralistic terms: my president is slaughtering my countrymen by the thousands, justifying the murders by dismissing liberalism and human rights as “Western.” I do not have the luxury of “problematizing” human rights as symptomatic of the era of “neoliberalism.” Scholars should be careful of the illiberalism they wish for in the Global North, because we in the Global South just might get it in the form of a bloodthirsty autocrat.

A restoration of liberal democratic principles in my country is urgent—a matter of life and death. And it is with this sense of urgency that we must rethink liberalism in the Global South, not as an endpoint of political development (“end of history”), but as the bare minimum of democratic politics. A liberalism for the Global South must be simultaneously anchored on realism and hopefulness. A moralist’s liberal stance must be anchored on, to corrupt what Gramsci said for Marxist ends, a pessimism of the intellect conjoined with an optimism of the will. Except, since liberalism refuses to foreground a revolutionary break along the horizon, it leaves more room for optimism. As modus vivendi, liberalism has no telos; it is never fully complete. Hence it is never fully a success or a failure.

The Global South, like liberalism, is a provisional and syncretic project, built on imagined networks of solidarity yet anchored on the necessity of everyday political praxis. They are both open, because they are both in perennial translation. As Arjun Appadurai contends, it is in liberalism that we find seeds of cosmopolitanism, because it is premised on “self-expansion” (2005, 434). This self-expansion may lead us into new theoretical horizons (even new forms of socialism), but it will remain anchored on basic principles: the respect for autonomy, the tolerance of other opinions, and the primacy of human rights. We uphold these values in both the Global North and the Global South.

#### Their Ks of lib-ism lack scholarly rigor and have it backwards—lib-ism’s failings come from it not being vigorously defended enough and historical anti-colonial resistance explicitly reflected liberal values—their K independently dooms positive reform in the Global South

Claudio, 17—Associate Professor at De La Salle University Manila's College of Liberal Arts (Lisandro, “Defending Liberalism in the Global South: Notes from Duterte's Philippines,” The Global South, Volume 11, Number 2, Fall 2017, pp. 92-107, dml)

First is the claim that liberalism is a universalizing Enlightenment idea that has imposed itself on colonial societies. In displacing other forms of non-Western thinking, critics say it creates a hierarchy between a civilized/liberal subject and an uncivilized/illiberal one, thus allowing for the violence of colonialism. The most prominent writer in this vein is Uday Singh Mehta (1999), who argues that imperialism was not a contradiction within liberal thought but inherent in it.2 Through colonialism, he contends, liberalism “found a project, with all the grandeur of scale, implicit permanence, purposefulness, and the absence of a need to negotiate with what is extant” (12). Mehta based his account largely on a critique of British liberalism and its effects on colonial India. But others have applied his arguments to other liberal empires. By examining the United States’ colonial expansion in the late nineteenth century, Julian Go challenges the narrative of an inclusive liberal nationalism in the US. He contends that one must think of “civic-liberal nations as liberal empire-states” (emphasis in original, 2017, 74). Drawing from the influential anti-liberalism of Losurdo (2014), Go claims that both “are predicated upon a core hierarchized binary of citizen and Other—that is, between those who are members of the community because they are rational, mature, and civilized, and those who are not” (74). It is in this manner, he concludes, that US liberalism has excluded various subaltern groups, from African-American slaves to colonial-era Filipinos.

To the critique exemplified by Mehta and Go, I offer two replies. First, liberalism’s universalism does not necessarily lead to colonialism. In fact, is it reasonable for a liberal who believes in rational deliberation to violently impose a set of beliefs on entire peoples? Scholars like Mehta are wont to emphasize the universalizing desires of liberalism (its first face), but they have neglected its other face, what Gray calls liberalism as modus vivendi—a liberalism that allows for “common institutions in which many forms of life can coexist” (2000, 6). A modus vivendi cannot be colonialism. And neither is colonialism a way of ordering liberty through institutions that enhance individual and collective freedoms. I must concede that at various points in liberalism’s history, the pendulum has swung towards its more universalizing tendencies. Yet to contend, as anti-liberal postcolonial theorists do, that liberalism is a universalizing project that imposes itself on divergent belief systems relies on an incomplete vision of the liberal project.

A second reply relates to simple logic. It is, of course, true that liberalism creates “others.” But what political movement is bereft of an inside and outside? Marxism constructs the proletariat in relation to the bourgeoisie, nationalism has foreigners, various forms of identity politics insist on the primacy of specific subject positions over others, and religions have non-believers. In the sense that it sees the world through a political subject, liberalism is no different from other philosophies that create bonds of community. And while philosophers have theorized more fluid conceptions of political belonging— Deleuze and Guattari’s “rhizomatic” subjectivity (1988), which inspired Hardt and Negri’s conception of the amorphous “multitude” (2005)—it is not clear that these ideas have produced long-term movements or concrete agendas, especially in the Global South.

The second claim is that liberalism is a modernist credo external to the experiences of the Global South and postcolonies and thus out of sync with the necessities of today. We have already noted how de Sousa Santos views the “indifference” of liberalism as anathema to the radical needs of the South. And we have also examined how the Comaroffs view liberalism as a “parochial” remnant of Euro-American modernity inapplicable to the Global South, both because it comes from Europe and America, and because it is anchored on outdated beliefs about the rule of law. Elsewhere, the Comaroffs contend that the liberal belief in “the capacity for constitutionalism and contract, rights and legal remedies to accomplish order, civility, justice, empowerment” is a form of legal “fetishism” that is ultimately “chimerical,” especially in postcolonial contexts. This kind of politics, then, becomes nothing but a pyramid scheme: “The more it is indulged, the more it is required” (2001, 38).

Again I offer two replies. First, a history of liberalism shows that its potency as a political credo is not limited to the West. Of course, we cannot deny that much of liberalism’s early history lies in Europe and that the US became a major hub of liberal experimentation; liberalism’s place in what the Comaroffs label the “Euro-American” past is not up for debate. But because liberalism may encompass shifting subjectivities, political actors have been able to redefine liberalism within colonial contexts. Mehta is correct that imperialists deployed liberal rhetoric to justify expansionist policy. Nevertheless, the earliest anti-colonial movements were likewise liberal in nature, and, I would argue, more in line with the tenets of classical liberalism. Anti-colonial radicals in Spanish America, as Richard J. Evans notes, corresponded and collaborated with European liberals, forming a liberal and radical “international whose connections spanned the Atlantic” (2016, 17).

Spain was a crucial node in this liberal internationalism; its various patriotic societies, which emerged after the Napoleonic wars, inspired similar organizations throughout the continent (Evans 2016, 39). It is thus unsurprising that European liberalism spread to Asia through the Spanish colony of the Philippines. Historians John Schumacher (1991, 31) and Nick Joaquin (2005, 24–35) have posited that the propaganda movement that paved the way for the Philippine revolution of 1896 (the first anti-colonial revolution in Asia) was birthed within a local liberal tradition that mixed with nationalist anti-colonialism. Recent evidence has shown, moreover, that, like the French revolution, the Philippine revolution was also liberal in character.3

Critics view liberalism through the eyes of “liberal” imperialists, but they are silent about how colonized actors themselves articulated concepts of liberty and human rights from their subaltern positions. Philippine national hero, the polymath novelist and polemicist Jose Rizal, saw in the liberal tenets of the French declaration of rights a blueprint for a society after colonialism, translating the declaration for his countrymen during a sojourn in Hong Kong (Schumacher 1997, 270). He was a liberal who criticized colonialism on liberal grounds and believed that liberals who abetted colonial rule were untrue to their principles. Writing in 1890, Rizal claimed that if Spanish liberals in the Philippines had “more faith in their ideals,” they would resist the colonial rule of Catholic friars and that “modern ideas” would not “be asphyxiated upon touching the shores of Manila” (1964, 289).

If it is true that the one consistent feature of liberalism’s history has been the “constant opposition to assorted tyrannies,” then the more authentic liberals were those in colonial contexts, who argued that colonialism was tyranny writ large (Ryan 2012, 28). For the Filipino propagandists, there was a sense that liberalism could be purified in colonial contexts.4 “Liberals” in positions of power more easily succumb to tyranny, thereby turning their backs on their very own principles. A correction of liberalism could thus occur in places of disempowerment. What prevents Global South thinkers from appropriating this liberal anti-colonialism today? This appropriation would not be a wholesale adoption of modernity and Enlightenment. Rather, as in the case of Filipino propagandists, it would begin by grappling with rights and liberties in the postcolony, seeing how these can be enhanced and purified in these new contexts.

My second reply to the argument about liberalism’s inapplicability to the postcolonial politics of the present rests on pragmatism. Modernist politics based on principles like constitutionalism may be wanting, but what are our alternatives? This is a trite response, but it bears repeating, especially in the context of the Global South, where people starve and immediate, even palliative, change is urgent. Reformism is not anathema to postcolonial societies. A fairer legal system that allows the poor to be treated equal under the law— one that affords them worthy defenses in criminal trials, one that prevents them from being kicked off their land and denied their property—is a sustainable goal that we must aspire for. And the Global South would do well to aspire for social services like state-sponsored healthcare (more dysfunctional in the Philippines than even the United States) that curb the worst violences of the “neoliberalism” that anti-liberals decry.

Presumably, the advocates of non-modernist anti-liberalism from the Global South anchor their vision of change on a renewed revolutionary politics that challenges the core structures of contemporary capitalist societies. For them, another world is possible. But what are political actors in the Global South left to do while the theoreticians figure out how and when the revolutionary break will occur? Liberalism promotes a baseline of slow yet functional politics that tempers the nihilism of much radical thinking. But, a stable base of political rights may open new possibilities that may also tickle our collective imaginations. Slow does not mean uninspiring.

## PERM

### Perm – Do Both

#### Perm: do both

#### NOT mutually exclusive

McDonald 17 Matt McDonald, Reader in International Relations at the University of Queensland, “Critical security in the Asia-Pacific: an introduction,” Critical Studies on Security, 5(3), 2017, pp.237-252, DOI [10.1080/21624887.2017.1420125](https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2017.1420125) /GoGreen!

There is also evidence to support the idea that in some instances, states are emphasising non-traditional security issues and cooperation associated with it as a mechanism for consolidating strategic partnerships driven by more traditional strategic concerns. This might be applied to the example of responses to the 2004 tsunami. Here, the United States, Japan, India and Australia established a coalition to coordinate aid delivery, in the process solidifying strategic relations while responding to regional disaster. Such a development suggests challenges associated with making clear distinctions between a traditional and non-security agenda, challenges heightened if non-traditional security is still viewed through the lens of state security.4

These issues raise important questions about the politics of security as applied to critical approaches, especially those that wish to contribute to debates about security practices: should our aim be to speak truth to power and articulate a bold vision for substantially different sets of approaches and actors, or to engage those institutions and actors with the capacity to enact change, attempting to encourage more progressive practices in the process? Of course, this is a simplistic binary in the sense that scholarship (and individual scholars) can do both. But it serves to remind us of the importance of engaging with the politics of security. This is central to Lee Wilson’s discussion of dynamics and practices of security in Indonesia in this special issue. Ultimately, we should be in a position to articulate grounds for incremental progressive change to those with the power to enact it, even while compelling ourselves to keep sight of a vision of security that is genuinely ethically defensible. This is a challenge for a critical approach to security, but one which intellectual openness, humility and reflexivity – combined with acceptance of a division of academic labour within the broad contours of such an approach – might go some way to addressing.

#### There’s no essential incompatibility between securitization and transformation – adding the ALT overcomes residual links, or it was never effective in the first place

Loader 7 Ian Loader, Professor of Criminology and Director of the Centre for Criminology at the University of Oxford; and Neil Walker, Professor of European Law in the Department of Law at the European University Institute, and the Tercentenary Professor of Law at the University of Edinburgh; *Civilizing Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-511-28506-6, pp.89-93 /GoGreen!

These critical observations on the current security constellation impart some valuable warnings, some of which, as noted, are shared by liberal critics of the ‘war on terror’. They suggest, first and foremost, that democratic societies risk spiralling into a vicious circle of terror–fear–repression whose all too likely consequence is the erosion, perhaps even demise, of democratic government and the rule of law (Rorty 2004). As political elites respond to acts of terror with ‘security measures’ that seek to assuage public insecurity (and anger) by further empowering police and military institutions, they do several things: not only do they direct the resources of the partisan state at already often unpopular and over-policed minority populations (both at home and abroad); they also institutionalize public anxiety in ways that make it difficult to envisage cultural conditions that will permit ‘temporary’ exceptional measures to be repealed, and leave themselves with little practical choice but to respond to the next terrorist attack with yet more – still tougher – ‘security solutions’. As each ‘ordering measure brings into being new ambiguities and ambivalences which call for further measures, the chase never ends’ (Bauman and Tester 2001: 79; see, also, Dillon 1996: 127).

For liberals the practical task is to find ways of responding to terror (and the fear and loathing that it generates, or reinforces, or renews) in ways that break out of this insecurity-heightening, democracy-corroding spiral (see, for example, Ackerman 2004; Ignatieff 2004; Dyzenhaus and Hunt forthcoming). This too, more broadly, is the impulse that informs this book – one that holds that it is possible in this field to envisage and create virtuous circles that both civilize security and release the civilizing potential of security. The variant of state scepticism we have been concerned with here presses, however, a more disquieting claim – one that presents a serious critique of such possibilities. From this perspective there is no obvious route away from a world in which exceptionalism has become what Agamben (2004a: 2 and passim) calls ‘the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics’ – and certainly not one which travels under the banner of security. We are faced with what looks set to become an unceasing war against terror in which partisan, exceptional states name and chase new enemies, fortify borders as they violate them, suspend law in the name of law, and undermine democracy in an effort to save it. How, in such a world, the leftist state sceptic asks, can we speak meaningfully about, let alone begin to construct, a socially coherent project of collective security?

Against security?

The strands of radical thought outlined in this chapter offer a cogent critique of the state and its securitizing practices. It is a critique that appears able to capture important aspects of a historical record that has seen states time and again, in both authoritarian and democratic contexts, allocate the benefits and burdens of policing in ways that systematically protect the security interests of powerful constituencies at the expense of those of the poor and dispossessed. It supplies, in addition, a cogent account of the dangers of placing security at the ideological heart of government, of the capacity of security politics to colonize public policy and pervade social life in ways that threaten democratic values and sustain fear-laden, other-disregarding forms of political subjectivity and collective identity. In these respects, this variant of state scepticism offers a critique of the operation and effects of state power that in many significant respects we share (N. Walker 2000; Loader 2002). But it also poses what are undoubtedly some profound challenges to the position we wish here to construct and defend. If we are to make a persuasive case for both the good of security, and the indispensability of the state to the production of that good, then we need to find a means of rising to them.

These objections then are far from trivial, and we have not devoted this chapter to them simply in order to knock them down. But they nonetheless arise from a standpoint that is not itself without shortcomings, as we hope to show in meeting them. As a prelude to the more sustained effort along these lines that we offer in part II, let us consider briefly what these shortcomings are. For analytic purposes, they may usefully be put into three groups.

This radical variant of state scepticism tends, first of all, to underplay the openness of political systems and the theoretical and political prospects that this affords. It displays, in particular, a structural fatalism that overlooks the overlap between the production of specific and general order, such that disadvantaged groups and communities have a considerable stake not only in controlling state power, but also in using public resources (including policing resources) as a means of generating more secure forms of economic and social existence. It also remains insufficiently attentive to how the mix between general and specific order (the extent, in other words, to which policing is shaped by common as well as factional interests) is conditioned by political struggle and the varieties of institutional settlement to which this gives rise, thereby varying over time and between polities. Much the same point, moreover, can be directed at the radical critique of the violence that underpins liberal political orders that aim to be free of such violence. One finds here a quite proper insistence on the troubling conundrum that democratic polities ultimately depend upon coercion to enforce collective decisions and protect democratic institutions. But this point is hammered home in terms that are overly sweeping and reductionist – often, as in the writings of Agamben (2004a), as a philosophical claim that invites but resists sociological scrutiny. If ‘there is always a violence at the heart of every form of political and legal authority’ (Newman 2004: 575), upon what grounds can we distinguish between, or develop a critique of, the security-seeking practices of particular states – and why would we bother?

Radical anti-statism evinces, secondly, a preference for social and political criticism over social and political reconstruction. It favours a politics that privileges the monitoring, exposure and critique of the systematic biases of state power (as, for instance, in the indefatigable efforts of the British-based NGO Statewatch), one that implicitly or expressly holds that ‘security’ is so stained by its uncivil association with the (military and police) state that the only available radical strategy is to destabilize the term itself, while contesting the practices that are enacted under its name (Dalby 1997: 6; see, also, Dillon 1996: ch. 1). There can, from this vantage point, be no progressive democratic politics aimed at civilizing security. Rather, one is left with a politics of critique, and a failure of political imagination, that leaves radically underspecified the feasible or desirable alternatives to current institutional configurations and practices, or else merely gestures towards the possibility of transcendent forms of non-state communal ordering – as in George Rikagos’s (2002: 150) claim that ‘the only real alternatives to current policing practices are pre-capitalist, non-commodified security arrangements’.

Finally, one finds what we think of as a one-sided appraisal of the sources of inequality and insecurity in the world today. This leftist anti-statist sensibility tends, in the ways we have demonstrated, towards an account of social injustice that views it as the product of the state’s malign and coercive interventions rather than of its impotence and neglect. Here one finds a curious parallel with the neo-liberalism considered in the last chapter – the state remains the problem. But one also encounters a critique of security politics that views it as tied to the production of authoritarian government – as if security is in some essential fashion inimical to democracy and human rights. Here the radical critic begins to inhabit similar ground to that occupied by what we characterized in chapter 1 as the ‘security lobby’. They assess the landscape very differently and commit to diametrically opposed political purposes. But they cling commonly and tenaciously to the belief that security stands opposed to liberty.

Our aim, in part II, is to move beyond these positions and oppositions: first, by retrieving the idea of security as a public good that is axiomatic both to the production of other goods (most directly, liberty) and to the constitution of democratic political communities; second, by arguing that the production of this good demands not the wholesale critique and transcendence of state forms, but more robust regulatory interventions by democratized state institutions. We must first, however, factor into our positive case two further critiques of the state, starting with the claim that it is a cultural monolith.

## ALT

### AT: ALT – Poststructuralism

#### The ALT solves nothing – BUT even if it did, transition wars outweigh

Jarvis 2K Darryl S.L. Jarvis, Senior Lecturer, Government & International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Sydney, PhD University of British Columbia, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline, University of South Carolina Press, 2000, ISBN 1-57003-305-6, pp.128-129 /GoGreen!

Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recommends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley’s torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to make such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, modernism, or realism emanate a “violence” that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self-professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy—vocal, published, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theoretical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even revolutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as “Down with positivism and rationality”? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of wrar in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocuous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations.

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge.37 But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any wray speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations?

On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problcmatize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.38

Contrary to Ashley’s assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those w ho struggle at marginal places.

#### No purchase in academia nor outside

O’Callaghan 2 Terry O’Callaghan, Lecturer in the School of International Studies, University of South Australia, “Jim George and the Repudiation of Realism: Challenging Postmodern Wisdom,” Chapter 3, *International Relations and the “Third Debate”: Postmodernism and its Critics*, ed. Darryl S.L. Jarvis, Praeger, 2002, ISBN 0-275-96000-5, pp.80-82 /GoGreen!

There are also a host of technological and logistical questions that plague George’s scheme and make problematic his recommendations. For example, through what medium are those on the fringes of the international system going to speak to the world? Although it may be true that the third world has now been integrated into the global polity via the advent of technological innovations in communications, allowing for remote access to information sources and the Internet, it also remains true that the majority of those on the fringes continue to be disenfranchised from such mediums, whether as a result of a lack of economic resources, the prevalence of illiteracy, or social, cultural and political circumstances that systemically exclude, women (among others) from economic resources and certain political and social freedoms. Need we remind George that social, political, and individual autonomy is at a minimum in these parts of the world, and an intellectual approach as controversial as postmodernism is not likely to achieve the sorts of goals that George optimistically foreshadows. Indeed, on practical questions such as these, matters otherwise central to the success of postmodern visions, George prefers to be vague, suggesting instead that the intricacies of such details will somehow work themselves out in a manner satisfactory to all. Such a position reveals George’s latent idealism and underscores how George’s schema is an intellectual one: a theory of international politics written for other theorists of international politics. George’s audience is thus a very limited and elite audience and begs the question of whether a senior, middle-class scholar in the intellectual heartland of Australia can do anything of real substance to aid the truly marginalized and oppressed. How is it possible to put oneself in the shoes of the “other,” to advocate on his or her behalf, when such is done from a position of affluence, unrelated to and far removed from the experiences of those whom George otherwise champions? Ideals are all good and well, but it is hard to imagine that the computer keyboard is mightier than the sword, and hard to see how a small, elite, affluent assortment of intellectuals is going to generate the type of political momentum necessary to allow those on the fringes to speak and be heard! 1 .

Moreover, why should we assume that states and individuals want to listen and will listen to what the marginalized and the oppressed have to say? There is precious little evidence to suggest that “listening” is something the advanced capitalist countries do very well at all. Indeed, one of the allegations so forcefully alleged by Muslim fundamentalists as justification for the terrorist attacks of September I I is precisely that the West, and America in particular, are deaf to the disenfranchised and impoverished in the world. Certainly, there are agencies and individuals who are sensitive to the needs of the “marginalized” and who champion institutional forums where indigenous voices can be heard. But on even the most optimistic reckoning, such forums and institutions represent the exception, not the rule, and remain in the minority if not dwarfed by those institutions that represent Western, first world interests. To be sure, this is a realist power-political image of the current configuration of the global polity, but one apparently, and ironically, endorsed by George if only because it speaks to the realities of the marginalized, the imposed silences, and the multitude of oppressions on which George founds his call for a postmodern ethic.

Recognizing such realities, however, does not explain George’s penchant for ignoring them entirely, especially in terms of the structural rigidities they pose for meaningful reform. Indeed, George’s desire to move to a new “space beyond International Relations” smacks of wishful idealism, ignoring the current configuration of global political relations and power distribution; of the incessant ideological power of hyperindividualism, consumerism, advertising, Hollywood images, and fashion icons; and of the innate power bestowed on the (institutional) barons of global finance, trade, and transnational production. George seems to have little appreciation of the structural impediments such institutions pose for radical change of the type he so fiercely advocates. Revolutionary change of the kind desired by George ignores that fact that many individuals are not disposed to concerns beyond their family, friends, and daily work lives. And institutional, structural transformation requires organized effort, mass popular support, and dogged single-mindedness if societal norms are to be challenged, institutional reform enacted, consumer tastes altered, and political sensibilities reformed. Convincing Nike that there is something intrinsically wrong with paying Indonesian workers a few dollars a week to manufacture shoes for the global market requires considerably more effort than postmodern platitudes and/or moral indignation. The cycle of wealth creation and distribution that sees Michael Jordan receive multimillion dollar contracts to inspire demand for Nike products, while the foot soldiers in the factory eke out a meager existence producing these same products is not easily, or realistically, challenged by pronouncements of moving beyond International Relations to a new, nicer, gentler nirvana.

More generally, of course, what George fails to consider is the problem of apathy and of how we get people to care about the plight of others. What do we with the CEOs of multinational corporations, stockbrokers, accountants, ctory workers, and the unemployed, who, by and large, fail to consider the omeless and destitute in their own countries, let alone in places they have never isited and are never likely to visit? Moral indignation rarely translates into action, and apathy about the plight of others is a structural impediment as strong any idea, theory, or writing. What George’s treatise thus fails to consider is how we overcome this, and how we get others to listen. He needs to explain how the social, political, psychological, and moral structures that define the parameters of existence for the many millions of ordinary citizens in the first world, and that deflects attention from the marginalized and the oppressed can be broken down. Unfortunately, there is little to indicate that George has thought much about this, suggesting that his commitment to postmodern theory is not likely to make much difference. In fact, in the academy the postmodern light is already beginning to dim in certain quarters, having registered scarcely a glimmer in the broader polity, where, if change was to ensue, it needed to burn brightly. Even among those versed in the nomenclature of scholarly debate, theorists of international politics remain skeptical of the value of postmodern discourse, by and large rejecting it. This does not portend well for postmodern visionaries and the future of postmodern discourse. But can George really be surprised by this? After all, his discourse indicts the “backward discipline” for complicity in crimes against humanity, calling for a repudiation of realism and with it a repudiation of the lifelong beliefs and writings of eminent theorists like Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Stephen Krasner who have otherwise defined the parameters of the discipline, its projects, and research agendas. Can George really expect discipline-wide capitulation to an intellectual diaspora that would see theorists repudiate their beliefs and works in order to take up the creed of postmodernism, as vague, open-ended, and indeterminate as it is? Without a clear and credible plan of how to get from “incarceration and closure” to intellectual freedom, creativity, and openness, George’s postmodern musings have understandably attracted few disciples.

#### Poststructural analysis fails

Rodwell 5 Jonathan Rodwell, PhD candidate, Manchester Metropolitan University, post-graduate studies at The University of Birmingham, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” 49th Parallel: An Interdiscplinary Journal of North American Studies, iss.15, Spring 2005, <https://fortyninthparalleljournal.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/2-rodwell-trendy-but-empty.pdf> /GoGreen!

However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical.

My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value, post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding.

The first major problem then is that historiographically discourse analysis is so capacious as to be largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history that explains everything and therefore actually explains nothing.

To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse.

### AT: ALT – Abolish NATO

#### NATO isn’t going anywhere – refusal to participate doesn’t solve any of their impacts – nor do anything about emerging tech; regardless of the goal, security cooperation is a superior method to achieve it than NOT

Gilli 20 Andrea Gilli, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College, former visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University, Johns Hopkins University, Columbia University, and Harvard University, ““NATO-mation”: preparing for technological transformation,” Chapter 2, *“NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence*, NDC Research Paper No.15, December 2020, pp.25-26 /GoGreen!

What are the implications of the growing capabilities and dissemination of AI, ML and BD for NATO? Is the Atlantic Alliance powerless when faced with this wave of technological change, or could it adopt some measures to handle and address the ensuing challenges and opportunities? And what should Allies do? Should they pursue arms control or promote research and development, address legal and ethical questions, or just focus on the tactical integration of these new technologies? How can the Allies exploit their combined, but diverse, set of skills, capabilities and experiences so as to harness the power of AI?

Building on the previous discussion of AI as a GPT, it appears that the challenge for NATO is subtle, multifaceted and significant. First, in an age of accelerating technological change and growing domain applicability, catching up with industry leaders and innovators becomes more and more difficult for those that lag behind.73 This means that waiting is not a solution – even though acting prematurely, in a realm of great uncertainty, is inherently difficult and risky.74 Second, governments cannot expect that individuals, firms and organizations will be able to embrace and successfully exploit the new wave of technological transformation alone, without advice, support, direction, vision or investments in infrastructure. Third, while some countries will have an advantage, others will find the transition more difficult. Regardless of this, technological transitions do not occur in a vacuum, as they require the alignment of incentives among a multiplicity of actors, organizations and institutions, as well as the provision of complementary services and goods for the new technologies to flourish and be adopted.75 Fourth, and more important for NATO, without coordinating and cooperating on their investments in the necessary complementary assets, goods and services, Allies could find themselves having to face additional hurdles.

What types of problem could emerge? Technology-generated efficiency gains in production lead to lower prices. However, lower prices lead to increases in demand – because the relative price of substitute goods (rivals) increases.76 Over the past decade, AI – and, in particular, ML – has made a particular activity, prediction, cheaper: it is reasonable to forecast that this trend will continue in the future.77 As AI becomes cheaper, however, the demand for AI-related services will increase, thus leading to more demand for related necessities like AI specialists, AI infrastructure (and 5G networks) and AI components (processors). This in turn might well lead to scarcity and higher prices, thus pitching actors against one another – not unlike the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis, when individual self-interested actions led to collectively bad outcomes.78 In the context of a military alliance, the problem goes much deeper, as it can generate a beggar-thy-neighbour effect with allies competing for the same scarce resources.79 Moreover, without consultation and cooperation, Allies could end up developing different technological solutions, with the risk of undermining compatibility and interoperability. Similarly, they could end up prioritizing some problems over others, with the risk of developing multiple, different and redundant solutions while neglecting other points in need of attention.80 However, through intra-alliance coordination and cooperation, as well as dialogue and consultation, secondary market mechanisms and other approaches, NATO could provide an important contribution to identify and address this type of problems.81

## LINK

### AT: Threat Inflation

#### Our threats are real and objectively knowable – institutional incentives militate against threat inflation, NOT for

Ravenal 9 Earl C. Ravenal, Distinguished Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, “What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society, 21(1), 2009, pp.40-43 /GoGreen!

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates).

In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:

In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects—a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)

Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputations (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary.

So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision-making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:

Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop separate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.

There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.

This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.

Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.

My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.

Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rationality in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.

Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and transmitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.

My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).

A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circumstances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction.

For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious, “rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operate compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testifies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

### AT: Objectivity Bad

#### Objectivity is good – ALT fails without it

Jones 4 Branwen Gruffydd Jonens, Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy, Goldsmiths University of London, Ph.D. Development Studies, University of Sussex, “From Eurocentrism to Epistemological Internationalism: power, knowledge and objectivity in International Relations,” paper presented at Theorising Ontology, Annual Conference of the International Association for Critical Realism, University of Cambridge, August 2004, <http://www.csog.group.cam.ac.uk/iacr/papers/Jones.pdf> /GoGreen!

The ‘common-sense’ view pervading recent discussions of epistemology, ontology and methodology in IR asserts that objectivity implies value-free neutrality. However, objective social inquiry has an inherent tendency to be critical, in various senses. To the extent that objective knowledge provides a better and more adequate account of reality than other ideas, such knowledge is inherently critical (implicitly or explicitly) of those ideas. 30 In other words critical social inquiry does not (or not only) manifest its ‘criticalness’ through self-claimed labels of being critical or siding with the oppressed, but through the substantive critique of prevailing ideas. Objective social knowledge constitutes a specific form of criticism: explanatory critique. The critique of dominant ideas or ideologies is elaborated through providing a more adequate explanation of aspects of the world, and in so doing exposing what is wrong with the dominant ideology. This may also entail revealing the social conditions which give rise to ideologies, thus exposing the necessary and causal relation between particular social relations and particular ideological conceptions. In societies which are constituted by unequal structures of social relations giving rise to unequal power and conflicting interests, the reproduction of those structured relations is in the interests of the powerful, whereas transformation of existing structured relations is in the interests of the weak. Because ideas inform social action they are casually efficacious either in securing the reproduction of existing social relations (usually as an unintended consequence of social practice), or in informing social action aimed at transforming social relations. This is why ideas cannot be ‘neutral’. Ideas which provide a misrepresentation of the nature of society, the causes of unequal social conditions, and the conflicting interests of the weak and powerful, will tend to help secure the reproduction of prevailing social relations. Ideas which provide a more adequate account of the way society is structured and how structured social relations produce concrete conditions of inequality and exploitation can potentially inform efforts to change those social relations. In this sense, ideas which are false are ideological and, in serving to promote the reproduction of the status quo and avoid attempts at radical change, are in the interests of the powerful. An account which is objective will contradict ideological ideas, implicitly or explicitly criticising them for their false or flawed accounts of reality. The criticism here arises not, or not only, from pointing out the coincidence between ideologies and the interests of the powerful, nor from a prior normative stance of solidarity with the oppressed, but from exposing the flaws in dominant ideologies through a more adequate account of the nature and causes of social conditions 31 . A normative commitment to the oppressed must entail a commitment to truth and objectivity, because true ideas are in the interest of the oppressed, false ideas are in the interest of the oppressors. In other words, the best way to declare solidarity with the oppressed is to declare one’s commitment to objective inquiry 32 . As Nzongola-Ntalaja (1986: 10) has put it: It is a question of whether one analyses society from the standpoint of the dominant groups, who have a vested interest in mystifying the way society works, or from the standpoint of ordinary people, who have nothing to lose from truthful analyses of their predicament. The philosophical realist theory of science, objectivity and explanatory critique thus provides an alternative response to the relationship between knowledge and power. Instead of choosing perspectives on the basis of our ethical commitment to the cause of the oppressed and to emancipatory social change, we should choose between contending ideas on the basis of which provides a better account of objective social reality. This will inherently provide a critique of the ideologies which, by virtue of their flawed account of the social world, serve the interests of the powerful. Exemplars of explanatory critique in International Relations are provided in the work of scholars such as Siba Grovogui, James Gathii, Anthony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Jacques Depelchin, Hilbourne Watson, Robert Vitalis, Sankaran Krishna, Michel-Rolph Trouillot 33 . Their work provides critiques of central categories, theories and discourses in the theory and practice of IR and narratives of world history, including assumptions about sovereignty, international society, international law, global governance, the nature of the state. They expose the ideological and racialised nature of central aspects of IR through a critical examination of both the long historical trajectory of imperial ideologies regarding colonized peoples, and the actual practices of colonialism and decolonisation in the constitution of international orders and local social conditions. Their work identifies the flaws in current ideas by revealing how they systematically misrepresent or ignore the actual history of social change in Africa, the Caribbean and other regions of the Third World, both past and present – during both colonial and neo-colonial periods of the imperial world order. Their work reveals how racism, violence, exploitation and dispossession, colonialism and neo-colonialism have been central to the making of contemporary international order and contemporary doctrines of international law, sovereignty and rights, and how such themes are glaring in their absence from histories and theories of international relations and international history. Objective social knowledge which accurately depicts and explains social reality has these qualities by virtue of its relation to its object, not its subject. As Collier argues, “The science/ideology distinction is an epistemological one, not a social one.” (Collier 1979: 60). So, for example, in the work of Grovogui, Gathii and Depelchin, the general perspective and knowledge of conditions in and the history of Africa might be due largely to the African social origins of the authors. However the judgement that their accounts are superior to those of mainstream IR rests not on the fact that the authors are African, but on the greater adequacy of their accounts with respect to the actual historical and contemporary production of conditions and change in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. The criteria for choosing their accounts over others derives from the relation between the ideas and their objects (what they are about), not from the relation between the ideas and their subjects (who produced them). It is vital to retain explicitly some commitment to objectivity in social inquiry, to the notion that the proper criterion for judging ideas about the world lies in what they say about the world, not whose ideas they are. A fundamental problem which underlies the origin and reproduction of IR’s eurocentricity is the overwhelming dominance of ideas produced in and by the west, and the wilful and determined silencing of the voices and histories of the colonised. But the result of this fundamental problem is flawed knowledge about the world. Eurocentricity is therefore a dual problem concerning both the authors and the content of knowledge, and cannot be resolved through normative commitments alone. It is not only the voices of the colonised, but the histories of colonialism, which have been glaring in their absence from the discipline of International Relations. Overcoming eurocentricity therefore requires not only concerted effort from the centre to create space and listen to hitherto marginalised voices, but also commitment to correcting the flaws in prevailing knowledge – and it is not only ‘the Other’ who can and should elaborate this critique. A vitally important implication of objectivity is that it is the responsibility of European and American, just as much as non-American or non-European scholars, to decolonise IR. The importance of objectivity in social inquiry defended here can perhaps be seen as a form of epistemological internationalism. It is not necessary to be African to attempt to tell a more accurate account of the history of Europe’s role in the making of the contemporary Africa and the rest of the world, for example, or to write counter-histories of ‘the expansion of international society’ which detail the systematic barbarity of so-called Western civilisation. It is not necessary to have been colonised to recognise and document the violence, racism, genocide and dispossession which have characterised European expansion over five hundred years.

### T/N – Objectivity Good

#### The scientific truths that undergird our scholarship are real – poststructuralism is coopted by corporations and post-truth politicians to worse material effect than anything we said and turns ALT solvency

Gómez-Baggethun 20 Erik Gómez-Baggethun, Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Faculty of Landscape and Society, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, and Norwegian Institute for Nature Research, “More is more: Scaling political ecology within limits to growth,” Political Geography, vol.76, January 2020, DOI 10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102095 /GoGreen!

Half a century ago, constructionist claims played an important role in critical scholarship, showing how analytical categories we take for granted as universal truths did not exist in other times and places, and exposing how these categories were exploited by elites to exercise power (e.g. Foucault, 1971). Authors like Wittgenstein, Benveniste and Lacan exposed the articulations between language and the way we understand reality, putting into question dominant forms of realism that magnified the absolute and universal character of scientific truths. In this line of reasoning, intellectuals associated with postmodern1 and post-structuralist thinking, like Barthes, Derrida, Kristeva, Foucault, Deleuze, Baudrillard, Jameson, and Lyotard challenged established beliefs surrounding scientific panaceas and the dogmas of modernity. In doing so they contributed to erode beliefs in certainties, allegedly emanating from reason, that shielded the exercise of power by endowing it with the unquestionable authority of scientific truth.

The deconstructionist machinery set in motion by these authors, however, soon proved double edged. Naïve realism –the original target of this criticism– fell in disgrace and social constructionism gradually became the mainstream in cultural studies. Eventually, and with some support of the media, vulgarized variants of this criticism contributed to expand a generalized climate of moral relativism, skepticism and cynicism that, in words by Lévy (1987: 20), installed us in an obsessively modest way of thinking that makes of uncertainty its last word, and which ‘extreme relativism has resulted in a generalized idiocy’ (cited in Naredo, 2015). In another critical account Sahlins (2002: 49) notes that ‘one of the more poignant aspects of the current postmodernist mood is the way it seems to lobotomize some of our best graduate students, to stifle their creativity for fear of making some interesting structural connection […] or a comparative generalization. The only safe essentialism left to them is that there is no order to culture’. Critics suggest that epistemic relativisms that reduce interpretations of reality to mere ‘narratives’, ‘discourses’ and ‘social constructs’ have been instrumental for today’s generalized skepticism and cynicism (Boghossian, 2007; Sokal & Bricmont, 1999; Zerzan, 1994). Naredo (2015) further notes that this epistemic climate, initially conceived as a healthy critique to established ideas, later came to be exploited by the status quo to mask the dark sides of progress –such as environmental destruction from economic growth–, behind a nebulous of uncertainty. Decades of scholarship devoted to deconstruct ‘truth’ paved the way for a golden era of relativism. Post-truth, a concept used to describe the disappearance of shared objective standards for truth and the undifferentiated blurring of facts, values, knowledge, opinion, and belief that characterizes today’s intellectual climate (Biesecker, 2018), may be looked at as the ultimate Frankenstein of this epistemological drift. According to Frankfurt (2005: 16), –who foresaw the post-truth coming long ago: ‘The contemporary proliferation of bullshit has deeper sources in various forms of skepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality’.

Today this intellectual climate is successfully exploited by business power that, in the name of progress and growth, manufacture doubt and uncertainty to prevent the precautionary principle and undermine environmental regulations (Harremo€es et al., 2013; Michaels & Jones, 2005; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). In an era of ecological breakdown and post-truth, caricaturizing limits as fanaticism (Bruckner, 2013; Phillips, 2015) or banalizing their relevance as mere ‘constructs’ or ‘discourses’, serves the denialism of corporate power and the new authoritarianism. To Latour’s assertion that ‘context stinks’ (2005: 148, citing Koolhaas), in today’s post truth era time may be ripe to add that ‘(de)constructionism stinks’ too.

### T/N – Ontological Security Good

#### Their thesis is backwards – “Western” identity is locked in – attempting to destabilize it threatens ontological security, which flips their impacts – strengthening collective identity via security cooperation solves

Bahar Rumelili 15, Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the Department of International Relations, Koc University, Istanbul, “Identity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical security,” Journal of International Relations and Development volume 18, pages52–74 (2015), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/jird.2013.22

With regard to ontological security, the distinction between security and insecurity is the more critical one. In a state of ontological insecurity, the Self experiences instability and uncertainty of being. Ontological insecurity refers to a state of disruption where the Self has lost its anchor for the definition of its identity and, consequently, its ability to sustain a narrative and answer questions about doing, acting, and being (Kinnvall 2004). It may arise from deep uncertainty (Mitzen 2006a) and/or from the failure to have its sense of Self affirmed by others (Zarakol 2010). Conversely, in a state of ontological security, the Self experiences a stable, certain, and consistent social existence, where it remains in control about its identity and capacity for action. While I do not rule out the possibility of a state of ontological asecurity, where the Self is simply not concerned with the stability and certainty of its identity, I do not explore this possibility and how it varies across different states of physical security in this article.

Having identified different states of physical and ontological security, I make the further assumption that since ontological and physical security are distinct, states of security do not vary uniformly across the ontological and physical layers of security. One can be at a state of physical insecurity while being at a state of ontological security, and vice versa. Consequently, Table 1 charts out the four possible states of security based on the conception of security as both ontological and physical.

The state of ontological insecurity/physical (in)security is one where the Self experiences concern about physical harm and the instability and uncertainty of its being. Ontological insecurity tempts actors to engage in practices that mark Others as not only different, but also as morally inferior and threatening (Campbell 1992). Ontological insecurity and physical (in)security reproduce one another. As actors seek ontological security through constructing Others as threats to their security-as-survival, they mobilise their physical defences in the pursuit of physical security through representing the sources of threat as different and morally inferior.

Similarly, in a state of ontological security/physical (in)security, actors experience stability and certainty of being in a relationship where the Other is constructed as threat to their security-as-survival. Consequently, they remain locked into conflict-producing routines to maintain their certainty of being (Mitzen 2006a). In protracted conflicts such as in Cyprus and Israel/Palestine, this state of security sustains a stable Self/Other relationship based on enemy roles. When in such a state of security, minority and majority groups, migrants and host societies perceive and represent each other’s identities as radically different and inherently incompatible, and reproduce these perceptions and representations through acts of securitisation in order to ensure their ontological security. The states of ontological insecurity/physical (in)security and ontological security/physical (in)security are both securitised states; however, whereas the former compels actors to construct new narratives of difference and threat and engage in the securitisation of new issues to regain their certainty and stability of being, the latter compels actors to reproduce the existing narratives and continue the securitisation of existing differences and conflicts to maintain it.

The state of ontological security/physical asecurity is certainly the most attractive state of security from a normative point of view. Security communities in international relations, and in particular, the European non-war community (Wæver 1998) and the Nordic community (Browning and Joenniemi 2012) constitute the best examples of such a state of security in international relations. A collective identity discourse makes it possible for states in security communities to maintain the us/them distinctions, which are necessary for the certainty and stability of being, while remaining in a state of physical asecurity vis-à-vis one another (Mitzen 2006b; Browning and Joenniemi 2012). In this state of security, conflicts are sustainably resolved; issues that have propelled conflict in the past are either settled or have shed their physical security-ness, and are negotiated in normal political channels. Yet, identity differences maintain their ontological security-ness as groups reproduce their distinct identities through various social and cultural practices.

#### Hybrid warfare in particular disrupts NATO’s ontological security – the AFF solves by insulating NATO from existential fear

Maria Mälksoo 18, Senior Lecturer in International Security at the Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, “Countering hybrid warfare as ontological security management: the emerging practices of the EU and NATO,” European Security, 27:3, 374-392, https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/772169/mod\_resource/content/0/malksoo.pdf

Hybrid warfare indicates a multitude of possible contingencies, generating anxiety about one’s ability to remain oneself and to continue to act. It is thus linked to “anxiety over the vulnerability of [Western] power” (Bell 2012, pp. 230–231), threatening the West about losing its particularistic form of existence (cf. Creppell 2011, p. 455). Anxiety, in contrast to fear, which per Giddens (1991, p. 43) constitutes a response to a specific threat, concerns “perceived threats to the integrity of the security system of the individual” (Giddens 1991, pp. 44–45, cf. Browning and Joenniemi 2017, p. 38; Rumelili 2015). OS-seeking aims to mitigate the effects of such hard uncertainty, bringing it within bearable limits (Mitzen 2006, p. 346). Routines are instrumental here, as they “pacify the cognitive environment … ‘inoculating’ individuals against paralytic, deep fear of chaos” (Mitzen 2006, p. 347).

Being able to survive the “hybrid threats” is directly pertinent to the survival of the EU and NATO as particular kinds of organisations, underpinned and driven by specific values – which cannot be sacrificed or diluted in the struggle for physical and institutional survival. Yet, hybrid warfare disturbs the OS of the EU and NATO in subtly distinct ways. Due to the particularities of their institutional set-ups and historical foundations, the OS drives of the two organisations are somewhat distinctive. NATO’s history is occasionally told through its surpassing of a sequence of crises, albeit the end of the Cold War and the collapse of its original enemy created a situation of unprecedented uncertainty and ontological insecurity for the Alliance. Meanwhile, the EU’s ontological insecurity is a more recent phenomenon, stemming mostly from the Eurocrisis and the looming possibility of a Grexit a few years ago; the refugee/migration crisis in Europe of 2015 (Dingott Alkhoper 2018; Mitzen 2018); the actual UK decision on Brexit in 2016 (Browning 2018); and the rise of populist politics within the EU (Kinnvall, Manners, Mitzen 2018) and the United States. NATO as a military alliance has been historically more accustomed to the othering practices of concrete geographical places, whereas the EU is generally regarded as an organisation that has risen above geopolitical othering, juxtaposing itself to Europe’s dark past instead (Rumelili 2018, Subotic 2018, and Della Sala 2018). Accordingly, the EU might be more at home with hybrid threat management due to its historically broader conceptualisation of security through the paradigm of intertwined risks rather than being focused more strictly on “the threat, use and control of military force” in the manner of a traditional defence alliance (Walt 1991, p. 212; Manners 2002). Regardless of its perpetual transformer’s self-image, hybrid threats represent the uncomfortable “hard” or “fundamental” uncertainty for NATO (cf. Mitzen 2006, p. 346) and are thus ontologically disturbing for the security of its self as a traditional alliance with a collective security pledge bound to “armed attack” against one or more of its member states.

In order to achieve OS, actors strive for “routinizing their relations with significant others” (Mitzen 2006, p. 342). Routines help to keep ontological fears at bay, out of everyday discursive consciousness (Mitzen 2006, p. 348). From this perspective, NATO’s naming and shaming strategy vis-à-vis Russia as part of its hybrid warfare countering strategy links the uncertainty emanating from the hybrid nature of the new threats to the known and routine relationship with its traditional antagonist.8 The incapacitating difficulties related to planning ahead in anticipating and countering hybrid engagements are thus somewhat alleviated by the latter’s attachment to a known rival. Russia’s hybrid intervention in Ukraine has concurrently provided NATO with the familiar parameters of the cognitive “cocoon” (Giddens 1991, pp. 39–40) which enables the alliance to reproduce its cognitively “knowable” world. A Mitzenian reading of NATO’s emerging response to hybrid threats/warfare thus points at the renewed routinisation of the “programmed cognitive and behavioral responses” to Russia as the alliance’s original nemesis.

Restoring traditional vigilance vis-à-vis Russia, buttressing the forward defence along the Alliance’s eastern flank with the respective military reinforcements, contingency planning and exercises, the emerging response of NATO to the hybrid menace could also be read as an attempted restoration of a known normative order for the North Atlantic Alliance. Hybrid warfare endangers the basic features of the said normative order (or that of the broadly conceived Western security community in general, including the EU as well) as its efficient countering would likely compromise the underlying principles for this order’s particularistic existence (cf. Creppell 2011, p. 450). As a threat of subversion, hybrid warfare exposes the internal vulnerabilities in the body of the traditional security alliance (NATO) and a self-proclaimed post-modern security actor (i.e. the EU; cf. Cooper 2004). This concerns, in particular, the ever-elusive (and contested) balance between national/organisational security and individual liberties (cf. Waldron 2003, Neocleous 2007), as strategic communication is inherently at odds with free speech as a core value of Western liberalism. Countering hybrid warfare is conducive of generating a security predicament of perpetual pre-emption which, by definition, would indicate pre-emptive gathering of all sorts of data, thus likely infringing on the privacy of the individuals for the sake of the organisational/regional/national security. This precautionary logic resonates with the risk society approach which characterises the struggling with a sheer volume of risks with potentially fundamental consequences as a key feature of modernity, implying that “decisions are … made not in context of certainty, nor even of available knowledge, but of doubt, premonition, foreboding, challenge, mistrust, fear, and anxiety” (Ewald 2002, p. 294).

### AT: L – Generic

#### “Justifies” is NOT “causes” – the link oversimplifies – securitizaton’s more likely to fizzle out in the face of contestation and budget constraints than result in their impacts

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Securitization theory has rightly garnered much attention among European scholars of international relations. Its basic claims are powerful: that security threats are not given, but require active construction; that the boundaries of “security” are malleable; that the declaration that a certain problem lies within the realm of security is itself a productive political act; and that “security” issues hold a trump card, demanding disproportionate resources and silencing alternative perspectives. Securitization thus highlights a familiar, even ubiquitous, political process that had received little attention in the international relations or comparative foreign policy literatures. It gave scholars a theoretical language, if not quite a set of coherent theoretical tools, with which to make sense of how a diverse set of issues, from migration to narcotics flows to global climate change, sometimes came to be treated as matters of national and global security and thereby—and this is where securitization’s critical edge came to the fore—impeded reasoned political debate. No surprise that, as Jarrod and Eric observe, securitization has been the focus of so many articles in the EJIR—and even more in such journals as the Review of International Studies and Security Dialogue. But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that securitization has failed to gain traction in North America. First, and most important, securitization describes a process but leaves us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of rhetorical contestation. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School, actors, usually elites, transform the social order from one of normal, everyday politics into a Schmittian world of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They conceive of this “securitizing move” in linguistic terms, as a speech act. As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues, “By saying it [security], something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the act . . .” [emphasis added]. Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. Countless articles and books have traced this process, and its consequences, in particular policy domains. Securitization presents itself as a causal account. But its mechanisms remain obscure, as do the conditions under which it operates. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are speech acts persuasive, by using well-known tropes to convince audiences that they must seek protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion, silencing potential opponents? In securitization accounts, speech acts often seem to be magical incantations that upend normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery. Equally unclear is why some securitizing moves resonate, while others [are ignored] fall on deaf ears. Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed, and this is true of both traditional military concerns as well as “new” security issues. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United States have long insisted that conflict with China is inevitable, yet China has over the last 25 years been more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—despite these vigorous and persistent securitizing moves. In very recent years, the balance has shifted, and the China threat has started to catch on: linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change. The US military has repeatedly declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly cast aside climate change deniers, many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly deferential to the uniformed military. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their securitizing moves. While George W. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against American values, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a more gifted orator, struggled to convince a skeptical public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. After thirty years as an active research program, securitization theory has hardly begun to offer acceptable answers to these questions. Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it. You don’t have to subscribe to a covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers unsatisfying. A large part of the problem, we believe, lies in securitization’s silence on the politics of security. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. In its seminal formulation, the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues, by treating securitization as a purely rule-driven process, the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of securitization, reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172). Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles, where coalitions counter securitizing moves with their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. Absent as well are the public intellectuals and media, who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others), sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). The audience itself—whether the mass public or a narrower elite stratum—is stripped of all agency. Speaking security, even when the performance is competent, does not sweep this politics away. Only by delving into this politics can we shed light on the mysteries of securitization. We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. To this end, we would urge securitization theorists, as we recently have elsewhere, to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers: that actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation; and that the power of language emerges through contentious dialogue. We are heartened that our ambivalence about securitization—the ways in which we find it by turns appealing and dissatisfying—and our vision for how to move forward have in the last decade been echoed by (mostly) European colleagues. These critics have laid out a research agenda that would, if taken up, produce more satisfying, and more deeply political, theoretical accounts. In our own work, both individual and collective, we have tried to advance that research agenda. So long as securitization theorists resist defining the theory’s scope and mechanisms, and so long as it remains wedded to apolitical underpinnings, we think it unlikely to gain a broad following on this side of the pond. Second, securitization has been held back by another way in which it is apolitical—this time thanks to its Schmittian commitments and political vision. Successful securitization, in seminal accounts, replaces normal patterns of politics with the world of the exception, in which contest has no place. They imagine security as the ultimate trump card. But, in reality, the divide is not nearly so stark. Security does not crowd out all other spending priorities—or states would spend on nothing but defense and “securitized” issues. Nor does simply declaring something a matter of national security guarantee its funding—or global climate change counter-measures, including research on renewable energies, would be well-funded. Nor are security issues somehow aloof from politics: politics has never truly stopped “at the water’s edge.” Securitization considers only the politics of security. Its strangely dichotomous optic cannot see or make sense of the politics within security. In ignoring the politics within security, securitization is of course in good company. Realists of all stripes have paid little attention to domestic political contest, except as a distraction from structural imperatives. But while realism is unquestionably a powerful first-cut, this inattention to the politics within security is also among the reasons so many have found it wanting. As Arnold Wolfers long ago observed, some degree of insecurity is the normal state of affairs. But “some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers.” And states, he further argues, do not actually maximize security—almost ever. “Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more security, the cost in taxes, the reduction in social benefits, or the sheer discomfort involved have militated effectively against further effort” (1962:151, 153). A securitization perspective renders all this politics within security inexplicable. And yet, as Wolfers saw half a century ago, it is crucial.

### AT: L – AI: LAWS

#### No impact to securitization – hybridization and grafting undercut legitimation effects and extreme responses

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A securitizing move is, according to the original definition by the Copenhagen School, a specific rhetorical structure or discourse – or, more precisely, a speech act – that frames an issue as an existential threat, i.e., a security issue (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 25–26). The central goal of this chapter is the identification and analysis of such speech acts because speech acts have indeed been the main means by which the Campaign has increasingly sought to securitize AWS. Since other means have also been employed, we will draw intellectual resources from other approaches to securitization theory too. There is still more, however, that we can borrow from the Copenhagen School. Wæver (1995) pointed to the performative dimension of the move: ‘the utterance itself is the act [emphasis added]’. He even defined the process as ‘[t]he performance of the security act’. Huysmans (2006: 147) accurately spotted the linguistic practice turning from mere description to performative acts as one of the organizing principles in social and political relations. One important caveat is that performativity is not the same thing as a theatre performance, but is about the ways in which the discourse is reiterated and networks are created (Ringmar 2019). In this chapter, we systematically illustrate how a particular communication within a distributed network produces and reinforces a shared understanding of insecurity. What deserves special note is that the emergent security issue is not necessarily linked to a real existential threat but has to be constructed and presented as such a threat (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 24). There have been insights showing that it does not stop with a politically and socially constructed threat. Discourses of insecurity are often about representations of ‘danger’ with material consequences (Campbell 1992). This concept is important for us too because the kind of threat we examine here has been constructed through, inter alia, discourses and representations of danger.

A person or a group that performs the speech act is a securitizing actor. Success depends to a great extent on the authority position held by the actor. Only a few actors and groups do in fact have ‘the power to define security’. Among them are political leaders, governments, bureaucracies, lobbyists, and pressure groups (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 31 and 40). Therefore, the Copenhagen School gave us a hint as to the nature of securitizing actors. Wæver (1995: 57) insisted specifically, however, that ‘security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, [typically] by elites’. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 21) reaffirmed the principle in their joint book: ‘Traditionally, by saying “security,” a state representative [emphasis added] declares an emergency condition.’ The limitation of the approach of the Copenhagen School is that it restricts the actors who can legitimately construct security primarily to political leaders. Also, the Copenhagen School provided initial instruction on how to assess the role the audience plays in constructing insecurity, yet this is another limitation. Success, in their view, depends on the audience being convinced that the issue is an existential security threat. The issue is securitized only if and when emergency measures that go beyond standard political procedures are accepted as justified (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 23–25). The audience’s role is, therefore, limited to the mere fact of their accepting the truth of the discourse. Other approaches to securitization theory will allow us to compensate for these limits.

Another major contributor to securitization theory has been the Paris School, situated within the emerging field of international political sociology and mainly represented by Didier Bigo and Thierry Balzacq. Their ideas further advanced the understanding of securitizing actors endowed with the authority to securitize. New actors appeared on the stage who were professionals with expertise in a given field. The Paris School put emphasis on expert security knowledge and the ‘authority of statistics’ (Bigo 2006). Security professionals and security agencies, the ones who routinely collect and analyse data, were recognized as having the authority to determine what exactly constitutes security (Bigo 2000: 176). Particular attention was drawn to bureaucracies that serve as an ‘intermediary’ with the central government and are directly involved in the provision of security services (e.g., military and police services, border guards and customs agents, intelligence services, risk assessment experts, etc.) (Bigo 2006). Increasingly, security professionals, both researchers and military personnel, are becoming facilitators for the success of securitization, as we show in this chapter. Bigo (2002: 83) specifically highlighted that, even if NGOs intervene, ‘they can do so only by turning professional’. Our analysis here illustrates, among other things, the trend towards professionalization in NGOs, themselves collecting, distributing, and efficiently utilizing professional knowledge. The success of the securitizing move is, consequently, linked to the structural position of the speaker within a relevant institution (Bigo 2002: 73–74). Bigo (2006) also noted that such institutions can overstep national boundaries and form transnational bureaucratic links. Transnationalization represents, in his view, yet another source of knowledge and ‘symbolic’ power. The transnational advocacy Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, which is the focus of this chapter, is perhaps the best illustration of how it can play out in everyday practice. Balzacq (2005: 178–179) listed the very same attributes of authorized security speakers: knowledge, trust, and the speaker’s power position, formal or symbolic. One of his key points was that ‘effective securitization is power-laden’. In addition, he carved out a more central role for the audience, focusing on ‘the power [emphasis added] that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction’ (Balzacq 2005: 171–172). This insight is still not enough to accurately define the role of the audience for the purposes of this chapter, but it brings us closer to the task.

The conceptualization of the securitizing move itself extends beyond the single speech act, as claimed by the Paris School. Bigo (2002: 65–66) stressed the importance of bureaucratic practices performed by security professionals and involved in the creation of administrative knowledge (e.g., population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, etc.). Therefore, practical work, discipline, and expertise are certainly no less important than the discourse (Bigo 2000: 194). Here we concentrate less on bureaucratic practices and more on different discursive frames in play. However, we still note, for example, that the Campaign has also drawn quite heavily upon surveys done by the market research company Ipsos. The most significant observation that comes out of it, however, is different: the Paris School broadened the definition of the securitizing move beyond the single, typically political, speech act. Balzacq (2005: 191) also focused on the ‘manner’ in which the securitizing actor makes the case for the point and drew attention to two basic principles ensuring ultimate success: ‘emotional intensity’ and ‘logical rigor’. He also reminded us of the role of analogies, metaphors, stereotypes, metonymies, lies, gestures, and even silence as effective tools of persuasion (Balzacq 2005: 172 and 179). In this chapter, we illustrate the significance of such tools for creating the terrifying image of ‘killer robots’. The increasingly blurred lines between fact and fiction, rationality and emotion are of particular significance to our understanding of that image. Last, but not least, the Paris School pointed to the existence of numerous stakeholders with heterogeneous profiles who do not share the same logics and are often in competition with each other (Bigo 2006). In such ‘power struggles’, securitizing actors align to eliminate alternative voices and swing the audience’s support towards their preferred course of action (Balzacq 2005: 173 and 179). It is a relevant observation, but a careful analysis of such struggles between the ban Campaign and its opponents is the subject of the next chapter.

Other, especially more recent, supplements to securitization theory contributed to the development of a more sophisticated set of assumptions regarding the authority of securitizing actors and the practice of threat construction. Stritzel (2012: 553) summarized the general tendency as the development away from static understandings of the authority to securitize and single speech acts to more complex processes of authorization and more dynamic representations of existential threat. Pointing out such complexities is one of the key objectives we set for ourselves in this chapter. Vuori (2008: 76) assumed that even those actors who fall outside official authority, but have sufficient ‘social capital’, can become securitizing actors. Social capital is a special kind of asset available, for example, to NGOs. In this chapter, we deal directly and specifically with the ways in which such capital is being mobilized. Berling (2011: 386) convincingly argued, in addition, that science co-determines the status of the securitizing actor. He called it the ‘authority of objectivity’ (Berling 2011: 393). Brauch (2009: 94) also drew attention to the significance of scientific ‘reputation’. Unsurprisingly, then, there is a strong focus on raising a scientific profile within – and in association with – the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. This is achieved, inter alia, by joining forces with senior scientists and larger scientific communities. The so-called ‘epistemic communities’ can indeed draw on their knowledge and expertise to influence the outcome of securitization moves ‘through reason and facts on the basis of (objective) knowledge’ (Floyd 2020: 12). An epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines with recognized scientific expertise and competence in a particular domain, according to the original conceptualization of the term (Haas 1992: 3). Haas (1992: 18) conceptualized epistemic communities as a separate category, inherently distinct from interest groups, social movements, and bureaucratic coalitions. Even though he equipped us with the appropriate concept, the definition is problematic. It is increasingly difficult to draw definitive dividing lines between scientists, political activists, and activist bureaucrats, as we clearly show here. A closer look reveals two serious problems: scientific facts are selectively used, twisted, or suppressed by political activists to serve their political purpose; and scientists themselves become willingly and directly involved in policy making and political manipulation. Berling (2011: 392) assumed that ‘scientific capital’ co-determines ‘the hierarchy [emphasis added] in the field of security and the chances of winning’. Yet the opposite is the case in this chapter. Hierarchies are being replaced with more horizontal heterarchies, as we will demonstrate. Science contributes significantly to the chances of success and successful claims for legitimacy, but scientists do not necessarily play a central role in the process of securitization.

There has, at the same time, been greater awareness that the audience can reinforce the authority of the securitizing actor. Salter (2008: 321–322) conceptualized interactions between the securitizing actor and the audience as ‘iterative’. He studied the process of ‘audience-speaker co-constitution [emphasis added] of authority and knowledge’. McInnes and Rushton (2011: 117) even introduced the idea that original audiences can, at some points themselves, act as securitizing actors. These insights help us conceptualize and, more importantly, analyse a much more active engagement on the part of the audience and the increasingly blurred line between securitizing actors and their target audiences. We call it hybridization, as explained below, and show how it works in practice. We also clearly demonstrate that such hybridization has no clear boundaries. Floyd (2020) drew our attention to the role of ‘functional actors’, often confused with the audience but, in fact, seeking to positively or negatively influence the trajectory of securitization. The concept itself, though originally underdeveloped, is borrowed from the Copenhagen School. Floyd (2020: 10) stressed that media outlets can prioritize certain issues over others, decide how information is relayed, and, therefore, control what becomes public knowledge. Vultee (2011: 77–93) showed practically how the media ‘speak security’. Our intention through this text is to once again demonstrate that the media play a crucial role in shaping public threat perception and disseminating stereotypes. The very idea of ‘killer robots’ caught public attention and imagination through broad media coverage. Foreign politicians can, in turn, either provide or withhold external legitimation, according to Floyd (2020: 10). The most important consequence, as we show, is peer pressure, i.e., attempts by the truly pro-ban states to push the blocking coalition towards adopting the ban on AWS. Members employed in the relevant industry can equally facilitate or impede securitization by presenting reasoned arguments for one side or the other (Floyd 2020: 11). We have a perfect illustration here: many technology companies have supported the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and publicly committed not to engage in the development of AWS. Clearly, such statements have significantly strengthened the spirit of the Campaign. Floyd’s (2020: 12) interpretation also suggests that even ordinary people can affect the dynamics of securitization, for example, through social media activism. Here we illustrate how ordinary people can facilitate securitization by partaking in surveys and voicing their concerns about the perceived threat. We also highlight that the Campaign has closely aligned with a broad wave of public concern, which has further reinforced its legitimacy in the eyes of the general public.

Numerous studies have also sought to develop a more nuanced understanding of the core of securitizing moves. First of all, there has been a general awareness that scientific models, data, and facts ‘can be mobilized strategically’ (Berling 2011: 393). Stritzel (2012: 560) explored the link between power politics and popular culture as ‘a principal background of meaning’. In particular, he inquired into the use of pop culture and cultural myths by securitizing actors. Williams (2003: 526–527) suggested that images and other visual representations are also part of ‘a broader performative act’ and do play a significant role in the process of securitization. This chapter shows how scientific facts and cultural imaginaries, visual and discursive frames are all mobilized simultaneously to construct the threat of so-called killer robots. Some scholars have even sought to highlight the supposed links between different security agendas such as the ‘migration-terrorism nexus’ (Ihlamur-Öner 2019), the ‘terrorism-asylum nexus’, or even the ‘terrorism-immigration-asylum nexus’ (Tsoukala 2006: 612 and 618). This is an important, yet undeveloped, argument. It is a good starting point for us to properly conceptualize processes of grafting involved in a securitizing move, as further elaborated below. Salter (2012: 934), at the same time, reminds us of the fact that ‘securitization is a constant process of struggle and contestation’. In accord with his interpretation, the so-called securitizing move in fact consists of ‘overlapping … language security games performed by varying relevant actors’ (Salter 2012: 931). The same author noted elsewhere (2008: 321) that there are also distinct types of audiences and that the move may be successful with some of them, but not others. It is a reminder for us: systematic hybridization between different types of actors acting at different stages in the securitization process, as we illustrate, does not necessarily lead to greater homogenization. We show it here too.

Building on this rich and diverse body of knowledge, the insights we borrow primarily include the significance of scientific reputation, the varied and dynamic identities of securitizing actors, the increasingly blurred line between securitizing actors and their target audiences, and the diversity of ways in which the threat can be constructed and presented. Yet we also go beyond to inquire into the process of over-securitization. There have already been efforts to understand and theorize over-securitization, so the term itself is not new. However, the existing literature approaches the problem from the perspective of referent objects of security. Hammerstad (2008: 1–2) was the first to point out that a security issue can ‘become over-securitised to the point where it is in danger of creating threats [to the referent object] where before there were none’. Ihlamur-Öner (2019: 210) concurred: ‘The securitization of irregular and forced migration has reached to the point that it can be described as over-securitization, which creates more threats where there were none, while putting the lives of migrants and refugee protection at risk.’

We take a different approach still and explore the dynamics of over-securitization from the perspective of securitizing actors and securitizing moves. In doing so, we distinguish two mechanisms through which over-securitization operates at these two levels: hybridization and grafting, respectively. Through the former, we demonstrate how complex hybridization of securitizing actors and target audiences produces circulatory, transepistemic, and post-truth configurations of security. When making this argument, we are inspired by Aradau and Huysmans. They accurately determined that ‘transepistemic relations create greater symmetry between various knowledges and dilute the superior authority of science in truth telling and factual knowledge about the world’ (Aradau and Huysmans 2018: 49). The same authors (2018: 54) defined the condition of post-truth as ‘a less hierarchical and more horizontal transversal practice of knowledge creation and circulation’. We have a practical illustration of their statements and argue that, when the tipping point is reached, the diffusion of authority decreases the likelihood of successful securitization. The concept of ‘grafting [a new norm onto existing norms]’ stands for a well-established legal practice and is borrowed from Price (1998: 617). Here it helps us conceptualize how a new security agenda can be grafted, through both discursive and visual representations, onto other security issues of immediate importance and even science fiction imagery. Such grafting techniques, as we show, reinforce the sense of insecurity but, quite counter-intuitively, can in some cases impede instead of facilitate the securitization process. The imprecise focus and reductionist paths make it more difficult to name the threat clearly, which is a precondition for successful securitization. Salter (2012: 938–940) gave an example of what it means if ‘the threat remains vague [emphasis added]’.

Here lies the paradox: success in broadening the stakeholder base and generating the sense of insecurity does not necessarily mean the success of securitization. In a nutshell, greater efficiency does not necessarily translate into greater effectiveness. Hence, over-securitization is about securitization efforts that are too intense and too ubiquitous, to the point of becoming counter-productive.

### AT: L – Arms Regulation / Prolif

#### No arms regulation link – desecuritizes and spurs identity transformation, NOT Otherization – empirics flow AFF

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STABILITY AND CHANGE Arms Control: Conservative or Transformative? As the "impact” discussion indicated, Arms Control can be looked at from two opposite perspectives concerning stability and change. Arms control aims at stability; critical security approaches have thus labeled arms control as a conservative, status-quo orientated strategy (Krause & Cooper, 2011; Krause & Latham, 1998). This school has also ascribed certain attributes of the concept to Western culture, thereby reifying the West as completely American without accounting for the considerable differences within the West (which shows, for example, in the related EU strategies [EU, 2003a, 2003b, 2016]). In this spirit, critical scholars have labeled as Western such attributes as the “necessity of deterrence," a “preference for one's own preponderance," and a “focus on proliferation” as if the Soviet Union had not shown the same traits all throughout the Cold War, and as if Russia had not followed the Soviet predecessor in this respect as well. But there is also a transformational perspective: Arms Control as a vehicle for inducing, accompanying, and reinforcing a fundamental redefinition of the relationship between two or more states; the template for this approach is, as will be discussed later, the years from 1985 to 1992, when the Cold War dissolved. Naturally, the concept of disarmament shows the greatest affinity to the transformational approaches. This transformational perspective leaves the dogmatic connection between arms control and stability behind. Stability by arms control is itself an instrument to foster dynamic change, just as homeostasis in young organisms is the condition for dynamic growth. This perspective opens the broader view on the relation of Arms Control and historical time. A reading of the history of arms control results in three models to conceive this relationship. Arms Control Through Time: Three Models. The first model corresponds to the enlightenment intuition of steady progress: Arms Control, once started, will create islands of cooperation in a still formidable sea of self-help. But successful agreements have an impact beyond technical constraints or limited cooperation gains. The factor of “learning,” enabled by agreements and their institutional settings, changes the relationship between former rivals and antagonists incrementally, but potentially profoundly (Nye, 1989). New information mitigates the security dilemma, as both capabilities and intentions of the partner become better understood and more predictable. Admitting transparency on agreed level of forces, which reduce opportunities and incentives to attack first—whether conventional or nuclear—build down the image of the enemy as a nefarious and implacable antagonist poised to devour neighbors and enemies. Arms Control works as a conduit for reassurance; the reassured party imputes more benevolent intentions on. its opposite. Institutional settings—domestic, bilateral, and multilateral—create new bureaucratic routines, produce more information, help to solve problems of ambiguity and suspicions of non-compliance, and inculcate cooperative practices in the daily work of decision makers and bureaucrats. Moreover, successful Arms Control agreements set incentives to try more daring ones. In the process, states might redefine their own security interests. Of course, Arms Control is not able to drive this process alone. Rather, its political effects help to encourage steps in other areas of the conflicting relationship, arid such steps (and their domestic repercussions) stimulate in turn new efforts in Arms Control. Throughout this development, increasing transnational communities (epistemic and otherwise) connect the national discourses of the participating countries by importing common knowledge, serving as interpreters of the ''other’s” views and actions, and working as advocates of cooperation (Nye, 1987, 1989) The Gorbachev years of 1985 to 1991 provide an impressive example for this dynamic. In the best case, it might turn islands of cooperation into a continent (Evangelista, 1999; Risse, 2000). The second model is a significant modification of the first one. It preserves the long-term vision of a cooperative world, but (informed by the historical experiences of the last 60 years) understands the Arms Control process as a series of waves, each of which leaves the world in a more cooperative state than the previous one: a pure self-help system gives way to an arms-control driving detente constellation, followed by a new political ice age in which, however, some of the Arms Control achievements of the detente period survive. A second Arms Control wave, followed by another ice age ensues, with again a few new lasting gains for cooperative security, and so on. This model accounts for the multifactorial political environment in which Arms Control has to operate. Power shifts among nations, national revolutions, or domestic polarization, can replace elites well socialized into the concepts and practices of Arms Control with nationalist, unilateralist, and supremacist elites, who see the only way to security and status in absolute superiority or even aggression and conquest. This account of the process toward more cooperation through ups and downs reflects better the experiences since 1960. A tentative success after the Cuban missile crisis, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, was followed by five years of stagnation, caused by the toppling of Khrushchev in Moscow, alienation through the Vietnam War, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The conclusion of the negotiations on the NPT toward the end of 1968 opened the first wave of Arms Control in the period of detente. After the— supposedly hawkish—presidency of Richard Nixon had installed itself, strategic arms negotiations started quickly. The next decade saw four agreements of strategic nuclear arms, two on testing, two multilateral treaties to prohibit biological and environmental weapons, and a couple of confidence-building measures to avoid severe crises between the superpowers, plus those in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, the “Helsinki Document”). However, this period came to a halt at the end of the decade when conservative concerns about perceived growing Soviet nuclear superiority and cheating, and Soviet inroads in the developing world produced a climate no longer conducive to Arms Control—SALT II remained observed by the two parties, but unratified. The early Reagan years were confrontational, with unfettered armament, and token Arms Control talks in order to pacify a concerned Western public on both sides of the Atlantic. Gorbachev’s ascendancy to power changed the situation (Arnett, 1990; Evangelista, 1999). Starting with new CSCE confidence-building measures in 1986 (the “Stockholm Document’' later dramatically enhanced by the series of “Vienna Documents”), a cascade of bilateral (INF Treaty, START I, START II), multilateral regional (CFE Treaty and the unprecedented Open Sky Treaty, which grants the parties mutual information-gathering overflight rights), and multilateral global (Chemical Weapons Convention, Ottawa Convention on anti-personal land mines, and the indefinite extension of the NPT) measures followed in close sequence. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was the last hurrah, but failed to attract the necessary “advice and consent” in the U.S. Senate, which was already dominated by archconservative forces led by Senator Jesse Helms, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee. From 1997 on, the political climate cooled down. Arms Control froze with the George W. Bush administration. The Moscow Treaty on strategic nuclear arms—a treaty without specifications, with a termination date of 2012 and no verification—was the only achievement, neutralized through the far more weighty abrogation of the ABM-Treaty by the Bush administration, which led to the prompt abrogation of START II by Russia, followed by Moscow's withdrawal from the CFE Treaty; the multilateral Oslo Convention banning cluster munitions succeeded only because the United States, opposed to this agreement, did not possess a veto position. Obama's revival of Arms Control yielded the New START Treaty, the agreement for the reduction of weapons-grade plutonium with Russia, and the Arms Trade Treaty, in. an all too brief period of new detente that ended at the latest with the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014. The notion of waves has a lot of empirical evidence to support it. One interesting indicator is the titles of writings on the subject that have appeared over time. A Farewell to Arms Control? (Young, 1972), "Arms Control: The Possibility of a Second Coming” (Freedman,1982), “Farewell to Arms Control?” again (Nye, 1986), “The Death of Arms Control” (Sullivan, 1987), The Future of Arms Control (Ball & Mack, 1987), “The Folly of Arms Control” (Schell, 2000),7 “The Rise and Fall of Arms Control” (Bohlen, 2005), all indicate a shifting between the highs and lows of the theme. It also indicates that experts did not always agree on whether they were feeing a high or a low. Young's book was written during the years of the first big Arms Control wave. Freedman’s "second coming" was authored in the first years of the Reagan Administration’s dark years for Arms Control. Nye s “Farewell” and Sullivan's “Death,” written from quite different positions, appeared when Gorbachev moved Arms Control on its path of greatest success, as acknowledged by the more optimistic Nye. Curiously, “The Death of Deterrence” (Dando & Rogers, 1984) falls between the “second coming" and the "death” of Arms Control. That these waves lead toward ever-increased security cooperation in a spiral-shaped process, however, is not self-evident. Consequently, the third model drafts a circular process. Progress is only temporary and will be overtaken by the eternal, harsh forces of the international power struggle. Of course, this is the view of the more pessimistic version of realism: Arms Control ebbs and floods alternate, but Arms Control achievements are fully or almost fully lost in each ice age: “progress” does not hold. Security cooperation and its legal and institutional sediments are a marginal phenomenon, dependent on temporary interest constellations. When interests shift, or when a power shift changes the hierarchy of the international system, the achievements of the past period will erode or explode, and the system returns to the dangerous competition, including its military aspects, which is its natural state (Mearsheimer, 1995; see also Mearsheimer, 2001 for the theoretical background). Among the three models, the “spiral model" has most to show empirically. As Joseph Nye (1987, 1989) observed already in 1987, even the icy early 1980s left much of the Arms Control achievements intact, such as the NPT, naval confidence-building measures, and the CSCE process with its confidence-building (the European allies prevailed over U.S. preferences). During the George W. Bush years, NPT, CWC, and BWC continued (the latter one after heroic rescue activities by the Europeans), the mutual reductions pursuant to the Moscow Treaty took place, the INF Treaty remained in force, as did CSCE confidence building, and even the Open Sky Treaty. The same applies to all global multilateral treaties. A second observation: Phil Farley counted, in his contribution to probably the best book on Arms Control that has ever been written, eight negotiations that had failed before 1987 (Farley, 1988, pp. 620,627-629). During the 28 years that have since passed, six of these eight have been successfully concluded.8 Up to now, the "spiral model" appears to hold, despite setbacks in the early 1980s, the years of the George W. Bush Administration, or the present impasse; thus, the hopeful Kantian vision of ever-closer security cooperation is still on the table.

#### No disarm trade-off link – there’s ZERO uniqueness since it’s NOT on the table now – BUT our reps snowball to it, which is offense

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The Permissive Effect of Prohibition Norms. One of the criticisms of critical security studies scholars has been that the prohibition of some weapons has had the effect of legitimizing non-prohibited weapons (Cooper, 2011; Mathur, 2011). Indeed, there is the ‘‘permissive’’ effect, which results from the stigmatization of the prohibited weapons as inhuman, which implies in turn that weapons not banned simultaneously are not equally inhumane. For material and psychological reasons, the focus on banning a specific weapon system will very probable prevent efforts to ban other weapons with comparable effects at the same time: The campaign to get rid of incendiary weapons (napalm) in the 1980s postponed action on landmines and cluster munitions for one and two decades, respectively. The material factor is the resource restraint (financial, time, diplomatic capital) of ban proponents (NGOs and like-minded governments), which makes it difficult to tackle more than one item at a time. The psychological effect is the impossibility of focusing and maintaining attention of both activists and the public (media and people) on more than one issue in a certain time-span (Rosert, 2015, 2016). As the sequence from incendiary weapons (prohibited in 1983), to anti-personal mines (prohibited in 1997), to cluster munitions (prohibited in 2009) demonstrates, however, this permissive/preventive effect is determining only temporarily. In the long-term, the opposite effect can be observed, “issue cascading”: the successful subjection on one type of weapon under the anti-humanitarian stigma makes it easier for a follow-up campaign to frame the next candidate for a ban in a way that promises success. The framing of a weapon type in analogy or comparison with an already stigmatized one (grafting) becomes easier as more weapons fall under a ban, and more characteristics and attributes are available to draw parallels to a weapon that is still permitted (Price, 1998, pp. 627-631). If permissive or preventive effects mean that old Arms Control stands in the way of new Arms Control, the cascading effect shows that old Arms Control can engender new Arms Control. Real World Effects. So far, the discussion has dealt with the effects of Arms Control on state behavior. Changed state behavior, of course, has effects on the physical world: Due to the implementation of Arms Control agreements, there are fewer nuclear weapons (between 15,000 and 16,000 instead of more than 60,000, at the height of the Cold War), fewer chemical weapons, fewer biological weapons, and fewer states possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the world, and fewer conventional weapon systems in Europe than would have been the case otherwise. The most impressive numbers come from humanitarian Arms Control groups: According to the Red Cross, the number of victims of landmines was at 20,000 the year before the Ottawa Convention. It has gone down to 3,500 per year since. By the end of 2015, international production and transfer of these weapons had commensurately shrunk, including by some non-members producers, quite a remarkable external effect of the norm; even 48 non-state armed groups have renounced the use of mines on the initiative of the NGO Geneva CalL Twenty-nine states were declared to be mine-free through efforts under the Ottawa Convention (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016). By the end of 2014, 3.68 million anti-personal mines had been destroyed in operations pursuant to the Convention (Landmines Report, 2009, p. 1; Landmines Report, 2015, p. 2). Surprisingly, in light of so many lives saved, some scholars belonging to the Critical Security Studies school contend that humanitarian Arms Control constitutes a well-concealed submission of civil society to the imperatives of Western militarism (Beier, 2011; Cooper, 2011; Mathur, 2011, 2012, 2014). This assessment of the mine campaign as "reconstitution of the West (and Western interest)” having “played a crucial (even decisive) role in the construction of the 'landmine crisis’” (Krause & Latham, 1998, p. 44) remains mysterious: First, both the Ottawa and the Oslo conventions were opposed by the quintessential Western power, the United States. Second, both were enthusiastically supported by the main victims of the prohibited weapons, namely the countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (Price, 1998, pp. 640-641). One could suspect that, based on ideological doctrine, some scholars are critical of all but their own perceptual biases, a strong similarity to some of the realist and neo-conservative critics of arms control, which they so enthusiastically condemn. Back to the independent-dependent variable relationship: The structurationist school of constructivism, orientated to the work of Anthony Giddens, takes the middle ground by constructing a dialectical relationship by which processes of Arms Control and processes of broader policy would mutually influence each other. As Arms Control has been conceptualized as a way to mitigate the security dilemma, its likely effects should be tangible there. Measures that reduce the ambiguity of intention and capabilities, and measures that, notably, reduce the capability for large-scale, speedy offensives should have strong positive impacts on mutual perception and help to foster security cooperation on a broad scope (Peters, 1992). They give signals of the absence of aggressive intentions and thereby help overcome the fundamental uncertainty, which is at the heart of the security dilemma (Lamb, 1988, pp. 225-234). The "Gorbachev effect” on the West was exactly that. ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL DISCOURSES Academic and political discourses on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in general, as well as in specific political fields of action, are framed in four different perspectives: deterrence, defense, disarmament, and humanitarian discourses.2 The deterrence approach is dominated by nuclear weapons: The regulation of arms is seen as maintaining a stable deterrence relationship, understood as the mutually assured capability to strike back after a first strike, accompanied by measures that make a first strike as unlikely, unprovoked, and unattractive as possible. Consequently, nuclear weapons, seen as embodying the greatest deterrence value, enjoy a legitimate existence (e.g., Quinlan, 2009; Riihle, 2009; Tertrais, 2011), though the idea of conventional deterrence has also been pursued (Gerson, 2009; Mearsheimer, 1985). Where the deterrence discourse prevails, certain Arms Control measures fall in disregard. For example, de-alerting (putting strategic nuclear forces on low alert) or even de-mating the nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, could be seen as destabilizing deterrence against a first strike. Shifting to a no first-use doctrine could be interpreted as opening one's nuclear forces for a first strike conducted by non-nuclear means. Arms control in a deterrence discourse could even advocate, under •certain circumstances, a build-up of nuclear forces if numbers have diminished below a perceived minimum that is seen as vulnerable to the combined offensive capabilities of potential enemies. The Chinese aversion against transparency is also stability-motivated, lest transparency could facilitate first-strike targeting against Bejing s comparably small arsenal. Arms control is a servant of deterrence and is limited by the perceived requirements of the latter. The defense discourse means the capability to react once deterrence fails and a ruthless enemy pursues conquest or extermination. Arms control, in this discourse, must recognize the need and serve the maintenance of a robust defense posture, which nowadays must inevitably include defense against missiles. At the conventional level, the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty came closest to the ideal arms control agreement: By reducing, and establishing an exact balance for, those five weapon systems needed for a large-scale, territory-grabbing land attack, while not touching those weapons indispensable for defense (like air defense or anti-tank systems), it granted the two participating alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, a chance for successful conventional defense This formula, however, is hardly applicable to the nuclear sector: deterrence can only be upheld through the offensive capability to strike even after having suffered an attack. Effective defenses could annihilate this capability for the party forced to strike second. It is hardly possible, therefore, to achieve conventional defense and nuclear deterrence on the basis of the same discourse, but only by combining the two. The defense discourse on Arms Control is structured in a way that Arms Control advocates must always fight an uphill battle against the argument of military utility/necessity. This burden of justification has hampered and frustrated advocates of international humanitarian law in the context of the Geneva Protocols and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) time and again (Mathur, 2012; see below). The disarmament discourse has a moral overtone in that weapons are seen as immoral and dangerous items that, whatever their military value, must be dismantled. They are framed in discourses of stigmatization (Shamai, 2015), in which the stigma is connected to their destructive power (WMD as threat to [human]mankind), cruelty that causes unnecessary and lasting suffering (chemical weapons, incendiary weapons), and indiscriminate effects on civilians (all WMD, antipersonal mines, cluster munitions) (Borrie, 2009; Price, 1998,2007; Rosert, 2015,2016). Stigma is not confined to WMD, but can be glued to other weapons systems as well; hence, weapons singled out for disarmament discourses are not dependent on the particular strategic value; to the contrary, part of the discourse consists of contesting this value to disempower arguments of military utility, which are usually deployed by opponents of the prohibition. Proponents of disarmament are even busy denying the utility of nuclear weapons for both warfare and deterrence (Harrington, 2009; Wilson, 2007, 2008). Today, disarmers rely strongly on humanitarian arguments; the disarmament and humanitarian discourses tend to amalgamate. The humanitarian discourse; finally, asks for measures that serve best the goal of human security: the survival, well-being, and integrity of individuals, notably civilians; consequently, the weapons that have the most devastating effect and discriminate least between combatants and civilians are subject to the demand for elimination, notwithstanding their ascribed military value. It is noteworthy that today's humanitarian discourse, manifested in a broad array of weapon types from antipersonal mines to nuclear weapons, has evolved from the tradition of the legal discourse on the humanitarian law of war that prevailed into the 1990s. There, the basic formula was to weigh humanitarian concerns and military utility. The humanitarian discourse was thus dominated by the defense and deterrence discourses. Today’s humanitarian Arms Control discourse gives priority to human concerns over military utility and links humanitarianism with disarmament, not with constraints on weapons use. Given the weight of military considerations in the attitudes and decision making of nation-states, this does not eliminate completely the weighting of military aspects. But, the burden of proof has shifted. In the old humanitarian law discourse, humanitarians had to argue against "military utility." In the new discourse, opponents of prohibition have to argue for indispensability and irreplaceability of the weapons in question (Price, 1998, p. 632). As a consequence, in the nuclear weapons field, a majority of states is not satisfied anymore with small steps of arms reduction, transparency measures, and confidence building; rather, they push for a fast elimination of nuclear weapons, preceded by the conclusion of a nuclear weapons ban (Borrie, 2014; Kmentt, 2015). The reason for the conservatism of the classical discourse on humanitarian law is not so much the past practices of the legalistic discourse of international humanitarian law (Mathur, 2012) as the result of the balance of political power, with great powers prevailing that wanted their utilitarian concerns (fighting and winning wars) to weigh heavily in the resulting treaties. The new discourse, in contrast, was created by a coalition of humanitarian and disarmament NGOs, and smaller and middle powers that push their causes because they have more moral concerns than stakes in fighting and winning wars, or in the weapons needed for war or for deterrence (Borrie, 2014). The intrinsic nature of the discourses has not engendered the change, but shifts in coalitions and discursive power (Mathur, 2012).

#### No prolif link – empirics disprove and it’s NOT racist to say others are just as likely as we are to make mistakes and argue pragmatically that more prolif is worse

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND ARMS CONTROL Arms Control does not completely discard self-help as the basis of national security, but entrusts a more or less significant piece of it to cooperation with potential enemies.3 For this reason, Arms Control is a difficult subject for (purist) realism and neorealism, but also for post-modernism. Realism and neo-realism expect states to pursue self-help as the only reliable basis for their national security. Cooperative security efforts admit that at least part of one's own security is dependent on the partners' compliance with agreed rules. Arms Control also requires a more relaxed attitude toward the problem of relative gains, the somehow unequal distribution of gains emerging from cooperation (Grieco, 1990). Since it is extremely difficult to (define exact balances (numerical balances, for example, neglect differences in geopolitical situations, qualitative aspects, or intangibles like differences in training, etc), relative gains are not only certain to occur, but difficult to assess exactly. Even the notion of an exchange of renunciation, in exchange for a security guarantee, is implausible in the face of the security dilemma, as the guarantor might defeat or may mutate into the enemy of tomorrow. That Arms Control happens in reality is thus somehow puzzling. For post-modernists, Arms Control is only thinkable as a hegemonic project to maintain power differentials, not as a non-hegemonic common endeavor that serves all participants well. Both realists and post-modernists are only at ease with unilateral, hegemonic Arms Control imposed on others, notably on defeated states after war (for example, Iraq in 1991). For post-modernists, post-colonialists, and critical security scholars, non-proliferation is the paradigm of hegemonic Arms Control as an attempt to prevent others from obtaining the weapons that oneself possesses, and the conceding of the difference by middle powers like Canada or Sweden is only explainable by the discursive hegemony of the nuclear weapon states (Keeley, 1990). These critics are right to see roots of non-proliferation thinking in the racist ideology of the colonial era, parts of which have been transported into the 20th century and resonate still in the "rogue state” discourse, with the thrust that “civilized” states must keep “barbarians” at bay by maintaining the difference in military power (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006; Gusterson, 1999; Mathur, 2014). This critique, however, has several weaknesses. It ignores that non-proliferation was deployed first with Germany and Japan, then already members of “the West,” as the primary targets,4 that the first victims of U.S. export controls in the 1970s were advanced European states and Japan, and that controversies over the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the first two decades of the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) were between Western governments more than between the West and the non-aligned (Bccker et al., 2013); moreover, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a main organ of Western nuclear export controls includes today Brazil, China, Mexico, Kazakhstan, and South Africa, non-Westem members that are more than fig leafs. It is the United States that is pushing the membership of India and has terminated “nuclear apartheid" as far as India is concerned. Conversely, most European states have not joined the “rogue state" discourse, and many Western Arms Control and non-proliferation experts have never accepted the distinction between “reasonable" Northern nuclear weapon states and “irrational” Southerners. To the contrary, they have warned against the risks in South Asia because of the proven risks of the nuclear arms race during the Cold War, where only a lot of luck saved [human]mankind from a global nuclear holocaust (e.g., Gavin, 2010; Muller, 2013a).s It should also be noted that multilateral Arms Control treaties apart from the NPT have been negotiated in a North-South forum such as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions (BWC/CWC), and that recent conventional disarmament treaties such as the Ottawa Convention (anti-personal mines) and the Oslo Convention (cluster munitions) were initiated and pushed by coalitions of Western and Southern middle powers against the express will of Northern and Southern great powers (United States, Russia, China, India). The simple categorization of West against South is no less ideological and misleading than the traces of racist thinking in a limited part of the Arms Control discourse. In contrast, Arms Control presents a solvable puzzle for rationalists with their emphasis on absolute gains and their acceptance of positive sum games and the-information and transparency providing function of institutions that manage and administer Arms Control agreements (e.g., the classic Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). The exchange of renunciation and guarantee appears more plausible to a rationalist when the guarantee is embedded in institutions that render faithfulness more probable (like institutionalized alliances), or in deployment patterns that make use of armed forces in response to an attack more likely (e.g., tripwire-type deployment). Rationalist liberal institutionalism finds good empirical confirmation in Arms Control regimes. Indeed, most agreements are endowed with organizations that serve as channels for communication, arenas for sorting out behavioral ambiguities of members and clarifying ambivalences in the language of prescriptions and prohibitions, and supply transparency by reporting and verification and can, after all, take decisions. Not only multilateral treaties have such organizations (like the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] working for the NPT or the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] working for the CWC), but even the bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia are usually managed by bilateral standing commissions.

### AT: L – Biotech

#### No impact to securitizing dual-use biotech

Edwards 14 Brett Edwards, PhD candidate, Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of Bath, The Ethics and Governance of Dual-Use Synthetic Biology within the United States and the United Kingdom (2003 - 2012), PhD thesis, February 2014, <https://purehost.bath.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/187955815/Edwards_Brett_PhD_Thesis_05_07_14_Final_Corrected_1.pdf> /GoGreen!

8.3 Dual-use Governance and Securitization Theory

Dual-use governance has proved an interesting issue area for the application of securitization theory. First, this research has drawn attention to the role of epistemic communities and scientific consensus positions on given issues in the context of complexity and uncertainty (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 72–73). In particular, this work has emphasised the fundamental impacts of the emergence of these factors on agenda setting and problem definition. Added to this, the work has drawn attention to the idea that systemic risks are made governable rhetorically with reference to complex webs of collaboration between institutions in the development and implementation of risk governance activities. This includes, for example, bio-preparedness models of governance which have developed in the US and Europe. However, the work also draws attention to the idea that such collaboration faces a series of political challenges, particularly in the context of anticipatory modes of governance which attempt to deal with challenges beyond the scope of existing risk management structures.

Second, this work has outlined that it is in this context that actors (including state and nonstate institutions) engage in two key modes of engagement with security politics. The first is the primary mode, which involves engagement in activities designed to set the rules for future policy making processes in relation given issue. This includes, for example, deciding which institutions are in charge of developing and implementing policies, and the nature of collaboration between actors within these processes. Within this work, it has been argued that the epistemic communities embodied in the NSABB and Sloan report processes, for instance, have been central to such processes.

The other mode of engagement is secondary, which involves engagement in the context of agreements about the overall process of policy development. Within this mode of action, actors seek to impact directly on the policies which are being developed and implemented. This may include initiating, advocating, facilitating or resisting specific initiatives.

Third, this work has outlined the extent to which policy models are useful to those who study processes of securitization in the context of systemic risks. In chapter three, it was argued that these models could provide focus, structure and limits within analysis, which are of central importance in interdisciplinary studies, as well as in multi-level approaches, and that this could help the analyst to identify which activities, discourses and actors are and are not relevant with regard to policy outcomes.

It is certainly the case that these models performed these roles in two important senses. First, they provided a central narrative for the life and death of single initiatives and policy proposals. For example, they allowed for the exploration of the extent to which forwardlooking oversight proposals have been rejected within political and policy streams within the US. A case in point is recommendations made by the NSABB in relation to synthetic biology research and technology, which have often struggled to garner federal US support. Another example was the 2004 bio-hazard non-proliferation proposal of George Church, which was dropped in favour of other governance options developed within the academic channel of polynucleotide synthesis policy development.

It was also argued in chapter three, that such policy models could provide a straightforward institutionally, historically and politically situated ‘environment’ for discourses and ‘speech-acts’ to occupy within an overall process of securitization. Such claims were made in the context of the concern that analysts studying securitization processes who rely on a linguistic approach may struggle to adequately account for the socio-historical context of speech acts, and to sufficiently trace the impact of such acts on policy outcomes. Simply put, it was argued that some approaches focus much more on those ‘speaking’ security in relation to an issue, and much less on those actually developing and implementing security policy. During the analysis process, policy process models provided a framework to help understand why actors were speaking security in some contexts, and what the actual implications of this was for emerging policy. A key example related to the NEST domain, where the scientific community, as well as associated social scientists, have been identified as a first line of defence in dealing with dual-use issues. Placing these assertions in a broader political context, however, revealed the extent to which these claims were contested, as well as the extent to which such assertions often belied low levels of action. Further to this, reasons were given to explain why NEST initiatives were struggling within both a US and UK context to transform innovation practice, as well as to encourage key regulators to engage pre-emptively with broader dual-use concerns.

#### Our biotech reps are a criticism of – NOT complicit with – racist scientific epistemologies – calling for entangled responsibility facilitates expanded political imagination

Chandler 18 David Chandler, Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Biopolitics 2.0: Reclaiming the power of life in the Anthropocene,” Contemporary Political Theory, 9-20-2018, DOI: 10.1057/s41296-018-0265-9 /GoGreen!

Biopolitics was once the preserve of critical Foucauldian-influenced theorists. This is no longer the case. The rise of new materialisms, networked and object-oriented ontologies and demands for the ‘renaturalization of politics’ (Grosz, 2011; Sharp, 2011) have turned the political into the biopolitical in much of radical contemporary political theory. Here, the biopolitical is often in tension with the Foucauldian discourses of the last few decades, affirming alternative possibilities rather than merely critiquing regimes of power (Malabou, 2008; Kirby, 2011; Taussig, 2018). One factor in this shift has been the impact of anthropogenic climate change and global warming on the contemporary political imagination, increasingly refracted through conceptualizations of the Anthropocene (Tsing, 2015; Cohen et al., 2016; Chandler, 2018). A second factor has been that the life sciences no longer appear to support understandings of deterministic differences but rather to cast evolution in sympoietic and entangled ways, making biology appear as no longer essentialising but as increasingly importable into politics, in ways which disrupt modernist or liberal conceptions of the culture/nature divide (Haraway, 2016). Two important but very different engagements, which reflect these affirmative readings of biopolitics, are reviewed here, from the fields of postcolonial literature and gender and race in international politics. I’d like to start by laying out the insights and framing of Stephanie Fishel’s The Microbial State. This book is a well-worked deployment of the new materialist thesis of the world of ‘lively matter’ (the cover and publicity blurb feature a ringing endorsement from leading political theorist Jane Bennett). Fishel locates her work firmly in the camp of posthumanism, counterposing the modernist, ‘anthropic’ account of the state as ‘the body politic’ to one that takes into account the ‘biospheric’ and the ‘microbial’ (p. 2). The key conceptual point is to highlight that the biological is crucial to the bounded imaginary of the state as a community analogous to the human body. Both these conceptions of the bounded political subject – the individual in liberal political theory and the state in international theory – are products of the biopolitical blurring of culture and nature in atomising and essentialising ways. Fishel critically uses the life sciences as a lens for alternative political imaginaries of complex and overlapping communities, which seek to overcome the homogenising ‘body’ metaphors of contemporary political discourse and the ‘autonomous and autarkic’ subjects of the biopolitical they produce (p. 15). Thus we move well beyond Foucault’s Biopolitics 1.0, where biopolitics is a technology of management and control. Instead, Fishel provides a ‘reversal of biopolitical critique, one that emphasizes vitality connection and entangled responsibility’ (p. 21): ‘This book takes life as a creative intensity that can offer new solutions, and new ways of engaging with the world’ (p. 21). In the inversion or ‘reversal’ of biopolitical critique, the world and its entangled relationality becomes a potential cure for the dangerous ‘immunitarian’ and essentialising biopolitical logic of individual and state rights and interests (p. 27). The metaphors of entanglement, contamination, sympoeisis and intra-active becomings can facilitate and enable a new (multi-species) politics, capable of addressing the crises of global warming and species extinction in the Anthropocene. Perhaps the most important conceptual move, in a range of interesting treatments, is the importance attached to the ‘microbial’ of the book title. Modernist, or human-centred, views of development and security treat the human or the state as separate and distinct entities and therefore as the referent for politics, through metaphors of conflict and militarism – with treatment as ‘intervention’, germs as ‘enemies’ or the ‘war’ against cancer (p. 49). Microbial and other entangled or relational metaphors enable alternative ontologies of being and becoming. If we seriously want to tackle contemporary problems, perhaps the starting point should instead be to ask, ‘What would a microbe do?’ (p. 56) Microscopic bacteria may seem ‘small and simple’ but they are what enable life to exist and highlight that living organisms are enmeshed in their environments, inside and out, enabling us ‘to envision political community as an assemblage of multispecies groupings’ (p. 56). Microbes enable us to go beyond binaries of self and other and to bring ‘system-based understandings of complex processes’ to the political realm, enabling ‘different forms of practice for sustainable, ethical, global living with one another, and with other life forms, as a bodies politic’ (p. 61). Processual and entangled ways of understanding politics change our attitude to problems and their governance; the questions become ‘more about various ecological relationships and balance, rather than resistance to invasion’ (p. 63). Key to microbial political possibilities is the removal of the keystone of modernist politics – the individual as subject – which ‘places the separateness of the human being as its most important trait’ (p. 69). ‘Biologically, at least, we are not intrinsically individuals, but collective super-organisms, assimilating multiple species and millions of individual organisms’ (p. 68). Microbial worlds enable us to question liberal and rationalist approaches that prioritise the individual over all other entities and collectives (this chimes well with other feminist science studies-informed work, equally suspicious of a liberal rights framework, for example, Clarke and Haraway, 2018). Microbially-imagined or posthuman forms of governance enable creative awareness that ‘[I]n Kantian and humanist terms, an individual is always an end, not a means; therefore, the will of the individual cannot be sacrificed without consent’ (p. 69). Thus in Fishel’s reworking of the biopolitical, key targets are liberal conceptions of ‘freedom’ (p. 69), ‘sovereignty, law and democracy’, which will need to be redefined. Microbes enable us to see the artifice behind the distinctions of liberal political theory, of separate entities with distinct rights and interests: ‘From this perspective it is impossible not to see the similarities between relationships in the internal relations between members of microbiotic communities in the human gut and the relations between member of a political society’ (p. 75). Rather than conflictual self-interests – the stuff of human-centred political communities – microbes enable us to imagine a politics of collaboration: ‘the human gut, in this book… is exemplified as a community in which very few relationships are pathogenic’ (p. 87). The microbial message of multi-species becoming is clear, with ‘new definitions of health for the state based on expanded notions of health through plurality… plurality and stimulation, not autonomy and purity, lead to strength’ (p. 90). Fishel is well aware that what I am calling ‘Biopolitics 2.0’ – with its affirmative use of biological metaphors – runs the risk, associated with all imports from biology into the political, of carrying ‘illiberal and conservative connotations’, but she stresses that ‘modern biology and current biological thinking’ are different, ‘no longer based on static equilibrium or a bare struggle for survival expounded by neo-Darwinist theories of evolution’ (p. 101). Rather than fixed entities fighting for distinct interests, microbial imaginaries are ones of collective and sympoietic becoming. This is a process of constant change and transformation, of ‘posthuman becoming’ and ‘biocultural hope’; entanglements with others make all of us ‘co-evolved symbionts’ (p. 102) where ‘the world is a joint product between the human and the non-human… composing the world together’ (p. 105). Fishel’s thesis of ‘the reversal of biopolitics’ claims to ‘open a space to reformulate biopolitics more positively by affirming life as vital and relational rather than a purely mechanical reaction against that which is Other’ (p. 108). Fishel is keen to flag up that in ‘mining the hermeneutic potential of the life sciences’ (p. 113) she is not forwarding ‘science as a Western imperial project’ (p. 116) – but seeking rather ‘to redesign, traverse, and complicate the body politic’ through using ‘alternate visions of science’ to ‘demonstrate that hybridity and heterogeneity are necessary elements for understanding the nature of the individual and the individual’s connection to the larger world’ (p. 116). The contemporary biological turn – with its rejection of Darwinist conceptions of ‘survival of the fittest’ and imaginaries of the ‘tree of life’ with separate and distinct lines of evolution – here provides a powerful critique of liberal imaginaries of security and development, with the underlying deterministic telos of hierarchy, competition and progress. The ideas of the contemporary life sciences – which are rewriting nature as creative and interactive rather than as passive and determined and emphasise hybridity, transference across species boundaries, symbiosis and sympoietic becoming – would seem a vital source of inspiration for alternative political imaginaries. The second book under review, Deepika Bahri’s Postcolonial Biology, engages the biopolitical moment from the angle of rereading and deconstructing embodied themes of transformation, hybridity and transference across racialized boundaries in postcolonial literature. It is productive to read her book alongside Fishel’s as Bahri both complicates and reinforces the points made above regarding the political and conceptual productivity of biologically-informed political imaginaries. Bahri states from the outset that her book ‘claims biology as a valid – indeed a crucial – area of interest for critical postcolonial studies’ as ‘[T]he socio-political challenges of the twenty-first century require us to look beyond biologically deterministic conceptions of racialized difference to porous, pliable, and plastic bodies and psyches as critically embattled zones of conflict in the wake of imperial modernity’ (p. viii). Bahri’s point is that the blurring of the nature/culture divide and the view of life as hybrid, processual, disruptive and transformative – rather than differentiated, deterministic and static – is not simply the preserve of contemporary posthumanist theorists but was already present in colonial discourses of governance with the ‘implicitly reincarnative politics of the so-called civilizing mission in imperial modernity’ (p. 2). Whilst it is easy to cast modernity as hegemonised by a Darwinian ‘racist science’ which ‘assumed that genetics locked in differences between races’, the colonial gaze, in fact, ‘implied an as-yet scientifically unverified but implicit belief in human bioplasticity and aesthetic reformation’ (p. 3). Ideas of distinct bounded bio-social political communities – or bodies politic – ‘were complicated by imperial designs on impressionable, plastic body-minds at the level of ideology as well as the micromanagement of the subject’s bio-physiology’ (p. 3). For Bahri, today’s new materialist or posthuman ontologies of human and non-human entanglement of nature and culture can be read as already implicit in, and also as a response to, colonial discourses of civilizing mission (p. 3). Bahri highlights that Darwinian perspectives, with their implied lines of genetic determination, were not as dominant in the early twentieth century social sciences as socio-biological discourses of indeterminism, with Lamarckian views of acquired characteristics the bridge between culture and race (p. 152 n. 25). Colonial and postcolonial views of the bio-social thus become an ‘instructive precursor to the nexus of capital, corporation, and the biopolitics of hybridity in the global present’ (p. 5). While old biological determinism produced ‘bad science and even worse politics’ (p. 6), the construction of the body as ‘pliant, bio-mentally plastic and permeable’, for Bahri, ‘is a battlefield no less worthy of our urgent attention’ (p. 6). Thus the contemporary revisiting of the biopolitical – Biopolitics 2.0 – is perhaps more usefully understood as a struggle waged on the grounds of a Lamarckian creationism, where bottom-up ‘bio-cultural hope’ stands as an open and creative counter to top-down views of the manipulation of hybrid becomings, central to the colonial mission. Bahri examines how colonial discourses operated not on a strict separation between biology and culture, but rather on the construction of a sliding scale interconnecting nature and culture, which imbricated both the life sciences and the humanities, constructing them as distinct and yet flexibly co-constitutive disciplines. It was this continuum that enabled ideas of racial distinction and genetic determination to easily morph back and forth with ideas of social, cultural and environmental hybridity and transformation. The colonial civilizing mission inevitably overlaid views of fixed genetic distinctions and determinations with bio-social discourses of epigenetic transformation, which blurred the distinction between culture and nature, enabling colonial hierarchies to be constructed and played out through transformative imaginaries that biologized cultural attributes. Bahri draws out well how these colonial discourses exposed the ‘weak link’ of modernist or Enlightenment thought, in politicizing the biological as the keystone of Otherness. In the bio-social construction of the Other as inferior there is the implication that the outside is always already present on the inside, as more real or ‘authentic’. Thus, in her citing of Fanon, for the colonial mind, it is always the Other who is the ‘bringer of biology’ or the one who ‘symbolizes the biological’ (p. 29). Bahri’s book engages with three novels, all of which deal with postcolonial framings of hybrid becoming: Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children; Hari Kunzru’s The Impressionist; and Julian Barnes’ Unofficial Englishmen, Arthur and George. The key characters in these novels all aspire to becoming other, confronting postcolonial biology through discourses of culture and aesthetics with the body as the site or battleground of bio-cultural adaptive transformation. It is the ‘biological body, its sounds, odours, excretions, urges, emissions, and expressions’ upon which the ‘civilizational project’ is expressed and measured (p. 11). Culture and nature are conflated at the same time as they are constructed as two poles of the human and the non-human. The key point being made is that the politics of race is an epiphenomenon of a deeper and more essential aspect of modernist and Enlightenment thought, the distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, which overcodes racial and colonial discourses of ‘civilization’ and today’s ‘developmental aesthetics’ (p. 135). Bahri’s work is also useful to understand today’s import of the contemporary life sciences into radical political imaginaries, as she seeks to draw from the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, who maintained the colonial ‘sliding scale’ but used this to critique the empty and ‘hollowed subject’ of the bourgeois rationalist Enlightenment (p. 31). The continuum and interplay between the biological and the socio-cultural-political was maintained, but the radical goal was to return to an awareness of the interdependencies, interconnections and entanglements of the ‘biological’. While the colonial civilizing mission sought to develop a bio-social science of transformation and hybridity to enable ‘becoming modern’ or ‘becoming liberal’, the radical response was to flag up the artifice and hubris of modernity’s attempt to repress or erase our entangled biological being. Thus for Biopolitics 2.0, with a more affirmative framing of nature and the biological, the weak link – exposed by the colonial discourse of ‘civilizing mission’ and blurring of the biological and cultural – can be turned against the advocates of the modernist episteme. Having understood the inherently oppressive logic of ‘instrumental rationality’ and the human/non-human, nature/culture hierarchical divides, the way is then clear for the return of biology as an alternative way of conceiving ‘life’ without modernist/colonial binaries and bifurcations (p. 142). Thus it is possible for the colonial discourses of plasticity with their ‘vague sociobiological indeterminism’ (p. 152 n. 25) to become repurposed for imagining creative and open alternative futures. The underlying stakes in biologically-inflected discourses of transformative and hybrid becoming were inevitably imbricated within universalist and modernist paradigms of development and progress. This is still the case today, except that the idea of the ‘sliding scale’ of civilization is transposed. In the Anthropocene, ideas of the superiority of the ‘human’ over the ‘nonhuman’ or of ‘culture’ over ‘nature’ or of ‘civilized’ over ‘indigenous’ have lost their credence. It is little surprise that the crisis of modernity has enabled the inversion of hegemonic, modernising and colonial frames of transformation. This fundamental shift, nurturing a new and affirmative assessment of the life that was previously repressed or excluded is well reflected in the two books reviewed here. Whereas Foucauldian-informed biopolitical critique railed against the reduction of the human to ‘bare life’, or of political life to biological existence, Biopolitics 2.0 inverses the assumptions, seeking to reinvest ‘mere life’ with meaningfulness and value: even life in its smallest and simplest microbial forms can make the human look insignificant and facilitate more creative political imaginaries.

### AT: L – Bioweapons

#### Securitization of bioweapons attacks doesn’t result in militarization, only effective preparedness and response

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The Threat of Biological Weapons: A Justification of Biological Weapons Securitization 1. Introduction In 2001, when attacks were carried out in the United States involving Bacillus anthracis, the bacterial agent that causes anthrax, the threat of biological weapons came into sharper focus for the American government. These attacks were not the beginning of the biological weapons threat, but rather a point along a continuum of increasing risk. Article 1 of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention defines biological weapons to include the “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes” as well as the “weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict”1. The use of biological weapons dates back centuries, but the fear of biological weapons of mass destruction, here defined as weapons that pose an existential threat to the target, is relatively recent2. Much of it is attributable to the rapid advances made in the biological sciences over the past decade, particularly with respect to the field of genomics, where there is a growing ability to manipulate genes3. This knowledge has a variety of applications in the field of bioweapons. Additionally, while states use of biological weapons was a concern through much of the 20th century, the possibility that rogue states or non-state groups would use biological weapons was largely ignored until the start of the 21st century1. Therefore, the threat of biological weapons has been framed as a security issue4. This essay examines whether, and to what degree, the threat of a biological weapons attack has been overstated with respect to the government’s response by drawing on securitization theory, which critically evaluates the process through which an issue comes to be viewed through a security framework. In addition, the essay will also use the precautionary principle, described by the 1998 Wingspread Statement as the notion that “when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically”5. Though more often applied to considerations of environmental risk, in the case of biological weapons, the principle could be used to justify caution even in the absence of consensus surrounding the probability of an attack, simply due to the severity of the consequences if an attack was to occur. It will be argued that the biological weapons threat has not been overestimated and that the biodefense measures expressed in current policy and funding decisions are warranted. Despite measures such as likelihood-adjusted mortality, which may suggest the U.S. government response is an overreaction, other characteristics of the bioweapons threat justify its securitization and resulting prioritization in the government agenda. To do this, the essay provides a discussion of how the potential consequences of an attack pose an existential threat to the United States, how there is an inadequate degree of preparedness for such an event, how the mere possibility of an attack is enough to warrant high spending on preventive and preparative programs, and how the response has been appropriately measured given the threat. The focus will be on the United States government because it has taken such a prominent role in bioweapon securitization and biodefense funding. A single country, the US, was chosen as a point of focus to avoid confusion due to differing levels of threat and response across countries. Additionally, any exaggerations that may exist in how the media or the public portray and view the biological weapons threat will be ignored; though this could be related to the government’s decision to securitize bioweapons, this is a separate issue from government policy decisions in response to the security threat and is outside the scope of this paper. 2. Securitization Theory and Biological Weapons Securitization theory is a constructivist approach informing how certain issues become framed through a security lens6. It offers a useful analytical framework for understanding how, why, and what issues come to be viewed as security threats. Securitization is an active process wherein a securitizing actor, in this case the American government, presents and addresses an issue as an existential threat to a particular group, or referent object7. In these situations, emergency response measures and extensive resource commitments are considered justified7. Securitization theory generally promotes desecuritization as preferable because it avoids the negative consequences of securitization, including a heavy-handed state response, reduced democratic accountability, and the narrowing of public choice8. However, it also recognizes that securitization is sometimes appropriate. Recent considerations of securitization theory identify three criteria that, if fulfilled, justify securitization: an objective, existential threat, a referent object whose protection promotes human well-being, and a response appropriately measured to the particular threat6. In the case of bioweapons securitization, the second criterion is less controversial, given that the referent object is human population; thus, any harm to the referent object would directly reduce a human well-being. However, the question of whether securitization of biological weapons meets the other two criteria is more contentious. Skeptics may point to Colin Powell’s 2003 address to the United Nations as a case where the biological weapons security threat may have been exaggerated and securitization was promoted for political ends, thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the securitizing actor, the U.S. government. In his speech, Powell made the case for an invasion of Iraq by claiming Iraq had capabilities to produce biological weapons of mass destruction, including mobile bioweapons labs, a claim that later turned out to be false9. Critics also target the policies resulting from securitization, arguing that the capacity of aggressors to carry out large scale attacks causing mortality has been overestimated, calling into question whether an existential threat truly exists and whether the response has been appropriately measured10. Government funding may be seen as unjustifiably skewed in favour of biodefense, defined as the capacity to respond to a biological weapons attack, to the neglect of other key areas, such as endemic and pandemic diseases. For instance, Klotz calculated what is referred as the “likelihood-adjusted mortality” for biological weapons, pandemic diseases, and endemic diseases by multiplying the probability of occurrence by an estimate of mortality were an event to occur11. By comparing these values with government funding allocated to each category, he demonstrated that biodefense receives more funding than its likelihood-adjusted mortality estimate would suggest is warranted11. However, objections have been raised to this argument. Supporters of biodefense prioritization point to the fact that focusing solely on potential fatalities ignores other issues, such as the negative social and economic fallout from an attack12. Additionally, they point to the possibility that it is more expensive to combat intentional threats, where there will be an explicit effort to circumvent current practices by exploiting weaknesses12. It should also be considered that the probability of one attack is not independent from another, and that an increasing probability of success may elicit more attempts12. To follow will be an examination of whether government spending and policies constitute a justified response to the threat of biological weapons. Securitization is relevant in that it was a way for decision-makers to implement the policies they want and is justifiable to the extent that the programs themselves are necessary and appropriate. Despite other consequences of securitization, such as public fear, political manipulation, and a heavy-handed response, which may give the impression of an overreaction, the reality is that securitization was a means of enabling the implementation of certain policies and programs necessary to respond to the threat of biological weapons. 3. Consequences of an Attack A government’s decision to securitize an issue is a strategy to make extreme responses seem justified, and it centers on the perceived existential risk a threat poses to the population7. Beginning with a brief history of biological weapons use, this section will aim to defend the framing of biological weapons use as an existential threat by examining their ability to cause mortality or to generate negative social and economic fallout. A brief discussion of the potential catastrophic consequences of a smallpox attack will illustrate the argument. The use of biological weapons dates back centuries. Examples include the Tatars catapulting plague-infected corpses over city walls at the siege of Kaffa in the 14th century, the deliberate triggering of a smallpox epidemic among Native Americans via contaminated blankets in the 18th century during the French and Indian War, and the contamination of salad bars with salmonella at a restaurant in Oregon in the 20th century2. However, with the development of the germ theory during the 19th and into the 20th century, there was an increase in scientific knowledge about biological weapons10. States became increasingly interested in such weapons, with Japan establishing a bioweapons program between 1932-1945, the United States in 1942, and the Soviet Union in 197313. In 1972, in response to increasing concern about the threat of biological weapons, the United Nations proposed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, more commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (or BWC)14. The treaty came into effect in 1975, and banned the development, acquisition, and stockpiling of biological weapons1. However, it failed to halt the research and development of biological weapons, which have continued into the 21st century. Those who argue that government response to the biological weapons threat has been overstated point to very low mortality in previous attacks11. The anthrax attacks of 2001 in the United States, for example, resulted in only 5 deaths15. This argument could be used to urge governments to instead invest resources in areas that consistently cause higher mortality, such as infectious diseases like AIDS or even the seasonal flu. However, in carrying out a threat assessment, it is also important to look at the potential for mortality. Here it has been suggested future attacks may not be on the same relatively small scale as those in the past15. It is difficult to produce reliable estimates of fatalities that might result from an attack; there is huge variation in estimates and, often, little statistical evidence to support the predictions11. That said, it is agreed that, in theory, even small amounts of a dangerous biological agent could cause significant mortality if prepared and disseminated effectively16. For instance, the WHO estimates that 50kg of B. anthracis distributed upwind of a population of 500 000 would leave 95 000 people dead and 125 000 more incapacitated17. Other sources suggest that 100kg of B. anthracis, disseminated via a crop-sprayer, could kill as many as three million people, and comparable values have been projected for other agents2,18. Another concern is that a contagious biological agent will result in person-to-person transmission, creating a self-sustaining effect not present in any other weapons class10. While mass casualties are possible, it is also important to note that, even in situations with few casualties, biological weapons attacks may have profound social and economic ramifications3. Such attacks could lead to widespread social panic and disorder, resulting in self-destructive behaviour and creating what is called a “societal autoimmune effect” involving increases in crime and looting19. While there is little evidence to predict this would occur based on previous disaster situations (such as the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001, where the public reaction is described as effective and adaptive, rather than panicked and disruptive), it must remain a consideration20. The effects of a largescale attack involving biological weapons are unknown, and epidemics of highly fatal diseases may cause serious social disruption20. The economic consequences of biological weapons attacks are severe and suggest that investing in defense makes good economic sense. While there were only five deaths in the 2001 anthrax attacks, those attacks resulted in tens of billions of dollars in government spending21. Also, the financial sector may be negatively impacted if investor confidence plummets3. Similarly, an attack on the agricultural sector, which accounts for 15% of the United States GDP, could have severe economic ramifications3. If the biological agent being used is contagious, there could also be implications for trade and travel restrictions3. The SARS epidemic of 2003 showed the economic consequences of a highly infectious disease, essentially “crippling” some of the most dynamic cities in the world4. The Center for Biosecurity has estimated the economic cost of a biological weapons attack in the U.S. could exceed one trillion USD15. In short, there are social and economic consequences that, considered in conjunction with the potential for catastrophically high mortality, justify the framing of biological weapons as a significant existential threat to the United States. This is illustrated by considering the specific case of smallpox. The Variola virus, which causes smallpox, is an example of an agent that, if weaponized and used in an attack, would pose a serious existential threat to the United States22. It is highly contagious; in a 1972 outbreak in Yugoslavia, even with routine vaccinations, which are no longer carried out, the disease spread rapidly, with each affected individual infecting 11 to 13 others23. It is also lethal, with a 30% fatality rate1. Human populations are highly susceptible because, since eradication, vaccinations have not been given for 20 years24. Other features make smallpox an appealing option for bioterrorism: it has no treatment once symptoms occur; it would not be detected for 7-17 days; it is physically disfiguring; and the virus is stable in aerosol form1,24. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of smallpox is that those infected are contagious before symptoms appear. Simulations have been carried out, including a 1999 exercise by the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at Johns Hopkins University, where a terrorist release of Variola virus grew into a global outbreak, which the health and emergency response system was unable to control22. Here it could be suggested that prevention efforts promoted by securitization are the only option, given the apparent inability to contain a global outbreak after an attack has occurred. While the dangers posed by the Variola virus are not contested, skeptics argue that it is too difficult to acquire to be a real danger10. However, there is significant concern over unaccounted Soviet Union smallpox samples, and a 1999 U.S. report pointed to evidence that secret stockpiles of the virus are held by North Korea, Russia, and Iraq1,25. It has also been suggested that the terrorist organization Aum Shinrikyo holds quantities of the Variola virus22. Threat and risk assessments should not rely solely on the worst-case scenarios of biological weapons attacks, especially since practical challenges still limit terrorists’ ability to conduct attacks that will have the greatest possible effect. However, it is equally crucial to be aware of the wide range of consequences of such an attack. This section has argued that there could be serious ramifications on several dimensions, ramifications which justify the framing of biological weapons as an existential threat to the United States and warrant investment in an appropriate response capacity. Securitization, therefore, played an important role encouraging policy responses that were justified and appropriate. 4. Preparedness for an Attack This section will examine the capacity of the United States to mitigate the consequences of an attack, a primary aim of biodefense. For government action to be justified, the response must be appropriate to the given threat level. The argument will be that this is the case with biodefense programs, which must seek to address key weaknesses in the preparedness system. There is a general consensus that the United States has insufficient capabilities to respond effectively to a biological weapons attack3. Three primary components of preparedness will be addressed: the ability to detect an attack, the preparedness of the health care and emergency response system to respond, and the medical countermeasures that currently exist. It will be shown that there are important deficiencies in all three of these areas, further suggesting that programs aimed at developing a more appropriate response capacity are not overestimating the threat but are both justified and necessary. Biological weapons are a unique class from conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons because their effects may not be felt immediately26. It could take days before it becomes apparent that an attack has taken place; this is problematic as immediate treatment may be crucial to survival27. Oral antibiotics for inhalational anthrax, for example, should be administered within 48 hours of exposure, which leaves little time for detection and delivery1. Any delay in detection could result in a large number of casualties. Additionally, if the weapon agent is contagious, failure to detect and respond the attack may result in a greater spread of the infection. For this reason, adequate detection capabilities are essential to bioterrorism preparedness. Unfortunately, while funding for biodefense has led to improvements, such as biosurveillance systems that seek information on disease outbreaks, there are still weaknesses in the system15. The systems are still quite rudimentary, relying on a time-consuming process of clinician reporting, laboratory diagnostics, and the phoning, mailing, or faxing of reports15. To improve, biosurveillance must be modernized. We need more effective electronic reporting, quick, cheap, and reliable diagnostic tests, and the integration of public health surveillance data with that from other sectors such as law and intelligence agencies26. Currently, however, detection systems are not able to detect biological agents at relatively low concentrations, or to detect multiple biological agents with a single system, and they are not sufficiently portable and user-friendly26. Detection ability is further compromised by poor diagnostic capabilities in hospitals. One U.S. study found that 91.2% of U.S. hospitals surveyed lacked the necessary diagnostic technology to analyze and identify biological agents28. Hospitals have been targeted as the weakest link in the preparedness chain, in particular due to their inability to accommodate a sudden influx of mass casualties29. It has been found that 60% of hospitals lack such resources as the supplies, equipment, beds, and staff to respond to a mass casualty situation28. Consequently, hospitals lack the surge capacity to attend to patients; this could be disastrous in terms of victims not receiving life-saving treatment, the failure to quarantine infectious individuals, and the possibility of social disorder as a result of public frustration. The problem is that hospitals need far greater resources to respond to a bioterrorist attack than they do for everyday functioning30. Practice scenarios have demonstrated this resource shortage problem on more than one occasion. A simulated attack on a U.S. city that involved the pneumonic plague resulted in antibiotic shortages after just three days; the situation worsened until, at the end of the weeklong simulation, 3700 cases of plague had been identified and 2000 “deaths” had been reported31. Also of concern is the overall inadequacy of medical countermeasures for biological weapons, identified as one of the areas in greatest need of attention15. Of the twelve biological agents identified as posing the highest threat to the United States, only anthrax, smallpox, and botulism receive substantial funding for medical countermeasure development and acquisition15. One reason for this is that pharmaceutical companies are not as motivated to fund research and development addressing biological weapons since there is not as great a commercial market as there is for chronic diseases and influenza15. Even such practices as decontamination require funding and improvement. The decontamination procedures for B. anthracis, previously used in the 2001 anthrax attacks, while effective, were also slow and expensive, and could not be replicated in a situation with mass casualties15. In the discussion above, it was argued that high government funding is not overestimated but is appropriate and justified to implement biodefense initiatives required to improve response capacity. This was done by demonstrating that the United States is ill-equipped to deal with a significant biological weapons attack, and that this lack of preparedness risks further exacerbating the already potentially catastrophic consequences of a biological weapons attack. Securitization was useful in helping justify prioritizing funding to address this issue. 5. Probability of an Attack The potentially disastrous consequences of an attack and the lack of preparedness for such an event have been demonstrated, but perhaps none of that would matter (or justify prioritizing biodefense) if the probability of an attack by states or terrorists was negligible, due to an absence of capacity or will to carry out a biological weapons attack on the United States. This section will consider the likelihood of a biological weapons attack in the United States by states or terrorist groups. This issue is hotly contested, with some groups arguing that the chances of an attack are much lower than popular fears and perceptions would suggest, while others, like CIA Director Gross, believe it is “only a matter of time”, and predict another biological weapons attack on the United States before 202028,32. As noted earlier, this essay’s focus is not on whether media rhetoric is inflated or public perceptions unrealistic. Rather, it will be argued that the increasing availability of biological weapons and the documented intent of various hostile groups to acquire such weapons make an attack more likely. This is where we see the relevance of the precautionary principle, as an uncertainty surrounding the probability of an attack encourages us to adopt the principle, promoting caution where funding is allocated in light of the dire consequences that may arise were an attack to occur. Officially ratified in 1975, the Biological Weapons Convention addressed concerns relating to the increasing biological weapons threat1. While commendable, the convention had important flaws including an absence of any formal verification of compliance by states. For instance, after signing the declaration, the Soviet Union continued to develop their biological weapons program (unbeknownst to the global community)33. Soviet defectors later confirmed the scale of their program, describing a massive, covert operation34. Other countries have also been alleged to have biological weapons programs, including Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria33,35. While Iraq has since claimed that its biological weapons were all destroyed, this has been impossible to verify2. Additionally, with the recent emergence of biotechnology industries in low and middle-income countries, most notably Brazil and India, more states are gaining advanced scientific capacity that could potentially be applied to biological weapons development and production3. The key here is that many states now have the scientific and technological capacity to develop biological weapons, but there is a limited capacity for national states or international organizations to monitor such a process36. In the BWC definition of biological weapons, the primary focus is on intent—both in terms of the purpose of the microbial agent and the delivery system1. Intent is the determining factor in the classification of biological weapons, but this is extremely difficult to measure or prove until after an act has been committed. In the biological sciences, much research is readily applicable to justifiable ends (vaccines), as well as hostile ones (biological weapons). The United States will often accuse other states of hostile intent based solely on the presence of pharmaceutical and biotechnological expertise necessary for biological weapons development35. This can be viewed as an area of overreaction to the bioweapons threat, illustrating how securitization processes seem to legitimize some bad policy responses as well as good ones. Despite the fact that most states could use this expertise to develop biological weapons, the majority does not. This suggests that, while capacity is present, the intent to use biological weapons is limited. In fact, over the past century, there is only one confirmed case of a biological weapons attack by one state on another: Japan’s striking against China in the 1930s and 1940s1. It has been suggested that reasons for this may stem from fear of retaliation or the difficulties of controlling effects on civilians and combatants1. Most countries possessing biological weapons claim their purpose is to deter attacks or biological weapons use by others35. In the past, the prospect of terrorists using biological weapons received little attention3. It was generally believed that terrorists would not be able to engineer biological weapons because they lacked access to the necessary biological agents, the technological capabilities, and the specialized knowledge to weaponize and disseminate a biological weapon10. Skeptics still believe that the advanced genetic capabilities required to produce biological weapons will not be available to terrorists in the near future3. For instance, the ability to process a biological agent into aerosol form, the most effective delivery method, requires expertise across a wide range of scientific disciplines32. Also suspect is their ability to account for environmental and meteorological conditions that may disrupt weapon dissemination10, 32. However, a changing global and scientific landscape has led to a greater potential for the acquisition of biological weapons capacity by terrorist groups. For instance, during the Cold War, the Soviets reportedly employed approximately 55, 000 scientists and technicians at 6 biological weapons research labs and 5 production facilities37. Among other things, smallpox was weaponized into ballistic missiles and bombs38. In 1997, the United States conducted a visit to one of these research labs to find that the facility was half empty, poorly guarded, and that most of the scientists had left39. It is, therefore, possible that the biological agents, the equipment, and the human knowledge and expertise have since fallen into the hands of rogue states or terrorist organizations. Additionally, methods of biological weapons production are now freely accessible via the Internet, and the technological requirements are not beyond the means of a determined, well-funded terrorist organization2. Moreover, recent scientific advances may support biological weapons production by enabling the production of a higher yield of high-quality product36. They may also support more effective weaponization, by making agents more resistant to environmental hazards or by making agents targetable against specific biochemical pathways36. As these capabilities spread across the globe, there will be a greater potential for terrorists to harness and use these techniques. While the capabilities of terrorists to engineer biological weapons may have been overstated in the past, this can no longer be said to be the case. It has been argued that two of the preconditions for assessing the threat of bioterrorism, vulnerability to an attack and terrorist capability, are in place; the only remaining consideration is intent40. It is important to determine whether the intent to acquire and use such weapons is present among terrorist groups. While terrorist groups have not often used biological weapons, it is unclear whether this is due to insufficient capabilities or lack of intent1. There are a variety of reasons why they may not be interested in the use of biological weapons, including viewing such weapons as illegitimate in military combat, risks of tactical failure, perceptions of high technical difficulty, and concerns about the indiscriminate nature of a biological weapons attack3. That said, various terrorist groups, including Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda, have a documented interest in the acquisition of biological weapons, and with advances in biotechnology and weaponization, their use may become more attractive2, 41. Experts also point to a shift in terrorist intent: “post-modern” terrorism aims to inflict the highest mortality rather than make political statements through violence33. This makes biological weapons an attractive option for such groups; one estimate suggests that the cost to cause civilian casualties is only one dollar per square kilometer for biological weapons, compared to 800 and 2000 dollars per square kilometer for nuclear and conventional weapons, respectively42. In a similar vein, the recent “war on terror” has created an increasingly decentralized terrorist threat; biological weapons are particularly well-suited to this form of smaller, more informed terrorist groups28. In short, while the intent to use biological weapons has been documented in terrorist groups in the past, present circumstances may make the acquisition and use of biological weapons more attractive. To conclude, it is difficult to either predict or prevent a bioterrorism attack, which makes any assessment of attack probability, by necessity, subject to a high degree of estimation. However, due to the potential severity of consequences of an attack, the precautionary principle justifies the government decision to allocate spending according to the severity of consequences, recognizing a situation where it is better to overestimate than to underestimate the probability of an attack. As argued by Michael Moodie of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, “The odds (of bioterrorism) are increasing…we have to walk a fine line between hyping the risk…and trying to convince people that it is a possibility for which we need to invest resources”2. 6. Biodefense Funding The essay’s previous sections have argued that a biological weapons attack would pose an existential threat to the United States, that there is an inadequate capacity to respond to such an event, and that the possibility exists for such an attack to occur. This would suggest that a substantial amount of government funding should be allocated towards addressing this threat. The decision to securitize bioweapons facilitated this process. Critics who believe the threat has been overstated often argue that the government should not invest so heavily in biodefense, but instead, improve other sectors, such as reducing mortality from endemic disease11. Meanwhile, proponents may argue that a securitized issue should receive more funding than issues that are not framed as an existential threat4. This section will argue that the response, in terms of government spending, is justified in that it seeks to protect the public and has not exaggerated the threat of bioterrorism. This will be demonstrated by examining the degree of investment in biodefense, showing that a relatively small amount is allocated specifically to biodefense. In 2000, the United States federal budget proposed that 10 billion USD be allocated to counterterrorism programs, an increase of 3.3 billion dollars from the previous year10. This covered all forms of terrorism, but there was a greater focus on biological terrorism than in the past, with spending on medical countermeasures and defense measures increasing fourfold from 91 million USD in 1998 to 336.6 million in 20002. These trends intensified after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent “Amerithrax” scare. While estimates vary, the consensus is that, since 2001, the United States government has invested between 50 and 100 billion USD towards research and development in response to the perceived threat of a biological weapons attack43. One calculation posited that the U.S. allocated 54.39 billion USD to civilian biodefense programs between 2001 and 201044. This did not include allocations to Bioshield, a program designed to address the lack of adequate medical countermeasures for terrorist attacks; 8.7 billion USD has been allocated since 200445. However, of civilian biodefense funding, 42.57 of the 54.39 billion USD was directed towards programs with multiple goals beyond biodefense improvement, such as basic infectious disease research, programs to improve public health planning and operations, and improving preparedness for a range of disasters44. One example is the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Hospital Preparedness Program, which seeks to improve surge capacity in healthcare facilities44. Some estimates suggest that up to 92% of biodefense funding has been directed to programs that serve secondary purposes, such as improving preparedness for disease pandemics and natural disasters15. One could argue that the amounts dedicated to biodefense as a percentage of entire budgets are not very substantial given the existential threat posed by an attack. The DHHS, the largest recipient of federal biodefense funding, has a budget of 879 billion USD, of which biodefense made up only 0.5%44. Similarly, biodefense makes up less than 1% of the Department of Homeland Security budget, and only 0.10% of the Department of Defense Budget44. Accordingly, it could be argued that the bioweapons threat does not, in fact, take as high a priority in terms of government funding as one might expect, given the associated security risk. Additionally, almost all of the increases in investments have arisen from new funding; other sectors are not suffering at the expense of biodefense prioritization12. High funding is appropriate independent of any controversy relating to estimates of attack probability, as the precautionary principle would suggest that decisive action is warranted given the potential for dire consequences, even with a low probability of the event occurring. These figures show that the funding response is not an overreaction but has been justified and appropriate given the documented threat of biological weapons, targeting programs that are likely to protect the public. 7. Conclusion The anthrax attacks of 2001 are a case where biological weapons were used against the United States in the absence of any direct provocation. Since then, though the issue is controversial, biological weapons have been considered an important threat to U.S. security. This essay has defended the securitization of the biological weapons threat as a means to an end. It is a process to engage in where it is necessary to get approval for policies that are, in themselves, necessary and justified. By analyzing the existential threat posed by bioweapons, the lack of preparedness by the United States for such an event, and the possibility of an attack, evidence presented in this essay suggests that these policies and the overall government response were appropriate. Taking these issues into account, the essay concluded that the threat of bioterrorism has not been overestimated; it warrants securitization and the resulting response measures. Moving forward now, government must recognize and respond to the reality of an increasing bioterrorism threat.

### AT: L – China

#### China threat discourse doesn’t cause war – BUT the ALT does

Hagstrom 14 – PhD, Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (Linus, “East Asia's Power Shift: The Flaws and Hazards of the Debate and How to Avoid Them,” Asian Perspective, 38.3)

Pan argues that the "China threat discourse" is "always intrin- sically linked to how US policymakers/mainstream China special- ists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example)" (2004, 306). Hagström demonstrates how the discourse on Japan's "abnormality" and "weakness" reproduces a standard of "normality" in world politics that is centered on the ability to go to war. Postwar Japan is socially constructed as deviant from this norm and thus as a threat to itself. This discourse, which emerges in both Japanese and Western academia and in Japanese political debate, legitimizes a road map for a more "realistic," "active," "responsible," and "nor- mal" Japan (Hagström 2014).∂ The power of the power-shift discourse does not stop at the production of identities and standards. The point is that identities and standards produce effects. Pan illustrates this by showing how the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996 was often understood as "further objective proof of the long-suspected 'China threat,'" but few acknowledged that "the 'China threat' discourse itself had played a constitutive role in the lead-up to that crisis" (2004, 323, 320). Moreover, standards in Japan's "normalization" discourse have enabled Realpolitik changes in its foreign security policy. Chinese vigilance vis-à-vis Japan and the United States might also be interpreted as discursive phenomena-the theme of national reinvigoration is a product of the lingering notion that China has been continually humiliated and victimized by the great powers since the nineteenth century. As these examples illustrate, the ulti- mate power of discourse is the production of self-fulfilling prophecies. When self-fulfilling prophecies occur on both sides of a dyad, we might end up with a socially generated security dilemma (Johnston 2004).∂ Much research has warned of self-fulfilling prophecies in the East Asian context. Some observers suggest that US or Japanese discourses about China might produce policies of containment, Japanese "normalization" and "remilitarization," and US "rebal- ancing" toward East Asia (Pan 2004; 2012; Hagström 2012; Turner 2014a; 2014b). Nonetheless, Japan and the United States have not yet embarked on containing China. Instead, both countries have on the whole accommodated China's rise (Christensen 2006; Jerdén and Hagström 2012). In a similar manner, perceived increases in bellicose or nationalistic representations in Chinese discourses led some observers to jump to the mistaken conclusion that this had already resulted in a more assertive Chinese foreign policy (Jerdén 2014). As important as it is to remain vigilant against the emergence of socially constructed security dilemmas, we need to bear in mind that there is no deterministic connection between discourse and policy-just an enabling one. Dominant discourses create propensities for action but do not make any action inevitable. More empirically informed theorizing is needed to address the questions of how, when, and why discourses make some actions politically conceivable, easy to communicate, and sometimes even coercive (Holland 2013).∂ Reflecting on the possible power exercised through the alter- native approaches introduced in this special issue is also neces- sary. In this article we raise analytical and normative concerns about the ideas of a more "powerful" and "threatening" China, a "weak" Japan, and a "declining" United States. We argue that such representations risk offsetting balancing policies and a secu- rity dilemma in East Asia, in line with the self-fulfilling prophecy logic discussed above. These arguments clearly belong to another site of discursive power production. That we have not seen any obvious balancing policies in East Asia thus far might arguably be interpreted as one of its effects.∂ In fact, our critique of the power-shift debate might itself be criticized as denying or playing down Chinese power, which could have two effects: (1) China appears less powerful and thus less threatening, which allows it to arm itself with impunity and behave aggressively; and (2) the Chinese government can ignore calls to take on more international responsibilities with reference to the limited scope of its power. As William Callahan points out, attempts to counter the "China threat theory" within China often "refute 'Chinese' threats as a way of facilitating the pro- duction of an American threat, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on" (2005, 711). Adopting a nonintentional power con- cept allows us to see how even critical scholars, inside and out- side China, who profess no interest in exaggerating threats against China but rather "seek to deconstruct the discourse of 'threat,'" might play a role in accelerating this process (Callahan 2005, 711). In other words, intentional attempts to prevent the emergence of a self-fulfilling prophecy may actually play an unintentional part in creating one.

### AT: L – Cybersecurity

#### No impact to securitizing cyber threats

Gomez 21 Miguel Alberto Gomez, Senior Researcher with the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, PhD candidate at the University of Hildesheim, Germany; and Christopher Whyte, PhD, Assistant Professor in the program on Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness at Virginia Commonwealth University’s L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs; “Breaking the Myth of Cyber Doom: Securitization and Normalization of Novel Threats,” International Studies Quarterly, 5-15-2021, DOI 10.1093/isq/sqab034 /GoGreen!

According to some, advancements in technological and organizational capabilities among capable state and stateaffiliated actors over the past decade increase the likelihood that offensive cyber operations (OCOs) might soon produce destructive physical effects (Saltzman 2013; Healey 2016). Expectations of real-world damage inflicted through cyberspace reinforce the “cyber doom” narrative that digital insecurity might result in a massive failure of social and economic processes across societies dependent on new information technologies and that dread of such failure permeates public perspectives on cyber issues (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009).

For those who study public opinion surrounding foreign policymaking, the “cyber doom” type of narrative is not especially uncommon. Environmental circumstances of sufficient visibility and meaning, such as the trauma-inducing experiences of 9/11 or the Cold War, often take on life of their own and affect opinion formation independent of an individuals’ priors or the cues of elites. Oddly, however, the oft-referenced notion of “cyber doom” appears paradoxical, even despite the link some scholars make between OCOs and physical effects.

Presently, conflict in cyberspace is characterized by persistent-yet-limited effects and a condition of apparent restraint exercised by cyber-capable actors (Maness and Valeriano 2016; Fischerkeller and Harknett 2018a). Moreover, the unabated integration of vulnerable information systems across all aspects of modern societies raises the question of whether or not a sense of dread associated with the exploitation of cyberspace is as severe as commonly portrayed (Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting 2017). Most damningly, the idea that “cyber doom” is most visible in Western national experiences as a fear appeal employed by politicians to galvanize support for policy in no way explains these curious logical shortcomings.

At the heart of the “cyber doom” narrative is the assumption that information about cyberattacks released to the public—particularly information about sophisticated cyber operations of foreign countries and organized crime1— produces anxiety about the digital health and security of a person. Ironically, this assumed relationship between cyber operations, their portrayal in public-facing media, and individual impact is often discussed in unclear terms by scholars than is the determining role of techno-strategic conditions.

Despite the recent turn by some to consider the societal impact of OCOs (Lin and Kerr 2017; Lindsay 2020; Whyte 2020), most research on cyber conflict continues to emphasize logic-of-the-domain explanations for the behavior of cyber-capable actors.2 This makes a certain sense because the domain is human-made and malleable. However, it is also puzzling given the scope of cyberspace and the degree to which digital action impacts both private industry and civil society across numerous levels. Though the mechanisms of interaction may be less precise than is the case with other forms of state power, the literature on public opinion, morale, and psychology in foreign policymaking tells us that popular perceptions of threat are shaped by a host of factors that then impact the formulation and implementation of state security policy.

In this article, we take aim at the “cyber doom” narrative logic as an initial step toward clarifying the relationship between cyber conflict, its portrayal, and public thinking about digital insecurity. Consequently, we align with critics of the narrative itself but argue that such criticisms make overly simplistic assumptions about public opinion and national security that do little to enrich and undergird evolving cyber conflict research. The logic of the core argument about digital disaster aside, the broader “cyber doom” argument— i.e., that the rhetorical and cognitive prospect of doom has some effect on a population—is undertheorized and understudied. This point is particularly important because scholarship aimed at explaining the sources of state public policy on cyberspace makes the curious misstep of holding domestic population preferences constant while focusing on third image determinants of strategy development. Authors argue that publics cyclically react with some fear to emergent threats and that, therefore, public policy is best explained by the incidence of cyber conflict or steps taken by state peers. Given that such assumptions are clearly far from safe on the merits, this article aims to ascertain whether or not negativity among the general public associated with malicious behavior in cyberspace is as salient as broadly claimed. We add evidence to the argument that the “cyber doom” narrative is unrealistic (Lawson 2013) by showing that the assumptions found therein are misleading.

Our study finds that sensitivity to cybersecurity threats is situationally shaped by exposure to negative reporting but that the onset of associated dread is not a given. Instead, it is influenced by expectations of the role of technology in modern society. Respondents dependent on such technologies are not as prone to negative effect as are those who remain not so deeply embedded in the fabric of digital society. Both groups become more sensitive to cybersecurity threats to their person as the information they consume becomes more negative, and this personal concern facilitates a heightened sensitivity to threats to the polity. However, the dread predicted by the “cyber doom” narrative is only weakly predictive of this dynamic and has no effect on the threat sensitivity of those who do not respond emotionally. Finally, in both cases, the link between concern for society is not a clear result of negative information so much as it is the result of initial sensitivity to threats at the personal level.

Consequently, we make two contributions. First, we show that the impact of novel environmental circumstances on individual opinion formation is shaped by issue embeddedness, suggesting that long-term exposure to any invasive development mitigates the affective response it is associated with. Second, we present evidence suggesting nevertheless that the unique characteristics of such a development matter in opinion formation, as sensitivity to digital threats to the polity is clearly premised on personal threat sensitivity.

These findings suggest that not only “cyber doom” is strategically and functionally unrealistic, but the effects of the idea’s securitization are also minimal and prone to diminishment over time. In doing so, they speak to the broad research program on public opinion and audience dynamics in foreign policymaking. More specifically, in line with recent work (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017), our study suggests that citizens are far more capable of responding to threat stimuli absent elite cues. Significantly, our work joins research that locates responsiveness to policy issues in the interaction of cognitive priors and social context with incoming information about new events. Judgment is rarely as linear as the “cyber doom” narrative suggests in its linking of negative reporting, fearful response, and sensitivity to threat inflation. Instead, individuals are conditioned by social circumstances such that even novel threats are incorporated into the horizon of issues the public encounters.

### AT: L – Disease

#### Disease securitization’s good – key to effective cooperation NOT militarization

Davies 17 Sara E. Davies, Griffith University, “Advocating Global Health Security,” *Global Insecurity*, eds. Anthony Burke and Rita Parker, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017, pp.253-272, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1 /GoGreen!

For the last two decades a strategy employed by health professionals, scientists, and diplomats has been to play the ‘health security card’ to achieve particular trade, diplomatic, strategic, and development goals (Elbe 2011). The presumption has been that the securitisation of health will harness global political leadership and resources. This marriage of health issues to security logic has been met with a mix of applause, caution, and critique (Feldbaumet al. 2010; McInnes and Rushton 2013; Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014). But the presumption has remained that, for the most part, the marriage of health issues to security will ‘harness political leadership and resources for various international health issues’ (Elbe 2011: 220). In the last 15 years, there have been three United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions that have specifically referred to health matters – S/Res/1308 (2000), S/Res/1983 (2011), both concerning HIV/AIDs, and S/Res/2177 (2014) in response to the Ebola viral disease outbreak in West Africa. In December 2012, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed resolution A/67/L.36, Global Health and Foreign Policy, the fifth resolution on global health and foreign policy resolution to pass in the UNGA since the adoption of the first resolution on Global Health and Foreign Policy in 2008 (A/63/33). The UNGA also adopted resolution A/69/1 giving support to the measures recommended by UN Secretary-General to contain the Ebola outbreak (A/69/389 2014). The decision of the UNSC to adopt three resolutions on health matters in 15 years and the UNGA sessions on global health and foreign policy have received mixed views. Some point to these events as illustration of the weakness of the global health security narrative (Youde 2014). In particular, it has been noted that the Ebola outbreak in 2014 was initially met with no international capacity outside of the World Health Organization (WHO) to respond to this crisis. The creation of the UN Mission on Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) in September (2014) was the first, and some argue should be the last, effort to respond to a viral outbreak (Panel of independent experts 2015). Others contend that, given that there is no procedure under the UN Charter for the General Assembly or Security Council to examine health matters – let alone develop a mission like UNMEER – broader UN engagement in health beyond the WHO could point to the success of the global health diplomacy (McInnes 2015). The question is what does successful global health diplomacy look like? Do we see in practice the securitisation of health as essential to pursue international diplomatic engagement in global health? There have been recent claims that the successful international engagement in health initiatives such as the Global Fund for AIDS, TB, and Malaria (Global Fund) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been achieved without asserting their necessity ‘primarily on security considerations’ (McInnes and Rushton 2013: 16; see also Sridhar 2012; Gagnon and Labonte 2011). However, the assumption remains that linking health issues, specifically health emergencies and infectious disease outbreaks to security discourse will create more opportunities for diplomatic cooperation and engagement (see Feldbaum et al. 2010; Hafner and Shiffman 2013). This chapter explores this argument beginning with the period where the phrase ‘global health diplomacy’ and ‘global health governance’ began to gain usage in international relations in the 1990s. In the first part of the chapter I briefly present the conceptual history of health security and its relationship to ‘global health diplomacy’. I explore the argument that the success of global health diplomacy has come from the preponderant use of security language, referents, and discourse (cf. Elbe 2011; Feldbaum et al. 2010; Kickbusch et al. 2007; McInnes and Rushton 2013). In the second part of the chapter I examine two cases, one where a type of security logic was deliberately employed to frame the ‘health emergency’ (Framework Convention on Tobacco Control or FCTC) and one where human rights logic was initially deployed when advocating for its creation (the Global Alliance for Vaccine Immunization or GAVI). I evaluate what ‘health security’ looks like in these global health initiatives and explore the presumption that ‘security discourse’ must be present in comparing these two major, successful global health initiatives. HEALTH SECURITY States have a history of formal international agreements addressing health matters and health threats, particularly infectious diseases, from the Decree of Quarantine in Ragusa-Dubrovnik in 1377 (Mackowiak and Sehdev 2002) to the International Sanitary Conference in 1851 (Fidler 2003) and the revised International Health Regulations in 2007 (Davies et al. 2015). However, the treatment of health as a ‘low politics’ priority at the international level remained the case through most of the formative years of nation-building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Fidler 1999). This was in spite of its great strategic benefit for colonial era expansion, winning wars and rapid industrialisation (Diamond 1997). In contemporary politics, a range of actors – such as foreign governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), pharmaceutical companies, private donors, and international organisations – drive a variety of different health agendas that influence priorities within individual states and affect the resources that are available to individual health workers and opportunities for patients (Youde 2012). Likewise, the post–Second World War Bretton Woods system had a profound influence upon health-care policy and practice around the world, with key lending institutions like the World Bank promoting particular health-care systems and policies in their lending programmes (Sridhar 2012). In this period, key discourses such as ‘Health for All’, the Essential Medicines List, and Right to Health emerged in the absence of linkage to security. These discourses brought in a range of actors including international organisations,NGOs and transnational corporations with the power to shape health opportunities and outcomes within and amongst states (Gagnon and Labonté 2011). In the 1990s, however, foreign and defence ministries became increasingly interested in global health policy – particularly infectious diseases – which would be referred to as having a ‘securitising’ effect on health (McInnes and Lee 2006). 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 255 During the 1990s, key events combined with a paradigm shift in International Relations (IR) and security studies (particularly in Western developed countries with the end of the Cold War) (Paris 2001) to connect security to health (Enemark 2007; Collier and Lakoff 2008). Acute awareness was growing amongst Western states that they were not immune to health events such as infectious disease outbreaks. The outbreak and spread of HIV across developing and developed countries during the 1980s; fear of biosecurity attacks with the breakdown of security in laboratories across the former Soviet Union (Koblentz 2010); sudden outbreak of the plague in India in 1995 and the arrival of West Nile virus near New York City in 1999; and the return of ‘slow-burn’ diseases thought eradicated such as Tuberculosis (TB), measles and meningitis in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia (Price- Smith 2002). As well, new strains of disease, such as haemorrhagic dengue fever and drug-resistant malaria were on the rise due to significant climate change impact in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Pacific (Kim and Schneider 2013). Andrew Price-Smith argues that prior to President Clinton’s appointment of the National Science Council on Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases in 1995, developed states had grown complacent to the fact that ‘despite their enormous technological and economic power, it is extremely unlikely that developed countries will be able to remain an island of health in a global sea of disease’ (2002: 122). Clinton’s move created a wave of interest in other developed countries, particularly the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, all shifting to appreciate and contextualise health threats in foreign policy terms (McInnes and Lee 2012: 32). Until then, on the rare occasion that health policy was discussed at the international level it was in relation to (mostly) infectious disease outbreaks such as plague and cholera, or large-scale efforts such as the mass immunisation programme led by WHO to eradicate smallpox. During infectious disease outbreaks, emphasis had been squarely placed on the responsibility of the host state and regardless of the capacity of its public health system to effectively respond (Fidler 1999). Meanwhile, the spread and scale of HIV/AIDS raised fears about its potential to threaten state cohesion and national economies. There was a particular focus on military forces being at risk of HIV infection, and the political insecurity these infectious could bring in societies (Singer 2002; Elbe 2006). The apparent potential for HIV/AIDS to cause state collapse or serious disruption that could ricochet throughout neighbouring states 256 S.E. DAVIES was considered a realistic scenario in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as some parts of South and East Asia and the Pacific (Shisana et al. 2003; Ramiah 2006; Price-Smith et al. 2007). It was specific reference to the threat of HIV/AIDs on peacekeepers that led to the first resolution on health, Resolution 1308, being passed in the UN Security Council in 2000 (UNSC 2000). In response to these developments, a host of analysts, including Solomon Benatar (1998, 2002), Peter W. Singer (2002), Robert Ostergard (2002), called for IR to engage with the economic, humanitarian, political, and security ramifications of the AIDS epidemic. At the same time, David Fidler and Andrew Price-Smith called for equal attention to the economic, political, and social insecurity that stems from a range of infectious diseases already prevalent in countries (Fidler 2003; Price-Smith 2002). Using quantitative analysis of the relationship between infectious diseases and state capacity, Price-Smith claimed that ‘infectious disease [already] constitutes a verifiable threat to national security and state power’ (Price-Smith 2002: 19). Health security, Price-Smith (2002: 9) argued, referred to the threat of the disease on particular populations as well as the country’s economic and political stability becoming unsustainable as a result of a pathogen wiping out the core population base. While a disease may have a different impact in different states: [I]ncreasing levels of disease correlate with a decline in state capacity. As state capacity declines and as pathogen-induced deprivation and increasing demands upon the state increase, we may see an attendant increase in the incidence of chronic sub-state violence and state failure. State failure frequently produces chaos in affected regions as neighbouring states seal their borders to prevent the massive influx of disease-infected refugee populations. Adjacent states may also seek to fill the power vacuum and may seize valued territory from the collapsing state, prompting other proximate states to do the same and so exacerbating regional security dilemmas. (Price-Smith 2002: 15) In a similar vein, David Fidler’s seminal 1999 book International Law and Infectious Diseases argued that with the increased risk of drug-resistant microbes in the twenty first century, as identified by public health officials (Institute of Medicine 1992; Heymann 1996), it will become important to ‘understand the international politics of infectious disease control, or microbialpolitik’ (Fidler 1999: 19). Microbialpolitik, argued Fidler, was ‘wrapped up not only in traditional concerns such as sovereignty and power but also in the implementation of scientifically sound infectious disease policies at the national and international levels’ (ibid.). Both Fidler and Price-Smith argued that the risk of newly emerged infectious diseases and drug-resistant infectious diseases required that all governments engage with the problem as if they were threats to national security. Likewise, Laurie Garrett argued in 2001 that ‘a sound public health system, it seems, is vital to societal stability and, conversely, may topple in the face of political or social stability or whim. Each affects the other: widespread political disorder or anti-governmentalism may weaken a public health system, and a crisis in the health of the citizens can bring down a government’ (Garrett 2001: 5). These ideas continued to influence the global politics of health into the twenty-first century (Fidler 2009; Davies 2012). In a 2010 study on the influence of global health on foreign policy, Feldbaum and his colleagues found that most discussion and policy from diplomatic engagement focused on the interplay of national interests and security, which meant that most diplomacy focus and discussion was on the containment of infectious diseases (Feldbaum et al. 2010: 87). At the time, WHO also immersed itself in the health security argument: Collaboration between Member States, especially between developed and developing countries, to ensure the availability of technical and other resources is a crucial factor not only in implementing the [International Health] Regulations, but also in building and strengthening public health capacity and the networks and systems that strengthen global public health security will. (WHO 2007: 13) Of course, health diplomacy refers to the pursuit of international health cooperation on matters of concern to states (Kickbusch et al. 2007). It is the amalgam of cooperation in areas where there is the possibility of genuine technical cooperation for a diverse range of diseases (Youde 2012: 25). However, because health diplomacy involves the interplay of national interests, power and diplomatic compromise, ‘state interests have been critical to either the success or obstruction of such agreements . . . and issues of national security remain atop the foreign-policy hierarchy’ (Feldbaum et al. 2010: 87). The counter-narrative to the health security discourse described above is that the securitisation of health promotes an instrumental pursuit of health. To capture foreign policy interest and engagement, global health discussions produce a ‘hierarchy of illnesses’ whereby some health issues receive interest and resources whilst other equally deadly health matters do not (Youde 2012: 160). Jeremy Shiffman’s (2006: 411–420) work on the peaks and troughs of investment in global health initiatives has revealed that despite disease burden to a population, some infectious diseases (i.e. HIV/AIDS) consistently attract stronger short-term investment from donor states – primarily those that are contagious or linked to the national security interests of donor states. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the threat of infectious disease alone encapsulated all diplomatic engagement with health issues at the turn of the twenty-first century. The rise of non-traditional security has also been attributed to the increased influence of the introduction of different social science methods and theories to International Security Studies (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 188). This has influenced research into the subject matter of security studies and IR. If insecurity and grievances amongst the population played a large part in the civil wars that gripped the 1990s (Fearon and Laitin 2003), engagement with health is not just a security concern for developed states but also for developing states. In other words, appreciations of health security were not one-dimensional. It was possible to advocate for a vision of health security that sought to protect individuals as much as states. Indeed, a human centred appreciation of security – coined ‘human security’ by the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (see MacFarlane and Khong 2006) – sought to redefine the ‘traditional’ security with issues and concepts under the umbrella term ‘non-traditional’ security, including health (Chalk 2006). Thus, there does appear to be a significant relationship between international health events and the direction of research and policy engagement (Davies 2012). In the last decade, events such as the United Nations Security Resolution on HIV/AIDS (S/Res/1308) and SARS create an explosion of IR engagement with global health governance, particularly in the area of health security. This ‘phenomenon’ has been witnessed again with the Ebola outbreak (Youde 2014). Amongst all these engagements, two key approaches have emerged. First, those who accept the inevitability of a ‘narrow’ approach to health and IR, focused on infectious diseases and bioterrorism as security threats (Koblentz 2012). Alternatively, there are those who articulate a broader vision related to development, state capacity, and cross-national health issues (Shiffman 2006; Nunes 2014; Rushton and Williams 2012). One of the central claims of the former approach is that health securitisation is an effective way of galvanising diplomatic engagement amongst states and other actors, resulting in the allocation of political will and material resources (Collier and Lakoff 2008; Elbe 2011; Hafner and Shiffman 2013). In the next part of the chapter I examine this core assumption. In particular, I explore whether the effectiveness of health initiatives is tied to their securitisation, focusing on the examples of two major health initiatives. I examine the Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) and the GAVI. Interest in these two cases comes from exploring the above presumption that security and health, particularly concerning infectious diseases, drives, and delivers policy momentum. While there is debate about whether that momentum translates into ‘real’ policy progress or whether it is mere rhetoric deployed at particular crises/events with no lasting impact, there is no debate that health security has dominated global health and foreign policy discourse (Feldbaum et al. 2010; McInnes and Rushton 2013). Below, I briefly examine the dominance of health security in successful global health initiatives – one where you would expect it to be deliberately deployed (GAVI) and one where it was not (TFI). TFI and GAVI, I contend, are interesting cases precisely because they confound the issueframing conventions about the relationship between health and security. CONFOUNDING EXPECTATIONS A global health initiative is defined in this chapter as ‘an emerging and global trend in health. They are usually focused on state, international organisation and public–private partnerships. Global initiatives typically target specific diseases and are supposed to bring additional resources to health efforts’ (WHO 2015). Case Selection and Discourse Analysis This section briefly compares two international health initiatives: the TFI and GAVI. The TFI sought to reach an international agreement under international law that countries would adopt to regulate the sale and production of tobacco. This global health initiative was in aid of preventing the unchecked rise of tobacco related illnesses – non-communicable diseases – including cancer (various), emphysema, heart disease, stroke, and diabetes (to name a few). In the case of the TFI, and in light of the 260 S.E. DAVIES literature discussion concerning health security above, it would be expected that there was little to no presence of security discourse in the early days of this initiative. It was (and is) about introducing tobacco control legislation, addressing unregulated sale and distribution of tobacco to address preventable tobacco-related diseases in young populations in already over-burdened public health-care systems (Roemer et al. 2005). In contrast, the GAVI is a public and private partnership between states, international organisations, pharmaceutical companies, and philanthropic donors that sought cooperation amongst this diverse group of actors to manufacture, purchase and deliver life-saving vaccines against deadly infectious diseases in the most remote, dangerous and impoverished locations around the world. GAVI is, ostensibly, the initiative where it would be expected to see initial employment of ‘security’ rhetoric given it is addressing the health insecurity of under five children in need of vaccination from, mostly, contagious infectious diseases. In fact, the immediate previous iteration of GAVI – the Child Vaccination Initiative – used security type discourse such as ‘mission’, ‘operation’, and ‘threat’’ under the steerage of a former US defence army medic (see Muraskin 2002). These cases were also selected because they shared some important features. Both the TFI and the GAVI are concerned with one specific health concern – tobacco and immunisation; both were launched within a similar time where health security discourse was gaining policy attention; both initiatives required the involvement of multiple stakeholders, including national governments, to enjoy success. The main difference, of interest to this chapter, is that the association of security with the health issue confound the type of cases analysed to date in the IR literature on global health security. I reveal below that the non-communicable, ‘slow moving’ health threat engaged more securitised discourse than the high morbidity communicable health threat. The comparison of the two cases was organised around a common framework involving three steps. 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 261 First, understanding the rhetoric and concepts used to frame the initiative. Each initiative has produced a significant volume of material outlining its purpose, scope and mandate. For the purposes of this chapter, I focused on the ‘founding’ document for each initiative. In the case of TFI, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2003, 8 years after the Convention was first proposed in the 1995 World Health Assembly. The Framework Convention was the outcome of the TFI and details ‘a regulatory strategy to address addictive substances; in contrast to previous drug control treaties, the WHO Framework Convention asserts the importance of demand reduction strategies as well as supply issues’ (WHO 2003). Included in the Framework Convention document analysed is an Annex 2, which details the history of drafting the Framework from 1995 to 2003. For GAVI, the document analysed is the GAVI Meeting of the Proto-Board in Seattle, July 1999. This document details GAVI’s terms of reference, mission, objectives, functions, structure, milestones, and budget priorities. An interest in the discourse used in the founding document of each initiative is informed by the premise outlined in the above literature – to what extent security frames were employed to justify, conceptualise, and operationalise these two global health initiatives which remain, successfully, in place today. Second, once accepting the premise that securitisation is deliberately engaged the two documents were analysed to identify a set of ‘benchmarks’ to guide its assessment of the extent to which a health initiative has aligned with security. Both documents were examined in detail for the presence of ‘speech acts’ (Hansen 2012) – the initiative itself or actors associated with the initiative identified an existential threat or risk and speech acts that called for the adoption of extraordinary measures. Was the initiative itself referred to as ‘security’, ‘threat’, or ‘risk’. Who was the ‘referent object’ identified – the group threatened; who was the functional actor capable of protecting the referent object from the identified threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 26–39); and what was the ‘scale’ of securitisation utitlised to emphasise the need for extraordinary measures (Buzan and Weaver 2009). Third, discourse analysis (Hansen 2012). In this case, the discourse within the two documents were analysed using NVivo Software. For the purposes of this chapter, I refer to three query searches conducted to analyse the perspectives being presented in the two documents concerning the threat the initiative is addressing, who the initiative is ‘protecting’ and 262 S.E. DAVIES who is responsible for such protection. To facilitate answering these three levels of inquiry, three query searches within NVivo of each document were conducted: (1) word frequency analysis, (2) text search of ‘security’ terms and, and (3) text search of ‘other’ normative terms (development, rights, economy). A word tree was then developed for the second and third text searches with a ‘in context’ search up to ten surrounding words (on either side) to enable understanding of the context and usage of the key words, i.e. ‘threat’ or ‘poor’ being searched in the document. The word frequency search assisted with identifying the primary actors discussed in the documents – i.e. who was identified as the referent actor intended for that initiative versus the functional actor necessary to give effect to the initiative. Findings Discourse analysis of the TFI and GAVI documents produced three key findings. The first, unexpected, find was that the TFI initiative was framed just as much in security terms as was GAVI. The number of securitisation ‘speech acts’ (Hansen 2012) searched and located in the Framework Convention was practically the same at GAVI – 0.08% and 0.07%, respectively (speech act terms: secure, threat, risk, mission, extraordinary, urgent). In both cases, the presence of security language was less than 1% of each document. What was significant was that in the search for ‘other’ normative terms (terms: responsible, rights, develop, needs, poor) – the Framework Convention was comparatively high at 1.05%, and a similar search for GAVI came at 0.4% references. However, given the Framework Convention is a legal document the presence of ‘right/rights’ partly accounts for high percentage compared to GAVI. Contextual analysis of these terms reveals further detail in how the documents framed the problem, the referent actor and the functional actor (see Table 14.1). In the Framework Convention – despite higher use of ‘other’ (nonsecurity) normative language than GAVI – there is a clear disposition towards identifying the state as the ‘functional’ actor responsible for taking measures necessary to protect the population from tobacco sale, use, and morbidity. The Convention directly refers to populations at risk (women and minors) and the need for member states to support civil society capacity to inform and educate tobacco awareness in these populations. Again, this is a legal instrument so the emphasis on member states is not surprising as they are the only signatories. However, even in ‘other normative’ references to rights, responsibilities and need – primary emphasis remains on the state as the functional actor protects the population at risk of addiction rather than alternative dominant frames such as the right to health, the right to information. The Framework Convention leans towards more ‘traditional’ security language in conceptualising the state–individual relationship concerning tobacco control: risk and risk mitigation; threat and protection. In the case of GAVI, the 0.07% security references in contrast with its 0.4% ‘other’ references hints at a different frame being brought to this initiative. However, it is not particularly clear until, again, the broader context of these terms is analysed. In the case of GAVI the focus is overwhelming on the ‘mission’ of the alliance and ensuring institutional clarity to support the primary focus – the right of the child to immunisation. This is clearly stated as seen above, particularly in the mission and responsibility statements (Table 14.1). The only time the roles of functional actors are associated with either security or other terms are in the context of securing commitment from actors (broad range of board membership from states to international organisations, pharmaceutical companies, and civil society), and development of health sector capacity. Despite GAVI addressing the containment of infectious disease, there is no threat language present. Securitised speech acts are practically absent – even when ‘security’ terms are located. The emphasis is overwhelming on rights and alleviating deprivation. Both initiatives confound the expectations prior to analysis – the infectious disease focused initiative is ‘under-securitised’ in comparison to the non-communicable focused initiative. Finally, hinted at above, the emphasis on primary actors in these two documents revealed key similarities – both focus on the institutional arrangements and the actors most closely associated with these arrangements. In the case of GAVI the board (comprised of international organisation, civil society, member states, pharmaceutical, and philanthropic members) is the primary functional actor; in the case of the TFI, the actor that looms largest is the organisation (namely, WHO) followed by signatory states to the Convention. Discussion about the population who are to benefit and arguably be empowered from these initiatives, is not discussed as much as the organisation and accordingly the implementation arrangements around the initiative itself. To some extent, given the nature of these two documents, this is not surprising. However, its presence in two documents for two very different initiatives may reveal that the pathology of organisations rather than the framing of an initiative requires further study when engaging with the comparative success and failure of global health diplomacy (Barnett and Finnemore 2003; Hanrieder 2015). 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 265 CONCLUSION What is the value of securitisation when it comes to building and sustaining global political interest in health issues? Some contend that global health security has not run its course and continues to have utility in building state interest, particularly the resources of foreign affairs and defence departments, to secure global health diplomacy objectives (Kickbusch et al. 2007; Feldbaum et al. 2010; Elbe 2011). Others contend it is a ‘smokescreen’ that captures short bursts of attention that are episodic and may have immediate impact but no essential ‘follow through’ (McInnes and Rushton 2013). In this chapter, I explored how global health initiatives securitise and what becomes of them. I deliberately chose two successful initiatives with the expectation that one had securitised a conventional health issue – vaccine preventable infectious diseases – and one had not – tobacco regulation. In examining the cases of TFI and GAVI, I looked at their core document: their mission and value statements reflected in, respectively, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the first meeting documents of GAVI. Speech acts, identified as the hallmark of securitising moves, were analysed in both documents and contrasted with ‘non-securitisation’ or ‘other normative’ language. The Framework Convention engaged in more securitising language or ‘speech acts’ compared to GAVI but both contained more references to human rights and responsibilities discourse. In neither case did it appear as if actors had taken a conscious decision to securitise the issue any more than they chose to articulate the issue in terms of human rights obligations. In the case of the Framework Convention where a focus on security was expected and to a greater extent seen here was an equally strong presence of human rights and ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ language. The security discourse may have helped capture attention but it was not the only discursive tool at play and neither did it obviously displace other discourses. In the case of GAVI, the initiative identified its primary mission as fulfilling the rights of the child; whereas for TFI, emphasis was member states fulfilling their responsibility to address the threat of tobacco related illness from tobacco usage. GAVI appears to have a single referent – the right of the child to health via immunisation; while TFI related to a multitude of actors. The operationalisation of the initiative(s) and their embeddedness in global health architecture dominated the discussion far more than the framing language. Framing language constituted a relatively small part of the discourse compared to the consuming discussion of institutional design. What this comparison of two global health initiatives reveals is that whilst security discourse might help capture the attention of states, it has not necessarily overtaken other policy frames such as human rights and ‘sovereignty as responsibility language’. Indeed, the key priority seems to be not whether the international community should be engaged with these issues, but the appropriate institutional design for initiatives to achieve these health goals.

### AT: L – Emerging Tech

#### No impact to securitizing emerging tech – empirical studies

Rolenc 20 Jan Martin Rolenc, Jan Masaryk Centre for International Studies, Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics, Prague, “Technological Change and Innovation as Security Threats,” SHS Web of Conferences, 74(02015), 2020, DOI 10.1051/shsconf/20207402015 /GoGreen!

4 Discussion and conclusion

There are dozens of emerging and new technologies and innovations that are to come in the foreseeable future. However, it is hard to imagine them now, especially the all possibilities of their convergence. Due to the uncertainty and because “all technologies are inherently prone to potential misuse and […] the necessary regulations usually lag behind the technologies” [1], fears among the public can arise. This is nothing new, but the recent research is relatively scarce and sometimes art (literature, film) is better in portraying the fears or the security threats generated by technological change, that are perceived.

The reviewed academic literature identifies some technological threats that are relatively likely and (will be) intensive such as cyber-attacks, artificial intelligence and robotics, and biotechnologies. In the Czech political discourse, we identified especially the securitization of robotics and automation, particularly in relation to the automotive industry that produces a substantial part of the country’s GDP. There are fears that they will lead to loss of employment and ensuing social and economic instability. Specialized national agencies and official documents also often mention cyber-threats. But the rest of all the possible concerns and threats is entirely absent from the Czech narrative.

Unsurprisingly, the Czech public only repeats the fears verbalized in politics and policies, but even those securitization moves are not very successful. The biggest threat perceived at the beginning of 2019 was water scarcity and then other mainstream fears such as terrorism or migration. Therefore, we can confirm Hauptman’s observation that “the public is rather badly informed about dangers of new technologies and that governments tend to underestimate the potential threats” [1].

Czech politicians and experts should accept the fact that, apart from the hope of solutions of the problems we face, new technologies can become security threats through having unintended consequences or being misused. They should also expect that the public fears do not necessarily have to reflect the “objective” existence, intensity, or nature of threats, but they can be “only” perceived or imagined and, thus, still have unsettling social and economic effects. Politicians and experts should intensify the public discussion in order to become better at managing technological change and to avoid the previously mentioned issues. There is also potential for further research in the Czech context, concretely to learn if and how Czech scientists, researchers, and experts see technological change and innovation as technology threats and which solutions they suggest.

### AT: L – Environment

#### Securitizing environmental destruction spurs pro-social responses – NOT militarization

Veldman 12 Robin Veldman, Ph.D. candidate, Religion and Nature, University of Florida, National Foundation Fellow at the Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists,” Ethics and the Environment, 17(1), Spring 2012, ProjectMUSE /GoGreen!

Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation. National surveys give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not [End Page 6] provide sufficient ethnographic detail. To complement this broader picture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater insight into how adherents themselves understand what motivates their environmental behavior. When seeking a subset of environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For example, many Earth First!ers believe that the collapse of industrial society is inevitable (Taylor 1994). At the same time, the majority are actively committed to preventing ecological disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowledged, the two are directly connected: “As ecological calamity unravels the living fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has become both common and necessary” (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to preserve wilderness areas, which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to restore the planet after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging activism to preserve wilderness, apocalyptic beliefs also motivate practices such as “monkeywrenching,” or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional “paper monkeywrenching” (lobbying, engaging in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). Ultimately, while there are disagreements over what strategies will best achieve their desired goals, for most radical environmentalists, apocalypticism and activism are bound closely together. The connection between belief in impending disaster and environmental activism holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported meeting “dozens of Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with them without any further elaboration” (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of an angry Earth Goddess preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia’s impending revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its energies were considered important for initiating a more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). As for material activism, Arthur notes [End Page 7] that the notion of environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental behavior: images of immanent [sic] ecological crisis and apocalyptic change often were utilized as motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview; for stressing the importance of working for the Earth through a variety of practices, including environmental activism, garbage collecting, recycling, composting, and religious rituals; for learning sustainable living skills; and for developing a special relationship with the world as a divine entity. (2008, 212) What these studies and my own experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that people who make a serious commitment to engaging in environmentally friendly behavior, people who move beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are quite likely to subscribe to some form of the apocalyptic narrative. All this is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason people become activists. However, it is to say that activism and apocalypticism are associated for some people, and that this association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely powerful and compelling about the apocalyptic narrative. Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or simply decide that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to deteriorate. Yet to focus only on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or reactance is to ignore the evidence that it also fuels quite the opposite—grave concern, activism, and sometimes even outrage. It is also to ignore the movement’s history. From Silent Spring (Carson [1962] 2002) to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972) to The End of Nature (McKibben 1989), apocalyptic arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature, topping best-seller lists and spreading the message far and wide that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus, while it is not a style of argument that will be effective in convincing everyone to commit to the environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear to be a close relationship between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority. The next section explores the implications of that relationship further. [End Page 8] The Apocalyptic Narrative as a Framework for Moral Deliberation In discussing how apocalypticism functions within the environmental community, it will be helpful to analyze it as a type of narrative. I do so because the domain of narrative includes both the stories that people read and write, as well as those they tell and live by. By using narratives as data, scholars can analyze experiential and textual sources simultaneously (Polkinghorne 1988; Riessman 2000). To analyze environmental apocalypticism as a type of narrative is not to suggest that apocalyptics’ claims about the future are fictional. Rather, it is to highlight that the facts to which environmentalists appeal have been organized with particular goals in mind, goals which have necessarily shaped the selection and presentation of those facts. Compelling environmental writers do not simply list every known fact pertaining to the natural world, but instead select certain findings and place them within a larger interpretive framework. Alone, each fact has little meaning, but when woven into a larger narrative, a message emerges. This process of narrativization is essential if a message is to be persuasive (Killingsworth and Palmer 2000, 197), and has occurred not only in the rapidly expanding genre of environmental nonfiction, but in much scientific writing about the environment as well (Harré, Brockmeier, and Mühlhäusler 1999, 69). What defines narratives as such is their beginning-middle-end structure, their ability to “describe an action that begins, continues over a well-defined period of time, and finally draws to a definite close” (Cronon 1992, 1367). Here I will focus on the last of these elements, the ending, because anything we can learn about how endings function within narratives in general will be applicable to the apocalypse, the most final ending of all. An ending is essential in order for a story to be complete, but there is more to it than this. Endings are also key because they establish a story’s moral, the lesson it is supposed to impart upon the reader. In other words, to know the moral of the story, auditors must know the consequences of the actions depicted therein, so there can be no moral without an ending. To take a simple example, when we hear the story of the shepherd boy who falsely claims that a wolf is attacking his flock of sheep in order to entertain himself at his community’s expense, what makes the lesson clear is that when a wolf does attack his flock, the disenchanted town members refuse to come to his aid. By clearly illustrating how telling lies can have [End Page 9] unpleasant consequences for the perpetrator, the ending reveals the moral that lying is wrong. As Cronon explains, it is “[t]he difference between beginning and end [that] gives us our chance to extract a moral from the rhetorical landscape” (1992, 1370). Endings play a similar role in environmental stories. In Al Gore’s book Earth in the Balance (1992), for example, he devotes over a third of the book’s pages to presenting scientific evidence that disaster is imminent.5 As he sums it up, “Modern industrial civilization…is colliding violently with our planet’s ecological system. The ferocity of its assault on the earth is breathtaking, and the horrific consequences are occurring so quickly as to defy our capacity to recognize them” (1992, 269). He builds this argument so carefully precisely because if the ending does not seem credible, the moral he wants readers to draw from the story will not be compelling. If his readers are not convinced that the ending to this story of ecological misbehavior will be a debacle of colossal proportions, they will not become convinced that they need to dramatically alter their ecological behavior. Thus the vision of future catastrophe that Gore presents provides a crucial vantage point from which the present environmental situation can be understood as the result of a grand moral failure, and Gore’s readers are made aware of their obligations in light of it. Gore himself appreciates the importance of this recognition, arguing that “whether we realize it or not, we are now engaged in an epic battle to right the balance of our earth, and the tide of this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join an all-out effort” (1992, 269, emphasis added). Here, as in so many other stories, the ending must be in place for the moral to become clear. To say that endings are essential in order for stories to have morals is already to hint that stories alter behavior, that they can encourage action in the real world even as they invoke an imaginary one. This much is clear from Earth in the Balance (1992): Gore does not just want people to grasp a moral, to perceive some ethic in the abstract—he wants them change their behavior in the here and now. In constructing a narrative with this goal in mind, he is banking on the ability of powerful stories to motivate social change, to be, as Cronon puts it, “our chief moral compass in the world” (1992, 1375). Mark Johnson’s insightful synthesis of cognitive science and philosophy helps explain further how this process of moral guidance occurs. For [End Page 10] Johnson, narrative is fundamental to our experience of reality, “the most comprehensive means we have for constructing temporal syntheses that bind together and unify our past, present, and future into more or less meaningful patterns” (1993, 174). Narratives are also critical to our ability to reason morally, an activity which Johnson asserts is fundamentally imaginative. In this view, we use stories to imagine ourselves in different scenarios, exploring and evaluating the consequences of different possible actions in order to determine the right one. Moral deliberation is thus …an imaginative exploration of the possibilities for constructive action within a present situation. We have a problem to solve here and now (e.g., ‘What am I to do?’…. ‘How should I treat others?’), and we must try out various possible continuations of our narrative in search of the one that seems best to resolve the indeterminacy of our present situation. (1993, 180) Put another way, what cognitive science has revealed is that from an empirical perspective the process of moral deliberation entails constructing narratives rooted in our unique history and circumstances, rather than applying universal principles (such as Kant’s categorical imperative) to particular cases. That we use narratives to reason morally is not a result of conscious choice but of how human cognition works. That is, insofar as we experience ourselves as temporal beings, a narrative framework is necessary to organize, explain, and ultimately justify the many individual decisions that over time become a life. Formal principles may be useful in unambiguous textbook cases, but in real life “we can almost never decide (reflectively) how to act without considering the ways in which we can continue our narrative construction of our situation” (Johnson 1993, 160). Empirically speaking, “our moral reasoning is situated within our narrative understanding” (Johnson 1993, 180, italics in original). The observation that people use narratives to reason morally may help explain the association between environmental apocalypticism and activism. The function of the apocalyptic narrative may be that it helps adherents determine how to act by providing a storyline from which they can imaginatively sample, enabling them to assess the consequences of their actions. In order to answer the question, “Should I drive or walk to the store?” for example, they can reason, “If I walk, that will reduce my carbon footprint, which will help keep the ice caps from melting, saving humans and other species.” It is their access to this narrative of impending [End Page 11] disaster that makes such reasoning possible, for it provides a simple framework within which people can consider and eventually arrive at some conclusion about their moral obligations.6 More broadly, it can guide entire lives by providing a narrative frame of reference that imbues the individual’s experiences with meaning. For example, it is the context of looming anthropogenic apocalypse which suggests that dedicating one’s life to achieving a healthier relationship with the natural world is a worthwhile endeavor. Absent the apocalypse, choices such as limiting one’s travel to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, becoming vegetarian, working in the environmental sector (often for less compensation), or growing one’s own food could seem to be meaningless sacrifices. Within this context, on the other hand, such choices become essential features of the quest to live a moral life. The apocalyptic narrative is but one of many ways to tell the environmental story, yet it is one that seems particularly well-suited to encouraging pro-environmental behavior. First, the apocalyptic ending discloses certain everyday decisions as moral decisions. Without the narrative context of impending disaster, decisions such as whether to drive or walk to the store would be merely matters of convenience or preference. In the context of potentially disastrous consequences for valued places, people, and organisms, by contrast, such decisions become matters of right and wrong. Second, putting information about the environment into narrative form enables apocalyptics to link complex global environmental processes to their own lives, a perceptual technique Thomashow describes as “bringing the biosphere home” (2002). Developing this skill is essential because without that felt sense of connection to their own lived experience, people are much less likely to become convinced that it is incumbent upon them to act (2002, 2). Finally, the sheer magnitude of the impending disaster increases the feeling of responsibility to make good on one’s moral intuitions. By locating individuals within a drama of ultimate concern, the narrative frames their choices as cosmically important, and this feeling of urgency then helps to convert moral deliberation into action. With this conceptual overview in place, we can now examine more closely what the relationship between apocalypticism and moral reasoning looks like in practice. [End Page 12]

#### Empirics prove they’re NOT coopted toward militarism and are key to our internal links

Leeson-Schatz 12 Joe Leeson-Schatz, Director of Speech & Debate, and teaches Media & Politics, Binghamton University, PhD English, Binghamton University, “The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of- The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism,” Journal of Ecocriticism, 4(2), 2012 /GoGreen!

It is no longer a question that human interaction with the world is destroying the very ecosystems that sustain life1. Nevertheless, within academic communities people are divided over which discursive tactic, ontological position, or strategy for activism should be adopted. I contend that regardless of an ecocritic’s particular orientation that ecocriticism most effectively produces change when it doesn’t neglect the tangible reality that surrounds any discussion of the environment. This demands including human-induced ecocidal violence within all our accounts. Retreating from images of ecological collapse to speak purely within inner-­‐academic or policymaking circles isolates our conversations away from the rest of the world—as it dies before our eyes.¶ This is not to argue that interrogating people’s discourse, tactics, ontological orientation, or anything else lacks merit. Timothy Luke, Chair and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, explains that¶ Because nothing in Nature simply is given within society, such terms must be assigned significance by every social group that mobilizes them[.] ... Many styles of ecologically grounded criticism circulate in present-­‐day American mass culture, partisan debate, consumer society, academic discourse, and electoral politics as episodes of ecocritique, contesting our politics of nature, economy, and culture in the contemporary global system of capitalist production and consumption. (1997: xi)¶ Luke reminds us that regardless of how ecocritics advance their agenda they always impact our environmental awareness and therefore alter our surrounding ecology. In doing so he shows that both literal governmental policies and the symbolic universe they take place within reconstruct the discourses utilized to justify policy and criticism in the first place. This is why films like The Day After Tomorrow and 2012 can put forth realistic depictions of government response to environmental apocalypse. And despite being fictional, these films in turn can influence the reality of governmental policy. Even the science-­‐fiction of weather-­‐controlling weapons are now only steps away from becoming reality2.¶ Oftentimes it takes images of planetary annihilation to motivate people into action after years of sitting idly by watching things slowly decay. In reality it takes awareness of impending disaster to compel policymakers to enact even piecemeal reform. On the screen it takes the actual appearance of ecological apocalypse to set the plot in motion. What is constant is that “as these debates unfold, visions of what is the good or bad life ... find many of their most compelling articulations as ecocritiques ... [that are] mobilized for and against various projects of power and economy in the organization of our everyday existence” (Luke 1997: xi). We cannot motivate people to change the ecological conditions that give rise to thoughts of theorization without reference to the concrete environmental destruction ongoing in reality. This means that, even when our images of apocalypse aren’t fully accurate, our use of elements of scientifically-established reality reconstructs the surrounding power structures in beneficial ways. When we ignore either ecological metaphors or environmental reality we only get part of the picture.`¶ In recent years, many ecocritics have shied away from the very metaphors that compel a sense of urgency. They have largely done so out of the fear that its deployment will get co-opted by hegemonic institutions. Such critics ignore how what we advocate alters our understanding of ourselves to the surrounding ecology. In doing so, our advocacies render such co-optation meaningless because of the possibility to redeploy our metaphors in the future. In the upcoming sections, I will provide an overview of how poststructuralist thinkers like Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger influence some ecocritics to retreat from omnicidal rhetoric. This retreat minimizes the main objectives of their ecocriticism. I argue that rather than withdrawing from images of apocalypse that we should utilize them in subversive ways to disrupt the current relationship people have to their ecology. Professor of Sociology at York University, Fuyuki Kurasawa argues that “instead of bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary ... it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action ... that can be termed preventive foresight. ... [I]t is a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society ... [by] putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes” (454-­‐455).

### AT: L – Extinction

#### Extinction scenarios do NOT create docile subjects tolerant of violent overreactions – that ignores the other half of the 1AC explaining why plan makes those responses unnecessary – rather, provokes reflection and criticism of the underlying conditions that make it possible – refusing to consider existential risks is itself existential

Stevens, 18—Lecturer in Global Security, King’s College London (Tim, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 283-302, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former. As Herz recognised, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.68 Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival. Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.74 Productive pessimism and temporality In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote: For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.75 Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.77 This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterised by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.80 Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, each marginalises and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.84 Again quoting from his autobiographical account of the impact of Nazism, Herz described the relationship between his early pessimism and his developing intellectual stance: The world became a theatre of the absurd. Suicide would probably have been the logical next move, and I considered it from time to time. But I was still too young for such a radical step. One thing, however, emerged: a growing interest in domestic and, above all, international politics. My complete resignation was no longer appropriate. If not from within, fascism might perhaps still be destroyed from without. To my continuing interest in theory, therefore, was added a practical interest in action.85 Channelling the spirit of E.H. Carr, he wrote of this ‘brutal awakening’ to the nature of power politics in the 1930s that, ‘Study could no longer be “pure” research; it had to become research committed to warn of the deadly peril and show the way to the necessary action.’86 His commitment to active engagement was an early one, gestated during his personal experiences of Nazism in the 1930s.87 This desire to combat Nazism from the outside was manifest in his activities for the Allies during and after World War II but it coloured his scholarly life also. Herz recognised pessimism was a powerful force in his life but, rather than overcome or mask it, he used it to propel his intellectual project further, and to engage with, not withdraw from, the world. He was, as van Munster and Sylvest relate, ‘[d]eeply pessimistic yet a committed social thinker’.88 Herz was explicit about this: a realistic and consistent pessimism can clarify where we are and prepare us to do what is necessary.89 Pessimism is a necessary component of a realistic view of the world, upon which proper and reasoned action can be founded. In this sense, pessimism can be productive. It produces positive outcomes through action, rather than negative ones through inaction or resignation. These are subjective value-judgements, to be sure, but are obtained through a process of realist engagement with the world, rather than blind [mere] fumbling or ideological railroading. Survival Research was a response to Herz’s pessimism about the future, not a rejection of it. This leads us to two observations about the relevance of pessimism to the study of international relations. The first is that pessimism does not imply disengagement from the world. If anything, the example of John Herz suggests the opposite. He was a pessimist, but his brand of pessimism was no ‘passive fatalism’.90 As he recalled a few years before he died, ‘I consider myself a realist who comes sometimes to pessimistic conclusions, but never gives up looking for solutions if ever so difficult ones’.91 Pessimism can be a spur to thought and to action and need not be a watchword for conservatism in theory or practice.92 This is not to say being a pessimist is easy. Morgenthau, for his part, ‘never flagged in efforts to use his conceptual skills to help improve the human condition’, despite his pessimism about the ability and will of people to take the long view on significant political issues.93 This required that scholars chart different paths through troublesome times and articulate alternative visions of international order, not to preclude political action but to facilitate it; not quite the conservative position realism is often assumed to occupy.94 In the face of worldly frustrations and horrors, it is this attention to the production of alternative futures that prevents ‘pessimism from turning into fatalism’.95 The second observation is that it is unhelpful and misleading to treat pessimism and optimism as oppositional.96 Pessimism and optimism are commonly regarded as antonyms but often enjoy a symbiotic relationship. In Herz, they mingle and cross-pollinate in ways that defy easy explication. Stirk claims, for instance, that Herz’s optimism about how the world could be refashioned ‘was never more than guarded’, restrained by his fierce attachment to the importance of the security dilemma.97 Puglierin notes that his ‘blatant pessimism’ (eklatanter Pessimismus) was always accompanied by some form of optimism.98 We are reminded of Gramsci’s famous statement regarding ‘pessimism of intellect, optimism of the will’ as the cognitive binary at work in the political mind.99 Even as his pessimism deepened over the course of his career, he was always wont to end his analyses with a ‘yet’ or ‘in spite of it all’.100 Importantly, as he became more pessimistic, ‘the solutions he proposed became ever more ambitious’.101 His growing pessimism was accompanied by increasing resolve to tackle the problems of the world head-on, although, as he admitted in a footnote in the 1980s, ‘Not for a moment do I have the illusion that what I have proposed is likely to happen’.102 A suitably pessimistic aside, perhaps, but it did not deter him from continuing his project for another twenty years. This drive seems not to be rooted in optimistic conviction, nor even a subtle version of hope, but in a properly pessimistic reading of the world and its possibilities, engendered as they were by the ontological temporality of perpetual change.

### AT: L – Hybrid War

#### Securitizing hybrid war is good – threat’s real – AND failure turns the K

Samuel Carruthers 19, Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University, “Countering Disinformation: A Case Study of Government Responses to Russian Information Warfare,” Master’s Thesis, 2019, Institute of Political Science, https://dspace.cuni.cz/bitstream/handle/20.500.11956/110029/120343310.pdf?sequence=1

Ethics of Securitization

As discussed in the literature review, securitization is most often discussed as a ‘negative’ concept for several reasons. First of all, securitization argues that the normal democratic procedures for decision makers be abandoned in favor of a streamlined decision-making process handled by a small elite that dictate policy on security related issues. Critics assert that securitization is something largely inconsistent with the openness and accountability that liberal democratic systems value, therefore securitization is something ‘negative’ to be avoided in societies that place true importance on these values. But what if the issue being securitized is a direct threat to those very democratic procedures themselves. Are there issues that deserve to be securitized for the common good, and can government policies have a positive impact on society when these issues are securitized?

Experts on disinformation warn of the dire potential that such propaganda can have on a society, and argue that liberal democracies are especially vulnerable to them. New technologies have made the 21st century into a completely different type of information space than its predecessor. The internet has decentralized and democratized the flow of information to the point where somebody sitting on a laptop at home may be able to make the same impact with a blog as a major newspaper with an article. With less institutional control and traditional media gatekeeping on the flow of information, the internet is a truly democratic platform.148 These democratic processes; freedom of information, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and free elections; are precisely what make liberal democracies so vulnerable to disinformation and propaganda. With knowledge of these asymmetric vulnerabilities, the Kremlin consciously aims “to take advantage of the free flow of information in a democratic society, the effect of that information on public opinion, and the electoral mechanisms through which public opinion determines a country’s leadership.”149

One foundation of a democratic society is the ability to make decisions in the public forum based on shared truth. When voters go to the polls, they may make a judgement on which candidate or which proposal they favor based on the information that they have consumed. Traditionally, they may differ on what course of action may be the best way to handle a problem, but there is an agreed upon reality that is a matter of fact; it is shared. Disinformation, from Russia and other actors hostile to the West, promotes falsehoods to the point where society cannot have a shared truth. Imagine four people each with a different source of news. One reads the New York Times, one watches Fox News, one reads Breitbart, and one watches RT. Each one of these people will not only come to radically different conclusions about what solutions are best for society, but also about what the basic facts of reality are in the first place. One person may be out on the streets protesting the disappearance and rape of a young Russian girl by Muslim migrants, while the next person may be aware that the story is a complete falsehood that never happened to begin with. Russian efforts in the EU show that these situations are not a hysterical fear-mongering reaction to new technologies and new sources of information, but that they are already a reality.

Disinformation creates a situation where people can have opposing realities because the information they consume is so radically different from that of their neighbor. Critical theory in international relations warns that securitization subverts democratic decision-making processes, but disinformation destroys these very democratic processes that are so fundamental for liberal democratic societies to function the way they are intended. It is impossible to imagine normal democratic processes solving these types of problems when those processes are being eroded by propaganda to the point where Western societies may no longer have normal democratic processes if this trend continues. In order to maintain these democratic norms, securitization may be a necessary process, even a ‘positive’ concept that can yield positive results and protect the democratic values that have propelled the European project into existence.

From the perspective of states, it is difficult to see why they would not wish to securitize the issue of Russian disinformation more. States tend to place an emphasis on matters of physical and territorial security over all else, which is why issues such as nuclear weapons, or rising military power in China, or international terrorism are prioritized in terms of security policy. States’ desire for physical security explains why these issues tend to be some of the most securitized political issues, with decisions made regarding military policy in Afghanistan by military panels rather than public referendums. Walt, arguing from the realist perspective, argues that states “place particular emphasis on the preservation of the state’s territorial integrity and the physical safety of its inhabitants.” 150 Material harm is of the utmost importance while more ethereal issues, like democratic procedures, freedom of the information space, and societal resilience towards propaganda are not prioritized in the same way. Disinformation has threatened some of the building blocks of democratic societies throughout the EU, and if these democratic systems fail, it isn’t difficult to imagine that physical security would come under threat as well. In the case of Spain, the issue of the Spanish government’s territorial sovereignty over Catalonia was attacked by Russian disinformation, exacerbating the political wounds of the independence referendum. The disinformation campaign questioned Spain’s fundamental right to exist in its current form, yet Spain did not place the integrity of their media space as an important security issue despite this. There needs to be a shift in the importance and value that European democracies place on the fundamental democratic principles that allow their system to flourish. They should be prioritized with the same importance that states place on more traditional measures of power. Securitization of disinformation with the liberal democratic system and democratic processes themselves as the referent object, has the potential to have a more ‘positive’ outcome than emphasis on hard power, or immigration, or other issues that contribute to the ‘negative’ conception of securitization.

Successful Securitization and Societal Resilience

In the case studies it is clear that some European countries have securitized Russian disinformation while some have not. Namely, the United Kingdom and Lithuania have successfully securitized disinformation, while Spain, Germany, and the supranational institutions of the EU have not securitized disinformation. Those that have not securitized, have identified Russian disinformation as a perceived security threat and have several securitizing actors currently at play. The potential audiences of the securitizing speech acts, those within the security apparatus, NGOs, think-tanks, and even the wider public of these countries have accepted that Russian disinformation is a security threat that warrants greater action by their governments. Thus far, they have not taken measures that could by any means be considered extraordinary, having allocated a relatively small number of resources and minimal effort towards combating disinformation, and therefore cannot be considered to have securitized the issue. These countries, and the EU, are possibly in the early stages of the process of securitization, though this does not necessarily mean that they will complete the process by taking more extraordinary measures against disinformation. In fact, there could be a reversal and disinformation could slip back into the realm of normal politics and become desecuritized.

Some clear trends emerge in the countries who have successfully securitized disinformation. First, propaganda narratives have a weaker effect on society when disinformation has been securitized, failing to have their desired impact and cause major rifts in the public. They also show that securitization of disinformation is possible without implicitly violating democratic norms of freedom of speech and open access to information. This becomes clear in looking at the contrast between Lithuania’s countermeasures against disinformation compared to those of Germany and Spain. In Germany, the Lisa case was dealt with almost exclusively via the normal criminal and legal channels, with the police investigation into Lisa’s accusations of kidnap and rape by migrants and police handling of most public statements related to the controversy. 151 They have begun to enact minor laws that aim at punishing hate speech and disinformation when posted on popular social media platforms as well.152 Spanish authorities have started task forces devoted to alerting the national government when disinformation narratives start to dominate a story online. 153 Spanish and German officials at the higher levels of national authority in their respective foreign and defense departments gave minimal statements regarding the controversies, and have preferred to continue dealing with Russia through dialogue over more overt confrontation that could complicate communication. Both Germany and Spain have taken a more reactive approach to countering disinformation, choosing to deal with it on a case-by-case basis as an incident unfolds.

Lithuania has taken similar messages to alert national authorities on dangerous narratives as they develop online, but it has also taken extraordinary measures that encompass a broader scope. The Lithuanian government has supported efforts at every level of society; political, economic, educational, and cultural. 154 Their wide spread programs focus not only on dealing with each case as it emerges, but also on strengthening the fundamental resilience of society at the source through teaching media literacy in secondary schools, funding Russian language media for the susceptible minority group, and sensitizing the public to the dangers of propaganda by making disinformation a security issue linked to the physical security and existence of the state.155 Their bans on Russian media channels during disinformation campaigns, while possibly construed as violations of a free press, are necessary to prevent media from spreading out right falsehoods. The news media, both Lithuanian and Russian language, should be held accountable and has a responsibility to act as a gatekeeper of the truth. Many media channels in Lithuania have voluntarily chosen to follow such a route, choosing not to report on ‘fake’ news stories that can be detrimental to society by becoming ‘real’ news through regurgitation by legitimate media outlets. It is important not to confuse the right of free speech of an individual with that of a news organization with ties to a foreign country, and such acts should not be considered violations of democratic norms when it comes to protecting the fundamental values of democracy.

The countermeasures taken by a country undoubtedly play a role in the impact disinformation narratives may have in that country. With Lithuania’s ‘successful’ securitization of disinformation, fake stories and attempts at propaganda have often fallen on deaf ears, with little real success. Lithuania’s overarching, comprehensive strategy at countering disinformation is the reason the NATO rape allegations failed to cause a large disruption in the news cycle.156 This strong contrast is seen with Germany, where the story of a rape by migrants of a young Russian girl caused an uproar and led to protests in Berlin and a diplomatic row with Moscow. 157 Spain also fell short, with Russian disinformation exacerbating a contentious independence referendum in Catalonia and influencing public opinion at home and abroad on the status of Catalan autonomy. Government policies that fail to securitize disinformation and alert society to the dangers of propaganda lead to false stories having explosive consequences.

Both Spain and Germany’s strategies of dealing with disinformation narratives as they arise is simply not effective enough. The state can spend time and resources trying to discredit every fake news story that finds its way to the public forum, but there will always be one to take its place. It is like fire prevention; a fire alarm can be an important part of fire prevention, alerting the fire department to come extinguish a blaze. But there are more important measures as well, such as building structures with fire resistant materials, or teaching people what to do in case of a fire. These types of continuous measures, like the policies Lithuania pursues, make society more resilient and prevent disinformation from causing a fire in the first place.

Policies aimed at improving societal resilience towards disinformation are being utilized in other countries with successful outcomes as well. Latvia uses a sweeping media literacy program from an early age to improve critical thinking in its citizens.158 Finland, a country with a long history of hostility with Russia, uses similar programs, emphasizing not only the need to publicly correct false narratives, but also the importance of creating a positive counternarrative to disinformation that is repeatedly applied to offer an alternative vision.159 These countermeasures only appear in countries that have securitized disinformation, as Finland and Latvia have similar histories as Lithuania and treat disinformation in similar terms, and they are much more promising than government authorities attempting to play catchup with internet trolls and false stories.

Internationalization of Countermeasures

Another key conclusion comes from the other case of successful securitization in the United Kingdom. The UK, in its securitization of disinformation following the assassination attempt on Sergei Skripal, internationalized the threat by creating a set of countermeasures that could be implemented along with its allies. The UK successfully convinced 20 allies to expel Russian diplomats in a coordinated effort at punishing Putin’s regime for the incident and the subsequent disinformation surrounding it.160 Theresa May, as a securitizing actor, not only convinced her public in the UK of disinformation as a security threat, but convinced the international community that such behavior “threatens the security of us all.” 161 Compared with the minimal Spanish attempts at coordinating counter disinformation at the EU level, and German attempts to keep the Lisa Case under the authority of Berlin’s police department, British efforts at securitizing their incident by bringing it to the attention of the international community and launching a unified response were highly successful.

This lesson of internationalization should be critical for the EU to deal with disinformation. Securitization needs to take place not only at the national level of member states, but also at the supranational level of the EU as an institution. The EU itself is under threat of Russian disinformation just as much as individual member states, with experts warning of further regionalization of Europe and the EU after Brexit. In this critical time for the continued existence of the EU, the threat of disinformation “requires new international instruments to manage it.” 162 Thus far, member states have shown a preference for taking individual routes in order to deal with disinformation. The importance of joint initiatives could be especially important during elections, a time in which the ability of national and EU authorities to cooperate is critical. During the European elections of 2019 for example, consisting of four days of simultaneous elections across 28 individual member states, “the failure of one government to properly mitigate disinformation efforts threatens the credibility of the entire electoral process.” 163 This problem of coordination cannot be understated, as some countries do not even have their own systems in place to monitor disinformation, allowing “local and national actors to spread fake news more freely” and leaving these countries defenseless against propaganda.164

It is essential for the EU to act as a bloc and start joint initiatives to counter disinformation. Russian efforts, as shown in the case studies, are not exclusive to one particular area of Europe, but threaten all member states. Issues Russia chooses to target; the migrant crisis, espionage, the use of chemical weapons in a member state, the solidarity and legitimacy of the NATO, and even the territorial sovereignty of some countries; should alarm every single member of the EU. These issues are not unique to one country, but they are issues that countries even outside of the EU are currently confronting. Europe is targeted as a bloc, and therefore it should respond as a bloc. Such a response, as seen in with the UK’s diplomatic expulsion, has a larger impact as a bloc rather than individually. Division will only encourage more provocations. Acting on a unified front in securitizing disinformation and reacting with countermeasures will do much more to potentially deter Russia from continuing down the same path in its relations with Europe. The EU needs to stop hesitating, and start throwing its full weight on the economic, political, and informational fronts.

‘Positive’ Securitization

The two trends discussed in the sections above also show that disinformation can be securitized without wide violations of democratic norms and exclusionary tactics towards Russian minorities in Europe. By arguing for securitization, this paper is not arguing that democratic principles should be thrown out in favor of extraordinary measures that subvert the democratic process, indeed the democratic process is of the utmost importance because these principles are the referent object of a European push to securitize disinformation. And according to polls in all of the countries involved in the case studies and the EU as a whole, the general public agrees that disinformation constitutes a security threat that could be detrimental to liberal democratic norms. Efforts like media literacy, cooperation with news organizations, and comprehensive strategies that deal with disinformation at every level of society are still extraordinary without necessarily violating democratic norms. These policies aim to sensitize the public to disinformation. They do not aim to monitor the public in a surveillance state and punish individual views that are unfavorable to European states. On the other hand, these policies are not afraid to prevent large news outlets from spreading lies that harm the ability to make democratic decisions based on shared truths. Diplomatic expulsion and unprecedented international cooperation on information issues are extraordinary measures taken without abuse of state power as in the War on Terror. Policies that aim to provide alternative news sources to Russian speaking minorities in Europe are not exclusionary ‘othering,’ but are inclusive and offer a broader, diverse, and more positive view of the Russian diaspora than as a monolithic fifth-column prone to side with Moscow and Putin’s regime over their new homes. These policies need to be inclusive to mitigate the risk of disinformation and the subsequent disillusion with European governments. A conscious, just policy of securitization of disinformation must take democratic principles, inclusion of diverse viewpoints, and the treatment of Russian minorities into account while avoiding the misuse of state power in order to succeed.

#### It's net positive

Samuel Carruthers 19, Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University, “Countering Disinformation: A Case Study of Government Responses to Russian Information Warfare,” Master’s Thesis, 2019, Institute of Political Science, <https://dspace.cuni.cz/bitstream/handle/20.500.11956/110029/120343310.pdf?sequence=1> \*ableist language changed

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to identify similar processes occurring throughout the EU by analyzing how four individual member states have approached the issue of disinformation. In looking at incidents of disinformation in the UK, Germany, Lithuania, and Spain, research was conducted to analyze the incidents themselves and how governments responded, placing that response into the wider context of securitization within those countries. It is clear that there is an ongoing process of securitization taking place in Europe around the issue of disinformation. Not all countries researched have demonstrated that disinformation has been fully securitized, but every country had elements of securitization taking place, such as securitizing actors and speech acts meant to draw attention to propaganda as an existential security threat. While these countries did show the initial factors in securitization occurring, they chose to deal with disinformation through the route of normal politics rather than extraordinary politics. It can be concluded that the level of securitization of Russian disinformation within a society, that is the treatment of propaganda and false narratives as a security threat and how deep a country is within the process of securitization, played a direct role in shaping the policies those countries pursued in order to counter disinformation.

Examining the different cases, the research showed how history, experience, and threat perceptions related to Russia influenced securitization of disinformation. The United Kingdom securitized Russian disinformation in the aftermath of a catalyst event, the attempted assassination of former GRU agent Sergei Skripal and the subsequent disinformation campaign in its aftermath. The UK government propelled disinformation to extraordinary politics in its diplomatic expulsion of Russian diplomats coordinated with its allies. Lithuania securitized Russian disinformation over a long period of time because of its complex history with Russia and the Soviet Union, and its experience of a slow barrage of disinformation since it regained independence. Due to decades of experience, Lithuania pursues a more comprehensive strategy at countering disinformation, which seeks to address the threat at multiple levels of society and multiple stages as false-narratives spread.

It was clear that other countries, and the EU as an organization, had not fully securitized Russian disinformation, although they showed signs they were in the process of securitization. Germany, in response to a young girl’s explosive accusations of rape in the context of the migrant crisis, showed a clear preference for dealing with disinformation through the normal political channels of Berlin’s police department. Spain took minimal responses through its foreign and defense ministries and is still in the early stages of instituting policies aimed at alerting the government to disinformation narratives. As a bloc, the EU also failed to enact extraordinary policies to counteract disinformation from Europe’s Eastern neighbor, with a lack of coordination between the individual member states and the supranational EU bodies.

While some countries have securitized disinformation, other have chosen a different route, and we can see how the different policies enacted by these countries can either protect society or make society more vulnerable to disinformation. Those countries that have securitized disinformation have also had the most success in countering it. Continuous policies that not only track disinformation narratives and discredit them as they emerge on a case-by-case basis, but also build resilience at the source through policy efforts in the social, cultural, educational, and political realm have proven more effective. Media literacy, Russian language programming, and public statements exposing false stories can all have an impact. Disinformation narratives have often failed to cause the same explosive consequences in those countries that have instituted comprehensive strategies to counter it. Internationalization of counterdisinformation policies, seeking solidarity and joint initiatives with like-minded allies, has also proven more effective cultivating societies that are less vulnerable to fake news. Diplomatic expulsions, online tracking, and coordinated alert systems have the potential to ensure that the more vulnerable countries in the EU do not let disinformation exert influence on political processes and thereby endanger the bloc as a whole.

This paper has also argued against ‘negative’ conceptions of securitization in relation to the issue of disinformation. It has warned that disinformation is indeed a security threat to liberal democracies in the West, with its ability to destroy foundations of shared truth and potentially ~~cripple~~ [destroy] democratic decision-making processes. While critical IR theorists believe securitization should be avoided to protect openness and accountability, and frame the process in a negative light, this paper has argued that securitization

is a necessary protective measure and does not inherently lead to abuse of state power. Policies pursued by the case study countries that have successfully securitized disinformation prove that while still extraordinary, countermeasures against disinformation do not necessarily need to violate the democratic values they are meant to protect. These policies do not need to be exclusive towards Russian minorities, but can be inclusive and contribute to public life. If European countries and the EU as an institution value the democratic principles that govern their societies, a conscious, successful securitization of disinformation may be beneficial and even have ‘positive’ results. Viewing disinformation as a national security threat is the path forward for the EU to respond to Russia.

### AT: L – Nuke War

#### Securitizing nuclear deterrence failure spurs peace and disarm mobilization, NOT militarization

Harris & Bender 17 John Harris, Politico editor-in-chief; and Bryan Bender, Politico national security editor; interviewing William Perry, mathematician, engineer, businessman and former Secretary of Defense, currently the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (Emeritus) at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, “Bill Perry Is Terrified. Why Aren’t You?” Politico, 1-6-2017, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/william-perry-nuclear-weapons-proliferation-214604/> /GoGreen!

At this naked moment in the American experiment, when many people perceive civilization on the verge of blowing up in some metaphorical sense, there is an elderly man in California hoping to seize your attention about another possibility. It is that civilization is on the verge of blowing up in a non-metaphorical sense. William J. Perry is 89 now, at the tail end of one of his generation’s most illustrious careers in national security. By all rights, the former U.S. secretary of Defense, a trained mathematician who served or advised nearly every administration since Eisenhower, should be filling out the remainder of his years in quiet reflection on his achievements. Instead, he has set out on an urgent pilgrimage. Bill Perry has become, he says with a rueful smile, “a prophet of doom.” His life’s work, most of it highly classified, was nuclear weapons—how to maximize the fearsome deterrent power of the U.S. arsenal, how to minimize the possibility that the old Soviet arsenal would obliterate the United States and much of the planet along the way. Perry played a supporting role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, during which he went back to his Washington hotel room each night, fearing he had only hours left to live. He later founded his own successful defense firm, helped revolutionize the American way of high-tech war, and honed his diplomatic skills seeking common ground on security issues with the Soviets and Chinese—all culminating as head of the Pentagon in the early years after the end of the Cold War. Nuclear bombs are an area of expertise Perry had assumed would be largely obsolete by now, seven decades after Hiroshima, a quarter-century after the fall of the Soviet Union, and in the flickering light of his own life. Instead, nukes are suddenly—insanely, by Perry’s estimate—once again a contemporary nightmare, and an emphatically ascendant one. At the dawn of 2017, there is a Russian president making bellicose boasts about his modernized arsenal. There is an American president-elect who breezily free-associates on Twitter about starting a new nuclear arms race. Decades of cooperation between the two nations on arms control is nearly at a standstill. And, unlike the original Cold War, this time there is a world of busy fanatics excited by the prospect of a planet with more bombs—people who have already demonstrated the desire to slaughter many thousands of people in an instant, and are zealously pursuing ever more deadly means to do so. And there’s one other difference from the Cold War: Americans no longer think about the threat every day. Nuclear war isn’t the subtext of popular movies, or novels; disarmament has fallen far from the top of the policy priority list. The largest upcoming generation, the millennials, were raised in a time when the problem felt largely solved, and it’s easy for them to imagine it’s still quietly fading into history. The problem is, it’s no longer fading. “Today, the danger of some sort of a nuclear catastrophe is greater than it was during the Cold War,” Perry said in an interview in his Stanford office, “and most people are blissfully unaware of this danger.” It is a turn of events that has an old man newly obsessed with a question: Why isn’t everyone as terrified as he is? Perry’s hypothesis for the disconnect is that much of the population, especially that rising portion with no clear memories of the first Cold War, is suffering from a deficit of comprehension. Even a single nuclear explosion in a major city would represent an abrupt and possibly irreversible turn in modern life, upending the global economy, forcing every open society to suspend traditional liberties and remake itself into a security state. “The political, economic and social consequences are beyond what people understand,” Perry says. And yet many people place this scenario in roughly the same category as the meteor strike that supposedly wiped out the dinosaurs—frightening, to be sure, but something of an abstraction. So Perry regards his last great contribution of a 65-year career as a crusade to stimulate the public imagination—to share the vivid details of his own nightmares. He is doing so in a recent memoir, in a busy public speaking schedule, in half-empty hearing rooms on Capitol Hill, and increasingly with an online presence aimed especially at young people. He has enlisted the help of his 28-year-old granddaughter to figure out how to engage a new generation, including through a series of virtual lectures known as a MOOC, or massive open online course. He is eagerly signing up for “Ask Me Anything” chats on Reddit, in which some people still confuse him with William “The Refrigerator” Perry of NFL fame. He posts his ruminations on YouTube, where they give Katy Perry no run for her money, even as the most popular are closing in on 100,000 views. One of the nightmare scenarios Perry invokes most often is designed to roust policymakers who live and work in the nation’s capital. The terrorists would need enriched uranium. Due to the elaborate and highly industrial nature of production, hard to conceal from surveillance, fissile material is still hard to come by—but, alas, far from impossible. Once it is procured, with help from conspirators in a poorly secured overseas commercial power centrifuge facility, the rest of the plot as Perry imagines it is no great technological or logistical feat. The mechanics of building a crude nuclear device are easily within the reach of well-educated and well-funded militants. The crate would arrive at Dulles International Airport, disguised as agricultural freight. The truck bomb that detonates on Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and Capitol instantly kills the president, vice president, House speaker, and 80,000 others. Where exactly is your office? Your house? And then, as Perry spins it forward, how credible would you find the warnings, soon delivered to news networks, that five more bombs are set to explode in unnamed U.S. cities, once a week for the next month, unless all U.S. military personnel overseas are withdrawn immediately? If this particular scenario does not resonate with you, Perry can easily rattle off a long roster of others—a regional war that escalates into a nuclear exchange, a miscalculation between Moscow and Washington, a computer glitch at the exact wrong moment. They are all ilks of the same theme—the dimly understood threat that the science of the 20th century is set to collide with the destructive passions of the 21st. “We’re going back to the kind of dangers we had during the Cold War,” Perry said. “I really thought in 1990, 1991, 1992, that we left those behind us. We’re starting to re-invent them. We and the Russians and others don’t understand that what we’re doing is re-creating those dangers—or maybe they don’t remember the dangers. For younger people, they didn’t live through those dangers. But when you live through a Cuban Missile Crisis up close and you live through a false alarm up close, you do understand how dangerous it is, and you believe you should do everything you could possibly do to [avoid] going back.” For people who follow the national security priesthood, the dire scenarios are all the more alarming for who is delivering them. Through his long years in government Perry invariably impressed colleagues as the calmest person in the room, relentlessly rational, such that people who did not know him well—his love of music and literature and travel—regarded his as a purely analytical mind, emotion subordinated to logic and duty. Starting in the 1950s as a technology executive and entrepreneur in some of the most secretive precincts of the defense industry, he gradually took on a series of high-level government assignments that gave him one of the most quietly influential careers of the Cold War and its aftermath. Fifteen years before serving as Bill Clinton’s secretary of defense, Perry was the Pentagon official in charge of weapons research during the Carter administration. It was from this perch that he may have had his most far-reaching impact, and left him in some circles as a legendary figure. He used his office to give an essential push to two ideas that transformed warfare over the next generation decisively to American advantage. One idea was stealth technology, which allowed U.S. warplanes to fly over enemy territory undetected. The other was precision-guided munitions, which allowed U.S. bombs to land with near-perfect accuracy. During the Clinton years, Perry so prized his privacy that he initially turned down the job of Defense secretary—changing his mind only after Clinton and Al Gore pleaded with him that the news media scrutiny wouldn’t be so bad. The reputation he built over a life in the public sphere is starkly at odds with this latest highly impassioned chapter of Perry’s career. Harold Brown, who also is 89, first recruited Perry into government, and was Perry’s boss while serving as Defense secretary in the Carter years. “No one would have thought of Bill Perry as a crusader,” he says. “But he is on a crusade.” Lee Perry, his wife of nearly 70 years, is living in an elder care facility, her once buoyant presence now lost to dementia. Perry himself, lucid as ever, has seen his physical frame become frail and stooped. Rather than slowing his schedule, he has accelerated his travels to plead with people to awaken to the danger. A trip to Washington includes a dinner with national security reporters and testimony on Capitol Hill. Back home in California, he’s at the Google campus to prod engineers to contemplate that their world may not last long enough for their dreams of technology riches to come true. He’s created an advocacy group, the William J. Perry project, devoted to public education about nuclear weapons. He’s enlisted both his granddaughter and his 64-year-old daughter, Robin Perry, in the cause. But if his profile is rising, his style is essentially unchanged. He is a man known for self-effacement, trying to shape an era known for relentless self-promotion, a voice of quiet precision in a time of devil-take-the-hindmost bombast. The rational approach to problem-solving that propelled his career and won him adherents and friends in both political parties and even among some of America’s erstwhile enemies remains his guide—in this case, by endeavoring to calculate the possibilities and probabilities of a terrorist attack, regional nuclear war, or horrible miscalculation with Russia. “I want to be very clear,” he said. “I do not think it is a probability this year or next year or anytime in the foreseeable future. But the consequence is so great, we have to take it seriously. And there are things to greatly lower those possibilities that we’re simply not doing.” \*\*\* Perry really did not expect he would have to write this chapter of his public life. His official career closed with what seemed then an unambiguous sense of mission accomplished. By the time he arrived in the Pentagon’s top job in 1994, the Cold War was over, and the main item on the nuclear agenda seemed to be cleaning up no-longer-needed arsenals. As defense secretary, Perry stood with his Russian counterpart, Pavel Grachev, as they jointly blew up missile silos in the former Soviet Union and tilled sunflower seeds in the dirt. “I finally thought by the end of the ‘80s we lived through this horrible experience and it’s behind us,” Perry said. “When I was secretary, I fully believed it was behind us.” After leaving the Pentagon, he accepted an assignment from Clinton to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear development program—and seemed agonizingly close to a breakthrough as the last days of the president’s term expired. Now, he sees his grandchildren inheriting a planet possibly more dangerous than it was during his public career. No one could doubt that the Sept. 11 terrorists would have gladly used nuclear bombs instead of airplanes if they had had them, and it seems only a matter of time until they try. Instead of a retreating threat in North Korea, that fanatical regime now possesses as many as eight nuclear bombs, and is just one member of a growing nuclear club. Far from a new partnership with Russia, Vladimir Putin has given old antagonisms a malevolent new face. American policymakers talk of spending up to $1 trillion to modernize the nuclear arsenal. And now comes Donald Trump with a long trail of statements effectively shrugging his shoulders about a world newly bristling with bombs and people with reasons to use them. Perry knew Hillary Clinton well professionally, and says he admired both her and Bill Clinton for their professional judgment though he was never a personal intimate of either. He was prescient before the election in expressing skepticism about how voters would respond to the dynastic premise of the Clinton campaign—a healthy democracy should grow new voices—but was as surprised as everyone else on Election Day. Donald Trump was not the voice he was looking for, to put it mildly, but he has responded to the Trump cyclone with modulated restraint. Perry said he assumes his most truculent rhetoric isn’t serious, the utterances of a man who assumed his words were for political effect only and had no real consequences. Now that they do, Perry is hoping to serve as a kind of ambassador to rationality. He said he is hoping for audiences soon, with Trump if the incoming president will see him, and certainly Trump’s national security team, which includes several people Perry knows, including Defense Secretary nominee James Mattis. There is little doubt the message if the meeting comes. “We are starting a new Cold War,” he says. “We seem to be sleepwalking into this new nuclear arms race. … We and the Russians and others don’t understand what we are doing.” “I am not suggesting that this Cold War and this arms race is identical to the old one,” Perry added. “But in many ways, it is just as bad, just as dangerous. And totally unnecessary.” \*\*\* Perry had been brooding over the question for a year. It was in the early 1950s, he was still in his 20s, and the subject was partial differential equations—the topic of his Ph.D. thesis. A particular problem had been absorbing him, day in and day out, hours and hours on end. Then, out of nowhere, a light came on. “I woke up in the middle of the night, and it was all there,” Perry recalled. “It was all there, and I got out of bed and sat down. The next two or three hours, I wrote my thesis, and from the first word I wrote down, I never doubted what the last word was going to be: It was a magic moment.” The story is a reminder of something definitional about Bill Perry. Before he became in recent years an apostle of disarmament, before he sat atop the nation’s war-making apparatus in the 1990s, before he was the executive of a defense contractor specializing in the most complex arenas of Cold War surveillance in the 1960s, he was a young man in love with mathematics. In those days, Perry had planned on a career as a math professor. His attraction to math was not merely practical, in the way that engineers or architects rely on math. The appeal was just as much aesthetic, in ways that people who are not numbers people—political life tends to be dominated by word people—cannot easily comprehend. To Perry’s mind, there was a purity to math, a beauty to the patterns and relationships, that was not unlike music. Math for Perry represented analytical discipline, a way of achieving mastery not only over numerical problems but any hard problem, by breaking it down into essential parts, distilling complexity into simplicity. This trait was why Pentagon reporters in the 1990s liked spending time around Perry. When most public officials are asked a question, one studies the transcript later to decipher a succession of starts and stalls, sentence fragments and ellipses, that cumulatively convey an impressionistic sense of mind but no clear fixed meaning. Perry’s sentences, by contrast, always cut with surgical precision. It was one reason Clinton White House officials often held their breath when he gave interviews—Perry might make news by being clear on subjects, such as ethnic warfare in the Balkans or a nuclear showdown in North Korea, that the West Wing preferred to try to fog over. “I’ve never been able to attack a policy problem with a mathematical formula,” he recalled, “but I have always believed that the rigorous way of thinking about a problem was good. It separated the fact from the bullshit, and that’s very important sometimes, to separate what you can from what you would hope you can do.” Perry wishes more people were familiar with the concept of “expected value.” That is a statistical way of understanding events of very large magnitude that have a low probability. The large magnitude event could be something good, like winning a lottery ticket. Or it could be something bad, like a nuclear bomb exploding. Because the odds of winning the lottery are so low, the rational thing is to save your money and not buy the ticket. As for a nuclear explosion, by Perry’s lights, the consequences are so grave that the rational thing would be for people in the United States and everywhere to be in a state of peak alarm about their vulnerability, and for political debate to be dominated by discussion of how to reduce the risk. And just how high is the risk? The answer of course is ultimately unknowable. Perry’s point, though, is that it’s a hell of a lot higher than you think. Perry invites his listeners to consider all the various scenarios that might lead to a nuclear event. “Mathematically speaking, you add those all together in one year it is still just a possibility, not a probability,” he reckons. “But then you go out ten, twenty years and each time this possibility repeats itself, and then it starts to become a probability. How much time we have to get those possibility numbers lower, I don’t know. But sooner or later the odds are going to get us, I am afraid.” \*\*\* Almost uniquely among living Americans, Bill Perry has actually faced down the prospect of nuclear war before—twice. In the fall of 1962, Bill Perry was 35, father of five young children, living in the Bay Area and serving as director of Sylvania’s Electronic Defense Laboratories—driving his station wagon to recitals in between studying missile trajectories and the radius of nuclear detonations. Where he resided was not then called Silicon Valley, but the exuberance and spirit of creative possibility we now associate with the region was already evident. The giants then were Bill Hewlett and David Packard, men Perry deeply admired and wished to emulate in his own business career. The innovation engine at that time, however, was not consumer technology; it was the government’s appetite for advantage in a mortal struggle against a powerful Soviet foe. Perry was known as a star in the highly complex field of weapons surveillance and interpretation. So it was not a surprise, one bright October day, for Perry to get a call from Albert “Bud” Wheelon, a friend at the Central Intelligence Agency. Wheelon said he wanted Perry in Washington for a consultation. Perry said he’d juggle his schedule and be there the next week. “No,” Wheelon responded. “I need to see you right away.” Perry caught the red-eye from San Francisco, and went straight to the CIA, where he was handed photographs whose meaning was instantly clear to him. They were of Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba. For the next couple weeks, Perry would stay up past midnight each evening poring over the latest reconnaissance photos and help write the analysis that senior officials would present the next morning to President Kennedy. Perry experienced the crisis partly as ordinary citizen, hearing Kennedy on television draw an unambiguous line against Soviet missiles in this hemisphere and promising that any attack would be met with “a full retaliatory response.” But he possessed context, about the capabilities of weapons and the daily state of play in the crisis, that gave him a vantage point superior to that of all but perhaps a few dozen people. “I was part of a small team—six or eight people,” he recounted of those days 54 years earlier. “Half of them technical experts, half of them intelligence analysts, or photo interpreters. It was a minor role but I was seeing all the information coming in. I thought every day when I went back to the hotel it was the last day of my life because I knew exactly what nuclear weapons could do. I knew it was not just a lot of people getting killed. It was the end of civilization and I thought it was about to happen.” It was years later that Perry, like other more senior participants in the crisis, learned how right that appraisal was. Nuclear bombs weren’t only heading toward Cuba on Soviet ships, as Kennedy believed and announced to Americans at the time. Some of them were already there, and local commanders had been given authority to use them if Americans launched a preemptive raid on Cuba, as Kennedy was being urged, goaded even, by Air Force Gen. Curtis LeMay and other military commanders. At the same time, Soviet submarines were armed and one commander had been on the verge of launching them until other officers on the vessel talked him out of it. Either event would have in turn sent U.S. missiles flying. The Cuban Missile Crisis recounting is one of the dramatic peaks in “My Journey on the Nuclear Brink,” the memoir Perry published last fall. It is a book laced with other close calls—like November 9, 1979, when Perry was awakened in the middle of the night by a watch officer at the North American Aerospace and Defense Command (NORAD) reporting that his computers showed 200 Soviet missiles in flight toward the United States. For a frozen moment, Perry thought: This is it—This is how it ends. The watch officer soon set him at ease. It was a computer error, and he was calling to see whether Perry, the technology expert, had any explanation. It took a couple days to discover the low-tech answer: Someone had carelessly left a crisis-simulation training tape in the computer. All was well. But what if this blunder had happened in the middle of a real crisis, with leaders in Washington and Moscow already on high alert? The inescapable conclusion was the same as it was in 1962: The world skirting nuclear Armageddon as much by good luck as by skilled crisis management. Perry is part of a distinct cohort in American history, one that didn’t come home with the large-living ethos of the World War II generation, but took responsibility for cleaning up the world that the war bequeathed. He was a 14-year-old in Butler, Pennsylvania when he heard the news of the Pearl Harbor attack in a friend’s living room, and had the disappointed realization that the war might be over by the time he was old enough to fight in it. That turned out to be true—he was just shy of 18 at war’s end—a fact that places Perry in what demographers have called the “Silent Generation,” too young for one war but already middle-aged by the time college campuses erupted over Vietnam. Like many in his generation, Perry was not so much silent as deeply dutiful, with an understated style that served as a genial, dry-witted exterior to a life in which success was defined by how faithfully one met his responsibilities. Perry said he became aware, first gradually and over time profoundly, of the surreal contradictions of his professional life. His work—first at Sylvania and then at ESL, a highly successful defense contracting firm he co-founded in 1963—was relentlessly logical, analyzing Soviet threats and intentions and coming up with rational responses to deter them. But each rational move was part of a supremely irrational dynamic—“mutually assured destruction”—that placed the threat of massive casualties at the heart of America’s basic strategic thinking. It was the kind of framework in which policymakers could accept that a mere 25 million people dead was good news. Also the kind that in one year alone led the United States to produce 8,000 nuclear bombs. By the end, the Cold War left the planet with about 70,000 bombs (a total that is now down to about 15,500). “I think probably everybody who was involved in nuclear weapons in those days would see the two sides of it,” Perry recalls, “the logic of deterrence and the madness of deterrence, and there was no mistake, I think, that the acronym was MAD.” \*\*\* Perry has been at the forefront of a movement that he considers the sane and only alternative, and he has joined forces with other leading Cold Warriors who in another era would likely have derided their vision as naïve. In January 2007, he was a co-author of a remarkable commentary that ran on the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal. It was signed also by two former secretaries of state, George Schulz and Henry Kissinger and by Sam Nunn, a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee—all leading military hawks and foreign policy realists who came together to argue for something radical: that the goal of U.S. policy should be not merely the reduction and control of atomic arms, it should be the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons. This sounded like gauzy utopianism, especially bizarre coming from supremely pragmatic men. But Perry and the others always made clear they were describing a long-term ideal, one that would only be achieved through a series of more incremental steps. The vision was stirring enough that it was endorsed by President Obama in his opening weeks in office, in a March 2009 address in Prague. In retrospect, Obama’s speech may have been the high point for the vision of abolition. “A huge amount of progress was made,” recalled Shultz, now 93. “Now it is going in the other direction.” “We have less danger of an all-out war with Russia,” in Nunn’s view. “But we have more danger of some type of accident, miscalculation, cyber interference, a terrorist group getting a nuclear weapon. It requires a lot more attention than world leaders are giving it.” Perry’s goal now is much more defensive than it was just a few years ago—halting what has become inexorable momentum toward reviving Cold War assumptions about the central role of nukes in national security. More recently he’s added yet another recruit to his cause: California Governor Jerry Brown. Brown, now 78, met Perry a year ago, after deciding that he wanted to devote his remaining time in public service mainly to what he sees as civilization’s two existential issues, climate change and nuclear weapons. Brown said he became fixated on spreading Perry’s message after reading his memoir: He recently gave a copy to President Obama and is trying to bend the ear of others with influence in Washington. If Bill Perry has a gift for understatement, Brown has a gift for the theatrical. In an interview at the governor’s mansion in Sacramento, he wonders why everyone is not paying attention to his new friend and his warnings for mankind. “He is at the brink! At the brink! Not WAS at the brink—IS at the brink,” Brown exclaimed. “But no one else is.” A California governor can have more influence, at least indirectly, than one might think, due to the state’s outsized role in policy debates and the fact that the University of California’s Board of Regents helps manage some of the nation’s top weapons laboratories, which study and design nuclear weapons. Brown, who was a vocal critic in the 1980s of what he called America's "nuclear addiction," reviewed Perry's recent memoir in the New York Review of Books, and said he is determined to help his new friend spread his message. “Everybody is, 'we are not at the brink,' and we have this guy Perry who says we are. It is the thesis that is being ignored." Even if more influential people wake up to Perry’s message—a nuclear event is more likely and will be more terrible than you realize—a hard questions remains: Now what? This is where Perry’s pragmatism comes back into play. The smartest move, he thinks, is to eliminate the riskiest part of the system. If we can’t eliminate all nukes, Perry argues, we could at least eliminate one leg of the so-called nuclear triad, intercontinental ballistic missiles. These are especially prone to an accidental nuclear war, if they are launched by accident or due to miscalculation by a leader operating with only minutes to spare. Nuclear weapons carried by submarines beneath the sea or aboard bomber planes, he argues, are logically more than enough to deter Russia. The problem, he knows, is that logic is not necessarily the prevailing force in political debates. Psychology is, and this seems to be dictating not merely that we deter a Russian military force that is modernizing its weapons but that we have a force that is self-evidently superior to them. It is an argument that strikes Perry as drearily familiar to the old days. Which leads him the conclusion that the only long-term way out is to persuade a younger generation to make a different choice. His granddaughter, Lisa Perry, is precisely in the cohort he needs to reach. At first she had some uncomfortable news for her grandfather: Not many in her generation thought much about the issue. “The more I learned from him about nuclear weapons the more concerned I was that my generation had this massive and dangerous blind spot in our understanding of the world,” she said in an interview. “Nuclear weapons are the biggest public health issue I can think of.” But she has not lost hope that their efforts can make a difference, and today she has put her graduate studies in public health on hold to work full time for the Perry Project as its social media and web manager. “It can be easy to get discouraged about being able to do anything to change our course,” she said. “But the good news is that nuclear weapons are actually something that we as humans can control...but first we need to start the conversation.” It was with her help that Perry went on Reddit to field questions ranging from how his PhD in mathematics prepared him to what young people need to understand. “As a 90s baby I never lived in the Cold War era,” wrote one participant, with the Reddit username BobinForApples. “What is one thing today's generations will never understand about life during the Cold War?” Perry’s answered, as SecDef19: “Because you were born in the 1990s, you did not experience the daily terror of ‘duck and cover’ drills as my children did. Therefore the appropriate fear of nuclear weapons is not part of your heritage, but the danger is just as real now as it was then. It will be up to your generation to develop the policies to deal with the deadly nuclear legacy that is still very much with us.” For the former defense secretary, the task now is to finally—belatedly—prove Einstein wrong. The physicist said in 1946: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” In Perry’s view the only way to avoid it is by directly contemplating catastrophe—and doing so face to face with the world’s largest nuclear power, Russia, as he recently did in a forum in Luxembourg with several like-minded Russians he says are brave enough to speak out about nuclear dangers in the era of Putin. “We could solve it,” he said. “When you’re a prophet of doom, what keeps you going is not just prophesizing doom but saying there are things we do to avoid that doom. That’s where the optimism is.”

### AT: L – Russia

#### Securitization theory does NOT explain Russia

van der Laan 16 Mark van der Laan, MA candidate, International Studies, Universiteit Leiden, BA History, University of Amsterdam, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Security Dilemma in the Baltics?” MA thesis, 10-12-2016, <https://www.academia.edu/29525112/BETWEEN_A_ROCK_AND_A_HARD_PLACE_A_Security_Dilemma_in_the_Baltics> /GoGreen!

The main theoretical underpinning of this thesis is, as mentioned before, that of securitisation. 13 The interesting point about this theory as explained by Wæver and others, is that takes a post-modern approach to security. Primarily that a discourse about security can enforce a reality. To specify this to Russian foreign policy, when NATO is seen as the primary adversary, every action by the alliance, such stationing military units Eastern Europe to reassure allies and deter possible military actions, can be viewed as a threat to Russian security concerns. Or as Sergey Karaganov, head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, puts it in an interview with Der Spiegel, ‘Now, fears in countries like Poland, Lithuania and Latvia are to be allayed by NATO stationing weapons there. But that doesn't help them; we interpret that as a provocation. In a crisis, we will destroy exactly these weapons. Russia will never again fight on its own territory…’14 It must be stressed though that this securitisation debate in this case is not sole a Russian purview. In response to Russian actions taken in Ukraine, and the several large military exercises in the Russian Western Military District, a securitisation debate is taking place in the West. One outcome of this debate were the NATO Summits of 2014, and 2016 which were explicitly concerned with coming up with a response to Russian military aggression.15 Therein lies also a weakness for the securitisation theory. If two narratives are put beside each other, and are then argued to be a discourse, then we might arguably state a false equivalency about the two narratives. While the Russian narrative in regard to the West, is arguably a constructed view of the world, Western concerns about Russian behaviour are arguably justified and a response to Russian aggression. In other words, we must discern fact from bullshit, as Harry Frankfurt put in his article On Bullshit.16 While it can be argued that the current security situation is a construct, this construct has implications in the real world. How did this construct came into being? It can be argued that President Putin’s notion that the collapse of the Soviet as one of the greatest geopolitical disasters of the twentieth century is not without merit.17 If we view the collapse of the Soviet Union as a collapse of an imperial power, Putin’s argument is understandable. Decolonisation can be a traumatic experience, for both the coloniser, and the colonised. The example of how France fought two destructive wars in Algeria and Indochina reminds us, shows that this can be the case. However, how both parties interact with one another after the dust has settled can do much to normalise relations between the two. For much of the past twenty-six years, it seemed that new geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe was a fait accompli. Which was reinforced by several treaties signed in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Treaties like the Budapest Memorandum18 and the NATO-Russia Founding Act19 in 1994, and 1997 respectively. Even the advent of President Putin as prime minister, and later as president, gave no indication of major shifts in Russian foreign policy behaviour. While there were tensions in the way NATO resolved the several Balkan conflicts, one would have to be clairvoyant, or extremely pessimistic to predict the current security situation in Europe. Yet, in 2008 with the five-day war against Georgia, and the annexation of Crimea and starting a war in Donbas in 2014, Western governments were confronted by a Russia, willing to bare its teeth to gain a geopolitical advantage. The timing of these actions are arguably well planned. Russia, having invested heavily in upgrading its armed forces, giving it a comparative advantage militarily. This development caught European governments on a vulnerable moment, which issued condemnatory declarations, but lacked substantial tools, save economic sanctions, to give teeth to those condemnations. Due to systemic defence budget cuts in the past twentysix years. Undeterred, Russian sabre rattling has continued unabated.

#### Even if it did, it’s too late now

Berls & Ratz 15 Dr. Robert E. Berls, Jr., Senior Advisor for Russia and Eurasia at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, former Colonel, U.S. Air Force, former air attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, former special assistant to the Secretary of Energy for Russia/NIS programs, Ph.D. Russian Area Studies, Georgetown University; and Leon Ratz, Program Officer with NTI’s Materials Security and Minimization Program, former policy specialist on Russian nuclear security, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Office for International Material Protection and Cooperation, U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, M.A. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, B.A. Boston College; “Rising Nuclear Dangers: Assessing the Risk of Nuclear Use in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI Paper, October 2015, <http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_Rising_Nuclear_Dangers_Paper_FINAL.pdf> /GoGreen!

The risk of nuclear weapons use in the Euro-Atlantic region is on the rise—and it is higher than it has ever been since the end of the Cold War. This is the conclusion of leading security experts from the United States, Russia, and Europe who responded to a questionnaire from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in early 2015.1 While the experts disagreed on the scale of the increase in risk and the reasons for the change, nearly all shared the view that the significant deterioration in relations between the United States and the Russian Federation has led to dangerous conditions under which nuclear weapons use has become more likely— although the probability of this outcome remains low. This study examined the risk of use of nuclear weapons, not just the risk of nuclear exchange or nuclear war. In other words, the study did not exclude the possibility of unilateral nuclear use. Indeed, respondents identified the possibility of unilateral nuclear use by Russia to quell a conflict on its borders as a risk of particular concern.2 Other possible nuclear-use scenarios identified by respondents include a rapid escalation due to miscalculation or accident (such as a mid-air collision between NATO and Russian warplanes), an escalatory response to a Russian incursion into the Baltic States, and a Russian reaction to NATO military intervention in Crimea or eastern Ukraine. The study did not assess the relative probabilities of these scenarios. Of all the risks examined, it is the risk of miscalculation that is of most concern. Absent a major incident, the likelihood of deliberate nuclear exchange under current circumstances is low. But it is the possibility of a major transformative event, such as a mid-air collision or a skirmish along NATO or Russian borders, that is on the rise. Such an incident involving the world’s two largest nuclear powers could plausibly shift alert postures and lead to a rapid series of escalatory measures precipitated by miscalculation and exacerbated by mistrust. The following section describes in detail the circumstances that have led to a heightened risk of escalation and possible nuclear use in the Euro-Atlantic region. Risk Factors The security experts who responded to NTI’s questionnaire identified one or more of the following ten reasons as contributing factors to the heightened risk: 1. Competing, Irreconcilable Narratives That Drive Heightened Threat Perceptions 2. A Deficit of Trust 3. Domestic Political Imperatives 4. Alliance Politics 5. Close Military Encounters 6. Broken Channels of Communication 7. Failing Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Use 8. Conventional Force Disparity 9. Reckless Nuclear Saber Rattling 10. Lack of Nuclear Experience The authors of this paper provided supplementary research to expand on topics raised in the responses. 1. Competing, Irreconcilable Narratives That Drive Heightened Threat Perceptions Moscow and Washington diverge not only in their interpretations of recent events in Ukraine but also in the basic narratives that describe their relations during the entire post–Cold War era.3 The Russian narrative is characterized by a combination of grievance and resolve. Prominent Russians frequently claim that Western powers took advantage of Moscow’s weakness after the Cold War to shift NATO borders east and bomb Russia’s allies in the Balkans.4 Western support for Ukraine’s European Union association agreement, Western sanctions against Russia, and Western demonstrations of military support for allies on Russia’s borders (military exercises, supplies of arms) appear to reinforce this narrative of Russia as victim of Western bullying. Prominent Russian officials thus argue that they face no choice but to demonstrate resolve lest they invite further Western aggression against their most vital national interests.5 The Western narrative is starkly different. The United States and its NATO allies view Russia as a revanchist power aggressively attempting to reclaim influence and territory in neighboring countries that desire a break from their Soviet legacies.6 Western officials chastise Russia for employing tactics such as hybrid warfare, manipulation of gas exports, and other forms of economic and military intimidation to achieve its political aims.7 They argue that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine represent a major break with the post-war order in Europe, an order that has prioritized respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.8 Russia’s behavior in Ukraine and the potential for Russian intervention in the Baltic States necessitate demonstrations of resolve lest the West invite further Russian aggression.9 These competing, irreconcilable narratives breed heightened threat perceptions, driving a vicious cycle of confrontation and escalation. By themselves, these threat perceptions would not necessarily lead to nuclear use, but—combined with the factors described below—they create dangerous conditions under which misunderstandings could escalate to unprecedented levels of confrontation between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. 2. A Deficit of Trust Russians and Americans have returned to Cold War-era levels of antagonism toward one another. According to a recent Gallup poll, Americans now view Russia as the greatest enemy to the United States, edging out both North Korea and Iran.10 The same poll showed that 49 percent of Americans view Russia as a critical military threat, and only 24 percent of Americans have a favorable view of Russia. By contrast, 62 percent of Americans held a favorable view of the Soviet Union in 1989 (see Figure 1).11 [ FIGURE 1 OMITTED – Figure 1. Americans’ Favorable/Unfavorable Ratings of Russia ] In Russia, the trust deficit is even worse. According to a recent poll conducted by the Levada Center, a Russian public opinion research organization, only 15 percent of Russians have a favorable view of the United States and 73 percent of Russians hold an unfavorable view, a figure that nearly doubled in the last year (see Figure 2).12 Another poll released in late June found that 62 percent of Russians believe that Russia’s relations with the West will always be characterized by mistrust.13 [ FIGURE 2 OMITTED – Figure 2. Russians’ Favorable/Unfavorable Ratings of the United States ] 3. Domestic Political Imperatives With such deep antagonism permeating public opinion, it becomes highly improbable for elected officials to support conciliatory measures. Instead, policy hawks who advocate resolve and confrontation tend to prevail in such environments. This is especially true in Russia where President Vladimir Putin brandishes a public image as Russia’s best guardian against Western bullying. Indeed, President Putin’s domestic approval ratings have never been higher. In June, a Levada Center poll revealed that 89 percent of Russians hold a favorable opinion of their President—Putin’s highest approval rating since he succeeded Boris Yeltsin 15 years ago.14 Considering that Russia’s economy continues to reel from the combination of low oil prices, Western sanctions, and structural economic problems, Putin’s high public approval rating indicates that the Russian people strongly support his handling of the Ukrainian crisis and his relations with the West. Any departure from the current course would almost certainly come with a heavy political price for Putin. In the United States, although anti-Russian rhetoric is much less prevalent, many public officials and political candidates also have voiced positions favoring resolve over restraint. For example, General Joseph Dunford, the Obama Administration’s nominee for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July 2015 told a Congressional committee that Russia poses the number one threat to the United States and that he favors sending heavy weaponry to Ukraine. The Islamic State, by contrast, was fourth on his list of security threats facing the United States.15 In August, the outgoing U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno echoed General Dunford’s comments by labeling Russia “the most dangerous threat” facing the United States today.16 As the 2016 U.S. presidential election approaches, it is also unlikely that political candidates will depart significantly from this anti-Russia rhetoric given how closely it aligns with record-high public antagonism toward Russia. Such domestic political imperatives—from public opinion to political posturing—in Russia and the United States create strong incentives for demonstrations of resolve, diminishing the chances of a resolution to the current standoff and leading to a high risk of a continued cycle of confrontation and escalation. 4. Alliance Politics Alliance politics also contributes to the rhetoric of resolve and confrontation. NATO’s Eastern European and Baltic members increasingly view Russia as a major threat and voice concerns that NATO is ill-prepared to fulfill its Article 5 obligation for collective defense.17 Meanwhile, recent public opinion polls show that most Germans, Italians, and French believe that their countries should not use military force to defend a NATO ally (see Figure 3).18 In this context, NATO publics increasingly view the United States as the only credible military opposition to potential Russian aggression against the Alliance (see Figure 4).19 The Obama Administration is thus faced with both political and policy imperatives to demonstrate readiness to [ FIGURE 3 OMITTED – Figure 3. Many NATO Countries Reluctant to Use Force to Defend Allies ] [ FIGURE 4 OMITTED – Figure 4. NATO Countries Believe U.S. Will Come to Defense of Allies ] fulfill its Article 5 commitments, creating a situation that is not conducive to promoting a conciliatory tone in relations with Russia. This, in turn, exacerbates the risk of further demonstrations of resolve and increases the chance of miscalculation. 5. Close Military Encounters With increasing frequency and alarming regularity, Russian warplanes and warships are coming dangerously close to Western military and civilian assets, creating heightened risks for accidents that could lead to further escalation. As described in a recent report by the European Leadership Network, these close encounters include two near-collisions between Russian military jets and Swedish commercial airliners, repeated incidents of Russian fighter jets “buzzing” U.S. warships in the Black Sea, and incursions and near-incursions by Russian military aircraft into NATO airspace during the last 18 months.20 Russia has insisted that NATO also has engaged in such behavior, arguing that NATO military exercises close to Russian borders have “destabilizing” effects on the region.21 In the absence of routine military-to-military communications (a factor described in more detail later in this paper), these close encounters and military exercises create conditions under which dangerous misunderstandings and accidents could happen—accidents with the potential to prompt rapid escalation. 6. Broken Channels of Communication During the past 18 months, institutions designed to promote dialogue between Western powers and Russia have been suspended or rendered powerless. In March 2014, Russia’s membership in the Group of Eight (G8) was revoked and its participation in G8-linked processes, such as the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, suspended.22 In April 2014, Russia’s representation at the NATO-Russia Council—the mechanism designed to foster security-related consultation and consensus building—was limited to the Ambassador-level, practically stripping it of any meaningful working-level interactions.23 Meanwhile, Russia withdrew from the Nuclear Security Summit process24 and suspended most of its nuclear security cooperation with the United States.25 Military-to-military engagement on EuroAtlantic issues between NATO and Russia, as well as the United States and Russia, has—for all practical purposes—been terminated. Security confidence-building engagement only continues in the context of arms control verification, an area that has also come under considerable strain as Western powers and Russia accuse each other of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty violations.26 Such severe curtailment of communications creates little room for confidence-building and increases the likelihood of misunderstandings that could lead to escalation.

### AT: L – Terrorism

#### Their evidence does NOT meet similar epistemological standards AND poststructuralism fails to affect either discourse or practice

Schmid 9 - Chair in International Relations; the Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University(Alex, Perspectives on Terrorism, v.3, issue 4, Book Review of “Critical Terrorism Studies. A new research agenda. by Richard Jackson”, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=96> \*edited for ableist and gendered language

The editors accuse, in their introduction  “the orthodox field” of orthodox terrorism studies of functioning “ideologically in the service of existing power structures”, with their academic research. Furthermore, they claim that orthodox scholars are frequently being used “to legitimise coercive intervention in the global South….” (p.6). The present volume is edited by three authors associated with the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) in the Department of International Politics in Aberystwyth (Wales, UK). They also happen to be editors of a new Routledge journal “Critical Studies on Terrorism’ . The “critical” refers principally but not exclusively to the “Frankfurt-via-Welsh School Critical Theory Perspective”. The twelve contributors are not all equally “critical” in aHabermasian sense. The programmatic introduction of the editors is followed by two solid chapters from Magnus Ranstorp (former Director of CSTPV, St. Andrews, and currently Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College) and Andrew Silke (formerly with the UK Home Office and now Field Leader for Criminology at the University of East London). They both rightfully criticize some of the past sins and present shortcomings of the field of Terrorism Studies. One of them approvingly quotes Marc Sageman who observed that “disagreements among experts are the driving force of the scientific enterprise”. Such disagreements, however, exist among “orthodox” scholars like Sageman and  Hoffman or Pape and Abrams. In that sense, the claim by some critical theorists that the field of traditional Terrorism Studies is ossified without them, is simply is not true. One of the problems with many of the adherents of the “critical” school is that the focus is almost exclusively on the strawman [strawperson] they set up to shoot – “orthodox” terrorism discourse rather than on the practitioners of terrorism. Richard Jackson claims that “…most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable” (p.74), dismissing thereby almost four decades of scholarship as “based on a series of ‘virulent myths’, ‘half-truths’ and contested claims…biased towards Western state priorities” (p.80). For him “terrorism is…a social fact rather than a brute fact” and “…does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field” (pp.75-76). He objects to prevailing “problem-solving theories of terrorism” in favour of an approach that questions “ the status quo and the dominant acts within it” (p.77). Another contributor, J.A. Sluka, argues, without offering any proof,  that “terrorism is fundamentally a product of social inequality and state politics” (p. 139). Behind many of the critical theorists who blame mainstream terrorism research for taking ‘the world as it finds it’ there is an agenda for changing the status quo and overthrowing existing power structures. There is, in itself, nothing wrong with wanting a new and better world order. However, it is not going to be achieved by using an alternative discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Toros and Gunning, contributors of another chapter, state that “the sine qua non of Critical Theory is emancipation” (p. 99) and M. McDonald als puts “emancipation as central to the study of terrorism” (p.121). However, there is not a single word on the non-emancipated position of women under Islam in general or among the Taliban and their friends from al-Qaeda in particular. One of the strength (some argue weakness) of Western thinking is its ability for self-criticism – something largely absent in the Muslim world. In that sense, this volume falls within a Western tradition. However, self-criticism should not come at the cost of not criticising   adversaries by using the same yardstick. In this sense, this volume is strangely silent about the worldview of those terrorists who have no self-doubts and attack the Red Cross,  the United Nations, NGOs and their fellow Muslims with equal lack of scruples. A number of authors in the volume appear to equate terrorism uncritically with political violence in general while in fact it is more usefully thought of as one of some twenty sub-categories of  political violence - one characterized by deliberate attacks on civilians and non-combatants in order to intimidate, coerce or otherwise manipulate  various audiences and parties to a conflict. Part of the volume advocates reinventing the wheel. J. Gunning, for instance, recommends to employ Social Movement Theory for the study of terrorism. However, that theory has been employed already explicitly or implicitly by a number of more orthodox scholars, e.g. Donatella della Porta. Many “critical” statements in the volume are unsupported by convincing evidence, e.g. when C. Sylvester and S. Parashar state “The September 11 attacks and the ongoing war on terror reinforce gender hierarchy and power in international relations” (p.190). Jackson claims that the key question  for critical terrorism theory is “who is terrorism research for and how does terrorism knowledge support particular interests?” (p.224) It does not seem to occur to him that he could have studied this question by looking at the practitioners of terrorism and study al-Qaeda’s ideological writings and its training  and  recruiting manuals. If CTS is a call for “making a commitment to emancipatory praxis central to the research enterprise” (R. Jackson et al, p. 228), CTS academics should be the first on the barricades against jihadists who treat women not as equals and who would, if they get their way, eradicate freedom of thought and religion for all mankind. It is sad that some leading proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies appear to be in fact uncritical and ~~blind on one eye~~.